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ABSTRACT 
 
At its core, this thesis represents an attempt to outline and clarify a concept of ‘wis-
dom’. Building upon a fairly well established tradition of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ 
the discussion sets out an understanding of a model of philosophy which sets a un-
ion of the virtues as its ultimate goal (finding models of non-ethical and primarily ac-
ademic philosophy to be lacking). Aristotle’s practical wisdom and Plato’s humble, 
human wisdom are found to be complimentary in certain key respects and useful (in 
conjunction) in describing the nature of this ‘wisdom’ as a state of moral expertise 
and broad insight (an understanding of, and action according to, that which is most 
important). An account is given of the kind of moderate moral realism which is able 
to account for the ‘moral facts’ which are necessary to render this sort of moral 
knowledge viable. This moderate realism is founded upon a similarly moderate or 
compromising epistemology which will itself constitute a recurring theme of this ‘wis-
dom’. Moving from this metaethical and epistemological justification, some account is 
given of the sort of practical means by which this moral knowledge might be arrived 
at with the suggestion that traditional analytic and cogitative practices must be com-
bined with far more anthropological ‘living-with’ practices in order that this moral 
learning can be plausible. Further to this suggestion of an amalgam of philosophy 
and anthropology, an effort is made to describe the sense in which aesthetic and 
ethical insight converge in this process of recognising moral insight and that, as 
such, ‘true philosophy’ must also allow for artistic (particularly narrative and poetic) 
methods. 
 
Having made a case for the practice of philosophy to move substantially away from 
its conventional means, the latter half of the thesis sets out a specific model of ‘liv-
ing-with philosophy’ in an attempt to demonstrate this novel model of philosophy and 
the more detailed nature of wisdom. This ‘case study’ takes the shape of living-with 
other living things and the stories and lessons which have unfolded through my own 
life with the non-human world. Due to the fundamental (practically, emotionally and 
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conceptually fundamental) and particularly varied nature of living with (by and 
through) non-human life, organic vegetable gardening is taken as a good (if not the 
best) means of realising this process of moral learning. The thesis focuses upon the 
way in which close living with non-human life can and should highlight the manner in 
which various virtues which are fundamental to a union of virtue can appear to be in 
conflict (particularly what might be called ‘compassion’ and ‘prudence’). Ultimately an 
attempt is made to describe the way in which these conflicts can and should be 
found to be complimentary to the realisation of wisdom through a subtle, complex but 
intuitive process of balancing. The thesis concludes with an examination of this act of 
balancing, particularly ‘in the face of death’, and the way in which it is commensurate 
with moods and attitudes of quietness, poignancy and good humour. It is found that 
wisdom, the union of virtues, is more than the sum of its parts, that it is characterised 
particularly by these kinds of attitude (echoing the moderation and humility explored 
at the outset).
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0 – Moral Knowledge (‘Wisdom’) as the Purpose of Philosophy and Life. 
 
 What a Piece of Work is a Man? 
- Shakespeare, Hamlet, 2.2. 
 
ἐθος ανθροποι δαιμον 
                                               - Heraclytus1 
 
Some time ago I needed to introduce the topic of ‘wealth and poverty’ to some 
year nine pupils (around 13 or 14 years old). I decided that juxtaposing two vid-
eo clips, one of conspicuous affluence and the other of evident poverty, would 
be an effective method for introducing the topic. I hoped that by showing a clip 
from some American competition eating first and then some footage of people 
in abject poverty I could shock the pupils into really engaging with the moral is-
sues involved. The visceral contrast would be morally illustrative. It worked, I 
think. A good lesson. 
                                            
1 Fragment (22B)119 of Heraclytus is (as can be expected of any fragment of Heraclytus) very 
tricky to pin down (Robin Waterfield gives a nice sense of this in his summary of Heraclytus’ 
fragments in R. Waterfield [tr.], The First Philosophers, [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2000], p.31. Here Waterfield translates 119 as: ‘Man’s character is his guardian spirit’. 
Shirley Darcus (Sullivan) offers a good analysis of ‘ἐθος’ and ‘δαιμον’ in relation to this frag-
ment in: S. Darcus, ‘“Daimon” as a force shaping “Ethos” in Heraclytus’, Phoenix 28.4 
[1974]: 390-407.). I will translate this fragment as: ‘a human’s way of life is their spirit’. Most 
famously, the meaning of this fragment is disputed by Heidegger in his ‘Letter on Human-
ism’: M. Heidegger, Pathmarks, W. McNeill (ed.), (Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 
1999), pp.270-3. My reasons for choosing this vague epigraph so early in the essay are 
many: (1) My own translation of ἐθος’ as ‘way of life’ reflects Heidegger’s attempt to add 
some archaic sense of ‘dwelling’ and ‘home’ to the translation. This essay is centrally con-
cerned with the way in which moral thinking must be concerned with both ‘ways of life’ in a 
more anthropological sense and our own homes (specifically our gardens). (2) The essay is 
also concerned with the inextricable connection between ways of life, the ways we should 
lead our lives and what might be thought of as our (we living beings’) capacities for flourish-
ing (‘δαιμον’, as ‘spirit’/ ‘mind’/ ‘capacity for flourishing’, will be superseded by a Hebrew term 
later in the discussion). (3) Despite my later attempt to get something a bit more Hebraic into 
my analysis, this thesis is grounded primarily in Greek sources. Some level of Greek lan-
guage, textual exegesis and potentially unwieldy footnotes come with the territory. (4) This 
essay is an exploration of what it is to do philosophy properly, the role of discomfort, provo-
cation and humour (or mischief) cannot be overstated. 
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There was no single moment of realisation. No one moment when I saw myself 
as one of those competition eaters. It was not a sudden epiphany, in which I 
could hear the wet, ever-churning sounds of mastication in my own mouth ring-
ing out across a world of starvation. Nothing so worthy or sudden as that. But it 
was always a kind of disgust. A lingering discontent and reticent acknowledg-
ment of my own greasy corpulence, all wrapped up in a tight envelope of terror 
at graphic thoughts of white chunks of fat tightening arteries and throwing my 
cells into a chaos of malignant deformation. It is a sadly trite fact that these me-
dia-exacerbated, melodramatic considerations, when they are discarded for 
their inconvenience from the forefront of one’s thoughts (as they inevitably are), 
drift to the bottom of the mire of one’s mind and sit there, building into a cloying 
sediment of melancholy. And then one eats more of course; one eats because it 
feigns such kindness. Like a billowy duvet of love; an omnipresent cushion of 
forgiveness and mind-numbing satisfaction. And that just makes it worse. 
There is a certain tendency, when attempting to explore any idea related to 
‘wellbeing’ (and ultimately ‘wisdom’) in its most holistic sense, to drive the con-
versation away from the physical, to escape the confines of traditional allopathic 
medicinal definitions by belittling the body and running to the light of a less tan-
gible self. To say: ‘don’t worry so much about muscles and bones, don’t even 
worry so much about this depression diagnosis or that anxiety drug, instead at-
tend to the deeper parts of your soul, look to the core of your person’.2 Such a 
temptation suffers from the perils of mind and body dualism as much as the 
western medical tradition and quite possibly with fewer fruits.3 No, it is critical 
that one recognises, for the fullest understanding of any kind of optimum state, 
just as the condition of one’s mind and the totality of one’s place in this world 
cannot be severed from the treatment of one’s flesh, bones or brain, so too 
                                            
2 Jackie Stacey highlights how this kind of dualism can creep into alternative therapies in cancer 
treatment (J. Stacey, Teratologies: A Cultural Study of Cancer, [London, Routledge,1997], 
pp.110-12). 
3 Which is not to say that mind-body dualism is necessarily beneficial in modern medicine. In-
deed, as J. F. Keenan argues, imagining the human as partly inanimate machine may simply 
have wide ranging detrimental consequences (J. F. Keenan, ‘Dualism in Medicine, Christian 
Theology, and the Aging’, in Journal of Religion and Health, Vol. 35, No. 1 [Spring, 1996], 
pp. 33-45 [pp.34-35]). 
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does the state of that body pervade the condition of one’s soul.4 It works both 
ways.5 
If philosophy is an attempt to understand what is important and thereby live 
one’s life according to that understanding, to achieve an optimum state, how 
could I be such a slob and still be doing philosophy? 
These suggestions might seem to involve some significant and unjustified 
jumps, much of what follows seeks to provide this justification. 
 
Doing well 
It is not a particularly novel suggestion that philosophy is something other (and 
more) than that which is done in classrooms and within the obscure lines of es-
oteric papers passed between mysterious academic cults. Within academic phi-
losophy there is a recognisable movement towards (or back to) a view of phi-
losophy which considers it to be not a distinct pursuit so much as a ‘way of life’.6 
The question is imagined as one of Socrates’ making, or at least he is frequent-
ly viewed as the founder of western moral philosophy. How should we be? Who 
should we be? What should we do?  Socrates asked questions about life rather 
than just about the substances and principles governing the world.7 The ‘we’ 
                                            
4 As David Cockburn illustrates, the division between mind and body involves a host of confu-
sions (D. Cockburn, Other Human Beings, [London, Macmillan, 1990], pp.207-8). 
5 I shall, for now (and fairly generally throughout this discussion) avoid much mention of the 
term ‘embodiment’ (see footnote 168 and 312). Theories of embodied cognition often entail 
theories of rationality which sit poorly with the way in which this current thesis seeks to dis-
cuss an idea of ‘personhood’ (Chalres Taliaferro makes clear the way in which the term ‘em-
bodiment’ carries other theoretical baggage in : C. Taliaferro, "The Virtues of Embodiment." 
Philosophy 76, no. 295 (2001): 111-25 [pp.114-5].). This essay also seeks to employ as few 
technical neologisms as possible (whilst it may not strictly be a ‘neologism’, the various theo-
retical connotations of ‘embodied’ result in a heavily technical cluster of meanings). Instead I 
attempt to use ordinary language or terms from other languages (usually Greek) which fit the 
bill. The use of language to evoke as well as directly analyse and communicate is crucial to 
the methods of this discussion, however, of equal importance is a reaction against ‘ivory 
tower’ academic specialism and jargony obfuscation (I follow Michael Billing here in rejecting 
any Bourdieu-esque suggestion that new-speak is necessary for academic success – M. Bill-
ing, Learn to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences, [Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013], pp.90-2). It is hoped that however fine the line may be between jar-
gon induced impermeability and poetic breadth and complexity, the language of this essay 
will demonstrate the important difference.  
6 P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, M. Chase (tr.), (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995), (Particularly) 
pp. 80-144. 
7 Of course, Socrates was not acting in a vacuum. Philosophy as a moral and practical thing 
was an existing model prior to Socrates. In this way it may be more accurate to call Socrates 
a champion rather than a founder or inventor. And it is equally important to recognise that 
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here is also important in a revival of ancient ethics. Even Socrates’, in all his 
mischief, wasn’t seeking to sever the individual entirely from his community. 
This was a world dominated by the identities and duties tied to the city-state 
and any question about how life should be lived was inherently bound to the 
idea of collective duty.8 The question then becomes not so much one of individ-
ual duties and responsibilities (though these are still important) as one of what it 
is to be a good human. What are the qualities and activities which characterise 
a flourishing human life? 
‘Flourishing’ is a popular term in ‘philosophy as a way of life’, it is an attempt, in 
part, to grapple with the Greek concept of εὐδαιμονία. Martha Nussbaum has 
been instrumental in this translation of εὐδαιμονία. In her ‘Therapy of Desire’, 
Nussbaum explains that the more traditional translation of ‘happiness’ ‘is mis-
leading, since it misses the emphasis on activity, and on completeness of life’.9 
Yet ‘happiness’ does convey the sense in which εὐδαιμονία is considered as an 
end goal by the authors who employ it in their ethical discussions.10 One can 
well imagine that happiness (as opposed to material wealth or power) would be 
viewed as a plausible and even laudable life goal by many people. The revival 
of ancient Greek ethical theory (though, crucially, not a wholesale revival of an-
cient Attic normative beliefs) explicitly seeks to distance itself from the sort of 
inclination which might lead to this sort of individualistic, hedonic and static vi-
sion of purpose. ‘Flourishing’ speaks of potential and as such takes on the pa-
ternalistic tones of unfulfilled potential, languishing in supposed happiness. This 
                                                                                                                                
this ‘Socratic’ model had to contend with the more theoretical and professional model of phi-
losophy even in its ancient forms (John Cooper describes this in: J. M. Cooper, Pursuits of 
Wisdom, [Oxford, Princetown University Press, 2013], pp.27-30). Socrates’ emphasis on the 
moral and ‘way of life’ elements of philosophy simply won out as the dominant model of phi-
losophy in this ancient period 
8 Larry Siedentop makes the suggestion that Socrates was so much a part of this polis ethic 
that this is at the root of the conflict with the Sophists, since they did not belong to any par-
ticular state in the way that Socrates belonged to Athens and were therefore ‘amoral’ (L. 
Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism, [Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 2014] pp.43-5). 
9 M. C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, (Oxford, 
Princeton University Press, 2004 [1994]), p.15. It should also be noted that Nussbaum con-
tinues by acknowledging the cumbersome nature of a translation to ‘human flourishing’ and 
her own preference for maintaining a transliteration (I would suggest that Greek characters 
don’t represent enough of a chore that even this is necessary). 
10 Kirsten Brukamp, in her tribute to the work of Nussbaum, gives a nice sense of how despite 
talk of εὐδαιμονία being principally founded in Aristotle’s ethics, many Greek authors found 
common focus in εὐδαιμονία as a purpose of human life even if they did not agree on just 
what it meant. K. Brukamp, ‘Elements of Eudaemonia: Capabilities and Functionings’ in A. 
Kallhoff (ed.), Martha C. Nussbaum: Ethics and Political Philosophy, (London, Transaction 
Publishers, 2000), pp.93-104. 
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is not a purpose to be arrived at through personal adventure and preference, or 
even cultural tradition, it is grander still, it is Human. Apart from this anti-hedonic 
mood, however, it is the emphasis on activity which Nussbaum highlights which 
has been crucial to the formation of philosophy as a way of life.  
As opposed to other academic fields which take ancient Greek sources as intel-
lectual points of interest and argumentative support, philosophy as a way of life 
takes the very model of ancient philosophising as an activity to be emulated. 
Against trends of specialisation and professionalisation in academia it sets 
practical engagement, emersion and self-improvement as its mode of conduct. 
Pierre Hadot (whose work Philosophy as a Way of Life is the seminal text of this 
revival)11 sets forth an understanding of ancient ethics predicated upon an idea 
of philosophy as itself being a call to a particular ethical code closely allied to 
the pursuit of εὐδαιμονία.   
A translation of εὐδαιμονία as ‘happiness’ might allow for an academic integra-
tion of ancient ethics into a more modern scheme of liberal hedonism whereby 
the professional philosopher does philosophy because they enjoy it or because 
it affords them opportunity for other enjoyment. εὐδαιμονία as a more complex 
notion, however, introduces an unavoidable dissonance between profession 
and that which is professed.   
εὐδαιμονία might literally be translated as well-spirit, and this may partly be to 
blame for the standard translation of ‘happiness’, it translates neatly as a noun 
concerned with psychological ease. If, though, a participle translation is allowed 
for, then ‘flourishing’ permits a far richer sense of the personal participation 
necessary to realise this condition. It is something which must be achieved not 
as a prize but as an activity. What ‘flourishing' can lack, however, though it car-
ries a sense of paternalism, is an explicitly moral sense. As Hadot emphasises, 
εὐδαιμονία is a complex idea which from its earliest records is not used in one 
univocal way nor in isolation but as part of a wider discussion of virtue and de-
sired ends.12 σοφία (wisdom), ἀταραξια (peace of mind), ἀυταρκεια (inner free-
dom) and ἀρετή (virtue), all converge in these ancient discussions of life, ulti-
mate meaning and our escape from suffering.13 Even the Epicureans, who di-
                                            
11 P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995 [1987]). 
12 Ibid, p.264-9. 
13 Ibid. 
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verged significantly from the Stoics in suggesting that pleasure does indeed 
take a central role in this mission, speak in normative and prescriptive ways 
about these goals. A challenge for philosophy as a way of life as a field, not just 
of academic study but of what might be called 'alternative therapy',14 is to nego-
tiate this normative character of ancient ethical discourse. This discussion 
seeks to explore in greater detail the moral dimensions of understanding phi-
losophy as a way of life. What sort of way of life is this and what recommends it 
above other ways?  
‘Doing-well’, as a translation of εὐδαιμονία, might capture that same sense of 
participation as flourishing and also carry a more explicit sense of moral orienta-
tion (as well as being a close to literal translation). If it were necessary to use a 
translation then this might suffice for the purposes of this discussion, but Nuss-
baum’s preference for leaving the term in Greek seems a safer bet. When an 
idea is complex in a unique and interesting way it forgives unique terminology. 
 
A Way of Life for All? 
It is telling that Pierre Hadot speaks explicitly of ‘exercise spirituels’ and couch-
es the ancient practice of philosophy in this kind of religious language.15 Indeed, 
Hadot makes no bones about the continuity he perceives between ancient 
Helenistic ethical practices and the understanding of ethics many of us have 
inherited through Christianity.16 Nor should we expect him to do otherwise, such 
musings are surely the raison d’etre of a chair of Hellenistic and Christian phi-
losophy, and yet there are questions we may still ask. Chief amongst these 
                                            
14 The qualifier ‘alternative’ is perhaps unnecessary since some therapies which derive (at least 
in part) from the movement ‘back’ to way of life philosophy are quite mainstream. Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy is perhaps the most notable and a significant element of the ‘way of 
life’ movement is concentrated on this explicit relationship between ancient Greek philoso-
phy and modern medicine. Donald Robertson dedicates his volume (D. Robertson, The Phi-
losophy of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, [London, Karnac, 2010]) to not only the history of 
CBT’s emergence from ancient Stoicism but also to the wisdom which can still be gleaned 
from Stoicism in the execution of psychological therapy. In part (and to a certain extent) this 
current essay resembles more closely the work of Tim LeBon (T. LeBon, Wise Therapy, 
[London, Continuum, 2001]), in his effort to withdraw somewhat from the medical impulse of 
some way of life philosophies (to put philosophy to work in ‘healing people’) and to ask 
whether ethics and learning should have a more central place. (It should be noted that Le-
Bon’s approach is geared explicitly towards discussing these issues in relation to practical 
counselling and are far less abstract and polemic than my own efforts Ibid. p.81 and it may 
also be prudent to note that I am far less focused on Stoicism than Hadot and his followers).   
15 P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, pp.264-9. 
16 Hadot is also at pains to emphasise certain differences between the Christian and pagan tra-
ditions (Ibid, p.82). 
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questions is that as to whether the kind of ‘spiritual’ way of life being recom-
mended is in fact the best, or even a good, way of life. 
In what follows, no dissimulation shall be made in regards to the somewhat po-
litical, anti-intellectualist impetus behind this enquiry into the goodness of this 
Hellenistic ethics. Indeed, it is suggested that, in common with Aristotle’s pro-
posed ethical methodology, 
In matters of emotion and of action, words are less convincing 
than deeds; when therefore our theories are at variance with 
palpable facts, they provoke contempt, and involve the truth in 
their own discredit… Hence it appears that true theories are 
the most valuable for conduct as well as for science; harmo-
nising with the facts, they carry conviction, and so encourage 
those who understand them to guide their lives by them.17 
So let us be wary of an ethics which, at times, encourages an almost ascetic 
detachment from day-to-day toil, which values above all else the activities of a 
contemplative mind and least of all those of physical work and bodily enjoy-
ment, and let us be particularly wary of this for it having been recommended by 
scholars and priests. Aristotle is himself not insensitive to the possibilities of 
misconstruing his own ethics into one which demands the prerequisite of abun-
dant good fortune and states that ‘private citizens do not seem to be less but 
more given to doing virtuous actions than princes and potentates. It is sufficient 
then if moderate resources are forthcoming; for a life of virtuous activity will be 
essentially a happy life’.18  
Iris Murdoch echoes this vein of concern in her own analysis of ancient ethics 
when she claims that ‘it must be possible to do justice to both Socrates and the 
virtuous peasant’.19 And, whilst I might express this thought differently, I agree, 
it must. Indeed, the tension here lies just at that confluence of Hellenistic and 
Christian thinking with which Hadot concerns himself. As Russell suggests in 
his history, it is the Christian insistence upon the importance of a ‘pure heart’ as 
opposed to any more sophisticated or worldly virtues which stands it in great 
                                            
17 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, H. Rackham (tr.), (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press, 1934) § X,i (1172a34-1172b7). 
18 Ibid, X,viii,x. Though we should note that Aristotle’s ideas of ‘moderate means’ and of private 
citizenship would not be terribly far reaching. 
19 I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, (London, Routledge, 1974), p.2 
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contrast to ancient ethics.20 It is this tension between knowing goodness and 
simple goodness with which Murdoch wrestles and which this essay also treats. 
Some have been tempted by the very assessment which Aristotle appears to be 
warding off, to understand his own ethics as recommending an understanding 
of ethical life as being highly (even primarily) dependent upon circumstance, 
that the ‘good life’ must also be the ‘lucky life’. That, yes, tough as it may seem, 
the good looking, well spoken, bodily able, financially wealthy and, most im-
portantly, intellectually capable man (and I suspect it usually is imagined to be a 
man) is indeed the better creature, the one who is better able to lead the ‘good 
life’.21 Two immediate concerns with this reading of Aristotle's ethics might be 
raised, first, an exegetical one, that Aristotle, at least, might not in fact advocate 
an evaluation of persons with any significant weight on fortune, and secondly a 
more fundamental concern over the accuracy of such a theory regardless of 
whether or not Aristotle proposed it.22 It cannot be denied that Aristotle certainly 
did espouse an ethics which placed intellectual activities in pride of place in 
human existence. Of course, no issue is being taken with any exegesis in this 
regard, philosophy was (and still is for many) an activity chiefly characterised by 
contemplation, it is the topmost room of the ivory tower (though it may now fre-
quently invite the natural sciences to share its quarters).23 The important differ-
ence between these ancient and modern perceptions of philosophy which 
Hadot is pointing out is that whereby the ancient understanding accords the 
pursuit of 'wisdom' an explicitly ethical character and the modern need not. 
Modern philosophy (of various kinds) has inherited a means but not an end. 
                                            
20 B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, (London, Unwin, 1948) p.111. 
21 Cooper is emphatic about the role of external goods in Aristotle’s ethics (J. M. Cooper, ‘Aris-
totle on the Goods of Fortune’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 
173-196). The position here, however, is not to deny that Aristotle discusses the role of ex-
ternal goods in achieving what might be called a well (eudaimon) life, only the importance he 
gives this in living a life well. Two glasses may both be full whilst one is far bigger than the 
other; I am only suggesting that Aristotle wants us to be concerned far more with complete-
ness and less with capacity. A very small glass which is well filled is more eudaimon than a 
big one which is poorly filled. 
22 It is the second point which will be of greatest interest here, though the former might be made 
through attrition rather than concerted effort. Ultimately it will be suggested that in both cas-
es some confusion has been reached regarding the important distinction between the ‘good 
life’ and a ‘life lived well’; it is the latter which needs to concern us most in normative ethics, 
though it is not unrelated to what might also be called the ‘desirable life’. 
23 On philosophy’s place as a chiefly intellectual, contemplative or academic activity associated 
with the sciences, Thomas Uebel’s essay on Neurath’s anticipation of naturalised epistemol-
ogy draws a nice historical line of how this ‘handmaiden’ philosophy has developed; T. E. 
Uebel, ‘Neurath’s Program for Naturalistic Epistemology’, in S. Sarkar (ed.), Science and 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1996), p.283.   
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The question we must ask is whether philosophy as a 'way of life' is only able to 
offer an ethical framework which is useful to the academic or whether some-
thing more nuanced or complex might be at play. Can εὐδαιμονία be achieved 
by extra-intellectual means? 
It seems quite uncontroversial to say that there are people who are not intellec-
tuals in any usual sense, yet who are nevertheless very good people.24 They 
might be generous; they might be gentle, brave, kind, loyal, affable, joyful or dil-
igent. There are so many virtues which do not require a quick mind, nor a mind 
which harbours a great array of knowledge, they require neither the ability nor 
the inclination to read, nor to investigate abstract problems.25 This does not, 
however, answer any question as to whether someone who has some of these 
sorts of virtues, but is also ‘intelligent’, is not then better, in some sense, than 
one who is less intelligent. This certainly seems to be the theory espoused by 
many ancient philosophers, and one which would seem prevalent still. If one 
person were brave and another gentle and yet another both brave and gentle, 
would we not think this third person best? What then if they added some intel-
lectual virtue, would they not then be even better? And mightn’t it be fair to sug-
gest that some virtues are more important (morally more important) than other 
virtues? If this final condition were permitted, then it may well be uncontroversial 
(in ancient and modern times) to suggest that an intellectual virtue is the most 
important of all. Intelligence (or something close to what we probably mean by 
‘intelligence’) might be imaged to have further reaching moral consequences 
than the other virtues. An understanding of philosophy as a way of life may very 
well appear to lend itself to just this sort of ethical theory. Philosophy then be-
comes a kind of virtue collection activity, with a psychological virtue as its 
greatest prize.  
Even a more typical understanding of philosophy, as an academic activity (in 
the modern sense of ‘academic’), would sit fairly comfortably with this sort of 
evaluation. Education, commonly conceived, touts academic achievement as a 
                                            
24 It is worth noting a basic sympathy here with the educational psychology and ‘multiple intelli-
gences’ of the gratifyingly named Howard Gardner (H. Gardner, Multiple Intelligences: New 
Horizons, [New York, Basic Books, 2006 (1993)]). So one could talk about moral knowledge 
as a kind of intelligence (perhaps emotional). I suspect that using the word ‘intelligence’ in 
this way can lead to unwelcome confusion and the foundation of this current essay in ancient 
ethics means there is no need to use this kind of psychological terminology since talk of 
‘knowledge’ and, more importantly, ‘virtues’, is far more apt.  
25 It might also be added that such virtues may not even require a human mind. 
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sort of pinnacle of human achievement to which all should aspire and in the 
light of which people can justly be categorized according to how far they have 
approached this brilliant peak.26 In this sense, the asceticism of some ancient 
schools of philosophy and medieval cloisters is not so distant from many con-
temporary models of evaluating our achievements. One model offers intelli-
gence as key, the other as simply another excellent (perhaps the best) muscle 
to flex. To live the life of the mind is the key to being a truly good person. 
One might be tempted by the Christian reaction against this intellectualism, as 
G. K. Chesterton is, and to see the converse as true. By placing the ‘pure heart’ 
of which Russell speaks, at the centre of one’s ethical evaluation, an emphasis 
upon the intellect might well be viewed as counterproductive both to this purity 
and to one’s general wellbeing.  
Poetry is sane because it floats easily in an infinite sea; rea-
son seeks to cross the infinite sea, and so make it finite. The 
result is mental exhaustion…If you argue with a madman, it is 
extremely probable that you will get the worst of it; for in many 
ways his mind moves all the quicker for not being delayed by 
the things that go with good judgement. He is not hampered 
by a sense of humour or by charity, or by the dumb certainties 
of experience. He is the more logical for losing certain sane 
affections. Indeed, the common phrase for insanity is in this 
respect a misleading one. The madman is not the man who 
has lost his reason. The madman is the man who has lost 
everything except his reason.27 
Chesteron makes clear that he does not take issue with logic and reason as 
such, though we cannot but gain the impression that the intellect is, here, 
viewed as something which should be subservient to a dogma of moral realism 
and common sense: reason as handmaiden to revelation. So, by this under-
standing, adding logical prowess to a list of someone's virtues need not contrib-
ute favourably to their ethical worth. 
                                            
26 Self-improvement could be conceived of as the goal of education or learning more generally 
and the degree to which the metaphilosophy espoused in this essay is an effort to reduce (or 
expand) ‘philosophy’ to be synonymous with these general concepts constitutes a valid po-
tential addendum. This question will not be explored in explicit depth or detail but the criti-
cism of conventional academic models which is part of this metaphilosophy is certainly 
commensurate with other commentaries which seek to unravel the academic and competi-
tion orientated ‘myth of meritocracy’. As Khen Lampert suggests, the ubiquity with which 
teachers express a sentiment of unlimited academic potential is often shocking (K. Lampert, 
Meritocratic Education and Social Worthlessness, (Houndmills, Palgrve Macmillan, 2013), 
pp.2-4).   
27 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy, (London, John Lane The Bodley Head, 1943 [1908]),pp.16,19 
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This juxtaposition, between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, is a crude 
one. First, imagining that there are only two competing theories of the place of 
intelligence in our ethical lives supposes that the dichotomy presented is a justi-
fied one; between intellect as prince and intellect as servant. Secondly, this dis-
pute also supposes that the two positions (as sketched above) are dealing with 
the same subject matter. It is crucial that if any headway is to be made in as-
sessing the role of intelligence in our moral lives then we must first come to 
some more sophisticated understanding of what is being referred to by this 
group of vague cognitive terms. ‘Intelligence’, ‘reason’, ‘logic’, ‘knowledge’, ‘ra-
tionality’, ‘mind’, ‘wisdom’. Such terms are thrown around as if it were self-
evident what is being referred to. It isn’t.  
Certainly there is something nebulous which we can recognise, something to do 
with mental activity as opposed to more tangible pursuits. Many of the aptitudes 
being highlighted are certainly frequently distinguishable. We often know bright 
people when we meet them; but are they all of one sort? That seems far less 
clear. Academia itself appears to be structured around the idea that there are 
many intelligences, each with its own niche in which to excel, yet even here 
there is frequently an attitude of hierarchy.28  
If philosophy can correctly and fruitfully be understood as a process of self-
improvement, and this ‘discipline’ can and should resemble (at least to some 
extent) the ancient model which took εὐδαιμονία as its goal, and intellectual ex-
cellence as its means, then some suitably robust philosophy of mind and of eth-
ics must be achieved. 
To reconcile the sage and the everyman in an evaluative structure which does 
indeed do justice to them both, it is proposed that a particular study must be 
made of an idea of ‘wisdom’, of the way in which there might be an intellectual 
capacity which is also particularly ethical which encompasses many ideas hith-
erto highlighted and which can demonstrate both a supremacy amongst virtues 
and also allow for the equal excellence of the ‘pure heart’; an ethic of intellectu-
al virtue which is not just useful to the academic, and which is also an ethic of 
the ‘pure heart’ not only of use to the saint or ascetic.  
                                            
28 James Duderstadt remarks on the ubiquity of this snobbery in relation to the hierarchy of dis-
ciplines which is frequently encountered at universities (J. J. Duderstadt, A University for the 
21st Century, [Ann Arbour, MI, University of Michigan Press, 2000],  p.123)
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It might be objected that there is some shoehorning going on here, with a desire 
for a kind of egalitarianism of capacities where there exists no such thing. This 
charge would, however, suppose that there is no good reason to suggest that 
there is an intellectual virtue which is of paramount importance to being good 
whilst also ways of being just as good without demonstrating any of the usual 
virtues associated with intellectual ability. No systematic argument shall be for-
warded as to the justice of Murdoch's suggestion. It is hoped that the ethical 
importance of something which we might call wisdom and of how it stands in 
relation to other evident virtues and our potential flourishing is conspicuous 
enough as to, at the very least, permit investigation. We need only be willing to 
entertain the idea, at this stage, that there might be some kind of virtue which is 
'primus inter pares' amongst other virtues, and that it has something to do with 
a uniquely broad and penetrating understanding of the world and a tying to-
gether of many other virtues. This needn’t be something which Socrates 
achieved perfectly, but rather something towards which he, and others like him, 
have pointed. It is enough to say: 'if there were such a thing as wisdom, what 
would it be like and how would it work', then we can better set about seeing how 
this sort of virtue might fit with our lives and the world in which we live. 
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1 – Plato and Aristotle on the Nature of Wisdom. 
 
To be honest, as this world goes, is to be one man picked out of  
ten thousand. 
    -Shakespeare, Hamlet, 2.2. 
 
οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἲει δεῖν κίνδυνον 
ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὄυτο τι καὶ 
σμικρὸν ὄφελμος ἐστιν, ἀλλ΄ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, 
ὅταν πράττη, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράτει, και ἀνδρος 
ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. 
- Plato, Apology, §28,b.29 
 
εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις: καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ 
βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ 
μέγιστα. 
- Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, §X, vi 
(1176a,33-5).30 
 
Both Plato and Aristotle agree that the epitome of human life, the most excellent 
and admirable object to which we might aspire, consists in a psychological vir-
tue. ‘σοφία’ has, both etymologically and (perhaps to a lesser extent) actively, 
defined the discipline and life of Western philosophy throughout its history.31 
                                            
29  ‘You do not speak well, Sir, if you hold that a man ought to be concerned with the danger of 
life or death, if he is to be of any small worth, rather than that he should look to this alone: 
when he does things, whether they are right or wrong, and whether they are the actions of a 
good man or bad.’ Though the translation is original it has made particular use of H. N. 
Fowler’s translation. This instance takes a more literal line and attempts to convey some-
thing of Socrates’ slightly irreverent tone. Plato, ‘Apology’, in Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Cri-
to, Phaedo, Phaedrus, H. N. Fowler (tr.), (London, William Heinemann, 1966). 
30 ‘We have said, then, that it [wellbeing] is not a state of being, for if it were it might belong to 
one who slept though their whole life, or who lived as a vegetable, or someone who suffered 
great misfortunes’. As above the translation is original though, in this case makes use of: Ar-
istotle, Nichomachean Ethics, H. Rackham (tr.), (London, Harvard University Press, 1934) § 
X, vi (1176a,33-5). For Aristotle referencing follows Thomist tradition of book and chapter in 
addition to Bekker numbers; Plato will use only Stephanus pagination.    
31 Pierre Hadot discusses the centrality of the idea of Sophia in his discussion of the origins of 
the activity of philosophy in P. Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy, M. Chase (tr.), (London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002) pp.16-21. This discussion also follows Hadot in the sugges-
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One might have hoped, then, that a sure port of call in any effort to better un-
derstand this concept and its cognates, particularly at its inception, would be 
these two seminal masters of the subject, these two men who did, between 
them, establish this debate in earnest. And yet, despite the confidence with 
which each of these authors forwards their wisdom-orientated ethics, and the 
breadth of the normative claims which are made on the basis of this sophic-
primacy, a clear definition of this virtue subsists neither between nor within the 
principle works of these authors on the subject.32 
It is undoubtedly important to recognise at the outset that The Nichomachean 
Ethics and The Apology do, perhaps even more than the other works of Aristo-
tle and Plato which we have, illustrate the different kind of writing which these 
two men were engaged in. Plato has left us with a corpus of published dia-
logues, works polished, dramatised and disseminated to a readily consuming 
audience. Aristotle has not. The Apology is not only a piece of scholarly writing, 
it is not purely a systematic treatment of what it is to be wise, it is also a piece of 
political propaganda, a monument to a mentor, a teacher, a founder and hero. 
The Nichomachean Ethics33 is not so varied in style. Aristotle’s widely published 
work has not survived intact and few facts in the history of philosophy are to be 
so lamented.34 EN is a far more single minded treatment of the subject, broad in 
its remit certainly, almost to the point of being incomparable to Plato’s brief de-
piction of Socrates’ trial, but it is an essay on human excellence. Though both 
works adopt radically differing styles, each serves as a seminal articulation of 
the nature of wisdom and its status as the ultimate good. 
So that we might gain a better understanding, not only of the history of theories 
of wisdom, but also of the concept as it stands and its importance in contempo-
rary ethics, it is certainly important to explore what both of these texts say on 
                                                                                                                                
tion that the sometimes imagined dichotomy between sophia as knowledge and sophia as 
concerned with ethics and wellbeing is, in fact, a false dichotomy. 
32 As discussed below, there are other works by these authors which pertain to this subject. 
This is certainly both, though for Plato (with the Protagoras being a notable example of an 
additional source) it may be fairer to say that the Apology is his exemplary rather than ex-
haustive work on wisdom. It is, at least, treated as such here, not primarily for its explicit the-
ory but for the manner in which it complements Aristotle's ethical work. Socrates' trial is an 
apt anchor for us all. 
33 Henceforth ‘EN’ 
34 On these different kinds of writing and the loss of Aristotle’s published works and Plato’s lec-
ture notes Cf. F. Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, Vol.1, (Norwich, Burns, Oates and 
Washbourne, 1947) pp.133-41, 268-76. Copleston highlights here the historical importance 
of what we have retained and what we have lost from these two great authors. 
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the subject and, if possible, how they might complement one another. Needless 
to say, it is not necessary to attempt an exposition of Aristotle’s entire theory of 
the ultimate good but it is important to recognise that it is a complex theory 
which involves a range of concepts which are inextricably linked and mutually 
defined, in fact this is simultaneously a significant strength of Aristotle’ theory of 
wisdom and a major weakness.  
The brutal simplicity of Plato’s ethical specifications, exemplified by his sugges-
tion that a good person cannot be concerned with danger to his life, strikes us 
as intuitively wrong. It could only be an ethic suitable for ascetics, saints and 
martyrs (and only then, very judgmental ones). At the same time, Aristotle’s 
suggestion that fortune is vital to the ethical worth of a human being can seem 
overly harsh and, perhaps more importantly, instructively vacuous.35 Yet, Pla-
to’s insistence on basic ethical reflection as being at the core of wisdom and the 
good life may seem to point in a positive direction and the importance which Ar-
istotle gives to practical concerns and the manifold vagaries of life similarly so. 
It is in these areas, then, that this discussion seeks some degree of resolution 
and clarity, in the suggestion that whilst The Apology and EN are mutually criti-
cal in some respects, they are also beneficial to one another through that criti-
cism and in agreement in other important respects. 
Investigating any theory of wisdom (and, for that matter, any other expansive 
concept) must contend with the difficulty of appropriately disentangling and con-
flating related concepts. To fully justify any approach to doing this would require 
a separate and extensive discussion; what is important to do here is make clear 
that although various psychological virtues, states and activities are discussed 
by both Plato and Aristotle, the latter author does far more to distinguish, and 
the former far more to conflate. The current discussion follows Emmanuel 
Ackah in appraising the Socratic theory of virtue as a whole, not only with moral 
knowledge and wisdom being synonymous (a more widely accepted conflation) 
but also, and more importantly, with wellbeing also forming a central part of this 
ethico-epistemological state.36 Ackah contrasts his own theory with not only an 
established understanding of Socrates’ principal activity as being normative but 
                                            
35 We must question the insight offered by telling people who are in unfortunate circumstances 
that they cannot possess the ultimate goodness possible for humans to possess and that 
there is nothing much to be done about it. 
36 E. K. Ackah, ‘Socratic Wisdom’, in History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2, (Apr, 
2003), p. 124. 
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also with that of Hugh Benson, who insists that Socrates also engages in an 
epistemological exercise.37 Benson does not deny, of course, that Socrates is 
mainly concerned with ethics, only that he is also, and distinctly, concerned with 
how we appreciate the truth. It is this distinction which Ackah criticises and 
which is most important here. Are knowing and being unrelated for Plato? Can 
a wise person be a bad person? Perhaps Alexander Nehamas is correct in 
identifying some fault in the tradition, which Benson follows, of refusing to ex-
pand any interpretation of Plato’s theory any distance beyond Socrates’ 
words.38 We may well need to read between the lines, and appreciate Plato as 
an author of philosophy more than Socrates as an historical philosopher, in or-
der to propose an interpretation of Plato as espousing a cohesive theory of eth-
ical and epistemological holism. That’s what Ackah does, that’s what this dis-
cussion does. 
 
The Apology  
So, the rumour had got about that Socrates thought himself the wisest man of 
them all. No doubt this sort of claim, when made about someone who repeated-
ly and openly criticised people of high social standing, would inevitably cause 
many individuals a good deal of agitation. It would certainly put these highfalutin 
folks in a mood to push this trouble maker into a tight spot, enough that he 
would be forced to make a public denunciation of this rumour. No such luck. In-
stead Plato shows us an unrepentant, casual, clever old man who explains the 
Delphic origins of this rumour and the probable meaning of the divine proclama-
tion.  
Socrates is wisest because he is the only person who seems to know that he 
doesn’t know anything at all.39 Certainly, Plato is aware of the contradiction be-
ing stated here, and it falls together nicely with the irreverent yet open and hon-
est humour Socrates possesses throughout the proceedings. It is not that Soc-
rates doesn’t mean what he is saying, but he does mean more than he is say-
                                            
37 Ibid, p. 123. Undoubtedly Ackah’s work owes some significant debt to Benson’s, not only for 
a title, but for Benson’s critical efforts in bringing Plato’s epistemology to the fore. H. H. Ben-
son, Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Plato’s Early Dialogues, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 4.   
38 A. Nehamas, ‘H. H. Benson, Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Plato’s Early Dia-
logues, Review’ in Mind, New Series, Vol. 110, No. 439, (Jul, 2001), p. 719. 
39 Apol., §21d 
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ing. It is not that he doesn’t know anything as such, only that he doesn’t know 
anything which should elevate him above others; his knowledge is not some-
thing divine, it is not complete knowledge, but rather it is the wisdom of a lived 
human life. Far from a boast, Socrates begins to sound self-deprecating. “Hu-
man wisdom is of little or no value”; this is what the oracle’s words must have 
meant, Socrates tells us, and that he is simply an example of someone who 
recognises this truth.40 Socrates has already told us that he may indeed be wise 
but that this wisdom is of a different character from the sort of thing he is being 
accused of, he does not claim some kind of intimate knowledge of the nature of 
the cosmos, some complete and comprehensive certainty regarding an ultimate 
reality (which undoubtedly does exist but which is not for human minds to com-
prehend) instead he has something else, he has ‘ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία’.  
Surely though, we cannot accept that Socrates is being honest if on the one 
hand he is claiming that this human wisdom is worthless and at other times is 
exercising aspects of this wisdom through ethical instruction which he clearly 
believes to be of the greatest importance. Socrates, in fact, knows what is ‘the 
greatest good for humans’, ‘μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ’, he knows it to be 
criticism.41 As Sharon Ryan points out, some have considered Socrates’ humili-
ty to be itself definitive of wisdom,42 yet how are we to take this ‘humility’ seri-
ously when it is followed by such wanton judgement and instruction? In what 
sense is Socrates humble?  
Again, it can be salutary to remind oneself that what is being read is itself a 
philosophical text, one in which Socrates voices not only his own (possible) 
words but also (and primarily) those of his pupil. It seems doubtful that Plato 
was either malicious or stupid enough to portray his mentor and friend as a con-
tradictory oaf, rather, it would seem fairer to suggest that Socrates is pointing 
towards different kinds of importance, different scales of understanding and 
truth. The charge of wisdom which Socrates denies is evidently being contrast-
ed with the kind of ethical, ‘human wisdom’ which Socrates is claiming. Socra-
tes suggests that Apollo probably does possess the kind of wisdom which Soc-
rates does not and this may well lead us to believe that this superior form of 
                                            
40 Ibid, 23a 
41 Ibid, 38a (Or ‘Examination’). 
42 S. Ryan, ‘What is Wisdom?’, in Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy 
in the Analytic Tradition , Vol. 93, No. 2 (Feb., 1999) , p. 119. 
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wisdom is something fanciful, a red herring allowing for Socrates to then con-
struct a false modesty around an intelligible form of wisdom.43  
Yet, allowing for Plato’s integrity and intelligence in this matter, we might rather 
suppose that this superior wisdom is simply a broader form of intellectual 
achievement, a kind of general scientific knowledge and certain, metaphysical 
insight of the sort pursued by many Pre-Socratic thinkers.44 Socrates does not 
know what the first principle of the universe is, nor does he profess to know the 
nature of the gods, in fact he very frequently doesn’t know the answer to the 
ethical and psychological questions in which he engages. All he knows is that it 
is vital to ask these questions, that it is important to be a good person and that 
there are some particular virtues which it is important to possess in order to be 
a good person (amongst which are inquisitiveness and open-mindedness). 
Very general principles of human life, this is what Socrates can recognise. Of 
course, some modern philosophers might restrict the remit of their discipline 
even further, with an understanding that metaphysics is essentially meaning-
less, but Socrates does not do this. It’s not that Socrates doesn’t believe in the 
objects of cosmic wisdom, he categorically does (for he denies the charges of 
atheism being levelled against him), nor does he suggest that such wisdom is 
impossible (or utterly detached from human wisdom), he simply doubts the pos-
sibility for humans to possess such perfect wisdom, at least as a cohesive 
whole.  Instead we must pursue most urgently those glimpses of truth which are 
available to us.  
It is not, then, that human wisdom is different in epistemological type from other 
wisdom, it is still the comprehension of a truth, objective and real, it is just far 
less exhaustive than an understanding of the nature of the cosmos and all that 
is in it, it is a small part of a much grander whole. So, in comparison to the kind 
of wisdom which philosophers had sought prior to Socrates, the sort which Soc-
rates was being accused of, his own understanding of his own limitations and a 
few broad ethical truths is, in an important sense, very little. Even compared to 
the level of knowledge professed by non-philosophers, those who practice 
crafts (particularly statecraft) for instance, with their libraries of certainties and 
                                            
43 Apol. 23a 
44 On the expansive quest of the Presocratics and their role in establishing the activity of west-
ern philosophy Cf. D. Roochnik, Retrieving the Ancients, (Oxford, Blackwell, 2004) pp.19, 
64. 
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pedagogical bravado, the understanding that such confidence is flawed is still 
humbler than if such confidence were not flawed.  
Undoubtedly this claim is made by Socrates with some degree of tongue-in-
cheek provocation. In relation to the wisdom of a god Socrates’ wisdom is in-
significant. In the grand scheme of things, objectively speaking, this human 
wisdom is only a wee scrap of a thing. Indeed, if all these distinguished gentle-
men who see fit to accuse Socrates of corrupting the youth of Athens were in 
fact in possession of the wisdom which they profess to be then, similarly, Socra-
tes’ ethical and epistemological insights would be relatively limited. But it is an 
important subjunctive. They are not in possession of this greater wisdom and 
Socrates knows this. His denial is not without its humorous barb, nor should it 
be, for in making his defense, Socrates also wishes to demonstrate the principal 
aspect of this human wisdom.  
As aforementioned, Socrates indicates that the core of his wisdom lies in criti-
cism, in the ‘examined life’, in a relentless pursuit of truth, honesty and the good 
life.45 Nor is this duty a solitary one, and this is what has got Socrates into trou-
ble, he wishes to engage others in this activity:  
And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall 
question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he 
does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for 
scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for 
what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and 
old, foreigner and citizen…46 
Quite strong stuff. There might even be part of a modern reader who begins to 
sympathise with Socrates’ accusers. It is all well and good making the whimsi-
cal analogy of a horsefly but the previous analogy which Socrates makes of the 
warrior might be nearer the mark.47 Persistence is one thing, but aggression 
and bloody minded devotion are quite another.  
Must we ask ourselves, then, whether Socrates invokes Achilles as a paragon 
of philosophic virtue for the benefit of his accusers or whether Plato does so to 
describe a theory of wisdom? Or perhaps the point is somewhat more complex. 
It is the courage in the face of death which these warriors demonstrate which 
                                            
45 Apol. 38a 
46 Ibid., 29e-30a 
47 Ibid., 30e and Ibid., 28a-29b 
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Socrates praises, and we must surely recognise that not only would the real 
Socrates have been well aware of his intentions at his trial and the imminent 
threat of death with which he was presented, but Plato too would want us to be 
aware of the soldierly bravery which his mentor exhibited throughout his life. 
These men of Athens executed not only the wisest man in Greece but also a 
brave Athenian soldier. What fools! Yet both Socrates and Plato evidently be-
lieved that this virtue of courage played an important role in either achieving or 
forming wisdom itself.  
If wisdom is viewing and enacting accurately those few, small, ethical truths 
which we might, then it may well follow that there are certain struggles involved 
in reaching this goal and that other virtues are required to surmount these 
struggles. So when Socrates professes that ‘it is not hard to escape death; it is 
much harder to escape wickedness, for that runs faster than death’,48 the cour-
age for which he calls is not only in the face of death, it is the courage required 
beyond that, the courage to fight the battles on one’s own less bloody battle-
fields. And if the metaphor of war is an uncomfortable one for a modern reader 
then we must not only be wary of anathema, but also of disregarding an im-
portant arena of human activity; of vices, yes, but also virtues. These men of 
Athens needn’t have dealt with death as an abstract pawn of philosophical ex-
amples, creeping in the shadows of retirement homes and half-forgotten funer-
als, they had war ready to hand and it served them well.  
So here (Socrates says) is an obvious kind of courage, but don’t ignore some 
other more important kinds. And of course he is right. When you stand there in 
the thick of conversation with those both known and unknown and suddenly a 
travesty of foolishness and misinformation spews forth from an unfortunate 
mouth. They have made a simple error of information perhaps, or even worse 
they have made an immoral conviction clear. Who hasn’t experienced the sud-
den call for courage, the pressing need to judge a complex battlefield of social 
expectations for weaknesses and opportunities? And countless other daily 
skirmishes of the soul, less public, which call for bravery without glory? To halt 
one’s hand or to press it into action. To break that conversation with an uncom-
fortable question. And who has not faltered? Of course Plato is right. But it is 
still a bit much.  
                                            
48 Ibid., 39a 
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This is not Troy and the gods do not fight restlessly by our sides. We are not 
Achilles nor should we expect to be. Despite the need, perhaps quite urgent 
need in some cases, to instill in ourselves and others greater honesty, critical 
reflection and moral courage, it need not follow that someone who experiences 
fear of death has no ethical worth whatsoever. This just feels like throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater.  
We are reminded again of Murdoch claiming that ‘an unexamined life can be 
virtuous’.49 Not only are there manifold ways of demonstrating virtue, there are 
at least as many situations which one might encounter which alter the ethical 
battlefield dramatically. A gentle, loving, kind and generous person may yet 
cower when you point a gun at them. Even more importantly, this virtuous per-
son might fluctuate in their inclinations. Mood is master of much; and whilst they 
may frequently be generous they may not be diligent, temperate, let alone 
bright and certainly not incessantly so. Supposing that Susan Wolf is correct in 
suggesting that we should neither expect nor desire moral sainthood in our-
selves or those we care about, does Plato’s theory of wisdom, as presented in 
the Apology, offer any defense against such charges of extremism?50 Well, per-
haps it is a matter of orientation and perspective.  
Socrates professes that his keenest desire is to help people to become better.51 
He has identified the way we can be better human beings and that is to be criti-
cal and reflexive and to foster ethical virtues in ourselves. He wishes to show 
his fellow Athenians the truth of this by breaking down their assumptions and 
narrow view of the world; to see their own small place in the great scheme of 
things and their own limited responsibilities. He wishes for them to focus on 
what is really important to them: their ethical selves. ‘Virtue does not come from 
money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man’.52 So, 
whilst we may not be inclined to accept Socrates’ theory, of how to be the best 
one can be, in its strongest form, we may yet recognise the importance of the 
direction it urges us to face. The Athenians whom Socrates addresses and to 
whom Plato wrote were in danger of having their attention stolen by a narrow 
world of profession and social climbing, of wealth and personal physical wellbe-
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ing; Socrates wishes to turn their minds to a wider vision of the world and their 
own true places in it. We are ethical beings first and foremost and all other con-
cerns must be cast in this light. For Socrates, it is this honest perspective on 
things and action based upon it which constitutes both the essence of human 
wisdom and the means for good living in general. We might, then, allow for this 
kind of wisdom to be a not particularly intellectual form of virtue. Of course it is 
presented to us in this way, but it would seem fair to suggest that a certain kind 
of broad perspective and consequent humility, coupled with an ethical orienta-
tion could be at the core of all virtuous persons and that this sort of wisdom is 
far from elitist. 
  
Nichomachean Ethics 
But are our lives so simple that we can simply turn away from daily concerns? 
Is ethical conduct so straightforward as to require a single orientation?  Aristo-
tle’s Nichomachean Ethics sets forth an alternative perspective whereby the in-
tellectual virtues are divided into sufficient categories that another form of wis-
dom is allowed for. Φρόνησις is a tandem virtue to σοφία, one which involves a 
practical awareness of the complex variety of situations in which virtues (and 
vices) can be exercised and the clarity of thought and judgement to pursue the 
best course.53 It is perhaps to be expected that Aristotle departs from Plato in 
moving away from a theory whereby abstract and occasionally intangible uni-
versals serve as a source of inspiration and towards a system which takes real-
life scenarios as the sources of virtue and vice.54 Aristotle says comparatively 
little about σοφία in the EN and we might be fooled into thinking that this more 
traditional conception of wisdom is unimportant and that φρόνησις has taken its 
place. It may be worthwhile, however, keeping in mind that φρόνησις is not 
simply a discreet capacity isolated from other intellectual virtues.  
Φρόνησις is indeed one of five such virtues listed by Aristotle: ‘τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, 
φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς’.55 It may be worth keeping these terms in Greek (or 
transliterated), as tomes could be written merely attempting to translate these 
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words into English. They might be translated roughly as: ‘technical skill’ (or 
knowing how to make by sound judgement), ‘scientific skill’ (or knowing a fact 
by sound deductive reasoning and observation), ‘prudence’ (knowing what’s 
best by sound deliberation on one’s own wellbeing), ‘wisdom’ (knowing a fun-
damental fact by sound deductive and inductive reasoning; though this may 
combine all virtues, not just science and intelligence, as is discussed below) 
and ‘intelligence’ (knowing a fact by sound inductive reasoning). These virtues 
do not, by any means, exhaust the psychological capabilities and qualities of 
human beings, they are, rather, the means by which one comes to understand 
truth.56  
It is immediately apparent that Aristotle’s treatment of wisdom differs dramati-
cally from Plato’s. Both authors were dealing with a Greek world struggling to 
understand their occupation, though each treats this task in a very different 
way. Where Plato’s Socrates rejects the vast majority of intellectual baggage 
and pretense which ‘wisdom’ carries with it, Aristotle seeks to pick up the pieces 
and sort them into some kind of sensible order. Neither departs from the gen-
eral idea that they are systematic truth seekers, one simply suggests that the 
only appropriate truth seeking to be done is in the destruction of false precon-
ceptions and the pursuit of right and moral action; the other that a wide variety 
of truth can be pursued and that moral action is dependent upon individual cir-
cumstances and an ability to judge those circumstances (or so it seems at first 
glance).  
This summary might give the impression that there is very little room for recon-
ciling the two views, even in part, and yet, as aforementioned, Aristotle’s theory 
is complex and extensive and cannot be treated fully here. It is clear at least, 
and Aristotle says so explicitly, that the virtue which he calls σοφία is actually a 
combination of two of the other virtues: scientific skill and intelligence.57 This 
sort of wisdom is the most general and holistic, it is all knowledge tied together 
in its most complete and perfect form, it is true authority, it is, of course, the sort 
of thing Socrates was denying possession of. Aristotle is adamant that σοφία is 
                                            
56 Aristotle also expands upon his theory of understanding truth and the importance of observed 
demonstrations in the Posterior Analytics though there he concentrates far more on the role 
of observation in knowledge (Aristotle, ‘Posterior Analytics’, J. Barnes (tr.), in The Complete 
works of Aristotle , J. Barnes (ed.), (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995) pp.114-
66. 
57 EN, §VI, vii (1141a:19-21) 
 30 
30 
necessarily general and, as such, must be distinguished from the kind of ethical 
insight which characterises good people which must, due to the sheer variety of 
characters, lives and species, be more adaptable and personalised.  
It is also clear that wisdom cannot be the same thing as knowledge 
about people; for if we are to call knowledge about our own interests 
wisdom, there will be a number of different kinds of wisdom, one for 
each species: there cannot be a single such wisdom dealing with the 
good of all living things, any more than there is one art of medicine 
for all existing things.58 
For this reason, Aristotle explains, there must be another form of wisdom, one 
which concerns how to be a good human and this he calls φρόνησις. It is tempt-
ing, and quite possibly accurate to assume at this stage that Aristotle is simply 
fleshing out Plato’s theory of wisdom and giving a name to the Socratic ‘human 
wisdom’ to better distinguish it from σοφία. We might be inclined to think that 
the two theories are, in fact, very similar indeed, yet there remains an apparent 
gulf between these authors’ attitudes towards the nature of goodness itself.  
Aristotle’s ethical relativism has been interpreted in various ways. Some com-
mentators have read passages like that quoted above to support a culturally 
relativist view.59 Commandeering virtue ethics and Aristotle for the cause of cul-
tural relativism may, however, say more about a zeitgeist than it does Aristotle, 
and it certainly seems less of a stretch to limit Aristotle to biological relativism. 
This is the approach of Martha Nussbaum and it would appear, ostensibly at 
least, to be a fair one.60  
Aristotle discusses the customs of Greeks of previous times, calling them ‘sim-
ple and barbaric’ and claims that ‘In general, all men seek not the way of their 
forefathers, but rather, the good’.61 Of course, exegesis aside, one might argue 
against both the cultural relativist and the biological relativist on the basis of 
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their following Aristotle’s tradition of making use of arbitrary and sweeping gen-
eralisations (regarding either ‘cultures’ or ‘species’).62 It would seem quite legit-
imate to question how far Aristotle’s own idea of humanity stretched. Slaves? 
Women? Barbarians? Other primates?63 It would seem wise, in fact, to keep 
Aristotle’s own dictum of precision appropriate to subject matter in our minds 
when considering the vastness and complexity of both human cultures and oth-
er living things.64 We might, however (whilst keeping a weather eye on family 
resemblance) allow for some nebulous categories (of whatever nature) to be 
valid sources of inspiration for ethical considerations.65 
Such an allowance would certainly strengthen the case against the commen-
surability of Plato and Aristotle’s theories of wisdom. There is something which 
we call human and it seems entirely reasonable to suggest there is a roughly 
definable collection of ways in which this human being can flourish. This may 
indeed vary here and there but there is certainly a core collection of virtues 
which can be identified. Indeed, Aristotle’s φρόνησις allows for just this sort of 
variation as this practical sense allows for someone to judge just what is appro-
priate for themselves as a distinct member of their species and community who 
encounters novel situations. It is primarily this necessity for a form of ethical 
wisdom which takes account of the (often seemingly trivial) minutiae of an indi-
vidual life which drives both Aristotle and Plato to distance this form of wisdom 
from an understanding of general principles of the cosmos. And yet both au-
thors refuse to sever ethical thinking from general principles.  
It is at this point of Aristotle’s consideration of how to be a good human being 
that he becomes most confusing. Again this is almost certainly due in part to the 
unpolished nature of the text (at §VI, ix it becomes particularly fractured). Criti-
cally, however, Aristotle focuses on the kind of thinking which sound ethical de-
liberation consists in and he acknowledges that an evil human could be crafty 
and accurate in their considerations of their own wellbeing to some extent and 
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yet we would be wrong to call this person wise in any sense. Aristotle thus con-
cludes that φρόνησις consists in a species of soundness of mind, a kind of habit 
of thought, attitude, awareness and action which leads to goodness.66  
This is not a strictly cognitive process with a conclusion which can be called 
true or false, but rather ‘being correct in the sense of arriving at something 
good’. So whilst φρόνησις need not be directly concerned with general princi-
ples it must nevertheless conform to non-instrumental ideas of goodness to 
some extent. In fact, Aristotle also explains the further intellectual virtue of ‘un-
derstanding’, which is the sound judgement required to perceive the right opin-
ions which can lead to sound deliberation.67 Indeed it becomes apparent that all 
of these virtues are tied together and Aristotle gradually becomes more and 
more inclusive in his consideration of these virtues. Despite the insistence upon 
distinction, even σοφία and φρόνησις are intimately linked to the extent that 
φρόνησις leads to σοφία.68 Indeed, σοφία is revealed to be something far more 
than simply comprehending some abstract, metaphysical insights, it is the ful-
crum about which all virtue and human wellbeing pivot, it is certainly a far more 
pervasive thing than first suggested.69 Aristotle is perhaps most perspicuous 
when he engages his medical analogies for it is in this way that he explains 
that: 
…it is not really the case that φρόνησις is in authority, over Σοφία or 
over the higher part of the intellect, any more than medical science is 
in authority over health. Medical science does not control health, but 
studies how to procure it; hence it issues orders in the interests of 
health, not to health.70     
Φρόνησις is the sensitive and calculative part of our minds. It is the judgemental 
eye cast over the world. But this eye could simply be crafty and manipulative; 
this sight must be guided by good virtue to be a force worth calling any kind of 
wisdom.71 It must be searching for and engaging in the right thing. And since 
σοφία appears to be an activity of being excellent (in the most general and per-
vasive, if overidingly cognitive, sense) one must have something of this σοφία 
to be virtuous and therefore to have φρόνησις. Φρόνησις looks for ways to be 
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good, σοφία is (in part) the activity of being good, but one must already be part-
ly good in order to correctly look for goodness. ‘σοφία is part of virtue as a 
whole, and therefore by its possession, or rather by its exercise, renders a per-
son well’.72 
Perhaps the most pressing concern that might be raised concerning this furious 
mix of psychological phenomena is the manner in which divisions and connec-
tions, dependencies and interdependencies are articulated so briefly and force-
fully that insufficient clarification is given regarding the nature of this admixture. 
Why is it so important that Socrates was wrong (so Aristotle tells us) about vir-
tues being principles as opposed to operating in conjunction with principles? 
This suggestion is certainly heavily predicated upon Aristotle’s own strict theory 
of human psychology and the division of the soul into distinct aspects: higher 
and lower, intellectual and biological.73  
Yet, mightn’t we allow for a more nuanced psychology, one which allows for far 
greater fluidity and lack of categorical definition? Aristotle certainly indicates this 
in pointing to the unity of virtues and it is perhaps here that we may find a final 
possibility for a kernel of an ancient theory of wisdom which accounts for ethical 
focus and insight, real-life adaptability, holistic understanding and soundness of 
mind and attitude.   
Elizabeth Telfer finds that Aristotle’s theory of the unity of virtue requires a ‘well-
disposedness’ and that whilst this is not explicitly claimed as part of Aristotle’s 
theory, it is nevertheless required by it.74 Perhaps we could be more generous 
to Aristotle than Telfer and find that he does indeed suggest this, particularly 
when he claims that 
A man of deficient self-restraint or a bad man may as a result of cal-
culation arrive at the object he proposes as the right thing to do, so 
that he will have deliberated correctly, although he will have gained 
something extremely evil.75 
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So φρόνησις must be guided by the right sort of desire: by virtue. It cannot be 
called wisdom unless it is driven by a general kind of goodness, otherwise, as 
aforementioned, it is just cleverness. Yet Telfer also finds that Aristotle fails to 
argue successfully for the unity of virtue due to the lack of nuance given to the 
virtues which must be united, someone may well possess this ‘well-
disposedness’ but they’re clearly not going to be perfectly virtuous in every way 
just because they have φρόνησις.76  
Telfer is certainly correct that Aristotle very often presents a vision of a moral 
world in which virtues can either be possessed perfectly or not at all, but this 
may be more to do with tone, or mode of expression, than the content of the 
theory. Certainly Aristotle’s insistence upon time and experience being key to 
forming φρόνησις (and σοφία) would suggest otherwise.77 Aristotle certainly 
isn’t suggesting that there is a critical point of age or experience which suddenly 
grants wisdom, it is, rather, a process of gaining a broader perspective which, in 
turn, grants both a better appreciation of the means of achieving goodness and 
a fuller participation in and understanding of that goodness itself. So if we can 
allow for this gradual development of virtues, including φρόνησις and σοφία, 
then it seems entirely reasonable to suggest that if someone is to be ‘called 
good without qualification’78, that is, not ‘good without fault’ but simply a ‘good 
person’, they must possess a cohesive awareness of both the general good-
ness towards which they strive and an awareness of the relationships between 
not only their actions and the world around them but also between one virtue 
and another.  
We can imagine someone who is very protective of their family, perhaps even 
generous with them, yet due to their lack of cohesive moral character and per-
ception of the moral world in which they live, they might also be quite violent or 
deceitful. This might represent an example of isolated virtue, but it is not true 
virtue. True virtue comes from a virtuous whole and when accompanied by ex-
perience and an ever improving ethical awareness and participation will impact 
virtue as a whole. It is important to keep in mind that Aristotle speaks of 
φρόνησις and σοφία as activities, or rather qualities which can be exercised, as 
opposed to static states. Φρόνησις is an ability to recognise and participate in 
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good things. Σοφία is an ability to recognise and participate in (amongst other 
things) virtue(s). So if we are to believe Aristotle, σοφία is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of φρόνησις and φρόνησις is a sufficient but not necessary 
condition of σοφία. So we can have absent minded geniuses who we might call 
wise but who do not understand or participate in particulars.  
Aristotle wrestles with a clear need to describe a system of moral virtue and 
psychological activity which is at once contiguous and cohesive and at the 
same time composed of distinct aspects. He disagrees with the Socratic vision 
of moral and intellectual activity which is homogenous and unitary because of 
its failure to deal with clear differences observed in the world. The wisdom 
gained through experience and time; the distinctions between those who are 
naturally good hearted and those who have a more complete understanding of 
their ethical activities; the myriad ways in which people can fail or succeed in 
acting virtuously. Yet he sees the need to describe a system which can also ac-
count for the interconnectedness, even singularity, of ethical character and the 
importance (albeit at a very basic level) of general principals of good and evil, of 
right and wrong, to act as a foundation of ethical action.   
This is where Aristotle’s theory of wisdom diverges most completely from Pla-
to’s. Socratic ‘human wisdom’ is not different in kind from other wisdom but in 
degree. Socrates is still the wisest man because, not only does he recognise 
the limits of his own knowledge but also, his recognition of and participation in 
those more worldly matters which it is our prerogative to understand is more 
complete. These ethical things occupy a narrower end of the wisdom scale but 
they lie nevertheless on the same scale. Aristotle demands a more complete 
division, ethical concerns are particular, active and petty, perhaps they co-
operate with grander, more static principals but they exercise a completely dif-
ferent part of our minds. 
Plato too argues for the unity of virtue. It is in the Protagoras that the Socratic 
unity of virtue is most fully articulated and as Brickhouse and Smith explain, this 
theory has divided scholars persistently.79 Do Plato’s dialogues endorse a view 
of Virtue as a singular thing expressed in different ways in different circum-
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stances or as a multifaceted thing composed of distinct virtues which can and 
do form parts of both virtue as a whole and of one another?  
This discussion follows Brickhouse and Smith in the suggestion that Plato’s ac-
count is not as fragmentary or troublesome as this part/whole debate would 
suggest but rather that Virtue is singular due to the overarching nature of one 
enveloping virtue, namely σοφία. Different virtues are united through their rela-
tion to σοφία, it is through knowledge of good and evil as such that all other vir-
tues exist and are exercised.80 Aristotle may have deemed that the relationship 
between this knowledge and its being exercised (and not being exercised) in 
particular circumstances was not fully developed by Plato, leaving this abstract 
master virtue floating in an offputtingly intangible æther. A fair criticism. Yet both 
authors discuss σοφία not only as an abstract, rarified knowledge of the ulti-
mate principals of the cosmos but also as a kind of lynchpin to good activity.  
Both Aristotle and Plato find themselves drawn away from this ethical dimen-
sion of σοφία. Aristotle uses a distinct psychological activity as a kind of buffer 
zone, a cunning slave to spare σοφία the degradation of being associated with 
the lowly matters of daily human existence; Plato merely sidesteps the need for 
this association and places himself at the inconsequential fringes of σοφία, a 
distant admirer, staring longingly at the brilliant core of this cosmic light. For 
both Plato and Aristotle true σοφία is not only the preserve of the gods but it is 
also highly conceptual in nature. Σοφία may be expansive and it may include 
ethical activity, a life lived ‘well-spirited’ or ‘happily’ (either distantly or indirectly) 
but it is ultimately an intellectual thing.  
Not only does Aristotle tell us that ‘a life of virtuous activity will essentially be 
one of eudaimonia’ but also that ‘eudaimonia is some form of contemplation’.81 
Indeed, since it is this thinking man, this man who ‘pursues intellectual activity’ 
who comes closest to divinity, who is most like the gods themselves, this is yet 
‘another proof that the wise man is most eudaimon’  
ὣστε κὰν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιτ΄ εὐδαίμων82 
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Plato’s ideal may be more religious and less scientific, but he too points to an 
excellence which finds its epitome less in the realm of action and more in the 
realm of pondering. Given their grand efforts to describe the less abstract sides 
of psychological virtue both Plato and Aristotle cannot help but ascribe the shin-
ing essence of this all-encompassing master virtue to something distinctly rare-
fied.  
It may well be, however, that this contemplative focus of σοφία is less integral to 
these theories of wisdom than their authors suggest. Indeed, it is this high es-
teem for intellectualism and its strict division from more worldly concerns which 
is at the heart of both Aristotle’s complex and problematic categorisation and 
Plato’s esoteric intangibility. If we were to allow for a downgrading of this aspect 
of wisdom, and a more complex and messy psychology which does not demand 
a capacity to deal with such things in isolation, we may well be able to reconcile 
these theories, not only with one another, but also with an acceptable and en-
lightening view of wisdom more generally. Such a holistic and equitable view 
may well demand that the relationship between human wisdom, or φρόνησις, 
and σοφία is biconditional (in line with Plato rather than Aristotle) and it may al-
so demand a potentially uncomfortable tethering of metaphysics and ethics, in-
compatible with many modern trends of thought, but it would allow for a theory 
which encompasses ethical focus and insight, real-life adaptability, holistic un-
derstanding and soundness of mind and attitude. If there is a kernel to an Aris-
totelian and Platonic theory of wisdom which can offer insight, it may be found 
only through this non-intellectual modification. Indeed Aristotle likewise finishes 
his discussion of wisdom and wellbeing with a hint in this direction, with a tem-
pering of theory through experience: 
… but it is by the practical experience of life and conduct that the 
truth is really tested, since it is there that the final decision lies. We 
must therefore examine the conclusions we have advanced by bring-
ing them to the test of the facts of life. If they are in harmony with the 
facts, we may accept them… Perhaps however, as we maintain, in 
the practical sciences the end is not to attain a theoretic knowledge 
of the various subjects but rather to carry out our theories in action. If 
so, to know what virtue is is not enough; we must endeavour to pos-
sess and to practice it…83    
                                            
83 EN, §X, viii (1179a:20-2, 1179a:35-1179b:2) 
 38 
38 
Perhaps, then, we might ask whether the lived experience of striving to live well 
reflects the erudite penchants of Aristotle and Plato or whether, as Aristotle was 
seemingly prepared to accept, wisdom might be spoken of as a more inclusive 
appreciation of goodness in a much broader and less academically centered 
range of practices.  
 
2 – Moderate Realism as the Epistemic and Metaethical Basis of Wisdom. 
 
There is Nothing Either Good or Bad, but Thinking Makes it So. 
- Shakespeare, Hamlet, 2.2. 
 
There are some who, as we have said, both themselves as-
sert that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be, 
and say that people can judge this to be the case… Further, it 
follows that all would then be right and all would be in error, 
and our opponent himself confesses himself to be in error. 
And at the same time our discussion with him is evidently 
about nothing at all; for he says nothing. For he says neither 
'yes' nor 'no'; and again he denies both of these and says 'nei-
ther yes nor no'; for otherwise there would already be some-
thing definite. (Metaphysics, IV, 1005b31-1006a2 and 
1008a29-34). 
Let us assume with Protagoras that your judgement is true for 
you. But isn’t it possible that the rest of us may criticize (sic) 
your verdict?... Secondly, it has this most exquisite feature: 
Protagoras admits, I presume, that the contrary opinion about 
his own opinion (namely that it is false) must be true, seeing 
that he agrees that all men judge what is. (Theatetus, 170d-
171b.) 
The victorious one, through knowledge                                                                                           
Of reality and unreality,                                                                                                                              
In the Discourse to Katyayana,                                                                                                                          
Refuted both 'it is' and it is not'.                                                                     
(Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakarika, XV, 7). 
Action depends upon the agent.                                                                     
The agent itself depends on action.                                                                         
One cannot see any way                                                                                            
To establish them differently.                                                                                       
(VIII, 12). 
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Quite a muddle. Someone must be wrong here. But then again, if philosophers 
like Siddhārtha Gautama and Nagarjuna are correct, then perhaps they can all 
be right and all be wrong at once. But that's not really what these Buddhist phi-
losophers are saying, is it? Perhaps saying 'neither yes nor no' is importantly 
different from saying nothing at all.  
The idea of wisdom highlighted thus far, of a virtue which ties together all vir-
tues, which is cognitive yet not necessarily intellectual, and crucially one which 
concerns a way of life and well-being at least as much as it does a sharp mind, 
may strike some as far from compelling. Whilst it might be agreed that the rea-
sons for wanting to outline such a virtue can be understood, sympathised with 
even, perhaps they are just as misguided as the metaphysical and ethical real-
ism which they seem to entail.84 If this wisdom, with its conjunction of practical 
and theoretical, consists in an awareness of and participation in truth, if it is a 
kind of knowledge primarily concerned with how we should live, then what place 
can it have in robust contemporary thinking?85 
If one individual is to have more knowledge of moral truths than another then 
there must be moral truths independent of both individuals which they can 
know. More than this, this wisdom is something which is practised, not merely 
possessed, and as such a freedom of will also seems bound up with this model 
of virtue. Certainly, Aristotle's treatment merges into a collection of virtues which 
need not be the direct result of an individual's power, but the core of these vir-
tues, even with Aristotle, concerns a volition (ἡ προαίρεσις)86, a culpable, unfet-
tered agency which is possessed of a kind of 'self-sufficiency' (ἡ αὐτάρκεια).87 It 
is popularly imagined that the problem of determinism and free will was first 
                                            
84 I am thinking here mostly of a kind of non-cognitivist which I regularly, even routinely en-
counter (what Russ Shafer-Landau calls an ‘expressivist’, Cf. R. Shafer-Landau, Moral Real-
ism: A Defense,  pp.19-22). Usually my own moral realist stance will provoke a kind of indi-
gence coupled with the suggestion that moral language simply isn’t of the fact claiming kind, 
which, as for reasons that will become clear, I find to be a curiously weak and empirically 
flawed objection.   
85 I am indeed, regularly encouraged by the headway made by Shafer-Landau in keeping an 
embattled position alive for moral realism within the narrow and fierce world of English 
speaking academic philosophy. Whilst such realism is usually assumed to be part of the the-
ologically inclined, unhinged fringes of academic philosophy (an identity I wouldn’t wholly ob-
ject to), Shafer Landau remains evidence of a relatively (academically) acceptable form of 
non-naturalist moral realism. My own realism differs (largely in an epistemological capacity) 
from that of Shafer-Landau, but at this stage what matters to be stated is that the kind of 
metaethical position which is eventually expressed here, however unfashionable, is not (at 
least not entirely) alone.   
86 EN, §X,viii (1178a35) 
87 EN, §X,vii (1177a25). 
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raised by Epicurus, but as Susanne Bobzien explains, even Epicurus seems to 
fit more comfortably into an ancient tradition of not recognizing a problem at 
all.88 Perhaps, as Bobzien suggests, the ancients preferred an attribution of re-
sponsibility on the basis of causal origin as opposed to freedom of the will, but it 
seems safe to say (whilst allowing for exegetical nuances) that along with the 
metaphysical and ethical realism entailed by this theory of wisdom comes a 
quite bold image of the agent as determiner.   
What does all this matter anyway? If we are willing to throw away Aristotle's 
simplistic psychology and Plato's extreme idealism, not to mention the intellec-
tualism that comes with both, why not just discard the naïve realism to boot? 
Can't we make good use of an idea of wisdom which doesn't involve a world of 
moral absolutes and mysterious little unmoved movers? Perhaps the most ob-
vious point to make here is that it is hard to say what a virtue concerned with 
the awareness of and participation in truth would be if there were no such 
strong idea of truth to engage with. Perhaps it would be concerned with limited 
truths; perhaps the truths of a community, or (as aforementioned) a species. 
Human wisdom would be an awareness of and participation in ‘human truths’. 
Ultimately, to deal with this issue comprehensively it would be necessary to 
treat the myriad arguments for and against relativism and what follows would 
become little more than a history of those arguments. There are, however, only 
two primary arguments which will be offered against a relativist objection to this 
theory of wisdom.  
The first argument suggests that ethical relativism is inextricably bound up with 
a more far-reaching relativism and that any such epistemology will necessarily 
result in incoherence (which will also be discussed in terms of dishonesty), nihil-
ism or a kind of naïve isolation of volition. This argument will take Nietzsche’s 
discussion of the same topic in ‘Beyond Good and Evil’ as a point both of 
agreement and departure.89 This first argument ultimately concludes that any 
ethical anti-realism will be born out of a fruitless and misplaced desire for cer-
tainty which might be dissolved by abandoning a false dichotomy between cre-
dulity and incredulity.  
                                            
88 S. Bobzien, ‘Did Epicurus Discover the Free Will Problem?’, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Phi-
losophy, Vol.XIX, Winter 2000, pp.286-337 (p.336-7). 
89 F. Nietzsche, ‘Beyond Good and Evil’, in F. Nietzsche, Human All Too Human and Beyond 
Good and Evil, H. Zimmem and P. V. Cohn (tr.), (Ware, Wordsworth Editions, 2008 [1886]), 
pp.513-690. 
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The second argument will seek to address an objection to moral realism which 
might be offered by linguistic philosophy, namely: that ethical talk is meaning-
less. This argument will suggest that far from ethical language being necessari-
ly meaningless, it is any language which purports to escape this way of talking 
which will ultimately be meaningless. This argument will take Wittgenstein’s 
identification of both ethics and logic as transcendental structures of our world 
of meaning as (once again) a point of both agreement and departure. Ultimate-
ly, this argument will conclude that whilst ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ cannot be 
meaningfully discussed, ‘good things’ and ‘bad things’ (and the differences 
therein) can (and must) be discussed. It will be suggested that any identification 
of ethical talk as meaningless will rely upon a false dichotomy between ethical 
and non-ethical ways of life/meaning. The corollary will follow that it is also non-
sense to posit any world which is not the ethical-logical one in which we live and 
that this might also address some of the anti-metaphysical objections of the rel-
ativist.   
This discussion will then conclude by looking to the more particular problem of 
free will and determinism which, though not raised directly by the theory of wis-
dom suggested here, is nevertheless implied. It will be suggested that rather 
than seeking to wrestle with the twists and turns of apparently irreconcilable in-
clinations to both freedom and causality, it is possible instead to embrace the 
spirit of humility and tentative realism hitherto alluded to. Instead of an exhaus-
tive appraisal of compatibilist and incompatibilist theories, an attempt is made to 
describe a manner of seeking wisdom which allows some level of intellectual 
tension and inexplicability to enter into our thinking. To the linguistic argument 
for moral realism will be added a kind of attitude or approach inspired by certain 
aspects of Zen Buddhism; a way of thinking which might allow for a navigation 
of the difficulties of realism without needing to treat the extant points for and 
against relativism exhaustively. An attitude which entails a simple, even naïve 
belief in the world, moral and physical, as it presents itself, yet one which in-
volves a retention of rational enquiry which disallows for a complete victory of 
this naivety. This view holds all truths, all natures as interdependent. Man is in-
deed the measure of all things, but so too are all things the measure of Man. 
That there is a point between stark, clear-cut categories and complete, empty 
dissolution; that there is a middle path to tread and that this is best;  neither 
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wholly yes, nor wholly no. This middle ground will feed not only into this 
metaethical theory but also the discussion as a whole. 
  
Between Good and Evil 
Let's imagine philosophy without an ethical or practical basis; intellectual en-
deavour without ego. Perhaps it would be a logical exercise, an attempt to out-
line what makes sense and what doesn't. It would be a pure conceptual analy-
sis; let's try to imagine just that, an airy juggling of thoughts, just floating there in 
an ethereal structure of logic and codified grammar. It might yield truth, such an 
activity might bear the crisp rationalist fruit of certainty. Unencumbered by the 
vagaries of life, of observation and experience, this pristine intellectual quest 
could grant us something immutable. That might be nice. If such a thing were 
even a possibility, wouldn't it be worth trying? Such cleanliness and clarity. Well, 
if so, why? 
Perhaps just because we like neat things, things which don't rot and change, 
that might be reason enough to attempt such a practice a priori. We could try an 
emotivist justification like this, that philosophy, of the conceptual, a priori variety, 
is simply something which is enjoyed by certain sorts of people, by neat freaks. 
Such a position would need to deal with the dissonance inherent in a profession 
of pursuing universal truths whilst attempting to remain content that the desire 
to do so is based in something so petty, insular, mutable and organic as a per-
sonal penchant. To find such a position compelling we would need to embrace, 
at the very least, an emotional kind of inconsistency, if not a rational one. Or 
perhaps this philosophy would claim something less grand, not that it seeks 
truth, but clarification. Even here, though, as Wittgenstein acknowledges, there 
would need to be an ethical axiom which drove us to clarity, some disdain for 
muddled conversations.90 It might merely be a therapy for the headaches of 
                                            
90 I am thinking here particularly of the section of the Philosophical Investigations where Witt-
genstein almost seems to pause and asks: ‘Where does our investigation get its importance 
from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and im-
portant? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we 
are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language 
on which they stood’. (L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §118). I don’t read Witt-
genstein’s first question as entirely rhetorical. The ‘clearing up’ which comes as a triumphant 
answer here cannot help but seem a little lackluster. Who but the most terminally, obsessive-
ly, compulsive would accept such a replacement for ‘all that is great and important’?  
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metaphysics and other mixed up language games.91 It would be a sad little phi-
losophy, though, which took the form of solitary diaries, spelling out purely per-
sonal grammatical confusions, thinking nothing for the confusions of others. 
Perhaps this is what drove Wittgenstein to want to work on a farm instead.92 
Far more likely, in all of these analytic and linguistic 'philosophies', is a norma-
tive suggestion, an ethical stance, however loosely wrought, that to seek truth, 
or to remove headaches, is an admirable activity. Of course, such a stance 
needn't discount the possibility of more visceral, emotive compulsions (and this 
acknowledgement will be important for what follows). It is being suggested here, 
however, that some kind of normative basis for a philosophical endeavour 
(however that activity might be conceived), is not only empirically broadly extant 
(if not logically necessary), it can also be accurate and hugely compelling.   
It is understandable, of course, that someone concerned with the pursuit of truth 
would want to get as far from emotive and normative motivations as possible. 
The emotive possibility would, as aforementioned, lead us into a realm of fragile 
subjectivism of just the sort we neat-minded truth questers hoped to escape. 
The normative foundation would open a can of ethical worms which cannot help 
but lead us into the fuzzy dominion of personal experience and uncertainty 
which we similarly sought to distance ourselves from. Such fears, though, begin 
to smack of wayward pride.     
Nietzsche recognises that any pursuit of truth must necessarily be bound up 
with a kind of moral quest; he suggests that we can either trust naïvely, blindly 
even, in these moral and metaphysical truths and thus remain enslaved to our 
ethical mess, or that we can cast off that inherited paradigm.93 Further to this, 
Nietzsche proposes that the latter option needn't lead to nihilism as we might 
suspect, in rejecting the fragility of our ethical lives and the pompous pseudo-
objectivity of truth-seeking, we needn't crumble into inhuman extinction, rather 
                                            
91 Rather than explicitly throwing my pennyworth into the arena of Wittgensteinian exegesis and 
the Theory vs Therapy debate, I hope instead that my own discussion of the counter-
productive attempt to separate clear thinking and good living will offer a less obviously parti-
san contribution. I suspect that my own disdain for solid and easy to wield answers (theories) 
fits particularly well with a reading of Wittgenstein which focuses on an attempt to draw phi-
losophy away from ideas of progress and, as such, finds some sympathy with Daniel Hutto’s 
‘third way’ (D. Hutto, Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy, 
[Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003], p.5). 
92 On Wittgenstein’s efforts to elope to the USSR see: R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty 
of Genius, (London, random House, 1990), pp.151-2. 
93 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, (London, Wordsworth, 2008), §10. 
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we (or those strong enough) can and must build ourselves anew; an effulgent, 
super human construct.94 Perhaps this artifice could dissolve any need for the 
pursuit of wisdom hitherto described.  
The belief in 'immediate certainties' is a moral naïveté which 
does honour to us philosophers; but - we have now to cease 
being 'merely moral' men! Apart from morality, such belief is a 
folly which does little honour to us!... Need I say expressly af-
ter all this that they will be free, very free spirits, these philos-
ophers of the future - as certainly they will also not be merely 
free spirits, but something more, higher, greater, and funda-
mentally different…95 
It would be too simple, and quite unfair, to criticise Nietzsche for employing 
evaluative language in describing his post-moral ideal. Yet it is still hard to say 
what this elevation of will to first principle achieves. Certainly, Nietzsche likes 
this overarching drive to manipulate, to change, this 'Will to Power', he ap-
proves of it. It is an ethic of escape. Nietzsche has followed the winding path of 
abstract speculation and he resents the false dichotomy with which he has been 
presented: 'accept naiveté and cartoonish truths or relinquish all understanding'. 
So demands the cosmos, and Mr Nietzsche shouts back 'No! I shall carve out 
something else for myself and those who follow me'.96 Nietzsche sees honour in 
the history of an occupation which has been gripped by a desire for solid, potent 
truths but urgently proclaims its new mission of creation. And he is right, of 
course, that it is a desire for control, for the safety of a quantity which is known, 
which drives both he and the truth seeker. But in resolving one false dichotomy, 
he has ignored other, more subtle options. A gentler path. 
The petty dishonesty of the truth seeker who feigns ignorance of the axioms 
and ethical foundations of her quest; the feeble mindedness of the non-
philosopher who doesn't even start down the path; the pitiful weakness and dis-
solution of the nihilist who turns away from it all; or the brave new world of the 
new philosopher as creator. It is fitting, and not beyond Nietzsche's understand-
ing, that this line-up is itself a fiction. If it is unbearably credulous to believe in 
truth and justice, then it is at least equally so to believe in any of these strange 
caricatures. Where is this sea of mindless slaves who wallow perpetually in ig-
norance and inertia? And what of the nihilist? That gothic, zombie-like ascetic 
                                            
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. §34,44. 
96 I should probably note that, despite the similar tone, this is not a quotation.  
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who has failed to pick up her own pieces? Least plausible of all, the superman, 
the artist extraordinaire, who would need to be so utterly psychologically re-
moved from anything we know that it is barely imaginable, let alone human.97 
Nietzsche's most important gloss, though, is with the truth seeker. Indeed, the 
dichotomy we are now presented with is between two groups. On the one side 
are the slaves and the false philosophers, the credulous, and on the other we 
have the nihilists and the new philosophers, the incredulous. Belief or doubt. 
But why not have both? 
Does the lover of wisdom necessarily betray her cause when she has faith in 
truth or goodness? Need this faith be blind? Though a foundation, need it lie 
there alone and hidden?  
Pure, alien, compulsive will remains true, not to the pursuit of truth but to the 
desire for the safety of certainty. We cannot achieve such certainty through 
speculation, or through experience, so we can only achieve it by making it our-
selves. But why should we take this desire for control and safety to be our bed-
rock? Is it so self-evidently fundamental to being? Rather, it is suggested here, 
that the fragile, complex, uncertain ethical realities of life are the irreducible axi-
oms upon which we should build our thought and our lives. Yes, they require 
some faith, some uncertainty; to accept them as the basis of our thinking re-
quires that we relinquish some aspect of that quest for truth but we needn't give 
up so much, just the unassailable safety of certainty or the prospect thereof. It is 
not a Will to Power which is fundamental to being but meekness.   
Such a loss of certainty need not, however, require a loss of conviction. Certain-
ly, the seeker of wisdom would be giving something precious up if belief and 
doubt were mutually exclusive. The trap is to think that accepting a truth de-
                                            
97 I agree with Keith Ansell-Pearson that ‘Nietzsche does not intend Zarathustra to teach some-
thing utterly fantastical’ (K. Ansell-Pearson, “Who Is the Ubermensch? Time, Truth, and 
Woman in Nietzsche.” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 53, no. 2, 1992, pp. 309–331 
[p.317]). I do not mean ‘unimaginable’ or ‘inhuman’ in a dramatic sense, but rather in a 
sense of psychological naivety and two-dimensional, implausibility. I agree also with Ansell 
Pearson that the basis of this ‘overman’ is in a kind of personal progress (we might say 
‘overcoming’), and for this reason this current discussion finds great sympathy with Nie-
tzsche’s quest. But Nietzsche’s answer is to reduce the human to a kind of minimalist im-
pulse, empty of moral intuition. My challenge is not, as with those against whom Ansell-
Pearson takes issue, with Nietzsche’s logical problems (as will become clear[er], that would 
be somewhat hypocritical) but with the almost foetal, creative core which Nietzsche identifies 
as vital, desirable and, in some sense, attainable. In place of Nietzsche’s self-immolation 
and rebirth I attempt to suggest a more gentle compromise, of perhaps the occasional self-
beratement.    
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mands unthinking compliance. If I am confident that selfless generosity is a fun-
damental constituent of the universe and a sound (though not solitary) basis for 
all of my activity (practical or intellectual), I needn't be a two-dimensional aco-
lyte, hopelessly constrained to accept any and all which bears the mark of such 
a virtue. Nietzsche himself, of course, was not two-dimensional in his escape: 
There is far too much witchery and sugar in the sentiments 
'for others' and 'not for myself'… Let us therefore be cau-
tious!... There is something ticklish in 'the truth' and in the 
search for truth; and if man goes about it too humanely - 'il ne 
cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien' - I wager he finds noth-
ing!98 
Nothing? Yes, let's be cautious, yes there can indeed be 'too much witchery 
and sugar', but need we do this 'too humanely'? Perhaps, just humanely 
enough might permit us to find something, however small and fragile that some-
thing might be. Something in between: not black or white, nor good or evil, nor 
right or wrong, not knowledge or ignorance, but something in between. Belief 
and doubt in a complex world of admixture and grey combinations.  
     
Un-Certainty 
The old philosopher may yet be unconvinced by this call to virtue, however miti-
gated by claims of moderation. Perhaps there is an option which fuses the nihil-
ist and the truth seeker: the sense seeker. Granted, we do, in practice, employ 
ethical foundations in all of our dealings, particularly in our 'philosophical' activi-
ties. Such things might be unavoidable to an extent, but does that mean we 
need to engage with them at all times and in all our activities? Can't we just limit 
our philosophy to avoid such topics, to areas where neatness is possible?  
One might even go so far as to say that ethical discourse isn't just messy, it's 
necessarily nonsensical. Indeed, in his 'A Lecture on Ethics' Wittgenstein con-
tends just this, transforming Hume's is/ought distinction into a matter of simile 
and semantic dissonance.99 We are told that 'Ethics, if it is anything, is super-
natural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a tea-
                                            
98 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §33,35 
99 L. Wittgenstein, 'A Lecture on Ethics', in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 
1965), pp. 3-12 (pp.9-10). 
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cup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it.'100 Thus any attempt at 
expressing non-instrumental value will necessarily draw upon our language of 
instrumental value because that's the only kind of value to which we can defini-
tively point, anything else will just overflow into meaninglessness. So when it 
comes to ethical talk, if we strip away the simile (unlike other occasions of simi-
larity) we are left with nothing.101 We may all wish to talk about this empty core 
to our ethical talk, but we cannot, it is the impenetrable bedrock of our language 
and necessarily cannot be meaningful: 'running against the walls of our cage is 
perfectly, absolutely hopeless'.102  
But is that what saying something is morally bad or good is really like? When I 
say, 'she is a bad person' and I am asked 'why do you think she is a bad per-
son?' I might answer by saying that 'she is cruel', I might even give some ex-
ample of her cruelty. There is certainly a meaning which is being successfully 
communicated here, and it is not just simply analogous to saying that 'she is 
bad at tennis'. Attempting to describe goodness is certainly hopeless, attempt-
ing to describe something which is good and something which is not, is not. 
Of course, Wittgenstein went on to develop his ideas in new directions. Bur-
bules and Smeyer are right when they identify the reason for Wittgenstein not 
including more ethical examples of language games as being because ethics is 
the 'practice of practices'.103 Wittgenstein never departed from his consideration 
of ethics, aesthetics and other religio-metaphysical matters as being beyond our 
ability to talk meaningfully about (though he did not dispute their vital im-
portance in our lives).104 Ethical talk is, by this view, a 'tendency in the human 
mind',105 a psychological quirk or anthropological curiosity. However founda-
tional or inescapable, it is a habit to be observed rather than a habit of observa-
tion. 
Now, there are two things which can be said of this model of ethical language 
which are entirely compatible with the realist theory of wisdom suggested previ-
                                            
100 Ibid. p.7. 
101 Ibid. p.9 
102 Ibid. p.12 
103 N. C. Burbules and P. Smeyers, 'Wittgenstein, the Practice of Ethics, and Moral Education', 
in S. Fletcher (ed.), Philosophy of Education 2002, (Urbana, IL, Philosophy of Education So-
ciety, 2003), 248-257, (§III). 
104 L. Wittgenstein, 'A Lecture on Ethics', p.12. Wittgenstein concludes his lecture by empha-
sising his enduring respect for ethical talk.  
105 Ibid. 
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ously and which are most urgent in the demands of relativism. First, (A) it could 
be said that only people engage in ethical talk or behaviour and that without 
people there would be no right or wrong, secondly, (B) that ethical truths can 
only be demonstrated through practice, or by living a certain way of life. Neither 
of these suggestions preclude the possibility of the reality of ethical truths inde-
pendent of the opinions of persons.  
Before examining in greater detail how these things (A and B) are compatible 
with a realist understanding of value, it might also be fruitful to consider how 
they can also be said of logic. 'Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-
image of the world. Logic is transcendental… It is clear that Ethics cannot be 
put into words. Ethics is transcendental…'106 Wittgenstein recognises the simi-
larity; it is just that he prioritises logic as the foundation of that which philoso-
phers should, by his reckoning, be dealing with: language. Certainly, one might 
be so sceptical so as to question the reality of logical rules beyond the minds of 
those who use language, but what would such an objection amount to? It would 
be an empty suggestion, it would rely upon the very thing which it aims to un-
dermine. 'Doubt gradually loses its sense. This language game just is like that. 
And everything descriptive of a language game is part of logic'.107 It would be 
meaningless to articulate a justification of the rules which govern our ability to 
convey meaning through language, and yes, any attempt to express or argue 
for the nature of goodness or badness would be equally vacuous. If there were 
someone who had no understanding of intrinsic value whatsoever there would 
be nothing anyone could explicitly say to enlighten them as to its character. 
What is argued here, is that there could, of necessity, be no such ‘person’.    
That ethical truths are evidently perceived (or conceived as the contrary would 
have it) through quite specific and disparate ways of life (B) leads, quite natural-
ly, to the suspicion that such truths are constructions: fictions which arise out of 
cultural and psychological pressures. That someone in another time or place 
could think slavery morally acceptable and that in my own society such a notion 
seems abhorrent leads people to suspect these opinions to be just that: δόξα; 
nothing more than the fragile, deluded fermentations of humanity. But this view, 
                                            
106 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (tr.), 
(London, Routledge, 1961), §6.13, 6.421. 
107 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, D. Paul and G.E. M. Anscombe (tr.), (Oxon, Blackwell, 
1979), §56  
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if it is to be anything other than the angry ramblings of the nihilist, if it is to cap-
ture the imagination of the philosopher escaping Nietzsche's brave new world, 
must be cast in contrast to linguistic communication and discussions of facts. 
Despite the work of those such as Peter Winch, in demonstrating the intercon-
nectedness of our ways of life and the rules of meaning by which we come to 
understand our world, there is still a tendency to think of these unshakable 
grammars of reality in inherently logical terms, before and after, cause and con-
sequence, together and apart, significant and accidental.108 We only understand 
such things and talk about them because we are creatures which live with them 
and in them. Living in the world is prior to (or coextensive with) both linguistic 
communication and evaluative appreciation. Pointing out that an appreciation of 
value(s) is dependent upon living a life (B) tells us nothing, since all understan-
ding is so dependent. 
It is not enough to say that logic and value are the foundations of the way in 
which we live in the world, such a suggestion intimates a duality between per-
sons and some other beyond which can have no meaning. There is simply no 
point to describing the transcendent horizon which bounds us all as an internal-
ly determined Kantian ideal, far less a biological condition. Logic and value are 
not just how we live but how the world lives. 
Certainly, this kind of sweeping statement regarding the fabric of the universe 
smacks of careless, antiquated metaphysics, the sort of thinking characterised 
by anthropocentrism and a cloying kind of arrogance. Indeed, it would hardly 
seem possible to square such a world-view with the idea that people are the on-
ly kind of moral things in the universe (A); how could such a thing be possible if 
the universe itself were inherently moral? We could turn (as ever) to the analo-
gy of light. Only those with eyes that see will be able to turn purposively towards 
the light, yet if one were in a room with a blind person, one would not be in-
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  Perhaps Winch’s , most perspicuous articulation of this anti-dualistic philosophy comes in 
his ‘Nature and Convention’ (P.Winch, ‘Nature and Convention’, in Proceedings of the Aristo-
telian Society, New Series, Vol. 60, [1959 – 1960], pp. 231-252 [p.238]). It should be noted 
that this current discussion suggests a rather more strong form of realism than that which 
might be read in Winch. Winch can certainly be read as suggesting a kind of biological rela-
tivism (the sort highlighted earlier in relation to Aristotle), though it might also be suggested 
that, given his focus on ‘intelligibility’ and in common with this discussion, such a position 
would be unintelligible (This is the position taken by W. P. Brandon, “’Fact’ and ‘Value’ in the 
Thought of Peter Winch: Linguistic Analysis Broaches Metaphysical Questions”, in Political 
Theory, Vol. 10, No. 2 (May, 1982), pp. 215-244).    
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clined to say that there was nothing to see: no direction in which to look. This 
kind of Platonic image might, however, be in danger of reinforcing the kind of 
dualism which this current argument seeks to challenge: between persons and 
the world in which they live.  
The cultural relativist objects that any framework of meaning, any ‘world’ as is 
spoken of here, is exclusive to the specific group of people who construct it 
through their living within it. People and world are coextensive but private, and 
there are many such worlds. The biological relativist recognises the horror and 
absurdity of describing insoluble and incommunicable ethical differences be-
tween groups of people; they see that it is apparent that people can and do 
communicate successfully with one another despite very different ways of life 
and that to imagine there is some sort of vital cut-off point between cultures is 
arbitrary and false.109 To step beyond this biological relativism, to imagine in-
stead that to be a creature with purpose (with intentions and motivations) is 
necessarily to live in a world of value, is not to suggest that these creatures im-
pose this value upon the world, but to describe the way in which both creatures 
and world exist. A world is such a thing that if it is to be a world in which crea-
tures live it must be a world in which statements (or beliefs) of a moral nature 
can be true or false. Any other kind of world will necessarily be meaningless 
and will sit within the emptiness of those transcendent edges which define the 
world in which we do indeed live.   
It is one thing, though, to mitigate the impression of arrogance by justifying 
one’s conviction, it is quite another to qualify the strength of that conviction and 
the role it plays in one’s discourse and conduct. The central and abiding charge 
                                            
109 At this point it is important to note that there is no working consensus on just what does and 
does not count as ‘cultural relativism’. ‘Biological relativism’ (as I call it here) of the sort ex-
pressed by the likes of Martha Nussbaum (perhaps articulated most comprehensively in: M. 
Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, (London, Harvard University Press, 2011) pp.110-1) 
seems entirely compatible with the kind of ‘cultural relativism 2.0 described by Michael 
Brown in M. F. Brown, ‘Cultural Relativism 2.0.’ in Current Anthropology, vol. 49, no. 3, 2008, 
pp. 363–383. Brown insists that the discipline of anthropology is not so riddled with Boazian 
relativism as is often claimed and suggests that a kind of relativism which far more closely 
resembles the ‘moderate realism’ expressed in this current discussion is more representative 
of what is genuinely believed. I hope Brown is correct about this. I would challenge his de-
scription of this actual belief as ‘relativism’ of any kind since, metaethically, it more closely 
resembles the realism I express here, but that is a discussion for another day. It is, neverthe-
less, vital to recognise that there are many pockets throughout anthropology where relativ-
ism takes on a less extreme form than these ‘cultural islands’ but the fact remains that we do 
encounter this kind of relativism frequently in the social sciences and (as I have often been 
reminded when presenting my ideas) must be addressed before the meat of the discussion 
can be reached.  
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against moral realism is, quite rightly, that of arrogance: of ‘witchery and sugar’. 
By attempting to revert the objections of linguistic analysis, reason has been 
offered, not for an assertion of this or that evil, or for this or that good, but rather 
for the ability to discuss moral matters honestly. Exactly how this might be 
done, and with what degree of certainty any moral statement might be made is 
not yet dealt with, only that to escape the dishonest suspension of disbelief 
called for by the non-cognitivist is justified. As David Wiggins says: 
…the non-cognitive account depends for its whole plausibility 
upon abandoning at the level of theory the inner perspective 
that it commends as the only possible perspective upon life’s 
meaning. This is a kind of incoherence, and one that casts 
some doubt upon the distinction of the inside and the outside 
viewpoints. I also believe that, once we break down the sup-
posed distinction between the inner or participative and the 
outer, supposedly objective viewpoints, there will be a route 
by which we can advance (though not to anything like the par-
ticularity of the moral certainty that we began by envying).110 
This meta-ethical foundation to a theory of wisdom is ‘a route by which we can 
advance’. Granted, to say that: ‘a world is such a thing that if it is to be a world 
in which creatures live it must be a world in which statements (and beliefs) of a 
moral nature can be true or false’ sounds a bit strong, but it does not mean that 
moral statements will ever be precisely true or false, only more or less true or 
false. Of course, it is also being suggested, or implied, that people can, by 
some means, recognise (to some degree of accuracy at least) which moral 
statement is more true and which more false and act upon this accordingly. 
What remains to be established is the way in which this possibility of recognition 
and action can justifiably be understood as also part of the transcendent fun-
dament of the world. The means by which the reality of this recognition and ac-
tion can be engaged with is the final matter to be discussed in this chapter, and 
it is also that which, one way or another, will comprise the bulk of the entire the-
sis. 
 
Not One and Not Two 
                                            
110 D. Wiggins, ‘Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life’, in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays 
on Moral Realism, (New York, NY, Cornell University Press, 1988), pp.127-65 (p.135). 
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How is it that we recognise good things and bad things, and, how is it that we 
act upon that recognition? These questions might be more clearly stated as: 
‘how accurate (or confident) can we be in our moral awareness’ And: ‘how 
powerful can we be in acting in accordance with that moral awareness?’. An in-
dication has already been given as to how we might approach the first of these 
questions, namely with a certain moderation in our conviction (which is to say 
nothing of the means by which we achieve accuracy, only that we should not 
expect precision or at least only profess it with a deal of humility and circum-
spection). Very little has been said regarding our moral powers. Obviously 
some sort of position needs to be adopted in relation to both of these questions 
if the moral realist position hitherto suggested is to be anything other than a 
matter of mere intellectual curiosity (which would be an untimely and incongru-
ous termination to such a practically motivated theory). It is, however, despite 
the interconnectedness of these issues, the matter of agency and a freedom of 
will which will be most helpful in reaching a conclusion to the moral realism 
which has been discussed here and which will be the focus of what follows.  
Iris Murdoch suggests that: 
As moral agents we have to try to see justly, to overcome 
prejudice, to avoid temptation, to control and curb imagination, 
to direct reflection. Man is not a combination of an impersonal 
rational thinker and a personal will. He is a unified being who 
sees, and who desires in accordance with what he sees, and 
has some continual slight control over the direction and focus 
of his vision.111 
Murdoch was combating a climate of moral speculation which sought to draw 
the conversation ever more in the direction of the naked will, of a consideration 
of the moral creature as a moving, dynamic thing rather than a perceiver.112 We 
might forgive, then, those times when Murdoch appears to proclaim perception 
almost to the total exclusion of will, but we needn’t relinquish totally the powers 
                                            
111 I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, (London, Routledge, 1974), p.40. 
112 Ibid. p.1-6. An understanding of ethics as primarily a matter of perception (or at least in addi-
tion to ‘reason’) is important throughout this discussion. Murdoch is important in this regard 
and towards the close of the essay I turn more to Weil’s idea of ‘attention’. Of great im-
portance in forming these ideas has been the work of Michael Hauskeller (see: M. Hauskel-
ler, ‘The Relation between Ethics and Aesthetics in Connection with Moral Judgements 
about Gene Technology’, in D. Heaf and J. Wirz [ed.] Genetic Engineering and the Intrinsic 
Value and Integrity of Animals and Plants, International Forum for Genetic Engineering, 
[Hafan, Llanystumdwy 2002], pp.99-102). And particularly through the advice Michael has 
given me throughout his supervision of this thesis, which has been invaluable. 
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of agency, nor should we. Murdoch’s summary, however much as it might fa-
vour perception, aptly highlights the inextricable link between recognising what 
is good and trying to do what is good. The arena of this ‘trying’, this power, 
might well be dwarfed by the immensity of the mechanical storm which sweeps 
us through existence, but however salutary an understanding of this diminution 
might be, we suspect that autonomy must play some part in goodness. Moral 
realism requires some ‘continual slight control’; whether this is simply over the 
direction of our attention or over other sorts of actions is (at this juncture) rela-
tively unimportant, the exertion of a (partially) self-determined energy is the 
same. 
The temptation is to become metaphysical in our speculations. The world of 
causes and consequences, especially viewed through the lens of a scientific 
age, would seem to disallow for any of these magical properties and spontane-
ous (it might even be said arbitrary) psychological activities. Even if we were 
inclined to allow for the less tangible phaenomenon of free will, the law of non-
contradiction, the core of logic itself, presses our ideas into a deadly conflict. 
Either we are free or we are determined. Our tandem inclinations, to believe in 
both a material, causal universe and true moral responsibility, appear to be in a 
doomed relationship, from which only one may emerge.  
Various arguments might be made for the compatibility of these conflicting incli-
nations, frequently taking the form of a kind of psychological assessment, leav-
ing intact causal determination and instead seeking to demonstrate what is real-
ly important in our understanding of moral responsibility.113 
A. Perhaps the end results of our actions are unavoidable. We might use 
Frankfurt’s example of a murder with a backup plan.114 If the murderer 
hadn’t committed the act voluntarily, the backup plan would have en-
sured that the murder took place. So the sequence of events in the uni-
verse may be unalterable but what matters for moral responsibility are 
                                            
113 I am talking here primarily about the compatibilisms of Strawson (P. Strawson, ‘Freedom 
and Resentment’, in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza [ed.], Perspectives on Moral Responsibil-
ity, [London, Cornell University Press, 1993], [1962], pp.45-66); Wolf (S. Wolf, ‘The Im-
portance of Free Will’, J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza [ed.], Perspectives on Moral Responsi-
bility, [London, Cornell University Press, 1993], (1981), pp.101-118);  Frankfurt (H. G. Frank-
furt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, 
No. 23. [Dec. 4, 1969], pp. 829-839); and also Fischer and Ravizza themselves. 
114 Otherwise known as ‘Frankfurt Cases’. Cf. H. G. Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility’ (1969) 
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the intentions of agents. We think someone guilty even if they cannot 
change what happens in the end.  
B. Perhaps instead we might say that a person who cannot help but be 
good is still a good person and vice versa. So a hero who saves some 
innocent people trapped in a burning building who later explains that she 
couldn’t have done otherwise, might be telling the truth and we would still 
think them a hero (maybe even more so).  
C. Perhaps a moral agent simply needs to be responsive to the right sorts 
of reasons.115 So, again, a creature whose actions are determined by the 
right sorts of causes is the sort of creature upon which moral responsibil-
ity can appropriately be heaped. A robot or a hypnotised somnambulist 
are not morally responsible because they aren’t responding to the right 
sorts of causes. Moral responsibility is just a kind of way we treat a cer-
tain sort of determined system, one which contains moral reasons as 
part of its mechanism.  
D.  Or perhaps these reasons need to accord with a second order desire.116 
So a morally responsible person is the sort who, upon reflection on their 
own desires, desires to have these desires.  
These are the likely sorts of positions which might be turned to in reaction to the 
conflict between our inclination to apportion moral responsibility and also to be-
lieve in a universe where every event is a consequence necessarily preceded 
by a corresponding cause. It might well be worth considering, if only briefly, that 
a conviction in such a rigidly causal universe could be shaken by anything from 
Hume’s thoughts on the idea of causation to even a cursory understanding of 
modern physics.117 But to follow that path any great distance would prove 
messy, metaphysical and tangential. 
                                            
115 This is the view defended by Fischer and Ravizza as they describe in the introduction to: J. 
M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (ed.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, (London, Cornell 
University Press, 1993), pp.1-44, (pp.31-3). 
116 Frankfurt makes this condition of second order desire a necessary part of personhood; he 
callsthose creatures without these desires ‘wantons’. This will be of some relevance later in 
this discussion. H. G. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, in The 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No.1. (1971], pp. 5-20. 
117 D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008 [1748]), §4:1:1-13. On the idea of causation and quantum physics see: R. Omnés, 
 55 
55 
In regards to the idea that it is simply intentions which matter, and an ‘ability to 
do otherwise’ does not (A), we may well suspect that, despite ultimate eventual-
ities being unimportant in apportioning responsibility, it still seems important that 
the person has determined, independently, their own intentions. This element at 
least must demonstrate some freedom. As for the person who cannot help but 
intend good things (B), perhaps the sort of thing Murdoch is imagining, we 
might say that, yes they are good, perhaps even a hero, but this is a different 
sort of good from someone who must make some kind of effort, someone who 
has some kind of inclination to not run into burning buildings. Additionally we 
might simply disallow for the alternative being possible. To imagine any person 
who acts in such a way that every element of their activity is entirely without 
contrary inclinations, either historically or presently, is not to imagine a person 
at all.118 
All of this kind of incompatibilist counter-argumentation is certainly useful for 
bolstering our reasons for being cautious of the comfort offered by these re-
sponsibilities without free-will. We might, however, simply recognise the com-
pelling insight of those compatibilist positions which highlight the role of reasons 
in our moral thinking (particularly of the type C). We do indeed think of moral 
behaviour being ‘caused’ by moral reasons. In this sense Murdoch seems right 
to suggest that a good person is the kind of person who sees what is good and 
therefore aims for it.  
Of course it is the ‘therefore’, the ‘cause’ of moral reasons which is problematic, 
and we may well suspect that we are being tempted to think about moral inspi-
ration, reasoning and perception in a way modelled on mechanical and physical 
causation, and that this is to confuse incommensurable ways of thinking, to con-
fuse our language games. We might attempt to amend our vocabulary and 
                                                                                                                                
Quantum Philosophy, A. Sangalli (tr.), (Woodstock, Princeton University Press, 2002); par-
ticularly pp.69-71, in which Omnés appeals directly to Hume’s epistemology. 
118 Moral action always requires some effort, nobody is utterly without alternative inclinations – 
which is not to say I desire to murder a bit, only that there are always some slightly less and 
slightly more good things to be doing which I incline towards. I might jump to someone’s aid 
instantly, and this is good, but it is part of a history of inclination and cultivation, we are moral 
through our history, not only in an instant. It is important to note at this juncture the role 
played by Elizabeth Anscombe in shaping this return to Aristotle and an ethics based on idea 
of cultivating a moral character over time. See particularly: G. E. M. Anscombe, ’Modern 
Moral Philosophy’, in Philsosophy, Vol.33, No.124, (Jan, 1958). 
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speak instead of a ‘responsiveness’ to reasons,119 or we might review the psy-
chology of intention and wilful desire in greater detail and thus attempt to clarify 
the range of activities and kinds of conversations which might be covered by 
this idea of moral reasons and ‘causation’.120 
However much one might attempt to reduce the conflict between determinism 
and moral responsibility to psychological or metaphysical misconceptions, one’s 
efforts will leave a phenomenological remainder. However much any of these 
theories of responsibility without freedom might affirm the diminished place of 
any freedom which we might hope to have, they do not extinguish the pivotal 
role which some sense of self-determined liberty plays in the reality of our moral 
lives. Nor does any criticism of the scientific and metaphysical difficulties of 
causation itself detract from the immediately apparent reality of both mechanical 
and psychological causation in our lives.         
Just as ‘a world is such a thing that if it is to be a world in which creatures live it 
must be a world in which statements (and beliefs) of a moral nature can be true 
or false’ so too does it seem to be one in which these moral statements (and 
beliefs) can not only be more or less accurate but also one in which they can be 
acted upon in accordance with both reasons and liberty. If good and bad form 
part of the ineffable boundary which defines our world then free will and deter-
minism occupy a similar realm. Our experience of freedom is prior to any 
speculation about its conflict with causation, and it is concurrent with our expe-
rience of that causation. Both causation (moral causation in the form of rea-
sons) and free will suffuse our lived experience in tandem. Together they form 
part of the basic fabric of life which precludes and shapes any discussion of 
their ultimate nature.  
If there is going to be some double think, some slight-of-hand (and seemingly 
there must be), it must come as part of the muddle, not as a solution to it. Better 
the tyrant who fails openly in weakness and frailty than the one who fails in se-
crecy through corruption and lies. Some vices are worse than others. We must 
remember the courage of Socrates’ philosophic soldier. Even the hardest gran-
ite wall will crack over time, and though it is the very bedrock, given to us as an 
                                            
119 As with Fischer and Ravizza: J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, Perspectives on Moral Respon-
sibility. 
120 I am thinking here particularly of Anscombe: G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, (Oxford, Black-
well, 1968 [1957]).  
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impermeable layer beneath which lies only impossibly blinding fire and upon 
which all else is built, it is itself the very model of all else in the world, it breaks. 
And though the cracks and weather-beaten recesses might upset those who 
look for symmetry or permanence, they are of incomparable beauty next to the 
shallow plaster and whitewash which would cover their roughness.   
As with so many philosophical problems the demands of our enquiring inclina-
tion, that tidy-minded quest for certainty, conflicts with the vital weight of our 
common-sense. There is a singularity, a conceptually infinitesimal and impene-
trable conjunction upon which our basic lived realities hinge; where freedom re-
quires being determined by good reasons and our world of causes and conse-
quences, of persons performing actions, requires agents which self-determine 
in order to be the universe we recognise every day. It is where the psychologi-
cal gap between intention and action closes to indistinction. To seek to ‘resolve’ 
this conflict under the auspices of the law of contradiction is to expect an infinite 
regress of logical conformity where none exists.121 It is, once again, to succumb 
to a spirit of cleanliness and arrogant ambition which is inevitably shaken to 
pieces when it too reaches beyond its limits.    
Perhaps then it is the business of philosophy, though it can do nothing with this 
ineffable point about which our moral world hinges, to approach this precipice 
as far as it can and to maintain it as an apophatic point of focus, a reminder and 
pivot to which our humility, our determination to do good and to seek truth is 
tethered. To ensure that the wavering and ineffable boundaries are permitted to 
neither be forgotten nor indulged to the point where they can overwhelm our 
common sense is the inescapable charge of the enquiring mind. As Zen master 
Qingyuan explains: 
Before I had studied Zen for thirty years, I saw mountains as 
mountains, and waters as waters. When I arrived at a more in-
timate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that moun-
tains are not mountains, and waters are not waters. But now 
that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that 
I see mountains once again as mountains, and waters once 
again as waters.122 
                                            
121 Or if such an infinite regression does exist, it does so only in conjunction with the infinite re-
gression of competing principles in an ineffable and ultimately meaningless sort of way.   
122 Qingyuan Xingsi, A. Watts (tr.) in J. Minford and J.S.M. Lau (ed.), Classical Chinese Litera-
ture, (New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 2000), p.975. 
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Rather than attempt to reconcile seemingly irreconcilable and contradictory 
principles, it may simply be better to describe a possible attitude to adopt in the 
face of these difficulties. To imagine that the rigorous demands of logic and the 
steady measure of a rational enquiry are necessarily at odds with the impres-
sions and assumptions which underlie our daily existence is to give credence to 
the demands of logical enquiry first and foremost. It would, however, be a pecu-
liar thing to describe a morally realist theory of wisdom and take it as an axiom 
without any attempt at excuse, it would then be only a small supplement to this 
to suggest that logic and rational enquiry necessarily fail us and we must soldier 
on without their aid.  
In an effort to escape the punishing laws of a western philosophical tradition this 
sort of mystical religiosity would simply set up its own tyrant in the place of an-
other. Instead, a spirit of non-dualism (or dualism and monism) might be em-
ployed in order that the squabbling inclinations of our lives can cohabit. Master 
Qingyuan’s Zen quest need not be seen as a grand, life-long narrative, but a 
continuous process. Not an attempt to move from naivety to nihilism and then to 
naivety again, but rather to move from the two in opposition to both in combina-
tion. To hold, at all times, both doubt and conviction in one’s mind, a world of 
both freedom and inevitability, of immediate truths, moral and otherwise, and of 
deep, impenetrable secrets, this is the principle of not one and not two.123 
Doubtless there are times and activities where one principle will weigh more 
heavily than another, but conciliation and admixture, even balance, are not syn-
onymous with homogeneity. 
This Zen principle may well bring us back to the humility of Socrates. An old 
man faced with hostility and injustice who rests in the comfort of what he 
‘knows’ to be truly important, and who smiles, both derisively and resignedly at 
the senseless confusion around him; and so too might the illogical boundaries 
which the Zen master hovers upon lie most convincingly in a smile. The stub-
bornness of the universe to conform to our expectations and desires and the 
confusion which this engenders might lead to a kind of panic, or despondency; 
or it might just make us laugh. This is not the mindless, empty-eyed smile of ni-
hilism, ascetic transcendence, or bloody minded faith, nor is it the maniacal grin 
                                            
123 Cf. E. McCarthy, ‘Beyond the Binary: Watsuji Tetsuro and Luce Irigaray on Body, Self and 
Ethics’, in B. W. Davis, B. Schroeder and J. M. Wirth (ed.), Japanese and Continental Phi-
losophy, (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2011), p.225. 
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of a carnival of chaos and lunacy, it is, rather, the smile of knowing content-
ment, of one who searches through the ashes of their burnt home and finds 
their most precious family heirloom unharmed; a realistic, contextualised hope-
fulness and gratitude.  
Indeed it is not a theory of free will or certainty, nor of moral realism which it is 
important to take forward into this enquiry of wisdom, instead it is this attitude of 
good-humored understanding in the face of overwhelming conceptual and mor-
al conflicts at the heart of our lives. It is this attitude which will be crucial 
throughout this discussion. 
In many ways this theory of realism closely follows that expressed (at times) by 
G. K. Chesterton in his ‘Orthodoxy’. Chesterton too associates his realism with 
a kind of common sense sanity or soundness of mind, one which is anchored in 
an attitude to contradiction. He explains how: 
The ordinary man has always been sane because the ordi-
nary man has always been a mystic. He has permitted the twi-
light. He has always had one foot in earth and the other in 
fairyland. He has always left himself free to doubt his gods; 
but (unlike the agnostic of to-day) free also to believe in 
them… Thus he has always believed there was such a thing 
as fate, but such a thing as free will also…It is exactly this 
balance of apparent contradictions which has been the whole 
buoyancy of the healthy man. The whole secret of mysticism 
is this: that man can understand everything by the help of 
what he does not understand.124 
This talk of mysticism and fairyland may cause us to suspect, like Nietzsche, 
the presence of ‘too much witchery and sugar’. The proclamations of a Roman 
Catholic apologist like Chesterton about what we should and should not just ac-
cept may well conjure up an air of dogma which sits poorly in any well-formed 
epistemology, and Chesterton certainly does go on to espouse far more of the 
belief than he does the doubt. But the spirit of conviction and confusion which 
Chesterton discusses is not dependent upon the catechism (as much as he 
might insist it is), nor is it alien to other traditions (as he also suggests).125 Yet it 
is ultimately undeniable that Chesterton’s epistemology and ethics has at its 
core an accepted impenetrability, a hiddenness, and this mysticism is certainly 
a part of the wisdom being enquired into here.  
                                            
124 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy, p.35. 
125 Particularly (peculiarly enough) Buddhism (Ibid, p.36)  
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Ultimately the question as to where to draw the line as to just how much of this 
cloud of unknowing can play a part in our thoughts is a complex one. Chester-
ton is certainly correct when he indicates that solid and unquestioned conviction 
in certain truths is a necessary part of a healthy and correct attitude, though we 
may suspect that his division of humility into that which lies in the ‘organ of con-
viction’ and that in the ‘organ of ambition’ may be too simplistic.126 We cannot 
simply doubt ourselves and not our other convictions.  
It has already been said that the ambition and pride behind a desire for endless 
order, comprehension and cohesion is at the heart of much of the psychology of 
a certain kind of philosophy. Although we can recognise what Chesterton seeks 
to achieve by dividing belief in one’s self from belief in other things, and appor-
tioning massive doubt to one and little or none to the other, we can also recog-
nise the continuity between the two. When I am humble about my own abilities I 
cannot so easily exclude my powers of reasoning or of sensation from that hu-
mility. This is not to deny, of course, that certain things, frequently those more 
tangible experiences, are less susceptible to the doubts raised as part of this 
humility, but doubt and humility are not synonymous. Wittgenstein is correct that 
certain doubts, when expressed, simply make no sense, but this doesn’t pre-
vent a much broader kind of tentative attitude towards one’s enquiries, however 
cerebral or otherwise these might be. One can be humble without rigorously 
doubting anything and everything. A line must be drawn.     
How and where these lines should be drawn is the topic of what follows. Of 
course, such a broad mission statement might be taken as a definition of ethics 
itself, but it is in the context of the realism, mindful of contradictions, that this 
current line-drawing activity shall be conducted. Indeed, the enquiry which fol-
lows into the nature of wisdom and how it can be employed in our lives is both 
built upon and offered in support of this ‘balance of apparent contradictions’. 
This theoretical and psychological balance is the principle in the light of which 
ideas of wisdom and wellbeing will be measured. As aforementioned, harmony 
or balance does not necessitate monotony or homogeneity; complex admix-
tures with apparent extremes, and even imperfections, can form balanced 
wholes. Just as the sculptures which once adorned the Parthenon express fine 
detail, elegant form, realist mayhem, harmonious proportion, the scars of time 
                                            
126 Ibid, p.41 
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and poignant perfections, so too can wisdom and wellbeing consist of many 
complex and interwoven elements. Our lives, of love and making do, of success 
and failure, these lives are expressions of this attempt at balance and, as Aris-
totle suggests, are the crucial test to which we must turn our enquiries. 
 
 
 
3 – An Amalgamation of Philosophy and Anthropology as the Best Meth-
od for Gaining Wisdom. 
 
More Things in Heaven and Earth 
- Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1.5. 
 
Lately I have been thinking that the point must be reached 
when scientistis, politicians, artists, philosophers, men of reli-
gion, and all those who work in the fields should gather here, 
gaze out over these fields, and talk things over together. I 
think this is the kind of thing that must happen if people are to 
see beyond their specialities. 
- Masanobu Fukuoka, One Straw Revolution127  
 
What’s this then? This thesis right here, right now, what is it about? It’s all well 
and good describing a grand affirmation of qualified moral realism and pseudo-
Zen non-dualistic good-humour, but what does that mean for an investigation 
into wisdom and what good could such an investigation do anyway? Certainly 
something has already been said about wisdom. That it should be a pervasive 
and fundamental thing in life, that it has something to do with an attitude to-
wards who and what we are; not just some cognitive attitude but something en-
acted, something lived. Indeed, it has been suggested that it is something which 
can be furthered by being practiced.  
                                            
127 M. Fukuoka, One Straw Revolution, L. Korn (tr.), (New York, New York Review Books, 
2009 [1978]), p.25. 
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By all accounts then, if this thesis is to shed any more light on wisdom, to make 
some substantive claims about this humble and inquisitive way of living, it must, 
in some sense, be a practical exercise. Of course, there is a very immediate 
sense in which an essay in academic philosophy (as this thesis might be con-
sidered) is already an exercise in seeking wisdom. If possessing wisdom con-
sists in understanding better that which is important and wisdom itself is some-
thing important, and to understand wisdom better one must possess some wis-
dom, then seeking to understand wisdom better seems like a promising way to 
become wiser (and thus understand wisdom better). If: 
1. P is things possessed. 
2. I is important things. 
3. U is things understood. 
4. W is wisdom. 
Then: 
1. Some P is I 
2. Every U is P 
3. Some U is I – this is W: the intersection of U and I (and P) 
And: 
1. W (w) is a member of W (the set contains itself)128 
But this doesn’t seem terribly practical, not for everyday life anyway. Cogitating 
on the difficulties of one’s occupation being the focus of one’s occupation is a 
far cry from the trials and tribulations of day-to-day living (however petty or ab-
stract those may be). If, though, ‘life’, in this vague and grand way, is to be the 
fount and fulcrum of wisdom, certain critical questions must be asked before 
any further enquiry can be made; namely:  
                                            
128 w is necessarily some U but w is some W Iff it is I but since W is I it seems reasonable to 
suggest that w is I. That this raises the problem of Russell’s paradox is hardly a problem at 
this point (seeing as though paradoxes are already being embraced quite openly). On Rus-
sell’s paradox (and it’s history and relationship with other paradoxes) Cf. N. Griffin, ‘The Pre-
history of Russell’s Paradox’, in G. Link, One Hundred Years Of Russell’s Paradox, (New 
York, Walter de Gruyter, 2004), pp.349-72. 
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1. Whose ‘everyday’ is to count as ‘everyday’? For an academic, these 
sorts of abstract problems are ‘everyday’, for an accountant or a lumber-
jack, probably not so much. 
2. Provided some agreeable understanding can be reached as to what 
counts as ‘everyday’ life, what method can be used to glean the afore-
mentioned wisdom from this life? Is it psychological? Anthropological? 
Ethological?   
The short responses to these two queries are:  
1. All forms and walks of life will offer some wisdom, many will offer 
common insights. Since every aspect of every life is too grand a re-
mit for any enquiry, it will be suggested that some ways of life not on-
ly shed light on more wisdom(s), but also that they do so by demon-
strating more of what has been discussed already in terms of ‘bal-
ance’ (a sustainable holding together of conflicting things) and that 
these are subsequently suitable foci for this enquiry. The purpose of 
describing these ways of life in terms of ‘everyday’ is to highlight both 
the universality and common nature of the wisdom they em-
ploy/reveal, and also to highlight the necessity of academic philoso-
phy to remove itself from its traditional bounds in order to achieve its 
own goals. 
2. Yes it is psychological, anthropological and ethological. It is self-help, 
it is autoethnography, it is journalism, history, politics, classics, liter-
ary criticism, comparative mythology, mythopoesis and theology. It is 
science, it is art, and it is all of these things because it is philosophy.  
Of course, these responses raise more questions than they answer, but such is 
the joy of philosophy.  
Disciplinary distinction certainly serves a purpose, and Anthony Kenny is cor-
rect when, in the general introduction to his ‘History of Western Philosophy’, he 
claims that: 
…once problems can be unproblematically stated, when con-
cepts are uncontroversially standardized, and where a con-
sensus emerges for the methodology of solution, then we 
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have a science setting up home independently, rather than a 
branch of philosophy.129 
It would be absurd to suggest that at all times every question must be asked 
explicitly as part of some grand lifelong quest for ultimate truth and meaning, for 
the fulfilment of one’s purpose and sense of wellbeing. We needn’t restrict this 
non-philosophy to the routines of lab or blackboard either; very simple, mun-
dane questions are regularly asked in a ‘non-philosophical’ way. ‘Where did you 
leave the keys?’ for instance, or ‘How long until supper is ready?’, are excellent 
examples of questions for which both terms and conditions are well agreed up-
on and methodologically settled. Controversy darkens not the face of mindless 
mediocrity and the comfortably run-of-the-mill. At least, not at first glance. But 
philosophy is always in the second glance.  
Though we might agree that there are times, in both science and practical ex-
istence, when uncritical assent is both appropriate and desirable, we may yet 
permit the philosophical eye to hover just beyond stage as a kind of psychologi-
cal overseer. This kind of concurrent assent and dissent has already been de-
scribed in relation to a foundational epistemology and ethical attitude in the pre-
vious chapter. So, although genetics might be allowed a practical sovereignty 
over its realm of cells and spirals, its borderlands will always be patrolled by its 
philosophical sire, its skies populated by invisible ancestors. Philosophy is the 
parent who never dies, whose estate is never wholly inherited.  
So, whilst it is evidently true that many aspects of life, academic disciplines in-
cluded, are not immediately concerned with the sort of self-improvement and 
big-picture, ethical scrutiny which characterises wisdom (as hitherto discussed), 
they may yet be so in an indirect way. Big discoveries are made through lots of 
little questions. 
 
Consilience 
The coinage of this term is attributed to William Whewell.130 For Whewell it des-
ignated the way in which scientific discoveries can and do agree with one an-
other in unexpected ways and that this agreement is a compelling reason to be-
                                            
129 A. Kenny, History of Western Philosophy, (Oxon, Oxford University Press, 2010 [2010]), 
p.xi. 
130  Cf. T. Vogel Carey, 'Consilience', in Philosophy Now, 95:25-27 (2013).  
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lieve the discovery. E. O. Wilson commandeers this term and uses it in a 
somewhat stronger sense, he uses it to describe a kind of unity of scientific 
knowledge which is at the heart of all science.131 Whether one allows for Wil-
son's adaptation, this term refers to something like the unity of knowledge (and 
virtue) which both Aristotle and Plato suggest and which is at the heart of the 
kind of moral realism and theory of wisdom being discussed here.  It is also the 
sort of thing which Masanobu Fukuoka is concerned with in the epigraph to this 
chapter. Whether by surprise or design, when we put the different parts of the 
elephant together, they fit. Ultimately it is the elephant which is at the heart of 
things. Consilience is also a nice word, so I shall use it a little.  
Specialisation has its weaknesses, it drifts away from the big picture, away from 
context.  ‘How long until supper is ready?’ is certainly a question which it is for-
givable, indeed laudable, to ask without too much reflection. But we do ask 
such questions for a reason. We dine at certain times of the day, eating certain 
quantities. When supper is ready is dependent upon affluence, free time, histor-
ical models of labour, nutrition, health, dedication to quality of food and the 
commensality of dining experiences. These facts too are related to geographic 
location and methods of cultivation. Before long one is brought to consider very 
broad questions of politics and economics, also of the role of diet in social life 
and physical wellbeing, of the rights of those who have laboured, suffered and 
died to produce the food. How we eat and where our food comes from are not 
trivial matters, indeed few matters are quite so significant. Simplicity and com-
plexity, prevalence and significance, these are not mutually exclusive, they are 
complimentary.  
The accountant, the lumberjack, the geneticist, they all get up in the morning 
and go to work. The accountant is confronted with the records of a friend, the 
finances of whom are in a shambles, and is faced with the difficult matter of ex-
plaining how dire the situation is and how extreme and immediate the changes 
must be. The lumberjack begins to feel the aches of advancing age, the icy 
wind bites deeper and the weight of the chainsaw bears more heavily on the 
knuckles and knees; each day makes more apparent their younger colleagues’ 
superior strength and questions of self-worth are unavoidable. The geneticist, 
head of their department, is faced with reduced budgets and must discontinue 
                                            
131  E. O. Wilson, Consilience, (New York, Random House, 1998[1998]). 
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one of their projects; longevity or heart disease, which is the more deserving of 
study? 
It is not only patronising and narrow minded to imagine that some life, base and 
crude, is devoid of philosophy, it is also inaccurate and a failure of the quest for 
insight. The value of the insight offered by the immediate and palpable experi-
ence of these dilemmas cannot be overestimated. The classic problem of the 
undergraduate philosophy seminar, when someone inevitably asks whether it 
is, in fact, wrong to kill babies, rings hollow when confronted with genuine di-
lemmas of Ayoreo women wrestling with the demands of family life and broken 
marriages, when they must choose between very great evils.132  
Of course, it is a shallow and trite suggestion that one cannot possibly under-
stand a topic unless one has had first-hand experience of the matter. The ob-
jection that ‘you can’t understand this unless you are… X (let’s say ‘a parent’)’ is 
the sort of galling, narrow-minded conversation stopper that’s being talked 
about here. But this kind of claim could be toned down. To say, then, that direct 
involvement can grant a deeper and distinct sort of insight from mere abstrac-
tion seems quite reasonable. Indeed, it could quite plausibly be suggested that 
abstraction and direct experience are complimentary to a fuller understanding. 
This is, in fact, very much what is being (and will be) suggested here. The par-
ent has a unique insight, but so too does the incisive, abstract thinker. Wisdom 
is to be found in the realisation of the contiguity of these sources of insight.   
This, then, is the working hypothesis (part one)133: that philosophy (a mindful 
pursuit of [self- and other-] improvement through abstract enquiry, critical think-
ing and the cultivation of a passion for learning) and the commonplace pursuit 
of work, wealth, sustenance, wellbeing, family life and wider success engaged 
in by the vast majority of (at least) human beings are not only compatible but, 
when ‘done properly’, mutually beneficial and, ultimately inextricable.      
To test this hypothesis it will be necessary (or at least appropriate) to take an 
example of ‘daily life done properly’ and examine whether or not it does encom-
pass what is being talked about here as philosophy (this pursuit of wisdom). 
                                            
132 P. E. Bugos and L.M. McCarthy,  G. Hausfater and S. Blaffer pp.504-11 
133 This is to be expanded below with part two: on a specific state of wellbeing synonymous 
with a way of living and doing philosophy. 
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The examination of 'daily life done properly' will be conducted primarily through 
a study of permaculture (this is, in large part, what might more generally be 
thought of as 'organic gardening'). This will be for (broadly) three reasons: 
A.1. This is a way of life with which I am personally familiar and which I 
have found not only to be intimately connected with my experience of 
philosophy but also with a more general sense of wellbeing and per-
spective which has here been discussed as part of (or identical to) 
‘wisdom’. 
A.2. It is a practice which is peculiarly rich in its amalgamation of ethical 
content (social, environmental, and particularly virtue) and its en-
gagement with ‘life’ in a very general sense. (This ethical 'richness' 
will be expanded upon below in relation to a general methodology of 
anthropological philosophy). 
A.3. It is a way of life which, despite the modern guise in which I shall en-
counter it, is ultimately an expression of the most basic and enduring 
of activities (encompassing work, diet, family life, prosperity etc.) and 
through which our own activities are least removed from those of oth-
er ‘life’. This 'basic' quality shares much in common with the princi-
ples of philosophy.  
As David Cooper remarks at the outset of his discussion of ‘The Philosophy of 
Gardens’ that ‘there is no discipline to be introduced’.134 To both Cooper’s and 
my own bemusement gardens have not been treated (in the extant philosophi-
cal corpus) with the level of seriousness and diligence which seems intuitively 
correct. Cooper’s treatment of the topic of gardens does, however, diverge sig-
nificantly from my own approach. It would be fair to say that where Cooper 
treats ‘gardens’ I treat the more specific topic of ‘organic vegetable gardening’. 
There are certain synergies between Cooper’s work and this thesis (particularly 
at this thesis’ close) and it is only right that an acknowledgement of ‘A Philoso-
phy of Gardens’ should find itself in the body of this text as opposed to being 
relegated to a footnote. Cooper does, for instance, explore the relationship be-
tween gardening and the cultivation of virtues and it is this topic which is at the 
                                            
134 D. Cooper, A Philosophy of Gardens, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), p.1. 
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core of this thesis.135 As such, I hope that there is some room to conceive of 
this discussion as an expansion of that one topic of Cooper’s introductory work 
and, whilst it may move in directions which Cooper does not (or would not) en-
tertain, I also hope that it does employ the seriousness which Cooper desires 
for this topic. 
This current study of gardening will be conducted through an admixture of an-
thropological and philosophical methodologies (as opposed to more conven-
tional conceptual analysis). For reasons expanded upon below, this amalgam 
will, in fact, be viewed as reflective of a single, more fruitful and appropriate 
method of enquiry which is commensurate with ‘philosophy as a way of life’. Au-
toethnography, multi-species ethnography and abstract conceptual analysis; 
these seemingly separate methodologies are an integral part of the conscilience 
(or 'holism') of this thesis as a whole.  
 
‘Daily Life Done Properly’ 
This is not a phrase which fits comfortably into many well thought through con-
versations. It is a familiar sort of phrase in the field of ‘philosophy as a way of 
life’ and various other branches of moral philosophy, nevertheless, it conjures 
discomfort. By what means will the properness of the doing be judged? Always 
supposing we can arrive at some idea of ‘daily life’ which covers enough ways 
of living so as to be viewed as somehow representative or inclusive. And if 
some criterion by which the properness of this doing might be judged were con-
sidered justified, wouldn’t that leave the whole process of scrutinising this daily 
life for evidence of wisdom redundant? If one were to say: ‘let’s find out what a 
good life is like by looking at a good life’ one would be in the tricky position of 
needing to know what a good life was like already in order to judge an appropri-
ate subject of study. Luckily Meno’s paradox, of which this is an example, ad-
mits to some possible moderation.136 In this regard there are two responses to 
                                            
135 Ibid. p.93. 
136 Unlike Nicholas White I do think that the theory of recollection has the potential to form the 
basis of this moderation (or ‘solution’). I should hasten to add that the form which this theory 
would take would not the be the theological one which Plato expresses but, rather, a psycho-
logical/anthropological/narrative kind of the sort expressed later in this discussion. There is a 
kind of recollection in the way we recognise coherence, that which we observe fits which that 
which have already at our disposal. See: Plato, ‘Meno’, in J. M. Day (ed./tr.), Plato’s Meno in 
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this aporia worth considering. First, we need not have a comprehensive under-
standing of the properness of the doing in order to have some reasonable sus-
picion that it is being done properly. I can think that someone seems to be doing 
something well and not have a detailed understanding of how that is so. Sec-
ondly, we might be wrong. As long as one has a reasonable suspicion that life 
is being done properly, as long as one’s inspection of that life permits the pos-
sibility that it is not being done properly, one’s investigation needn’t be consid-
ered artificial or unacceptably biased.  
Of course, still we are left with the criterion by which we judge the reasonable-
ness of our suspicion that a life is being lived properly or well. It might be ob-
jected that any such suspicion cannot possibly be justified, that there are no 
values on which to draw which do not already infuse the investigation with an 
unacceptably high level of personal preference. Of course, it would be foolish 
(or at least dull) to be dragged back altogether into a concern over cultural rela-
tivism, and just as before it will be maintained that there are indeed certain 
broad values which are not only common to most ‘daily lives’, past and present, 
but which can reasonably form the basis for judging whether or not a life seems 
to be being lived well. It must also be noted that no claim has been made to the 
exclusivity of any such life, so some level of personal preference, which might 
fairly be viewed as inevitable, may yet be considered permissible. In this way, if 
one were a reindeer herder, and thus had an inclination to look for a well lived 
life amongst arctic herders, one might nevertheless concede that fishermen in 
the western pacific could live quite a different sort of life and still live it well.137 
There can be many forms of life lived well. We may, though, suspect that there 
will be some common elements between these distant paragons of virtue.  
Certainly this idea of common virtues is consistent with the Greek theory of vir-
tue and of wisdom which has formed the point of departure for this discussion. 
Aristotle says: ‘in general, all men seek not the way of their forefathers, but ra-
ther, the good’.138 There are common excellences to which we should aspire. 
                                                                                                                                
Focus, (London, Routledge, 1994), pp.35-72; and: N. P. White, ‘Inquiry’, in J. M. Day (ed.), 
Plato’s Meno in Focus, (London, Routledge, 1994), pp.152-71 (p.163). 
137 It will be noted that life being ‘done properly’ and ‘lived well’ are two phrases being used 
synonymously here.  
138 Aristotle, Politics, W. D. Ross (tr./ed.), (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957), §2:1269a:1-5. For 
translation, the ‘Revised Oxford’ entry was consulted: Aristotle, ‘Politics’, B. Jowett (tr.), in J. 
Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 2., 
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So, if we were inclined to be persuaded by this antique vision of virtue, we 
might look about for rumours of courage, of justice, of temperance and, of 
course, wisdom. Perhaps, if we felt like permitting our list of virtues to creep 
closer to our own times we might even allow for some more medieval, Christian 
flavours, like charity or piety. But need we be so specific? Might not the virtues 
be more nebulous than this effort to categorise suggests (particularly if they are 
unified through wisdom as has been said)? Perhaps we might also allow the 
virtues we seek to be a little less constrained by the context of ancient Athenian 
gentlemanly conduct or the cloistered order of medieval monasteries. We have 
already discussed the mother of large families which Murdoch raises; in that 
case we can still think of courage, still think of temperance and justice. So it 
may be fair to identify some very broad ideals as common to all persons and 
expressed in many diverse (and frequently not very exceptional) circumstances. 
It is this sense of a unity of virtue which will be taken forward very much in the 
way Aristotle speaks of ‘ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν’, or ‘κυρίως ἀγαθὸν’.139 Which is 
not, as has been said, to carry over the stronger Aristotelean commitment to a 
heavily intellectual epistemic fulcrum, nor the Platonic adherence to an inherent, 
a priori virtuousness, but rather the sense of an underlying and common thread 
of goodness which connects all instances of goodness.   
How far beyond the acceptable limits of scholarly rigour and genuine illumina-
tion does such talk of virtue and goodness take us? To look for compassion in 
the coup de grace of the !kung San, and find it.140 To look for ambitious hope in 
the production lines of Foxconn, and find it.141 To seek courage in the eyes of 
dogs and find an overflowing source.142 Perhaps not so far; not when these vir-
                                                                                                                                
(Chichester, Princeton University Press, 1995) and use was also made of the intermediate 
LSJ, 7th ed. 
139  ‘Virtue in the principal sense’ or ‘general goodness’. EN, VI:xiii, 1144b3,6. 
140  Cf. S. Hurn, Humans and Other Animals:Cross Cultural Perspectives on Human-Animal 
Interactions, (London, Pluto Press, 2012), p.58. 
141 I certainly do not mean, here, to undermine in any way the appalling working conditions 
which many Foxconn employees find themselves subjected to. I would not wish to suggest 
that these conditions in some way foster the cultivation of particular virtues. The point, ra-
ther, is that without reflecting on justice, but also hope and ambition and the full gamut of 
ethics, little sense can be made of the humans who live and work in Foxconn’s factories. Not 
only is ethics appropriate in these investigations, it is necessary. Cf. P. Ngai, ‘Incomplete 
Subjects: Circular Migration and the Life and Death Struggles of the Migrant Workers in Chi-
na’, in C. Solé, S. Parella, T. Sordé Martí and S. Nita (ed.), Impact of Circular Migration on 
Human, Political and Civil Rights, (London, Springer, 2016), pp.175-94 (particularly pp.181-
4)  
142 The issue of non-human virtue is integral to the thesis as a whole and will be expanded upon 
below. In this regard (and others) the work of Raimond Gaita in The Philosopher’s Dog has 
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tues are taken as instances of something quite general in character, something 
vitally constitutive of our way of talking about goodness. Just reasonable suspi-
cions.    
With this sort of virtue in mind, it may well seem most sensible to take as our 
models of well lived lives, those who dedicate themselves most explicitly to the 
service of others. Charity workers, battlefield nurses, saints in the far-flung hells 
of humanity. For two reasons this will not be the case. First it supposes that 
those sorts of activities are indeed the most virtuous and whilst it shan’t be 
claimed that they are not, establishing their status at this stage would require a 
tangential discussion of supererogation.143 Secondly, whilst these sorts of activi-
ties undoubtedly represent the daily lives of some people, and the virtues of 
those people are certainly sources of inspiration, it would seem far-fetched to 
imagine them as exemplars of ‘everyday life’ (and since the aim of this essay is 
to explore something, wisdom, which is common to many if not all lives, that 
would seem counter productive). Perhaps, though, the potential for these kinds 
of lives, and the virtues they demonstrate to act as sources of inspiration might 
permit us to draw a common thread between the virtues they express. ‘Self-
lessness’ might be the title of that theme. Certainly, the problems of where to 
stop, of the importance of self-regard, of the place of non-sentient entities; the-
se all worm their way into any theory of selflessness as a fulcrum of ethics. But 
perhaps a concept like ‘selflessness’, however grand, vague and problematic, 
could be sufficiently solid so as to serve, at least in the first instance, as ‘the cri-
terion by which we judge the reasonableness of our suspicion that a life is being 
lived properly or well’.  
                                                                                                                                
been invaluable. Gaita’s reflections on his dog Gypsy offer an example of just this kind of 
discussion of non-human virtue and it may be worth noting at this point that Gaita remarks 
explicitly that Gypsy, though she may have been ‘An intelligent dog, is not a wise one’. 
Gaita, The Philosopher's Dog, (London, Routledge, 2003), p.43. 
143 I think it is important to note here a line of thought which suggests that charitable giving does 
not require (or legitimately suggest) supererogation and that the kind of thinking which is ap-
propriate about charity is not anything based on exceptional heroism but, rather, something 
more calculated and focused on the collective. Toby Ord is, I think, of particular importance 
in this regard in his ‘Giving What we Can’ project aims at fostering this kind of group-
thinking; Cf. T. Ord, ‘How to be a Consequentialist About Everything’, presented at the tenth 
conference of The International Society for Utilitarian Studies, at University of California, 
2008. I happen to think that Ord’s movement (and those who follow his suggestions and 
those like him (Singer perhaps most notably) if laudable, I would just not go so far as to think 
that ethics can or should be thought of in such a quantitative way. I understand that the sili-
con-startup may feed more starving people, perhaps even staunch more wounds, but I can-
not help but find more to admire in the battlefield nurse. This, though, a discussion for an-
other time.  
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Perhaps it is the nature of a reasonable suspicion, when it is playing an im-
portant guiding role in an investigation which involves practical as well as con-
ceptual enquiry, that much of its more nuanced and detailed character (as much 
as it may ever be detailed) emerges through practice. As will be seen below 
(and particularly in relation to the work of Albert Schweitzer) selflessness brings 
its own important conflicts and it is just these sorts of conflicts (conceptual, 
practical and ethical) which can act as the greatest lessons in wisdom (virtue 
and wellbeing). 
 
 
Experts in Living and Thinking 
So far, then, this discussion might be summarised (in a perhaps less than gen-
erous fashion) thus:  
I. There is a virtue, ‘wisdom’, which is the traditional and best goal of phi-
losophy and which some people possess more than others, this virtue is (to 
at least some extent) within reach of all of us (at least humans) and it can be 
increased.  
II. Wisdom both entails and is fostered by living a better more moral life and 
by seeking a greater understanding of how to do this. 
III. Wisdom has something to do with a broad and enquiring perspective on 
the world and on those with whom one shares it.  
IV. To increase wisdom it is necessary to gain this greater perspective 
through a combination of both abstract enquiry and lived experience which 
must often deal with central and abiding conflicts. 
V. This current discussion will conduct this combination of abstract enquiry 
and lived experience with a particular way of life deemed an apt source of 
insight. 
So general a collection of statements as this could imply an investigation of al-
most any sort. Doesn’t everyone employ this combination of abstraction and di-
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rect experience anyway?144 Such an enquiry would be tantamount to merely 
creating a written record of human life in its most mundane and general of 
forms; a stream of consciousness with a vaguely interrogative bent. This brings 
me to Tim Ingold and his suggestion that anthropology (and a certain kind of 
philosophy) is just an extension of what everyone does normally anyway. I 
agree, it is, and so is philosophy, in fact, when done properly, anthropology and 
philosophy are the same thing. This amalgam of philosophy and anthropology 
will be the means by which this investigation of wisdom and wellbeing will be 
conducted. 
In his article ‘That’s Enough About Ethnography’, Ingold seeks to distinguish 
what he identifies as the rigid and academically restricted practice of ethnogra-
phy from the more open ended and expansive discipline of anthropology or 
‘participant observation’.145 Ingold’s primary reason for wishing to do this is that 
he observes a kind of objectification in ethnography which he views as neces-
sarily foreign to participant observation which requires a ‘living with’ as opposed 
to a ‘writing about’. Ingold believes that this crucial distinction is frequently for-
gotten, to the detriment of anthropology. What I agree with here, is Ingold’s de-
scription of participant observation as differing ‘only in degree from what all 
people do all of the time, though children more than most’. I also agree with In-
gold that the strength of participant observation is in its openness to difference 
and cooperative approach to understanding other ways of life. What I disagree 
with is his suggestion that the sort of ‘distortion that contrives to render the af-
termath of our meetings with people as their anterior condition’, which he identi-
fies with ethnography, is neither a part of participant observation nor (by exten-
sion) philosophy and our lives more generally. 
Ingold is clear about the continuity and even identity he acknowledges between 
anthropology and a certain kind of philosophy. Towards the close his discussion 
of ethnography he quotes his own words: ‘anthropology is philosophy with the 
people in’146 I shan’t seek to dispute the particular incarnation of philosophy he 
intends to embrace here, it is enough for now just to find support for the general 
notion of philosophy as anthropology (and vice versa). What is crucial here is 
                                            
144 Always allowing for differences of capacity (disability is one concern here, species is anoth-
er, both shall be discussed below). 
145 T. Ingold, ‘That’s Enough About Ethnography’, in Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 4, 
2014 (1): 383–395. 
146 Ibid. p.393. 
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that philosophy is more commonly associated with the sort of distant reflection 
which Ingold views as detrimental to the process of ‘living with’ which is the 
great strength of anthropological investigation.147 
What is this practice which is different ‘only in degree from what all people do all 
of the time, though children more than most’? Does such a suggestion entail an 
overly romanticised view of children? Perhaps some picture of an innocent face, 
staring in wide-eyed wonder at the world. Or maybe a little voice asking why the 
sky is blue, why one rule applies to them and not to another, why the pigs live 
outside and the dogs inside, why grandma isn’t coming back, why we sleep at 
night and not in the day why, why, why, why, why. Surely, though, we can put 
this sort of wonder and ceaseless query down to naivety and lack of experi-
ence, and we certainly wouldn't want to reduce anthropology or philosophy to a 
professional infantilism.  
The connection between philosophical thinking and a kind of childlike wonder 
and tendency to question things which are otherwise taken for granted by the 
stagnant, grown-up masses is not new. In the Theaetetus Socrates describes 
how ‘wonder is the only beginning of philosophy’148 and Aristotle echoes Plato’s 
thoughts in his Metaphysics when he explains that ‘it is because of wonder that 
men both now begin and first began to philosophise’.149 Of course, wonder is 
not the sole preserve of children but we can perhaps see why Ingold would re-
late the exaggerated form in which it does occur in the young to the practice of 
participant observation. The wonder of children is born out of a freshness, an 
unfamiliarity with their surroundings, anthropologists seek to place themselves 
in similarly unfamiliar situations, into environments which they hope will teach 
them something new.   
It is the curious, seemingly contradictory mixture of participation and observa-
tion which acts as the focus of Ingold’s paper and which is the key to the meth-
odological coextension of philosophy and social science which this current dis-
                                            
147 Ibid. p.389. Ingold is comfortable using the term ‘intersubjectivity’, which he understands as 
being, in essence, about living with others intentionally as opposed to attentionally. As 
aforementioned, I have attempted to avoid technical language of this kind (especially when it 
is as ugly and clinical as ‘intersubjective’). As such, I shall stick with ‘living with’ although In-
gold’s choice of the term ‘correspondence’ is highly tempting. 
148 Plato, Theaetetus, H. N. Fowler (tr.), (London, Harvard University Press, 1921), §155d. 
149 Aristotle, Metaphysics, H. Tredennick (tr.), (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
1933), §I:II (982b). 
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cussion seeks to establish. Indeed, it will be suggested that this social scientific 
methodology embodies the very balance of contradiction and coherence which 
has hitherto been identified with a correct epistemic and ethical attitude. To par-
ticipate fully in an activity and to simultaneously maintain a reflective disposition 
which involves considering one’s situation from an external perspective is the 
remit of philosophy.  
That the realities of a form of life, social facts, are understood from within has, 
typically, driven those considering social research to place an emphasis very 
much on the participation as opposed to the observation of this practice of an-
thropology. It has been suggested that Peter Winch’s ‘The Idea of a Social Sci-
ence and its Relation to Philosophy’ should have been called ‘The Very Idea of 
a Social Science!’150 Science is one thing, it deals with facts, objective matters, 
social realities are something quite different. So if we are to understand some-
one else’s perspective, their way of life, we must live that life too, we must par-
ticipate but we shouldn’t hope for any kind of objective observations as part of 
this participation. Ingold echoes Winch’s thoughts in his effort to distance an-
thropology from ethnography. Objectivity requires an outside perspective, an 
observation, and we are always on the inside.  
J. H. Gill is quite right to wonder why Winch preserves a special place for the 
physical sciences, to wonder why he imagines that the rules which we apply to 
these fields are from outside.151 Gill may be right that this is because Winch, as 
with many other thinkers prior to more recent scholarship in the philosophy of 
mind, failed to consider the enveloping nature of our complex, tangible realities. 
If we are not rational and physical, but rather ratio-physical, there is a continuity 
between us and the physical world, its rules and our minds are not distinct.152 
Sadly, Gill takes this neglect of our ‘embodied’ nature to be an excuse to ride 
the participation wagon all the way into town; no more room for observation. 
Similarly, Ingold follows this relativistic epistemology to clothe participant obser-
vation in the many hues of Heraclytean flux. It is not necessary to travel too far 
down this epistemic path, that piece has already been said. Instead of repro-
                                            
150 P. Winch, ‘The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy’, (Oxford, Routedge, 
2008 [1958]).  cf. J. H. Gill, ‘Winch Science and Embodiment’, in Soundings: An Interdiscipli-
nary Journal 
 Vol. 65, No. 4 (Winter 1982), pp. 417-429 [p.417]. 
151 Ibid. p.420 
152 On ‘embodied cognition’ and avoiding it here see and its see again footnote 5. 
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ducing arguments, a case can be made for the kind of strange balance between 
objectivity and subjectivity, uncertainty and confidence (as has been outlined 
above) as being far more in line with the super-childlike wonder which Ingold 
invokes than the maelstrom of life and perspectives which would result from a 
dissolution of observation.   
The insider-outsider distinction (or, indeed, ‘problem’) has been at the core of 
many debates in social science.153 This is the banner under which the dilemma 
of the ‘conversation stopper’ mentioned earlier has been academically legiti-
mised. The parent saying ‘you can’t possibly understand this unless you are a 
parent’ threatens to become the guardian of an insuperable epistemic fortress. 
This is frequently distilled most potently in the study of religion, where the 
Elyeusian mysteries of faith do become the sole preserve of the initiate, invul-
nerable to outside investigation.154 What the wonder of children can illustrate 
here is not only an attitude and mental state which is exaggerated and honed in 
the philosopher-anthropologist but also a position of insider-outsider which illus-
trates the fallacy of raising any impermeable epistemic membrane. 
We might think that, of necessity, there must be a point at which the parent be-
comes a parent. To assign this process a single ‘point’, however, is to be overly 
atomistic. My own becoming a father occurred, and occurs still, in contiguous 
stages. Prior to the birth of my daughter, the pregnancy was itself composed of 
these stages, of a growing sense of her imminent arrival, of my fiancee’s shift-
ing sizes and sufferings and, importantly, of the persistent reminder from friends 
who had children that ‘it will change everything’. ‘Think you are tired now?… 
You have no idea’. Really? ‘no idea’? ‘change everything’? Being of a pedantic 
and critical disposition these proclamations of epistemic and experiential altera-
tions beyond my possible current understanding raised concerns. Certainly ex-
periences come in varying magnitudes of significance, changing us more or 
less, but these, it had seemed to me, are differences in degree, not (at least not 
altogether) in kind. During my limited time on earth so far I had never experi-
                                            
153 Clifford Geertz’ essay on this topic (C. Geertz, ‘“From the Native's Point of View”’: On the 
Nature of Anthropological Understanding.’, in Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, vol. 28, no. 1, 1974, pp. 26–45) is a seminal expression of this enveloping discus-
sion. In its own small way, this current discussion seeks to identify philosophy as a way of 
life with this same debate about insider vs. outsider.   
154 Cf. R. T. McCutcheon, ‘The Autonomy of Religious Experience (Introduction)’, in R. T. 
McCutcheon (ed.), The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion, (London, Blooms-
bury, 2005), pp.67-73.  
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enced the kind of transformation of which these people spoke, certainly I had 
experienced major changes, ‘life altering’ even, but not a metamorphosis totally 
without prelude or suggestion. Perhaps this way of speaking is just idiomatic, 
perhaps they just meant that the change is significant, but I suspect that its 
proclamation was connected with a sense of pride in knowledge which comes 
with an idea of removal from the uninitiated. Tribes of knowledge, clubs of expe-
rience.  
Of course, it wasn’t entirely accurate (and perhaps I take too much glee in the 
affirmation of my own contradictory epistemic removal from that folk 
knowledge). Our daughter’s arrival has been wonderful, profound, exhausting 
and terrifying, certainly, but, in part, similar to other things. Before her birth I had 
suspected that those who spoke so certainly of the imminent transformation 
were those with limited experience of looking after other animals or elderly rela-
tives. Those experiences also bring much of the responsibility, emotional tur-
moil and sleeplessness that parenthood brings. Our daughter has pushed our 
understanding of these domestic ways of living and thinking to new heights and 
given us a keen sense of our continuous state of discovery, but that might as 
well remind us of past discoveries as prompt us to wonder at future ones.  
Meno queries how we can possibly discover the answer to a question if we do 
not already know it, because how will we know where to look and how will we 
know when we get there?155 It is an epistemic variation of Zeno’s paradox, 
where Achilles must traverse an infinite number of points before he can reach 
his goal. If any journey is composed of increments, and those increments are 
similarly composed of increments, and so on, then an impenetrable barrier is 
established to any kind of progression. If our discoveries are preceded by other 
related discoveries then how do we move from one to the next? What drives us 
from ignorance to knowledge? Must we simply be passive receptors of experi-
ence? Motes without agency drifting through a cloud of life?  
The problem is to imagine any dynamic system (physical or otherwise) as of 
necessity being composed of atoms or points. We can recognise distinct things, 
bodies and events, in the universe and this leads us to imagine that the uni-
verse is composed entirely of distinct things and this leaves the relationships 
                                            
155 Plato, ‘Meno’, §80d-e 
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between those distinct things as a vexatious, infinitely regressive problem. In-
stead, let us imagine discovery as a matter of betweenness. What is meant 
here is largely an application of a kind of process philosophy.156 To reject the 
Epicurean atomism of the universe is frequently imagined to be synonymous 
with adopting either a Parmenidean mysticism whereby identity is some kind of 
epiphenomenal trick of psychology or a Heraclytean dedication to chaos 
whereby identity is similarly consigned to illusion. Process ontology is usually 
associated with the latter view but allows for identities to emerge from the cha-
os, and this is just the compromise necessary to make sense of the activity of 
learning, to merge participation and observation. To cultivate wonder (or resur-
rect it) is not to abandon oneself to a state of boundless drift but to float with di-
rection, to navigate with rudder, sail and anchor.  
We are, each of us, always in a process between knowledge and ignorance, a 
half-way-house of constantly dawning realisation. The horizon of understanding 
shifts as do we, some of its epistemic landmarks are more dramatic than others 
but mountains of the mind don’t just rise up out of nowhere, their shining peaks 
appear long before we glimpse their vast and complex roots. We needn’t com-
mit to the meaningless dreamscape (or nightmare) of total experiential flux, nor 
the Platonic solidity of predetermined knowledge. It’s both; things that change, 
relatedness and difference.  
And of course it must be so, children show us this. Wonder and ceaseless inter-
rogation are the visible and audible manifestation of this state of constant dis-
covery. Things are new but they are also identifiable, phenomena fit into de-
                                            
156 This needs to be understood in a not terribly strong sense. Metaphysical theory, whilst not 
being discounted as potentially insightful and ultimately necessary, is not something which 
this discussion can pursue to any great extent. The lack of detailed analysis here of process 
metaphysics and the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead is similar to the neglect else-
where of theories of embodied cognition. An attempt is being made, not to expound any kind 
of original metaphysics, nor a comprehensive analysis of a metaphysical theory, but to sup-
ply sufficient cursory mention of those metaphysical topics which pertain more directly to the 
ethical discussion as to make that ethics less jarring for those who naturally desire some 
metaphysical basis. The concern here is largely epistemological and psychological. Given 
the Platonic, (or Murdochian) and Schweitzerian tones of this essay, I have no doubt that 
complimentary metaphysical theory could yield some insight but this would be a task for a li-
brary of later treatments, not this one small discussion. I agree with Whitehead that a com-
plete philosophy is the desired goal and that such a ‘speculative philosophy’ should attempt 
to supply us with something in light of which ‘every element of our experience can be inter-
preted’ (A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, [New York, First Free Press, 1985 (1929)], 
§1:1:1). On the degree to which Whitehead’s philosophy itself contains an ethics see: J. W. 
Lango, ‘Does Whitehead’s Metaphysics Contain an Ethics’, Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society, vol. 37, no. 4, 2001, pp. 515–536.    
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creasingly loose frameworks of meaning, language games are played more and 
more adeptly. If this learning occurred either solely through the passive recep-
tion of novel revelations or through pure extrapolation from familiar perspective 
then no wonder would be extant. What impact could any realisation have if it 
were utterly distinct from a child’s previous understanding, if it didn’t fit? As Wil-
liam James says: 
The novelty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it is also tinged 
by what absorbs it. Our past apperceives and co-operates; and in the 
new equilibrium in which each step forward in the process of learn-
ing terminates, it happens relatively seldom that the new fact is add-
ed raw. More usually it is embedded cooked, as one might say, or 
stewed down in the sauce of the old.157 
I might write or speak, ehnghsplit, a sentence which has a hitherto unknown 
word in it and those witness to this novelty won’t experience wonder, merely 
confusion (and possibly irritation). Similarly, if one moment to the next were only 
populated by the drawing out of previous moments then no change would ever 
really occur. Wonder is the spirit of adventure, not of sheer novelty. Pure inven-
tion has a disjointed and monstrous quality to it, again it smells like the hubris 
and bloated pride of one who views creation itself as the most divine of acts ra-
ther than the humility of learning.  
But a pattern is observed, from novelty to familiarity. Fresh faced youth sub-
sides into the world-weary, safe mediocrity of age. To this the philosopher ob-
jects, she objects because it is dishonest. To treat any knowledge as complete 
would be to deny its relatedness to that which is unknown, to project it as an 
atom of understanding. What the anthropologist does, what the philosopher 
does, is refuse to allow this process of discovery to ossify, to reject that safety 
of a single way of seeing things and instead, look around the corner of the world 
for a new view. We are inexorably drawn into our own way of seeing the world 
and the outsiderishness of childhood is worn away by the distractions of famili-
arity.  
Let’s extend the landscape metaphor.158 
Perhaps this deterioration of wonder happens because the peaks of the moun-
taintops are just so brilliant and majestic, the dark and tangled roots at their feet 
                                            
157 W. James, Pragmatism (1907), (Cambridge, Hackett, 1981), p.78 
158 The extensive use of metaphors, images and poetic language will be expanded upon later. 
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are barely even visible to those who have looked skyward for so long. If we take 
our time, though, and acclimatise to the detail of that which lies beneath the 
highlights of our world, if we peer through the misty darkness of the forests and 
valleys, we will find endlessly branching valleys and streams, waterways which 
spread far and wide and which, ultimately, intertwine with new, previously un-
guessed-at sources and pinnacles, distant caps which invite us to continue our 
journey with renewed vigour.    
What the anthropologist-philosopher must not do is consider herself a pure par-
ticipant and forget that the new mountain is linked to the last by the valleys be-
low. Ways of living and thinking isolated from one another by a void and into 
which one must simply throw oneself. Ingold is in danger of suggesting it is all 
peaks; the analysis, the ‘anterior condition’, what lies beneath the snow and 
sun, these are the means by which we reach the next discovery, flying from 
peak to peak, blown by the wind any which way, that is as much a problem as 
the analyst, the detached philosopher, the ethnographer, who reduces the 
mountain to its geology, the worldview to its justifications and causes, who 
spends their life digging to the very core of the earth only to be burned to noth-
ing in the process or who merely digs in their 'work time' and treats their mine 
as imaginary, or ancillary upon emerging. The fruitful path, the holistic, big-
picture approach is one of stone and sky.  
Certainly we may need to push ourselves sometimes, to jump from a secure 
place towards a new way of life, and we might only get a proper look at the 
foundations in their entirety when we are actually squarely atop that new rise, 
but we mustn’t forget what lies below. 
In plainer terms, this elaborate and somewhat pastoral metaphor seeks to de-
scribe: 
I. The manner in which seemingly isolated world views are connected 
through their foundations. 
A. These foundations are the justifications, rationales, moral obser-
vations, pyschological tendencies, biological and environmental univer-
sals upon which (and of which) our knowledge is built. 
II. Philosophical analysis has traditionally taken as its objects of interest 
these unseen foundations. 
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III. The process of engaging in that sort of analysis requires a removal from 
the well defined comfort and familiarity of the assumptions and well estab-
lished knowledge of a particular perspective or way of life. 
IV. This removal, this observation, must usually be orchestrated if it is to be 
manifested beyond the natural unfamiliarity with the world demonstrated by 
children.  
V. This orchestration of observation must be tethered to a participation, and 
the participation to an observation if it is to achieve the broad, holistic 
knowledge which it traditionally and properly sets as its goal and this is what 
is meant by an exaggeration of ‘what all people do all of the time, though 
children more than most.’159 
 
This does have practical implications. This discussion of participant observation 
has been framed as a criticism of Tim Ingold but in truth that opposition is 
somewhat artificial. Ingold’s real objection to ethnography is the way in which it 
is taught as some kind of special activity, almost a scientific experiment which is 
prepared, conducted and completed (with conclusions flowing thenceforth).160 
Prior to the ethnographic research one is not doing ethnography and afterwards 
one can resume one’s 'normal', non-anthropological life. Ingold rejects this view 
of anthropology and sets out the way in which there cannot be a strict division 
between fieldwork and non-fieldwork.161 The similarities between this objection 
and the efforts of philosophy as a way of life are not, I would suggest, coinci-
dental and one key purpose of this current chapter is to establish why and how 
these two seemingly distant academic schools of thought are, in fact, of one 
mind.   
Both are rejections of the professionalism and specialism which has come to 
dominate and define the academy. The view that there is a core, universal prin-
ciple of learning and self-improvement through greater understanding of the 
world and, crucially, those with whom we share it, is at the heart of both disci-
plines and, one might argue (indeed philosophy as a way of life does so argue), 
                                            
159 T. Ingold, That’s Enough About Ethnography, p.387. 
160 Ibid, p.385. 
161 Ibid, p.386. 
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at the heart of the academy itself (or at least historically so). Academic enquiry 
becomes, by the standards of these anti-specialist schools of thought, a kind of 
refinement of human conduct, a distillation of being a reflexive being. Instead of 
a pastime it is an ethos which bleeds into all aspects of life.  
The claim then, on the face of it, is a simple one. The dichotomy between prac-
tical and theoretical knowledge is a false one. Just as with the rejection of the 
dichotomy between knowledge and doubt, however, this rejection must itself be 
mitigated, it might even be said that the dichotomy between dichotomy and uni-
ty is itself a false dichotomy. Once again the perennial dilemma of philosophy, 
of bipolarity, rears its head; the inescapable shadows of Heraclitus and Par-
menides.  
It would be foolish and self-refuting, however, to at once repudiate the over-
intellectualisation of philosophical investigation and simultaneously declaim the 
necessary conjunction of intellectual abstraction and practical engagement. In-
stead, perhaps, another metaphor: poles can do the job of dichotomies. A 
sphere has poles, antipodes, yet at its innermost core and its broadest surface 
these opposed points are conjoined. Indeed, the very idea of an object as such 
involves this concurrence of opposed points and unified conjunction and so too 
might this ontological precondition be extended to epistemic states. Distant and 
careful reflection, abstraction, rigorous cogitation, these things can and do oc-
cur in stark and seemingly isolated contrast from the almost unthinking, auto-
matic, visceral, sensuous absorption of the world and its activities but almost is 
the key term here. Even on those occasions when these ways of learning are 
most distant from one another, they are not detached, for if they were, they 
would cease to have definition, just as if one side of a coin were to vanish so 
too, of necessity, would the other.  
What is being claimed is not the impossibility of abstract reflection, of part-time 
conceptual analysis, or purely descriptive, professional social science. Such a 
denial of what is quite obviously extant would be odd at best; preposterous 
would probably be nearer the mark. The claim here is primarily normative, not 
empirical, it is that when the goal of one’s investigation is something very broad, 
perhaps the broadest of all possible goals, that of ‘life, the universe and every-
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thing’, as Douglas Adams might put it,162 then the best approach is one which 
deals not in epistemic extremes, niches, specialities or parts but, rather, in 
wholes. The goal of this present essay, of achieving a better understanding of 
wisdom and wellbeing, is indeed a goal of just this sort of breadth. If wisdom is 
understood as an understanding (a perception and practice) of what is most im-
portant (as it is so understood here), a better understanding that is (for lack of a 
better phrase) of ‘the meaning of life’, then the sweep of our net must be as 
wide as we can muster.163  
By way of objection to this attempted union of philosophical reflection and an-
thropological methods, it might be suggested that the idea of self-cultivation, 
self-improvement even, is not by any means an integral aspect of social scien-
tific enquiry and that it is with this principle that the similarity between these two 
movements ends. Furthermore, if the kind of moral realism which has been 
suggested as integral (or at least very helpful) to the ancient model of wisdom is 
indeed accepted as part of the philosophical way of life then the two traditions 
might be seen as thrust even further apart. Any such objection would, however, 
in order that it might be accurate, require an opponent seeking union in history 
rather than potential. What I mean here is that, as with the previous analysis of 
Aristotle and Plato my intent is, again, normative rather than exegetical. It is 
what is common between these emerging traditions which interests me as it is 
that which I wish to put forward as fruitful. Just as with those two great propo-
nents of wisdom it is principally in their points of convergence that I believe 
greatest wisdom can be gleaned.  
If, however, one were inclined to humour such an objection, and one might just 
be so inclined, there are good reasons to reject this idea that evaluation and 
moral judgment are not common to both philosophy and ‘living-with’. Even in a 
purely descriptive sense, what is discovered, what is sought, indeed, in any 
process of mindfully living with others, is a cohesive ‘way of life’ a tune to which 
people dance. One cannot participate, live life amongst others, without a cohe-
                                            
162 D. Adams, Life, the Universe and Everything, (London, Macmillan, 2010 [1982]).  
163 It might be easier to see, now, that it would be a mistake to imagine that this present discus-
sion of learning is merely an extension of embedded or embodied cognition. Certainly, the 
descriptive element, that there is an essential and epistemologically prescient contiguity be-
tween practical and theoretical knowledge shares elements with this theory of the mind be-
yond the brain. It is indeed being suggested here that to imagine the mind as a purely de-
tached and reflective phaenomenon would be erroneous. 
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sion, a language game certainly, but a living game more broadly, a ‘form of life’. 
Wittgenstein certainly recognised how close he was bringing philosophy to so-
cial science yet still he wished to maintain a division based on reflective dis-
tance. He explains: 
If we look at things from an ethnological point of view, does 
that mean we are saying philosophy is ethnology? No, it only 
means that we are taking up a position right outside so as to 
be able to see things more objectively.164 
Wittgeinstein is commenting here on the sort of comparative ‘ethnology’ found 
in Frazer’s ‘Golden Bough’,165 rather than the reflections of participant observa-
tion, and perhaps this is partly to blame for his adversarial tone.166 Yet Wittgen-
stein’s desire to retain distance is linked to an insistence that a form of life must 
be considered as a cohesive whole if it is to be understood at all. As Antonio 
Marques remarks, Wittgenstein sought ‘the peculiar connections of a whole 
form of life’.167  
Now, it may seem quite a leap to move from this cohesion of distinct life forms 
to the insistence that the method for investigating lifeforms must be evaluative. 
Indeed, it might fairly be thought that some trickery is being attempted in draw-
ing out an ought from an is. By reflecting on a way of life we may well be able to 
say that this is how things are done by these people or those people, but surely 
we cannot so easily drift into saying that therefore this is how things should be 
done.  
In the following chapter it will be suggested that there is a continuum between 
the cohesion of a way of life and moral and aesthetic cohesion and that under-
standing such cohesion is key to all understanding, moral and otherwise. The 
culmination of both the epistemology and methodology described thus far will 
need to be something which ties together these otherwise desperate ways of 
‘making sense of things’. 
                                            
164 L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, G. H. von Wright (ed.), P. Winch (tr.), (London, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press,1984 [1940]) p.37. 
165 J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (1890), R. Fraser (ed.), (Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press, 1998). 
166 Though one might think his reaction would be more violent towards a method involving far 
more emersion.   
167 A. Marques, ‘Anthropological Representations and Forms of Life in Wittgenstein’, in J. P. 
Galvez (ed.) Philosophical Anthropology, (Lancaster, Gazelle Books, 2010), pp.61-72 (p.64). 
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When we come to cultivate participant observation (rather than practice it) we 
are learning to have conversations, to work together, to negotiate impasses of 
understanding and interests. I am not attempting to suggest that there is any-
thing so monolithic and solid as ‘a culture’ or a uniform or homogenous way of 
life which is devoid of inconsistencies, variation and change, quite the reverse. 
It is precisely these sorts of inconsistencies which make the business of partici-
pant observation and philosophy so integral to all life. What I am suggesting is 
that the negotiation of these cracks in the cohesion of our lives is only possible 
if one allows for a sort of sensitivity to cohesion as such: practical, psychologi-
cal, moral and conceptual.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
168 It may well now be appropriate to recognise the degree to which this talk of cohesion (based 
as it is in idea of transcendent boundaries to our existence) resembles some fairly ‘old fash-
ioned’ forms of phenomenology. Kant’s project and later (and far more obviously related) 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit certainly ask many of the same questions and offer similar 
answers (G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit [1807], A. V. Miller [tr.], [Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1977]). I hope that this is no surprise since one of the central tenets of this 
essay (and hardly a novel suggestion) is that philosophy deals with perennial problems and 
should aim not for creative originality in the usual sense but rather continuous moral learning 
through somewhat novel approaches to ancient problems. A future extension of this discus-
sion would undoubtedly call for a more extensive treatment of these early phenomenologies 
but for now such exegesis is narrowly beyond the remit of this essay.   
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4 - The Necessity of Aesthetics and Preeminence of Narrative in Practic-
ing Anthropological-Philosophy.  
 
 
Could beauty, my lord, have better commerce than with honesty? 
- Shakespeare, Hamlet, 3.1. 
 
            μονώτης εἰμί φιλομυθότερος γέγονα 
     - Aristotle, from Demetrius De Elocutione169  
 
διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν: ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων 
     - Aristotle, Metaphysics, §1, 982b170 
 
It is important to emphasise at the outset of this chapter that the efforts at 
methodological consilience which are being made in this essay are not exclu-
sive in their prescription. This is only to repeat that I do not wish to claim that 
philosophy cannot be something different from anthropology, only that it can be 
the same thing and that when it is, it is valuable. My wish is to find common el-
                                            
169  This particular fragment is one of my favourites and is perhaps, for this reason, given a 
more prominent place here than it really deserves. Μονώτερος is variously translated and 
the fragment shifts significantly in meaning depending upon how this is done. The edition of 
the Greek text consulted here is that of W. Rhys Roberts who translates this word as 'more 
self-centered'. 'The more of a loner I become' is also used and this certainly gives a different 
feel. The passage of Demetrius from which the quote is taken is itself concerned with the 
unique nature of this word and the way it can be contrasted with something like 'solitary' 
(αὐτίτης). I suspect 'loner' does get closer to the meaning here, but I suspect it has some-
thing to do with a certain aloneness which permits one to have the space to give time to 
one's own thoughts. Either way, it is this state which Aristotle identifies as correlating with his 
increasing fondness of stories. Demetrius of Phalerum,W. R. Roberts (ed.), De Elocutione, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1902),  
170 'Thus, the lover of stories is, in a sense, a philosopher, since stories are composed of 
wonders' §144. Aristotle, Metaphysics, §1, 982b. 
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ements which point towards a particularly holistic kind of investigation into a 
particularly holistic kind of subject. Certainly definition, finitude, clear and practi-
cal limitations are not only a useful part of interrogatory methods but a neces-
sary part of all meaningful concepts. My suggestion (though it is not really my 
own for it is a staple of the history of philosophy) is that a definitive and central 
aspect of philosophy is to attempt to deal with the most general and expansive 
concepts it can manage. As the primary focus of this thesis I have taken one of 
the most general concepts (wisdom) and understood this itself to be defined by 
what may be the most general of concepts (The Good).171 I have taken as com-
pelling to the point of being axiomatic Aristotle's suggestion that a method of 
investigation should mirror its subject matter and desired goals in both detail 
and breadth. As such, I have attempted to outline, with an appropriate degree of 
perspicuity, an understanding of philosophy whereby this discipline is itself best 
suited in means to its proclaimed ends.  
In as far as this investigation has attempted to reflect the generality and multi-
farious nature of its subject it may have been so far suspected of being occa-
sionally unnecessarily opaque, diffuse and even verbose in its means and ex-
pression. This chapter, in attempting to tie together the methodological, 
metaethical and epistemological section of this essay, will also attempt to ad-
dress these concerns of style and substance. This will serve as the fourth and 
final point of the propaedeutic to part two of this thesis in which the investigation 
proper into wisdom will take place. It must be stated, however, that many of the 
themes and ideas (particularly the balancing of conflicting yet mutually depend-
ent principles) will be of continuous and vital importance to the investigation as 
a whole.  
____________ 
Rhetoric! This is the word most likely to be thrown at any effort to persuade 
which does not follow those means and modes of argument traditionally ad-
hered to by modern, analytic, philosophy. The charge here is likely to be one of 
evasion and dishonesty, a betrayal of the core principles of philosophy. Rhetoric 
is concerned with persuasion, not truth; rhetoric concerns itself with the rela-
tionship between the point being put across and the audience, not with the justi-
                                            
171  This is probably just as useful as any shorthand for the sort of moral reality which has 
been suggested as being the focus of wisdom. 
 88 
88 
fications for this point. If there were a cheap trick to ensure an audience's con-
version, rhetoric would take it.172  
In what follows I am happy to indulge this somewhat two-dimensional view of 
rhetoric, I am even happy to conflate rhetoric with sophistry as this view seems 
bound to do. The reason for this easy indulgence is that the theory that there is 
an inappropriate and anti-philosophical (dishonest) way to attempt persuasion 
and even engage in interrogation is vital to this current discussion. For the time 
being it really doesn't matter what we call this anti-philosophy, this charm mas-
querading as wisdom, what matters is the 'true philosophy’ against which it is 
measured.  
'Poetry' is one term that might be used to describe something else besides 
rhetoric, 'song' is another, 'stories' and 'storytelling' are yet other possible terms 
for the same sort of thing, 'myth' and 'mythopoesis' are others still. These are 
the terms which best capture the central topic of this chapter and part of its ef-
forts will be in distinguishing this 'storytelling' from that less scrupulous form of 
philosophy which might be identified with rhetoric or sophistry. In what follows, 
these terms will be used somewhat interchangeably. Certainly, poetry, myth 
and story all have different connotations but what they have in common is that 
which is most crucial. The different connotations will be put to use and each 
term will be employed in slightly different contexts though it is important to note 
that these differences are far less important than that which is common. As a 
working definition it will be useful to make use of Robert Burch's attempt to clari-
fy the difference between philosophy and poetry: 
Suffice it to remind ourselves that, since Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, no one can simply take for granted the divisions 
and determinations of the apophantic and aesthetic upon 
which this usual definition of the poetic turns, nor the ready 
equation of poetry with meter and verse that it posits. Instead, 
to begin with, we understand the term 'poetic' here in the 
broadest etymological sense to encompass the whole domain 
of poesis as that of the creative production of meaning. Fol-
lowing etymology, we likewise construe the term 'philosophy' 
                                            
172  David Zarefsky's introduction to this topic offers a good summary of this view: D. 
Zarefsky, Rhetorical Perspectives on Argumentation, (London, Springer, 2014), p.xvi.  
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in a similarly broad way as philosophia, the love of wisdom, 
expressed in the quest for truth.173  
Here, less emphasis will be placed on the 'creative production' element of 
ποίησις, at least in the sense of the autonomous or purposeful act of a person 
and far more on the sense of the emergence (purposeful or otherwise) of mean-
ing and the contiguous nature of this emergence. As has already been ex-
plained, the understanding of philosophy here links the quest for truth insepara-
bly from a quest for improvement and this through an increase in one's ability to 
recognise significance (chiefly moral) and act accordingly. It is through these 
ideas of significance and meaning that a union of poetry and philosophy will be 
described.  
At the centre of this discussion of poetry (and particularly what we might call 
stories or myth) is an attempt to tie together both the means of investigation and 
argument exercised in this essay and the kind of growth in (cultivation of) wis-
dom through 'living-with' as discussed in the previous chapter. It will be argued 
that just as living-with grants us windows into truth (principally moral truth), and 
rigorous and logical argument and investigation also grants us a view of truth, 
so too can beauty offer similar revelation. It will be suggested that it is here that 
a general species of cohesion, a 'hanging-together', can be identified, that it this 
which characterises all of these modes of understanding and that it is for this 
reason they (should) all share a persuasiveness. 
 
A Conflict to Resolve 
Our history must always begin with a battle.  
It is an age of heroes, of wine-dark seas, and the coast of Asia Minor (as ever it 
seems to be) is alive with the clamour of a human tempest. Bronze flashes, 
empires rise and fall. Here identities are born. One history begins with gods 
fighting men, another with men fighting gods.  
Apollo, 'arrows rattling on the shoulders of the angry god as he moves', un-
leashes merciless death amongst the Greek host.174 Sometime later (and a bit 
                                            
173  R. Burch, 'Thinking Between Philosophy and Poetry', in M. Verdicchio and R. Burch 
(Ed.), Between Philosophy and Poetry, (London, Continuum, 2002), p.3 
174  Homer, Iliad, §1:45 
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further south) Thales wonders if things might not, in fact, be somewhat different 
from the way the poets have hitherto suggested. With less spectacle and glam-
our Thales unleashes far more devastating arrows. Unlike Achilles, Thales is 
not supported by a mighty army, his Myrmidons were yet to come. Socrates, 
greatest of their number, appears armed for the same cause, standing against 
the monstrous name of custom, against a tide of comfort and fear, he aims 
blows against deception and perishes in the effort, yet his battle cries echoed 
on and shaped a world entire.  
If any clear view of philosophy as myth is to be achieved then we must first 
overcome the immediate objection that philosophy, by definition, was the oppo-
site of myth, and that's how it was born and continues to function.175 For a bet-
ter understanding of this history, that philosophy arose in explicit opposition to 
religious and poetic tradition, we must again turn to Aristotle and Plato. At the 
outset of the Metaphysics, as Aristotle is attempting to outline the nature of his 
subject matter (the nature of wisdom and philosophy), he turns to a brief history 
of philosophy and to Thales and (notably) Hesiod at its inception. He describes 
how the first philosophers were all concerned with finding a single principle at 
the source of all things and that Thales identified this principle with water.176 
There are some who think the men of very ancient times, long 
before the present era, who first speculated about the gods, 
also held this same opinion about the primary entity. For they 
represented Oceanus and Tethys to be the parents of crea-
tion... they say that this was Thales’ opinion concerning the 
first cause.177 
After considering the shortfalls of theories which place a material element as 
first principle Aristotle goes on to say that philosophers now needed to ask what 
kind of non-material principle might be at the root of things and that: 
It might be inferred that the first person to consider this ques-
tion was Hesiod... for Hesiod says –  
 First of all things was Chaos made, and then 
                                            
175  Whilst historical, exegetical and etymological concerns are not (as has been repeatedly 
stated in this essay) the same thing as current function and correct understanding, they do 
heavily influence our understanding of any phenomenon and particularly philosophy. Philos-
ophy, by its nature, is a slow beast and its roots are strong, though for some disciplines two 
thousand years would be a long time, to philosophy it feels like only yesterday.  
176  Aristotle, Metaphysics, §I:III (983b-984a). 
177  Ibid, (983b1-984a5). 
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 Broad bosomed Earth... 
 And Love, the foremost of immortal beings 
thus implying that there must be in the world some cause to 
move things and combine them.178 
Two things are important to draw from these accounts (and also that which 
serves as the second epigraph to this chapter in which Aristotle draws a similar-
ity between myth loving and philosophy): 1. That poetry/storytelling and religion 
are, in this context, synonymous (this is why the word 'myth' will be of some, 
albeit limited, use); and 2. Both philosophy and myth are concerned with the 
same questions (principally, in their infancy, the structure and content of the 
cosmos: physics and metaphysics, the wisdom of Apollo). Both of these (relat-
ed) points will be of some consequence for this discussion of wisdom. The first 
point will, at this juncture, only be significant as a point of information and clari-
fication. When speaking of poetry and storytelling in an ancient Greek context 
what we are talking about is a Pre-Socratic tradition intimately bound up with 
the metaphysical, ethical and historical beliefs of the Hellenes, not an idle or 
merely aesthetic practice. The second point is of more immediate concern. The 
idea that philosophy is opposed to myth is rooted in an idea of the two arts as 
vying over the same territory and that their mastery of that ground is mutually 
exclusive; it is this mutual exclusivity which I wish, in part, to dispute.179 It is this 
conflict which is most clearly articulated by Plato's discussion of the 'ancient 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry'180 and which is at the root of the case 
he puts forward for philosophy against poetry and rhetoric.  
The territory under dispute is that of the immaterial, the powerful, the important, 
The Truth. This is the stuff of wisdom: important things. The poets had been the 
formulators and disseminators of the truth amongst the Hellenes for time im-
memorial and though it was inventive and adaptive in the sense of speaking to 
                                            
178  Ibid, §I:IV (984b23-31). 
179  In pursuing this introduction to the idea of the conflict between and identities of philos-
ophy and myth, in addition to drawing on ancient literature, I am primarily indebted to the 
work of Raymond Barfield in his book 'The Ancient Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry' 
(R. Barfield, The Ancient Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry, [Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011]). Barfield's broad historical approach provides an ideal overview of 
this topic and is gratifyingly anchored in the transcendental, Platonist model which this essay 
seeks to build upon. Barfield also gives a good sense of the inextricable relationship be-
tween poetry and all Greek literature and thought.  
180  Rep., 607b5–6 Also, on the possibility of Plato being the originator of the idea of this 
history of conflict see R. Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.2 
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the people and reflecting their own world, it was static in its means and pomp-
ous in its claims to authority. Philosophy was a rebellion against the status quo 
of received authority. Perhaps, rather than just regurgitating old stories, they 
thought, we could augment these stories with inquiry and observation (I think 
'augment' is the right word here, as will be seen). As Barfield suggests, it was a 
discontent with mere particulars which drove this rebellion.181 It's all well and 
good if the gods bind their vows by the water of The Styx, but what is the water 
doing? How does it do it? Is it at the foundation of other things? All things? The-
se lovers of wisdom sought not the isolated fragments of the cosmos but the 
wholes which they compose, the points of their origin and the lines along which 
they run. 
It may be apparent in this account of myth and philosophy that though I am at-
tempting to move away from a view of opposition I am not trying to dissolve 
conflict. 'Rebellion' may be too strong a word; even by the time of Aristotle it 
was evidently still permissible for a philosopher to turn to a poet for insight 
(however limited that insight might be).  
Plato's republic is to be free of poets but they are replaced by philosophers.182 
Rebellions come in many forms. Certainly, the vitriol of The Republic might 
make us think this rebellion against myth is of the nature of replacement but de-
velopment might be nearer the mark. We do not think of Einstein as being op-
posed to Newton, of Galileo as an enemy of Ptolemy. It might, however, be 
suggested that Einstein and Newton shared a method and goal and only dif-
fered in their solutions, we might say something similar of Galileo and Ptolemy. 
Perhaps this is why we think of philosophy and storytelling as being so op-
posed, we imagine that their methods and goals are distinct and that the conflict 
must be one of opposition rather than of development. The development model 
might just fail to fit. 
It is not too hard to see the modern opposition between science and religion as 
being the successor to the quarrel between philosophy and myth, we might 
even say it is identical (1). 
                                            
181  R. Barfield, The Ancient Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry, p.12. 
182  Ibid, p.10  and Rep. 377d 
 93 
93 
As much as this tension between science and religion might be seen as crude 
and populist183 it is nonetheless very real. I have, in the past, been tasked with 
challenging this idea of an inherent conflict between science and religion, with 
school aged children; it is a less than simple process. The majority of the chil-
dren whom I have taught tend to think this battle is a foregone conclusion 
(though they may sit on differing sides of the divide). My go-to sources for this 
effort in reconciliation are His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, and 
the 104th Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams. Apart from being two fig-
ures for whom I have a great deal of respect and admiration (and whom I there-
fore relish introducing children to at the earliest opportunity) these two figures 
are also prominent religious leaders who have been outspoken about the natu-
ral synergy between religion and science. The reason this is of particular rele-
vance at this juncture is that the kind of synergy which these figures (and others 
of like-minds) discuss may offer a response to the objection that philosophy and 
storytelling are at-odds or cannot be brought together. 
One possible problem with this model of cooperation between science and reli-
gion is that it typically imagines the universe as carved up into different kinds of 
questions, some of which can be answered by science and others by religion. 
As Rowan Williams explains: 
It is a complete falsehood to suggest that there is an intrinsic 
hostility between the scientific worldview and religious faith... 
Many modern scientists have supposed that when they do 
their scientific research they are speaking from a position of, 
you might say, synoptic understanding of how the world works 
so that the most basic, fundamentally true way of talking 
about the world is in terms of material interaction. That reduc-
tive approach is perhaps the most generative of conflict be-
tween scientists and people of faith, at least as the media and 
popular intellectual communication presents it.184 
It would probably also be fair to say that the sin goes both ways and there are 
plenty of religious leaders and 'people of faith' who also attempt to be all things 
to all men. Either someone says all things can be reduced to the material or the 
other says that all things can be reduced to the immaterial. The crucial concern 
                                            
183  Eugene Goodheart sets out some of the ways the New Atheists fall afoul of more nu-
anced academic reflection: E. Goodheart, Darwinian Misadventures in the Humanities, (Lon-
don, Transaction, 2009), p.33. 
184  R. Williams, 'Building Bridges in Istanbul', in D. Marshall (Ed.), Science and Religion: 
Christian and Muslim Perspectives, (Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2012), 
p.3 
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that this model raises is that we have already seen how philosophy, since its 
inception, has explicitly concerned itself with being holistic, universal and ex-
haustive. First principles are, by their nature, somewhat reductive. So a syner-
gistic model of reconciliation between philosophy and storytelling may also fail, 
since synergy requires sharing and philosophy appears to be a greedy force.   
If the development model of conflict resolution fails and the synergy model also 
falls short, perhaps this battle is doomed to end in misery. If, however, some 
accommodation of both models could be made, then perhaps philosophy as 
storytelling might better survive this introduction.  
If philosophy is science and poetry then perhaps it can be all things to all men. 
It can make claims on all topics because it does so with some circumspection, 
to poetry it is science and to science it is poetry. When it finds a poem of gods 
and magic it introduces statistics, when it finds cold, hard facts it asks after the 
soul. The idea of synergy is that certain questions are part of one domain, and 
others of another. Perhaps this can be utilised, not in terms of subject matter so 
much as scale (this echoes the earlier discussion, in chapter two, of philosophy 
as an overarching discipline concerned with 'the second glance'). It is not hard 
to see how sciences can hive off from philosophy by this means and in this way 
(historically) also sit comfortably with a development idea of philosophy. When 
the question is not 'What is change?' but rather 'What causes this change?' we 
can see a difference in scale, between universal and particular, which renders 
one philosophy and the other science. This is the difference in the sort of ques-
tion to which commentators like Rowan Williams wish to draw our attention. 
 It may be harder to understand, however, how this would work with philosophy 
and storytelling. Perhaps, in maintaining the non-exclusivity of this argument, 
we could also allow some non-philosophical storytelling. These would need to 
be the kind of stories which make no effort in drawing our attention to univer-
sals. As will be discussed in the next section, however, this essay will again fol-
low Plato, this time in suggesting that such two-dimensional, hollow creations 
are (at least when they exist, and sadly they frequently do), vicious and the en-
emy of true philosophy. It is in this sense that the idea of development is most 
useful, to express the way in which philosophy should be understood as the 
'new' poetry. Sometimes exclusivity and prescription are necessary.  
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Ultimately, when discussing philosophy as storytelling, I am not attempting to 
peel back the millennia and suggest that it would somehow have been better if 
the Milesians hadn't bothered; rather, I am attempting to suggest that in setting 
its escape trajectory too directly away from myth (at least in the analytic tradi-
tion), philosophy has lost something which it would do well to reclaim by an at 
least partial return. The Milesian and more generally classical reaction against 
the religious authority of the poets was productive of a newly critical way of 
thinking and it is right that we should see science as an inheritor of this tradition 
but just because this movement has been fruitful, its linear continuation need 
not be so. Philosophy certainly added something to ancient storytelling but it 
does not follow that it must have erased something. Perhaps anthropology and 
its storytelling can be seen as an effort to restrain philosophy from destroying 
itself through this linear movement (this is indeed how I would suggest anthro-
pology should be seen). 
Of course, people, 'The People', have always found comfort in traditions and 
stories which paint pretty pictures, which capture the imagination. Rhapsodes 
and their ilk had been pedaling smoke and mirrors long before the Sophists ev-
er got their grubby hands on the tools of logical argumentation and critical dia-
logue. Indeed, it has already been suggested here that the proper place of phi-
losophy is precisely to draw people away from the comfort of the familiar, to in-
troduce new ways of thinking, of seeing the world. To imagine, however, that 
the rejection of received wisdom requires the rejection of all the means and 
content of that wisdom is to confuse matters; to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater. It is certainly not terribly novel to suggest that stories, myths even, 
can reveal uncomfortable, unfamiliar realities. If we are to attempt a return to a 
philosophy as a way of life, a revival of ancient styles of philosophy, then we 
also need to understand the way in which ancient philosophy can be seen as 
having built upon myth rather than destroying it. Nor, indeed, does a rejection of 
comfort, and the authority which exploits comfort, necessarily entail a rejection 
of all the passions associated with storytelling. We are moved by tales and po-
etry in many ways, not least by the unveiling of truth, and this passion, at least, 
is at the very core of philosophy. 
 
Bad Art and 'Thick-Psychology' 
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It's always a fight and there has always been philosophy. Why should we imag-
ine it was a new thing? Because the Greeks gave it a name? Certainly a written 
tradition of philosophy, in Greek, Chinese or Sanskrit emerges at a particular 
time, but it doesn't follow that before that time nobody thought critically, that no-
body sought out goodness and truth and beauty in a careful, compassionate, 
rigorous and critical manner. That such written traditions have emerged in iso-
lated enclaves of wisdom would suggest that the tendency was at least latent, if 
not persistent. I see no reason to believe that there have not always been phi-
losophers, though they may have been more or less common and are now 
nameless and silent.185 They have always been opposed on two sides. Just as 
with the idea of moderation in conviction with which this discussion began, phi-
losophy has always been hemmed in by the forces of comfort and greed, the 
collective and the superman, blind devotion and empty selfishness, dogma and 
nihilism. Tell the people to question their beliefs and you are struck down, tell a 
king to fight for virtue, not profit, and you are struck down. The temptation may 
be to imagine a sudden break with traditions of storytelling, poetry, art and myth 
because these seem timeless and written philosophy so novel; this discussion 
of wisdom, however, requires a vision of philosophy that permits it to be as 
timeless as people and their stories because it is people and their stories. 
'Why can't poetry just be art? Pure wordy creation? Sure, poetry might have 
been religious myth in ancient Greece and current religion is just a mix of those 
kinds of myths and some pseudo-philosophy, but why do you need philosophy 
                                            
185  I do not dispute that the 'Axial Age' (as coined by Karl Jaspers) was a significant turn-
ing point in human history. What I mean to suggest is that the significance of this period 
(when all of what this current essay refers to as philosophy seems to have been founded) 
can be attributed to a quantity and longevity of work through technological, political and eco-
nomic means rather than any theoretical, ethical, or psychological advance. In some re-
spects I echo here the thoughts of Jan Assmann in regards to the role of literacy in what is 
frequently attributed to cultural evolution during the mid-first millennium BC (though I do not 
wholly deny the significance of this time period) (J. Assmann, 'Cultural Memory and the Myth 
of the Axial Age', pp.366-409, in R. N. Bellah and H. Joas (Ed.), The Axial Age and Its Con-
sequences, (Cambridge, MA, Belknap, 2012), pp.397-8. I think Aristotle's suggestion that 
philosophy emerges when people essentially have spare time is to some extent fair (Met.I 
981b 14-26) and this probably has much to do with the boom of such activity at that time, but 
fending off barbarians and burning poo to keep warm only makes dedication to wisdom more 
difficult, not impossible. When (and where) homes are warm and children are safe and well 
fed it becomes far easier to take the time and cognitive space necessary to gain grand per-
spectives. One's mind needn't be narrowly focused on the details of immediate security, it 
can drift further away and take in a much broader stretch of the cosmos without fear of ne-
cessities crumbling. But in dark times there are still those who keep the light aloft. The books 
of Lindisfarne and Kells shine with this light. It is a basic incarnation of philosophy, crude 
even, focused on the basest and most stark virtues and truths. Such small philosophy, hid-
den philosophy, may indeed be more of an ember than a fire, but how much easier is it to 
kindle a blaze from an ember than from damp kindling? We owe them much. 
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and myth to be the same thing? Can't stories just be inventions for fun? Enter-
tainment? Can’t this cohesion, this “hanging together” just be a matter of mere 
taste and the satisfaction of appetites? Certainly, stories, poetry and (if you real-
ly insist) myth can contain truth, but this is just a sugar coating for truths which 
could be more perspicuously expressed through philosophical argument. That 
is the whole point of philosophy, it attempts to get away from all the gumpf and 
foggy padding which is found in so much art. The point of those arts, when they 
do contain truths or moral content (and that is far from necessary) is to be easi-
er for the majority of people to consume, or at least just to offer them variety in 
their intellectual diet.'  
It might be entirely plausible to simply dismiss this voice of criticism as yet an-
other incarnation of relativism, of sophistry and rhetoric, those ancient enemies 
of philosophy; to discard such an objection with melodramatic outrage and vitri-
ol. This would be the temper of Platonism and may well seem quite in keeping 
with the tone of this thesis. To tow that line, however, would undoubtedly press 
this view of philosophy and poetry into an untenably ferocious ethical and met-
aphysical position. Such poetry, we would be bound to say, is valueless be-
cause it teaches no values, it is evil because it does not fight for The Good and 
if you're not on our side then you are on theirs! This, though, is the voice of the 
crusade and its clamour is impervious and if there is anything which the philo-
sophical ear must be, it is pervious.  
To answer the charge of creation for its own sake, of merely entertaining stories 
it will be necessary to say something about bad art.  
A work of art (and specifically what is here called story or poetry) can be viewed 
as non-philosophical in a wide variety of ways and it will be important not to 
create some sort of straw man out of very strong Nietzschian views which fit 
neatly into the anti-relativist stance of this discussion. Perhaps the strongest 
view (‘strong’ in persuasiveness, ‘weak’ in a technical sense) against which this 
present mytho-philosophy can contend with is some form of what is sometimes 
called ‘moderate autonomism’.186  This view is simply that artworks can possess 
a variety of different virtues or qualities and that these qualities needn't interfere 
                                            
186  For a good summary of this term see: S. Bacharach and J. Harold, 'Aesthetic and Artis-
tic Value', in A. C. Ribeiro (Ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Aesthetics, (London, 
Bloomsbury, 2015), pp.106-7 
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with one another although they may. So a work of art may indeed have what 
has here been called philosophical content (most usually moral content) and it 
may also have aesthetic value but it may be that these qualities of the artwork 
have no particular bearing on one another. The moral value of the piece is not 
the reason it is beautiful nor is its beauty the reason it is morally instructive. The 
moderation of this view can allow for the converse to be the case (that the mor-
al value does influence the aesthetic and vice versa) but merely states that this 
need not be so. This view appeals intuitively to those who enjoy artworks of an 
apparently dubious moral character (or outright repugnant moral character).  
Wagner is a classic. I enjoy Wagner's operas less because he and his operas 
were tied up with, and sympathetic to, an anti-semitic movement in 19th century 
Europe which ended very, very badly. When I express diminished enjoyment I 
am often confronted with an indignation which seems to regard this reduction in 
enjoyment as almost tantamount to a logical fallacy; perhaps some sort of ad 
hominem aesthetic process. 'What has his anti-semitism got to do with how 
beautiful his music is?' I will be asked. 'Probably not much', I will reply, 'but a 
little nonetheless'.  
My response to those who question my (slight) condemnation of Wagner is de-
scribed by Berys Gaut as 'Ethicism'.187 This is the suggestion that moral quali-
ties do (of necessity) inform an artworks's aesthetic value insofar as they are 
extant in a work of art. So a good work of art needn't be entirely morally lauda-
ble, but its aesthetic value will be diminished by its moral defects as far as they 
are defective. So much of Wagner is brilliant: the grandeur, the drama, the 
sweeping themes and deep, emotive character and story. It is also occasionally, 
and sometimes only slightly, a bit racist; somewhere in there, lurking in its guts, 
is something rotten. So overall I really think quite a lot of Wagner's operas, very 
much so (most of them), but I value them less for their moral defects.  
I use the terms 'think quite a lot of' and 'value' precisely because they are 
broad. I do not say 'appreciate aesthetically', and I attempt to move away from 
'enjoy', because what I mean to express is not precisely the kind of ethicism 
which Gaut describes. Ethicism is based in what is essentially a conceptual 
                                            
187  B. Gaut, ''The Ethical Criticism of Art', in J. Levinson, Aesthetics and Ethics, (Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.182-3. It should also be noted that Gaut also 
mentions Wagner briefly.  
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analysis which could conceivably allow for a non-moral piece of work which is 
nevertheless good; what will be defending here is what might be called a theory 
of psychological richness, or 'thick psychology' (pun intended) which does not 
allow for such work. What is beautiful in Wagner's work is also bound up with 
that which is true and morally laudable in Wagner's work; were his work totally 
devoid of any such philosophical content (which would be difficult if not impos-
sible) it would only be capable of mediocrity at best. 
What I mean by 'thick psychology' is a view of ‘the mind’ which considers it to 
be irreducibly complex.188 This is to say that reflecting on any given cognitive, 
emotional or otherwise sentient phaenomenon in isolation, outside of the con-
text of its other accompanying processes which comprise the totality of the per-
son is naive and inaccurate. Once again, this theory fits into the broader theo-
retical trend of this discussion in recognising accuracy in both distinctness and 
wholeness. So, as before, what is not being claimed is a strong Parmenide-
anism but rather an effort in achieving a balance with more Heraclytean views. 
So by saying that nothing can make sense outside of context, it is also im-
portant to note that nothing can make any sense unless it is distinct from its 
context: so individual cognitive states are salient but cannot be understood 
properly outside of their wider psychological context. Since, as has already 
been stated, this balance of continuity and discontinuity must be true of self and 
world as much as of any other phaenomena this thick-psychological analysis of 
aesthetics and ethics is not contrary to a conceptual analysis but concomitant 
with such an analysis. This is just to say that rather than talking about how the 
concept of beauty must involve a concept of goodness, and the concept of any 
good thing must involve that thing also being beautiful I shall also (and primari-
ly) talk about how the way we think necessitates appreciating the world in this 
way. These two ways of talking are not altogether distinct. Again, if we are the 
sort of creatures which must consider things in a 'thick' way (simultaneously de-
scriptive and evaluative) then the world is such a place that it must consist of 
entities which are 'thick' in this sense.189 
                                            
188 By ‘the mind’ I mean the same as ‘a person’. 
189 This is to reiterate the previous argument regarding the role of doubt and conviction in 
metaphysical claims. To imagine a more distinct gap between person and world or aesthet-
ics and ethics is as useful as attempting to imagine a world of primary qualities without sec-
ondary qualities, shapes without colour... which is just silly. 
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Both the use of this term ‘thick’ and in other capacities (later on) this discussion 
follows the work of Bernard Williams.190 But another important source of this 
use of the term ‘thick’ (to mean complex interwoven concepts and phaenomena 
from spheres of life usually conceived of as quite separate is Clifford Geertz.191 
Geertz is critical of the artificiality of Gilbert Ryle’s use of the idea of ‘thick de-
scriptions’ and instead seeks to impact some genuine empirical weight to this 
idea by applying it to ethnographic work.192 My own attempt to employ this kind 
of terminology is (perhaps unsurprisingly) in an effort to achieve a sort of amal-
gam between the ethical approach of Williams and the ethnographic approach 
of Geertz. I certainly mean to describe something on the scale of an individual 
mind, as does Williams, but I also want to illustrate the way in which moral 
meaning for that individual mind can only be made sense of in a wider context 
of ‘thickness’. Ultimately the idea is that it is best to conceive of our existence in 
a morally orientated narrative-poetic sort of way and that storytelling, and beau-
ty should have a firm place in the pursuit of wisdom.193 
What I am describing with ‘thick psychology’ is akin to a universal synaesthe-
sia.194 This is the idea that those who demonstrate a remarkable conjunction of 
the senses are only extreme examples of what we all demonstrate. Some peo-
ple might think Tuesday is blue, others that Rachmaninoff feels like silk or that a 
grumpy expression smells sort of cheesy. Some examples are more extreme 
than others. My own favourite is Ramachandran and Hubbard's bouba-kiki ef-
fect. 
                                            
190 Bernard Williams developed his use of ‘thick concepts’ (to mean concepts both evaluative 
and descriptive) in: B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (Oxford, Routledge, 
2006). 
191 Geertz was following Gilbert Ryle’s use (though that is of less importance here). Geertz dis-
cusses ‘thick description in: C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York, Basic 
Book, 1973). 
192 Ibid. pp.6-9. 
193 It may also be worth noting that, in escaping Ryle’s rigidity and artificiality, Geertz explains 
that Ryle made the job of cultural analysis ‘sound too much like that of the cypher clerk when 
it is much more like that of the literary critic’. Ibid, p.9. 
194  The idea of universal synaesthesia has been and is supported by a variety of psycho-
logical studies to date See: D. Johnson, C. Allison and S. Baron-Cohen, 'The Prevalence of 
Synesthesia: The Consistency of Revolution', pp.3-22, in J. Simner and E. M. Hubbard (Ed.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Synesthesia, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), pp.16-17 
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The question is, which shape is bouba and which kiki?195 There is a temptation 
to suggest that some category mistake is being made if one identifies round-
ness with a 'boo' sound and sharpness with a 'keek' sound just as there is a 
temptation to suggest that a category mistake is being made if one identifies 
beauty with goodness or vice versa. In the case of extreme synaesthesia there 
is perhaps even more of a disjunction between the usual way of seeing things 
and the connections being suggested. We are all used to thick moral concepts: 
repugnant murders or heartwarming heroism, and these are common to both 
our daily experience and (as such) the stories we tell one another.  
High degrees of synaesthetic behaviour are often connected with what is re-
ferred to as 'creativity' and also an ability to use metaphor.196 Of course, there is 
no implicit suggestion in any theory of universal synaesthesia that Tuesdays 
actually are blue or that the 'boo' sound actually is rounded in some way yet this 
is certainly part of our thick moral talk and also with much art criticism. Even if 
we were to take some very abstract art, perhaps the work of Mark Rothko, it 
would still be entirely natural for us to talk about energetic or calming pieces, 
impressions of rage or pensiveness. Perhaps a piece of canvas painted with 
simple blocks of colour can speak to us of something oppressive, a brooding 
malevolence, even violence, yet somehow an evil without deceit; a forthright 
darkness, smug in its power.   
                                            
195  V. S. Ramachandran and E. M. Hubbard, 'Hearing Colours, Tasting Shapes', in Scien-
tific American, 288 (5), pp.42-49.  
196  R. Gross, Psychology: The Science of Mind and Behaviour (6th ed), (Oxford, Hodder, 
2010), p.78 
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- Black in Deep Red, Mark Rothko 
Certainly, as we begin to speak in this way, if we are not shot down immediately 
for pretension, the breadth of our thick-psychological interconnections becomes 
clearer, from extreme synaesthesia to familiar metaphor. It must be restated 
that what is not crucial here is any particular normative claim, that this Rothko 
should be understood as brooding or that this or that shape should be recog-
nised as bouba, or even that one should find murder repugnant (though such 
normative claims will be made further down the line). What is important here is 
that it is entirely plausible, and indeed persuasively so, to suggest that when we 
engage a faculty of moral judgement we are also (though we may not be alto-
gether aware of it) engaging other judgmental faculties of not only veracity but 
aesthetics. We see the world in complex interwoven patterns and to extract el-
ements of those patterns from that tapestry, to sterilise them and present their 
naked isolation as in some way essential is to misinterpret both ourselves and 
the world in which we live.  
It might be claimed that the purpose of some abstract art is to achieve a kind of 
sterility, almost as an act of defiance against the gods of our minds, an experi-
ment in human power. Similar motivations might be claimed of works which 
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subvert moral norms (Nabokov's Lolita might be offered as an example),197 that 
such works are an attempt to break free from our natural inclination to conflate 
our experiences. Deconstruction and subversion would thus become marks of 
greatness and the degree to which these works bring us out of our thick-
psychology into a reduced and fractured world is the degree to which they suc-
ceed in their efforts. This defense, though, drifts again into a kind of nihilism 
(which has already been, if not argued against then at least circumvented) and 
notions of truth, understanding and improvement fade into the distance the fur-
ther we walk down that path.  
It should be remembered that our concerns here are twofold: first and most im-
mediately, this is an attempt to establish that talking beautifully is not just useful 
but necessary for fully demonstrating what is true and good just as talking truth-
fully is necessary for demonstrating what is good and beautiful; secondly (a 
matter which has not yet been properly expanded upon) this is an effort to es-
tablish that perceiving, appreciating and discussing stories can be a good way, 
if not the best way, of appreciating what is true and good. If the way in which we 
engage with the world is irreducibly 'thick' (in a way which is synonymous with 
the cohesion and ‘hanging-together’ of disparate, complex elements in our lives 
discussed earlier) then to appreciate any phenomenon in a more complete and 
accurate way it is important that any exploration is conducted in a commensu-
rately ‘thick’ fashion. This is where the distinction between good and bad art is 
being drawn, between that which is rich and enlightening and that which is nar-
row and obfuscating. The same distinction is being made between good philos-
ophy and bad philosophy.   
Occasionally, stories for children are forgiven for being simple and unphilosoph-
ical in the sense described here. These stories and nursery rhymes may be 
shallow: nonsense songs and stories in which events simply occur, in which a 
two dimensional protagonist navigates the most prosaic of happenings. It might 
be tempting to take these sorts of skeletal works as examples of unphilosophi-
cal stories which nonetheless are not 'bad art'. These stories, though, are fre-
quently designed, and quite overtly, to introduce the very young to language it-
self and the basic elements of narrative and in this sense are chiefly practical 
                                            
197  V. Nabokov, ‘Lolita’ (1955), in Collins Collectors Choice: Vladimir Nabokov, (London, 
Collins, 1971). 
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exercises as opposed to descriptive pieces. Even so, it would be a grave error 
to imagine that stories for children need to be devoid of philosophical content. 
Certainly it would not be controversial to suggest that good stories for children 
are rich in moral content. So it is entirely possible to subject even these works, 
despite their seeming simplicity, to precisely the same critique as any other 
work. 'What does it say?', 'Why did he do that?', 'What happened to her?', 'What 
does this mean?' these are very much the sorts of questions engendered by 
these works in precisely the audience at which they are aimed. Indeed, even 
when a rhyme appears to be nonsense arranged just for the sake of entertain-
ment, the very fact that its content is nonsensical and plays with our ideas of 
what makes sense and what does not is itself indicative of a quite significant 
philosophical problem. Reaching the boundaries of cohesion and meaningful 
language is a philosophical issue on which this thesis has already dwelt.  
Hey, diddle, diddle 
If very abstract art and very simple art can both be criticized on the basis of 
their philosophical content (which is to say the manner in which they evoke, 
challenge and embody complex and broad concepts and ways of life in an effort 
to communicate a truth) then it seems fair to suggest that all art, when it does 
what it should, is philosophical. As Marcia Muelder Eaton suggests: 'Bad art is 
mindless and dulls the senses; good art demands, deserves and repays sus-
tained attention, no matter what the community or traditions'.198  
Of course, saying that art should be philosophical is not the same thing as say-
ing that philosophy should be artistic. If, though, it is correct to suggest that the 
reason good art must be philosophical is because we experience the world in 
such a 'joined-up' way that philosophical art is both more fulfilling and better 
able to illuminate goodness, truth or beauty, then there may be good reason to 
believe good philosophy must also be artistic.  
It is important to emphasise that this idea of a rich, thought provoking art being 
the best art is not a theory of instrumental good. Certainly, this idea of thick 
psychology does translate into a kind of satisfaction when one is presented with 
rich, complex, balanced wholes as opposed to isolated fragments of concept or 
                                            
198  M. Muelder Eaton, Merit, Aesthetic and Ethical, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001), p.211. The role of that which rewards sustained attention will return as a crucial (if not 
the crucial aspect of wisdom itself). 
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form. This experiential 'fulfillment' is not, however, the primary reason for sug-
gesting that this art is better than the 'mindless' art which Muelder refers to. 
Certainly the goodness of such art is connected with this fulfilment but not de-
pendent upon it; rather, the converse is true. Indeed, this is precisely the rela-
tionship between εὐδαιμονία and goodness hitherto discussed. It is useful to 
pivot this idea of art upon its intrinsic value because it is easy to recognise the 
same value in philosophy.  
The activity of philosophy is good because it leads us towards truth or good-
ness, a work of philosophy (as we might talk about, say, a written work) is good 
insofar as it demonstrates this truth or goodness. It would be misleading to con-
strue philosophy as good because it is good for us, rather it is good because it 
is an attempt to be good. Nor would it seem right to suggest that a poem is 
good or not on the basis of the enjoyment it brings to this or that person. This 
thought mirrors that of Susan Wolf in her own discussion of the link between 
philosophy and art in this regard: 
If the source of an object's value lies in its capacity to benefit 
someone, it's value full-stop is conditional upon the value of 
the beneficiary. But this does not seem to be the case with art 
or philosophy. The value of a beautiful poem or symphony 
does not seem to depend upon our judgement of the worthi-
ness of its audience.199 
By suggesting, then, that we possess a psychological predisposition to appreci-
ate meaning and form in inextricably interwoven complexes of concepts, sensa-
tions and impressions which are contiguous with everything else we apprehend, 
I am not merely attempting to set out a reason for the inevitability of art's philos-
ophy and philosophy's art. This is not a brief psychological description of how 
we enjoy things but rather an attempt to point at why a more moral and illumi-
nating poem is more beautiful and a more beautiful philosophy leads to greater 
wisdom.  
It’s like the blind men and the elephant. With each additional aspect, each new 
perspective, the picture becomes more complete. Let's imagine, instead that 
these men are not blind but merely very short sighted and that one man, ever 
so gradually, begins to regain his full power of sight. At first, a trunk may seem 
                                            
199  S.Wolf, The Variety of Values: Essays on Morality, Meaning and Love, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2015), p.75 
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an incongruous addition to tusks, and this vast grey side would seem an end-
less, alien thing compared to that familiar ivory smoothness. But it all adds up 
and the voices of other elephant-explorers, which had hitherto seemed so erro-
neous, begin to make sense, though their continued isolation appears all the 
more tragic.  
We do indeed perceive the world as a rich and contiguous mixture of meanings 
and identities but very frequently it is that which is closest to hand and most 
sharply in focus to which we cling. The shadows of other parts of the elephant 
seem confusing in their gloomy vagueness, perhaps we can think on them in 
isolation but to allow them to encroach upon our crisp and solid world of tusks 
would be too much to take. But then again, when we think about it, these tusks 
move in unison with that grey mass, the subtle motions match the rhythm of that 
background breath. Our awareness of the world as a whole is certainly not inev-
itable, indeed, as has already been said in regards to the wisdom of the gods 
which Socrates was forced to deny, such a complete wisdom is inhuman. Yet 
one sphere does, at least to some extent, inevitably bleed into another, rumours 
of moral judgement echo through our descriptions and a delicate scent of aes-
thetic scrutiny suffuses our logic. Kindness and cleverness are conjoined, 
though the point of contact may not be obvious. 
This thick-psychology is, then, just another way of talking about the epistemic 
and ethical holism hitherto set out in relation to both the 'middle way' and 'living 
with', by which a consilience of knowledge can be achieved and thus a state of 
wisdom attained. Without denying the reality and usefulness of particularity and 
focus, the effort is one of painting a plausible image of our mind and world 
which is cohesive and real, bounded not only by logic but also by ethics and 
aesthetics.  
Art is bad when it is empty, when it expresses a paucity of meaning and signifi-
cance. Stories are bad when they don't say important things because we are 
creatures who live in a world in which even the seemingly mundane is pivoted 
about matters of very great significance. This is to echo Murdoch's earlier point 
regarding Socrates and the peasant. The lumberjack and accountant may seem 
only to be chopping wood and checking numbers but they are creatures with 
history and vital questions. Any given moment of their lives is defined by every 
other moment, each impression only a fragment of an interconnected move-
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ment through time primary and secondary qualities alike. As we perceive these 
people through media both critical and expressive, through languages of analy-
sis and of evocation, our understanding will become correspondingly richer and 
more accurate. This is what Marcus Aurelius means when he explains:  
ὥστε, εἴ τις ἔχει πάθος καὶ ἔννοιαν 
βαθυτέραν πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ 
γινόμενα, σχεδὸν οὐδὲν οὐχὶ δόξει 
αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν κατ̓ ἐπακολούθησιν 
συμβαινόντων ἡδέως πως 
διασυνίστασθαι. οὗτος δὲ καὶ 
θηρίων ἀληθῆ χάσματα οὐχ ἧσσον 
ἡδέως ὄψεται ἢ ὅσα γραφεῖς καὶ 
πλάσται μιμούμενοι δεικνύουσιν, 
καὶ γραὸς καὶ γέροντος ἀκμήν τινα 
καὶ ὥραν καὶ τὸ ἐν παισὶν 
ἐπαφρόδιτον τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ 
σώφροσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρᾶν 
δυνήσεται: καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ 
παντὶ πιθανά, μόνῳ δὲ τῷ πρὸς 
τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὰ ταύτης ἔργα 
γνησίως ᾠκειωμένῳ προσπεσεῖται. 
And so, if a man has sensibility 
and a deeper insight into the 
workings of the universe, scarce-
ly anything, though it exist only 
as a secondary consequence to 
something else, but will seem to 
him to form in its own way a 
pleasing adjunct to the whole. 
And he will look on the actual 
gaping jaws of wild beasts with 
no less pleasure than the repre-
sentations of them by limners 
and modellers; and he will be 
able to see in the aged of either 
sex a mature, prime and comely 
ripeness and gaze with chaste 
eyes upon the alluring loveliness 
of the young. And many such 
things there are which do not ap-
peal to everyone, but will come to 
him alone who is genuinely inti-
mate with nature and her 
works.200 
 
Objects (and here Aurelius writes particularly of creatures) when viewed in a 
very broad context (temporal, spatial, psychological, ideological, biological, so-
cial, etc.) come, in some sense, to share in the significance of the whole. It is 
once again an expression of the paradox of whole and part: that the true signifi-
cance of individual identity is expressed most fully when understood in the con-
text of which a phenomenon is a part. Art which fails to capture this potential 
significance, fails to permit something to stand out, let it speak, situate it just so 
with a flourish, a movement, a form, art which fails in this regard will only ever 
be prosaic in the most mundane of ways; not really art at all.     
So bad art and bad philosophy are bad in similar ways and good art and good 
philosophy may also be good in similar ways, indeed, just as was stated previ-
                                            
200  M. Aurelius Antoninus, 'Mediatations', C. R. Haines (Tr.), (London, Harvard University 
Press, 1930), §3:2:3 
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ously when it was claimed that 'There is a singularity, a conceptually infinitesi-
mal and impenetrable conjunction upon which our basic lived realities hinge', 
this discussion of methodological consilience suggests the same conjunction. 
As we draw out for a more general view of how we understand the world, the 
distinctions between art and science dissolve into a union of apprehension, of 
nebulous experience. Pythagoreans (and we may class Plato in their number) 
were obsessed by the parallels between mathematics, music and logic. Harmo-
ny in sound could be expressed mathematically and so too, to their wonder, 
could harmony in deduction and argument. An excitement over nearing some 
kind of core to the universe is palpable in that antique philosophy. Perhaps 
some part of that enthusiasm (though we might forgo quite its full extent) can 
pervade an approach to philosophy which allows for a more fluid methodology, 
where truths are presented both analytically and poetically.  
But what kind of poetry? 
 
Narrative, Possible Worlds and Representation 
It is now necessary to get a bit more specific about the sort poetry which is be-
ing discussed here, in particular the role of narrative and how this fits into this 
model of a pursuit of wisdom.  
Discussing art in a very general sense leaves open the possibility of this broad 
contextual psychology, epistemology, metaethics or ontology as being a static 
thing. Of course, the idea of change has already been discussed and the ne-
cessity of temporality as part of this network of meaning has been noted but 
even this might suggest something chaotic and amorphous. From the discus-
sion of the idea of wisdom taken from the apology and Nichomachean ethics, 
through the ideas of betweenness and anthropological consilience and into this 
discussion of art and thick psychology, it might be imagined that this theory of 
wisdom rests on something very closely resembling process ontology.   
In some ways, perhaps many ways, identifying the theories and methods hither-
to set out in this discussion as being process philosophy would be accurate. 
The assertion of difference and similarity, identity and change, universal and 
particular as being interdependent and paradoxically coextensive does, to some 
extent, fit well with an ontology which asserts a theory of anti-substance mon-
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ism. This synergy is even more notable when this anti-substance consists of 
what might be called process, being, experience or (and particularly) relation or 
'to-do-with-ness'; things which pivot about 'actual occasions' as the atoms of 
reality. In the words of Whitehead, the world is composed of 'drops of experi-
ence, complex and interdependent'.201 Each thing is what it is in relation to other 
things, not by dint but as such. This is an attractive schema in which to situate 
this current discussion but has been bypassed in its more complete forms for 
three main reasons. In order to better clarify the model of philosophy and reality 
being discussed here it will be useful to briefly relate these reasons and (albeit 
in a fairly superficial way) situate this current theory in relation to process phi-
losophy. 
• First (the least pressing of the three reasons), there is a tendency to con-
flate the Heraclytean model in which identity is in some sense illusory or 
at least secondary with this Whitehead-Hartshorne tradition in which 
identity can and does take a central ontological place. Whilst this latter 
model has come to take the principal role in characterising process on-
tologies this conflation is symptomatic of the vast range of theories 
(complementary and otherwise) which march under the banner of 'pro-
cess'. This potential confusion simply means that any invocation must be 
accompanied by a substantial clarification which, in this instance would 
not serve the discussion enough to be indulged.  
• Secondly (and perhaps somewhat convolutedly), process philosophy 
frequently takes the form of metaphysical theory. Some effort has al-
ready been made to set the metaphysical boundaries of this current dis-
cussion. Whilst it has not been claimed (and will not be) that metaphysi-
cal speculation is invalid, the emphasis of this treatment of wisdom has 
been on the linguistic and psychological (and one might even be tempted 
to say phenomenological) foundations for understanding 'our world' as 
being the way it is. This does not preclude the possibility of supplemen-
tary metaphysical speculation, rather it simply focuses its efforts else-
where in the hope of avoiding some of the 'mess' or risks associated with 
metaphysics. It should be noted, however (and here is the convoluted 
bit), that what has been called 'ontology' has been indulged to some ex-
                                            
201  A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, §1:2:1 
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tent and that the distinction between metaphysical and ontological theo-
ries is far from clear.202 So some of the mess of metaphysics has inevi-
tably and willingly been accrued through the (albeit tentative and sparing) 
invocation of 'ontology'. It would perhaps be simplest to say that the way 
'ontology' has been used here is to indicate questions of how things are 
as opposed to what or why things are. This is to favour the more 
Heideggerian tradition of discussing the preconditions of anything rather 
than what that anything consists of, 'Being' as opposed to 'beings'.203 In 
regards to process philosophy, this distinction may, however, be on fairly 
shaky ground, given that here particulars do, in a sense, consist of their 
preconditions (any actual occasion is what it is to other actual occasions 
and there are no other phaenomena or conditions). Suffice to say, that 
the emphasis of this discussion is not 'what there is' but rather 'how we 
should relate to what there is'. Evidently some concern with 'what there 
is' is necessary but is nonetheless of secondary concern.  
• Following from the concern of metaphysical focus and closely related is 
the primary departure from process philosophy: Goodness and God. The 
theory of wisdom offered here has as its fulcrum an idea of the possibility 
of goodness. It may well be that Whitehead's God would (perhaps in 
great part) mesh with this idea of possible goodness quite happily, and 
the theories of creation and poetry to be put forward shortly might also 
go further to solidify this bond but that must be a work for another day. 
The intrusion of a pseudo-Platonic moral realism into such a well estab-
lished philosophy of substance and change represents an addendum far 
too ambitious and tangential to be pursued here.  Doubtless there are 
those who would read this present species of moral realism, seated as it 
is in Plato and a hybrid Zen-Chestertonian anti-logic, as being identical 
with a theology. I have left God out of it on purpose. God makes people 
                                            
202  People muddle these two things up all of the time; I, for one, suspect that it's because 
'ontology' sounds a bit more complex and sophisticated whereas 'metaphysics' sounds old-
fashioned and religionesque; so people say 'ontology' when they possibly should say 'meta-
physics'. I also suspect that even when people think they know what the difference is be-
tween metaphysics and ontology they'll have a very different idea from someone who is 
equally certain. On this confusing use of these terms see: F. Bacchini, S. Caputo and M. 
Dell'Utri, Metaphysics and Ontology Without Myths, (Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars, 2014), 
p.ix 
203 M. Heidegger, Being and Time (1927), J. Mcaquarrie and E. Robinson (tr.), (Oxford, Black-
well, 2001). 
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angry. This violent reaction may lack justice and philosophical sound-
ness yet I will try to complete my task without invoking divinity as far as I 
may. The field of Philosophy as a Way of Life (if it can even be called a 
'field') already suffers from rejections by association with 'that God per-
son'.204 The extent to which debate about Whithead's God can become 
heated is also a breed of chaos which this essay can do without.205 More 
than this danger, however, there is the matter of what a theory of moral 
realism adds to an idea of a cosmos composed of processes, and this is 
a matter of direction. Oughts and shoulds are, as has already been sug-
gested, built into the fabric of reality, they are part of what grants any 
event meaning, but they are also what knits any given actual occasion to 
the next, what permits us to make sense of things and it is this which 
must be the focus of this current discussion of the poetry of the universe. 
So, it will pay to have process floating in the background but no more than that, 
it certainly is a philosophy to which this thesis is indebted but rather less so than 
to the theories which both this discussion and those of process philosophies 
draw in common (I mean here primarily the Greek conundrums of substance 
and change already mentioned frequently).  
Given the cognitive stance of this thesis, that moral statements do make claims 
about the world and reflect possible beliefs, it follows quite naturally that poetry 
occupies a similarly indicative realm. This is not, of course, to deny the rich and 
diverse ways in which ethical and aesthetic matters can and are thought about, 
in fact it is quite the reverse. Whether it is in terms of thick-psychology or just by 
highlighting the complexities of poetic and ethical language, this discussion is 
an effort in emphasising the endlessly deep and rich nature of our world. This 
richness does not, however, preclude meaning or what might be called 'orienta-
tion', indeed it presupposes it.  
Philosophy and poetry both say: 'Here! Here is a possible world, what do you 
think of it? Does it not seem right? Does it not move well? Does it not mesh? 
Does it not chime? Does it not cohere and hang together? Take it up and make 
                                            
204  On this association, particularly in relation to Hadot, see: M. Joy, 'In Search of Wis-
dom', in J. Cornwell and M. McGhee (Ed.), Philosophers and God: At the Frontiers of Faith 
and Reason, (London, Continuum, 2009), p.103 
205  There is no shortage of arguments about Whitehead's God. For a summary of this see: 
C. Heartshorne and C. Peden, Whitehead's View of Reality, (Newcastle, Cambridge Schol-
ars, 2010),  pp.81-87 
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it yours!'. Philosophy sings this indicative song and its harmonies are played out 
in the consistency of logic. Contradictions and presuppositions are curtailed in 
an effort to achieve lasting structures, solid and graceful. The songs of songs, 
of poetry and other word art, are far more subtle in their mechanisms of power. 
It may be cadence, it may be tone, allusions and thick webbings of connections 
and interconnections of meaning create a dance with unfolding layers; yet, so 
too is harmony sought. As has already been said, philosophers can be guilty of 
becoming overly fond of their consistency, the neatness of their endeavour. Un-
tidy edges, boundaries and axioms, are glossed over or ignored in the hope 
they might vanish in obscurity; paradoxes and impenetrable horizons are 
scorned for their inescapable power. Yet each song, each dance, each move-
ment, whichever school or tradition, each one asks: 'does this seem right?'.  
Of course, this observation is a fairly trite one (that truth claims abound), yet 
there is a way in which the kind of poetry which tells stories (storytelling) em-
braces and illuminates the interplay of solidity and dynamism which this account 
of indicative practices necessitates.  
It is a very familiar matter really; our appreciation of non-fiction writing in the 
form of history, ethnography and journalism represents a well trodden path in 
the exploration of the boundary between kinds of true stories.206 Whether a sto-
ry relates historical events or spins a tale of the imagination, each story will fo-
cus, will emphasise, will neglect and will move with a momentum of its own. 
Each element of the tale, however obscure, will be woven together with each 
other 'actual occasion' and will, together with its greater form, sing out with par-
ticular notes, particular meanings and messages. This structure of meaning 
might be called narrative, indeed, narrative is a good word for it and the work of 
Walter Fisher and his ‘narrative paradigm’ is certainly of importance.207 As 
Fisher explains: 'the narrative paradigm assumes that arguers tell stories and 
                                            
206  On this in particular in relation to investigative journalism see: J. S. Ettema and T. L. 
Glasser, 'Narrative Form and Moral Force: The Realization of Innocence and Guilt Through 
Investigative Journalism', in B. L. Brock, R. L. Scott and J. W. Chesebro (Ed.), Methods of 
Rhetorical Criticism, (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1990), pp.256-71  
207  W. R. Fisher, 'The Narrative Paradigm: An Elaboration', in B. L. Brock, R. L. Scott and 
J. W. Chesebro (Ed.), Methods of Rhetorical Criticism, (Detroit, Wayne State University 
Press, 1990), pp.234-255. 
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that storytellers argue'208. What holds one together is not so different from what 
holds the other together, 'cohesion' is a common principle.  
Galen Strawson offers a particularly powerful objection to the trend of charac-
terising both our psychology and our ethics as necessarily narrative in nature.209 
Strawson is inclined to find a great deal of psychological content and activity in 
an extended now and plenty of moral behaviour in that now too. Now, it must be 
remembered that this current discussion of narrative meaning is concerned pri-
marily with a best way to analyse and persuade, not a necessary way. The 
necessary bit of the psychology is ‘thick’ but not narrative, narrative is an op-
tional extension for gaining greater insight. So it is entirely possible to be not 
only human but also highly moral without being narrative; highly moral, but not 
wise. The suggestion is that those who do think in extended, complex and co-
herent ways about themselves and their world (in time) are inclined to be able 
to bring to the fore greater insights about what is and is not moral (by including 
more detail in moral deliberation it is possible to be more accurate). So Straw-
son’s weaker claims are compatible with those made here. Where this discus-
sion does depart from Strawson significantly is when he makes stronger claims 
of the following sort: 
…the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you 
risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from the 
truth of your being. Some are constantly telling their daily ex-
periences to others in a storying way and with great gusto. 
They are drifting ever further off the truth.210  
Of course, greater risk does not equate to inevitable corruption. For Strawson’s 
simple, now-focused soul to be the paragon of an ethical life, the working con-
ception of wisdom (and moral realism) upon which this discussion has been 
based would need to be abandoned. Storytelling may well carry great risks, 
risks of dishonesty. Simple souls may find certain virtues far easier to come by 
and to keep unscathed. Indeed, such a conception of simple virtue is central to 
this discussion, since those (often non-human) characters are of vital im-
portance to informing our own quest for a more complete set of virtues. But a 
perilous quest is nonetheless a worthy one if its goal is admirable. Such stories 
are the greatest of all.   
                                            
208  Ibid. p.244 
209 G. Strawson, ‘Against Narrativity’, in Ratio (new series) XVII 4 (December, 2004).  
210 Ibid. p.447. 
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Why, then, not just stick to storytelling? Why talk in terms of 'poetry' and 
'songs'? The answer to these questions must point back to the idea of 'thick-
psychology' and perhaps the best way to merge these ideas, of the narrative 
paradigm and inescapably interwoven modes of moral, aesthetic and logical 
appreciation is through Rowan William's use of the concept of 'representa-
tion'.211  
In his Gifford lectures, Lord Williams set out to (amongst other things) draw our 
attention away from an understanding of indicative language as flat description 
and towards an idea of 'representation' as a more nuanced thing.212 The distinc-
tion is a complex one but what it partly depends upon is a characterization of 
language as frequently being a rich kind of thing which is not simply a two di-
mensional tool used to transfer meaning but is, rather, bound up with the pro-
cesses of the world. This representation permits a kind of depth to ideas, a liv-
ing vitality or dynamism and each word, each linguistic deed, becomes a kind of 
complex of relationships with the world. As Lord Williams explains: 'Rather than 
seeking to stand in for what's “really” there, a representation is the “thereness” 
of the object in relation to the perceiver'.213 There is no true division between 
our communicative acts and the world as an arena for those acts. There are, of 
course, ways of talking, ways of thinking, which more clearly demonstrate this 
kind of rich language. Poetry is probably a good example. Through a certain 
rhythm, a tempo in the words, a poem might evoke feelings of panic or serenity, 
words which at first may seem vague are rendered powerful through the mani-
fold possible relationships they hold with ideas unspoken, even unspeakable. 
Indeed, each word and even the music between the words is not one thing but 
many. Rather than a cardboard cutout, a descriptive word: dead and impotent, 
movements in the poem speak so closely to the world because they are rich 
and complex, perhaps endlessly so. A thought becomes an analogy, it becomes 
a way of embracing the fullness of things more wholly, more truthfully, because 
it deals in many media.   
'Song' is a good word, let’s use that instead, at least for a while, because the 
music of poems can be more obscure (though it is no less real). Narrative 
songs not only have a 'beginning, middle and end', not only do they have char-
                                            
211  R. Williams, The Edge of Words, (London, Bloomsbury, 2014), p.191. 
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acters and causes, they also have another layer of harmony, of sense, of hang-
ing together. The notions and words must fall in place but so too must each 
note, each beat. This is how the world is, how our thoughts are. Logic, aesthet-
ics, ethics, all make demands, each one tickles our concern, but the end result 
needn't be a bitty thing, chunks of sense isolated from one another. Just as a 
song's words and music will fit, so too can good sense be made of morals and 
great elegance of argument. The manner in which a moral realism and narrative 
paradigm can cohabit is in just this poly-harmonic way. All that we say and do 
fits together as a story. Every object has a history (known or unknown) it has a 
type and character, every moment and person fits into categories of expecta-
tions which, far from being nebulous or arbitrary are, despite their complexity, 
woven together with the threads which we, our people and our world sow to-
gether. Behind it all there is a sense of harmony as such, and though this may 
be unfathomably more complex when it comes to ethical questions, the differ-
ence is one of degree.  
If our language is systematically indeterminate, incomplete, 
embodied, developed through paradox, metaphor and formal 
structure, and interwoven with a silence that opens up further 
possibilities of speech, it is a reality which consistently indi-
cates a 'hinterland'; as if it is always following on, or always 
responding, living in the wake of or in the shadow of intelligi-
ble relations whose full scale is still obscure to us. To put it a 
little more sharply: these aspects of language seem to show 
that we live in an environment where intelligible communica-
tion is ubiquitous – where there is 'sense' before we make 
sense.214  
This is not a purely creative process, it is not just invention, mere rhetoric, it is a 
poetry within a super-poetry. It is not complete, this is its point, each fragment of 
knowledge, though it is tied to the whole and defined by the whole, this connec-
tion stretches far beyond our ken. We may be reminded of the ‘ἀνθρωπίνη 
σοφία’ to which Socrates appealed in the Apology. This realm of analogy is our 
realm, meaning is contingent and complex, flowing and deep, it is related to 
something less fluid, anchored somehow in its horizons, but that something is 
not ‘ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία’.  
                                            
214  Ibid, p.170 
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Lord Williams speaks primarily in terms of systems of symbols,215 a very human 
sort of language, and whilst systems of symbols and a proficiency with these 
certainly has an important role to play, there is no reason to confine this rich-
ness of interrelation to symbolic interaction. The ubiquity of sense would need 
to be open to the widest communications of interest. The kind of song which 
this discussion seeks to explore, the kind of story which it seeks to put at the 
heart of a philosophical anthropology (or an anthropological philosophy) is the 
kind of story which is inhabited, which is lived.  
By carrying over the way in which we appreciate stories (in a way we usually 
think of as an appreciation of art) we can better conceive of how we should 
think about our search for wisdom in a way which embraces the in-
betweenness which has hitherto been described in epistemology, metaethics, 
participant observation and, perhaps most crucially, philosophy. By 'living-with' 
(one might even say 'living-with-in', though that’s just too ugly) a fuller extent of 
the meaning of each occasion, each moment, each person, each desire, each 
demand can be apprehended in its richness and the part it plays in grander 
wholes be better appreciated. When I ask the questions, how should I live? 
How can I become a better person? How can I grow in wisdom? The answer is 
first to listen, to attend. Listen to the song as it is sung about you, listen to its 
many voices. Attend to discord and cacophony, practice simultaneous distance 
and closeness. Draw back to see the whole and attend with great focus on the 
details. Immerse yourself in lives as diverse as you may and discover what 
rhythms and melodies lie deep within. Do not neglect yourself in this, for you will 
find that each word of this world is but an instance and each character is part of 
a far longer tale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
215  Ibid. 
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PART 2: THE GARDEN 
 
 
5 - Purposiveness Amongst Living Things as a Focus of Wisdom and the 
Usefulness of Fringe Cases for Acquiring Wisdom. 
 
To be, or not to be: that is the question. 
- Shakespeare, Hamlet, 3.1. 
 
 
It is not at all easy to convey my sense of relief (I will call it relief for now) when I 
first see my tomatoes.  
Spring seems to have a reputation, amongst many, for gentleness and ease, 
but life on these little farms shows it to be otherwise. I would say there is no 
harder season. For those who live indoors, those who work in warm boxes, I 
suspect winter seems the cruellest of seasons; perhaps it is for some. I know 
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that winter is cruel for many of those other creatures who live outside, it means 
death, but for the grower of vegetables, the keeper of animals, it is the early 
spring which is toughest of all. 'The hungry gap' it is called, the time between 
the brassicas giving up the ghost and the broad beans offering their fruits. From 
the end of February to the beginning of May it is not unusual for one day to be 
snow and the next to be clear, warm skies. The tasks of winter are steady and 
predictable, they are matters of dead and sleeping things, rocks and old wood. 
Feeding pigs and mending fences. Cold, yes, and frequently uncomfortable, but 
not much more than that; and there's always Christmas. But the new year is 
austere and unpredictable.  
Tomatoes are always my first seeds to go in. They need time inside, under cov-
er, to get going, they won't germinate in cold soil and they need a good head-
start in order to grow enough to make fruit over a long season. So it is entirely 
usual to start tomatoes early on a window sill or in a propagator. But they're my 
first also because of what they represent, because of what they can do. 
I have always spent time on my tomatoes, worried about them. People some-
times return from a holiday in Italy and proclaim, with middle-class abandon, 
that the tomatoes in Italy are like nothing you've ever tasted here. They are ac-
tually; many of them are inferior to the tomatoes I grow. They are like little jew-
els in the garden, they represent what the garden can do, it can rise above the 
bland, plastic course we have been set, it can bring true excellence through 
small and simple things.  
I live with lots of these simple things: many lives. I say this in this particular way 
not only for poetic force but because the many lives with which I live are not on-
ly human lives, nor just animal lives but the lives of plants and all that make up 
what might be called the local biosphere or living environment. Of course, in 
one sense this is true of anyone. There is not a human who has ever lived in 
isolation from all other lives. Not only do we require connection (biological and 
social) with other humans (we may think most obviously of our families), we al-
so live alongside myriad forms of other life, noticed or unnoticed.  
There are, of course, many living things (bacteria, insects, fungi) which live out 
their lives unseen and yet in direct contact with us throughout our lives. We are 
biospheres all of our own. I do not just mean these lives though. There is a 
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sense in which these lives, these invisible lives, are as distant from our own as 
that of a butterfly on the other side of the globe, we don't really live with them in 
the sense that we do not have an abiding and dynamic awareness of them. I do 
not wish to discount these little, microscopic lives entirely simply on the basis of 
them not being explicitly in the forefronts of our thoughts, that would be a crude 
and overly cerebral characterization of shared living, but (as with so many 
things) they will sit at a far point of a spectrum for now, the hazy fringes of a 
sphere (they shall reappear, at its core and in a new guise, later in the discus-
sion).  
There is a more obvious shared living at the heart of that sphere. 
In one form or another I have always lived on a smallholding. It sounds a very 
grand and bourgeois thing, a ‘smallholding’, and so it is, I suppose, at least in 
the context of the country and times in which I find myself. I would like to say 
that there is another spectrum here, with smallholdings occupying a place fur-
ther along in some direction or other from the small farms which have constitut-
ed the homes and occupations of people everywhere for a very long time. My 
family, however, are not subsistence farmers. Though they may know how to 
grow vegetables and care for animals, they are certainly of the bourgeoisie, so 
my hopes of a spectrum here, some continuity with a greater, more fundamen-
tal humanity, may be moonshine; we shall see. My family are probably upper-
middle class: media types, hippies at boarding schools. So there was a time in 
my childhood when my father cut the orchard grass with a scythe, and we 
would, come harvest time, cart the apples off to the mill up the hill in exchange 
for cider and cheese (that's what they make well in Somerset: cider and 
cheese), but we did not live off scrumpy and cheddar alone. One way or anoth-
er, though, this is what I have always known. 
Apples and hay, sheep and chickens, raspberries, medlars and eels. And it 
went further; other animals, injured or abandoned, were nursed and raised: 
weasel, barn owl, song thrush, swans; all these beside the cats and dogs. I 
suppose this sort of thing might lead some people to rebel, that's what we hear 
sometimes, that children want something different from what they have been 
given. I have always found this to be an alien and distasteful attitude. Neither I 
nor my siblings have ever shown any signs of rejecting this life with other ani-
mals (I do not mean to boast, I am simply grateful to my parents for providing 
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such a life). My sisters may not have taken up the mantel quite so enthusiasti-
cally as I have, but they would never dream of a life totally away from these 
other lives, such a thing would be sterile and hardly life at all.    
I remember quite clearly the dawning realisation that not everyone saw other 
animals as we saw them. It was not that this alternative view came from other 
children. Children, as a rule, seem to quite naturally perceive other animals as 
being sentient creatures like themselves: persons. Whether this perception 
translates into compassion is another matter, but the idea that there is a very 
sharp distinction between humans and other animals seems foreign to most 
young people.216 No, the idea that other animals were not people came from 
teachers and parents, possibly TV (though certainly not from most media aimed 
at children). The idea was not, however, articulated explicitly, it was simply the 
way in which they talked about 'it', rather than using a more personish pronoun.  
What's been said here needs to be carefully qualified. Recounting some haly-
con age of inter-species communion might give the impression of a kind of spe-
cies blindness, dancing innocently through an arcadian wonderland. The word 
'person' may be important here; they are 'persons'. In a sense, this idea of 'per-
sonhood' is just as simple and transparent as that arcadian vision would sug-
gest, in other ways it is far more complex. Both this simplicity and this complexi-
ty must be treated if any sense is to be made of the way in which a 'life with 
other living things' can been instrumental in, and constitutive of what small wis-
dom we might hope to cultivate.  
 
Binary 'Creatures', Analogue 'Persons' 
Let's be careful when we're talking about words. All too well will the teacher of 
philosophy know the inner lamentations (and urgent responsibility) brought 
about by students who are not sufficiently conversant in Wittgenstein. 'That's 
not what X means' they say with all the conviction of pre-philosophy. 'X means 
Y' they decry from soapboxes built from such sanguine etymologies that it can 
be hard to know quite where to start in dismantling them. 'Person' can undoubt-
edly mean 'humans'. Most of the time I think 'person' and indeed 'people' does 
                                            
216 Indeed, this recognition of personhood can accompany malice as opposed to compassion, 
Cf. S. Hurn, Humans and Other Animals, p.100. 
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just mean 'human'. 'Man', 'ἄνθρωπος'; these terms are undoubtedly species 
specific terms. But words like this, concerned with the identity of our kind, which 
are so rich in history and meaning, and which are so ubiquitous in use, can pre-
sent real ethical concerns. 
The kind of language used already in discussions about non-human lives will 
necessarily inform how we are able to make sense of non-human lives as lives 
to be 'lived-with'. Certainly, 'animal rights' are not, as such, of immediate con-
cern here but the discussion surrounding what is and is not permissible in our 
treatment of other animals is closely married to questions about what sort of 
'other lives' these non-human creatures lead, and that kind of question is of im-
mediate concern since it relates closely to the question as to what kind of life 
we can lead with them. Can these non-human lives be legitimate and fruitful 
sources of the kind of philosophical insight hitherto outlined?  
The go-to analogue for animal rights is human rights. Speciesism is lined up 
with the other 'isms', particularly racism.217 There are undoubtedly many sound 
and morally pressing debates to be had surrounding this heated war of analo-
gies, but heat can be a hindrance. The rabbit hole of arbitrary or significant dis-
tinctions, of genetic differences and similarities, risks drawing us into a realm of 
obfuscation rather than illumination. I have no doubt that the genetic differences 
between myself and another human are simply a matter of degrees away from 
the differences between myself and an individual of another species. So too, do 
I have no doubt that I am less devastated (and with moral justice) when a moth 
hits my windscreen than when I see the lifeless corpse of a human on the road-
side (for, alas, I have). This analogy (of speciesism and racism), whatever its 
defects or pitfalls, brings forcefully to our attention the power of words like 'peo-
ple' and 'person' for with these terms comes an inclusion or exclusion from 
moral categories.  
Lafolette and Shanks are correct to emphasise that the question is whether the 
differences we observe (between one 'person' and another) are 'morally rele-
vant', and whilst it is right that we should ensure that our focus doesn't drift from 
our central ethical concerns, just what is and is not permitted in the realm of 
                                            
217  Hugh Lafollette and Niall Shanks do a nice job of indicating the central (and expected) 
nature of this particular meeting of 'isms'. H. Lafolette and N. Shanks,. 'The Origin of Spe-
ciesism', in Philosophy 71.275 (1996): 41–61. 
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those concerns is far from clear.218 Categories, groups and their names, frame 
the ethical debate before it has even commenced.  
As with so much of what has already been discussed in this essay, there is a 
battle here between those who perceive important continuity where others see 
significant difference. If one does not recognise moral relevance then what is 
one to do? Part of the purpose of this entire treatment of wisdom and 'the good 
life' is to demonstrate (or at least suggest) that one good way, if not the best 
way, to negotiate these disagreements as to the (moral) significance of differ-
ences and similarities, is not to exchange abstract contradictions and consist-
encies but rather to experience (in a direct and visceral sort of way) the matter 
in question. The way to understand that a dog is a person (in a very morally rel-
evant sense) is to live with a dog (particularly one who is very much a person). 
This, though, is to get ahead of ourselves and there is still a place for a certain 
level of abstraction; time to frame the debate: to find our words. 
The use of words like 'people' is, admittedly (though only in part) an exercise in 
political provocation and in training. When my daughter has always used the 
word 'person' to be synonymous with the word 'creature' an invisible barrier is 
removed which for others remains. When I talk about non-human 'people', cas-
ually or academically, conversation is punctuated by confusion and confusion 
can be the seed of new understanding. Discomfort, discontent with the way in 
which I have used words inevitably spawns some kind of interest in why I have 
used these words in the way I have. The idea of manipulating language in order 
to establish or reinforce boundaries between morally distinct sets is a familiar 
one. Terms like 'subhuman' have been wielded in the justification of slavery and 
genocide and the idea of personhood, if it is not entirely synonymous with 'hu-
man', nevertheless creeps in through lack of scrutiny: conflation by inaction.219 
David Livingstone Smith attempts to use the terms 'person' and 'human' to dis-
tinguish between what seems to be human and what is actually human. By this 
rationale an android or zombie would be a 'person' and you or I would be a 
'human'.220 This departure from the philosophical and Lockean tradition of dis-
                                            
218  Ibid. P.42. 
219  D. Livingstone Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate 
Others, (New York, Macmillan, 2011). 
220 Ibid. p.5. 
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cussing personhood as associated with mind serves to demonstrate the confu-
sion and moral weight behind this family of terms.221  
'People from another world'. This is a comfortable enough phrase which may 
help to flesh out our understanding of persons and human bodies. There is no 
sense in which 'people' is being used here in a technical sense. Science fiction 
is a sufficiently venerable and wide-spread element of our culture now that this 
kind of phrase (though it may smack of a chrome-plated, monster movie, 1950s 
silliness) carries a core meaning of 'person'. Perhaps these people will need to 
be decidedly humanoid. The Martians of a bygone era, lurching from silver sau-
cers, steam belching from unknown sources. Two arms, two legs, a head and, 
perhaps most importantly, a face and voice. Star Trek is well known for slapping 
some heavy makeup on an actor, perhaps an exaggeratedly furrowed brow, and 
calling them an alien. They are still certainly a person.222 This might only serve 
to confirm that we do not use the word 'person' with genetics in mind, and it 
may only shift our focus from ‘human’ to ‘humanoid’. What is interesting, how-
ever, is that people like David Livingstone Smith want to use the term 'person' to 
identify the moral irrelevance of 'humanoid' qualities since it is the observation 
of phenotypical differences which is at the root of racist discrimination. Instead it 
is something 'within' which matters, membership of the moral category is based 
in psychology not genes or appearance. 
The alien is a tool, a shortcut, and certainly not my own. Mark Rowlands has 
utilised the idea of the alien in discussing animal ethics, in his Animal Rights: All 
That Matters, he uses the idea of alien abduction to explore the problem of oth-
er minds in relation to other animals (a subject to which I shall return).223 C. S. 
Lewis is, perhaps, a more surprising author who turns to the animal and alien in 
ethics. In his essay Religion and Rocketry, Lewis wields these dual ideas, of 
                                            
221  P. F. Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 
pp.11; 58-64. 
222  It is only fair to note that Star Trek, being the bastion of pop-philosophy that it is, dealt 
quite early on with the question of animality (in its own peculiar way) in the film The Voyage 
Home (1986). Here an alien probe threatens Earth and speaks in the language of humpback 
whales and it is only they who can save Earth. In a rather more intellectually sophisticated 
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Fish, (London, Pan Books, 2009 [1984]) in which the Dolphins of Earth, far from saving the 
planet, abandon it prior to its destruction.  
223  M. Rowlands, Animal Rights: All That Matters, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 2013). 
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other creatures, terrestrial and otherwise, deftly and with comfort.224 Lewis is in 
no doubt about what characteristic is crucial in determining the 'moral rele-
vance' of any extra-terrestrial life; “Have they rational souls?”, this is the ques-
tion we must ask and this is the same as asking “Are they spiritual animals?”.225 
This might seem an unnecessarily religious way of asking the same sort of 
question philosophers generally ask about other animals: 'Are they rational?'. 
We may well suspect that Lewis, in his insistence on souls and spirituality, is 
attempting to negotiate the kind of difficulty those who emphasise psychology 
as the moral qualifier run into when it comes to human infants and those adult 
humans who do not possess the usual kind of intellectual human abilities. 
Those who claim genes or appearance as morally relevant have a problem with 
racism and sexism, those who claim psychology as crucial have a problem with 
humans who do not match the intellectual standard. If, though, the flavour of the 
psychology in question were not one of abstraction or heavily cerebral cogita-
tion but, rather, something less easily expressed and yet still somehow more 
basic and more immediately perceivable then our theory might be both more 
practically applicable and more closely resemble reality.    
It is in an effort to dismiss this sort of question, of rational animals, that Ben-
tham's famous quote is commonly employed: 'The question is not Can they 
Reason? Nor is it Can they talk? But can they suffer?'.226 There is no doubt that 
the fame of this quote, and its wide utilisation by people like Singer and Regan 
is justified.227 It is the sort of morally incisive suggestion which cuts through con-
fusion like a hot knife; it turns us away from the deep, dark box in which we 
have been rummaging furiously to show us that we have been looking in the 
wrong place all along. But do we ever ask this? Do we ever wonder: 'can they 
suffer?'. I suppose some people do, they look excitedly to scientific journals 
which proclaim discoveries of neurological structures and particular kinds of 
nerve endings. This seems quite wrong, quite possibly horrible. I have never 
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really wondered 'can they suffer?', though I have certainly wondered, in certain 
circumstances, 'do they suffer?', and far more so 'how do they suffer?'.228  
Sometimes I will ask 'does it hurt?' and in the same way I will scan the face of 
my dog or the twitches of my horse's back. I will glance up, when removing a 
splinter from my fianceé's hand, to check if it hurts, how it hurts. When there are 
fireworks next door and my daughter climbs onto my lap for a cuddle I will tell, 
not just with my eyes but with the feeling in that embrace, just what kind of fear 
she feels and so too will the dogs climb up for a cuddle when the rockets ex-
plode; I will read their fear in the same way. Sometimes, albeit rarely, I will won-
der if there is any suffering at all, it will be so deeply buried. Horses are very 
good at this, burying their pain, sometimes they will just be silent, still, their eyes 
will be distant. More so, though, I will think about the depths of suffering, the 
nuances, the benefits, and, most crucially the desert. The kind of core to crea-
tures to which Bentham turns our attention, the basic capacities we have to suf-
fer, may indeed be basic in the sense of being ubiquitous and fundamental but it 
is nonetheless a dimension of deep complexity. We need language which con-
veys this complexity; thick descriptions, stories.  
Merely pointing to perceived similarities in behaviour (physical or neurological) 
which are analogous to our own human behaviour will do nothing to ‘argue’ for 
the kind of concern and insight which is crucial to our sense of other living 
things as capable of pain or any other state which is constitutive of being a per-
son. Any point of similarity can be emphasised just as much as any point of di-
vergence. Moral relevance requires a far richer language which is already em-
bedded in the morally suffused world in which we (living things) live together. As 
David Cockburn says:  
…this point applies to the appeal to the great similarities be-
tween what goes on in the nervous systems of a human being 
in pain and of a dog that has been hit by a car. Certainly this 
appeal might move somebody who had doubt about pain in 
dogs. But he might equally conclude from the similarity, and 
'the obvious fact that dogs don't feel anything', that what hap-
pens in the nervous system is a far less decisive mark of pain 
than he had previously supposed. No doubt he would have to 
                                            
228 This is one of many suggestions made in this thesis which are wholly indebted to Raimond 
Gaita’s work in The Philosopher’s Dog. R. Gaita, The Philosopher's Dog, (London, 
Routledge, 2003), (in this instance pp.106-11). Gaita criticises a kind of ‘scientistic’ way of 
thinking about proof when it comes to how we should think about other animals. 
 126 
126 
be crazy or corrupt to draw this conclusion. But then he would 
have had to be crazy or corrupt in the first place to doubt that 
dogs feel pain. The appeal to this 'decisive similarity' does not 
provide us with an 'argument' where before we had 'only 
common sense.229  
Perhaps Lewis' language of 'spirituality' can help resolve the confusion around 
words like 'people', 'rationality' and 'suffering'. It might be easier to attribute 
complexity to something like 'spirituality' than to 'rationality'. What I mean by this 
is that, although Lewis uses these terms interchangeably, we are used to think-
ing about rationality in a quite binary and Kantian sort of way, either you are or 
are not a rational being. Rationality is more like a simple capacity or potential 
than it is a realisation or exercise of anything. Quite possibly Lewis would say 
the same about spirituality (and we need not follow Lewis too far with this term) 
but use of the word 'spiritual' is far less obviously binary. It is easy to imagine 
one person being more or less spiritual than the last, and in quite different sorts 
of ways. I wish to say the same about personhood as such. 'Intelligence' might 
be thought of in a similar way and the temptation may be to try to find some-
thing like intelligence which helps us understand and justify the differences in 
our interactions with and expectations of and for different kinds of creature. Cer-
tainly, I talk to young children in a different way from the way I talk to philosophy 
students, I also expect different things from them and for them but they are all 
fellow persons, 'someones' rather than 'somethings'.230 There is something dif-
ferent in kind about the qualities which differentiate these different people from 
one another and the qualities which differentiate them from rocks and mobile 
phones. The first set of differences constitute something complex and ana-
logue, the other is something simple and binary. My interest here is in discuss-
ing how we can best make sense of the difference between humans and other 
living things being of the first, analogue kind and how there is no third difference 
in kind, only more differences by degree: more or less someone. 
                                            
229 D. Cockburn, ‘Human Beings and Giant Squids’, in Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 268 (Apr., 
1994), pp. 135-150, (pp.138-9). It should also be noted that Cockburn’s work far more gen-
erally (particularly through teaching and advice) have been hugely important in the formation 
of the ideas presented here. 
 
230 I take this language (though it is natural enough) of ‘someone’ and something’ from Robert 
Spaemann: R. Spaemann, Persons: The Difference Between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’, 
O. O’Donovan (tr.), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006).  
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This suggestion begs two obvious questions in response. First (1), what are the 
ethical consequences of accepting this theory of 'personhood by degree’? And, 
Secondly, how do we determine how much of a someone someone is? The an-
swer to the latter query has already been intimated and will continue to be ex-
panded upon through the medium of ‘anthropological storytelling’ which has al-
ready been discussed. The answer to the former is a more complex matter but 
of less concern than may be immediately suspected. 
The question at hand presently is whether and to what degree non-human life 
can (and should) serve as the object of 'living-with' which has been previously 
outlined as the exercise of pursuing wisdom or philosophy/anthropology/poetry. 
Can the business of philosophy consist in learning from the lives of non-human 
others? (2) And, to what extent are non-humans 'others'? The normative corol-
laries of suggesting that personhood comes in degrees (1) do not pertain direct-
ly upon either of these questions (though they are, admittedly, of close second-
ary concern). Typically these corollaries, when they relate to intelligence, are 
imagined to be the sorts of things which are wielded in debates around human 
rights. If a chimp is more of a someone than an ant then it seems natural to 
suggest that a young child is less of a someone than an adult. It then follows 
(it's imagined) that the rights of the chimp outweigh those of the ant and the 
rights of the adult outweigh those of the child. Singer famously answers this 
idea, that greater intelligence grants greater rights, with the observation that this 
is manifestly not true, that we do not think we owe less to the child than the 
adult (conversely, we may owe the child more) and this should show us that a 
lower intelligence does not translate directly into fewer rights.231 This is one of 
Singer's greatest contributions to our discussion of other animals, to have taken 
Bentham's insight and shown a plausible inverse relationship between intelli-
gence and suffering.232 A world populated by innocent, child-like minds. Of 
course, Singer immediately acknowledges that accusations of anthropomor-
phism will be made, that any drawing of parallels between human children and 
other animals is simply to misunderstand what other animals are really like.233  
                                            
231  P. Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals, p.12 
232  P. Singer, Practical Ethics (1979), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1994), 
p.60 
233  P. Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals, pp.10-15 
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Since the model of philosophy (anthropology/poetry) previously suggested is 
one of learning about how life should be lived by becoming familiar (through 
simultaneous observation and participation) with the perspectives of others then 
it is clear that normative questions about what we should expect of and for other 
animals (1) are closely tied to our primary enquiry (2). When the question is 
whether other animals (or other living things) represent the kinds of lives which 
can reasonably inform this activity of attempting to live the good life, of philoso-
phy (2), then questions about what we should expect of and for other animals 
(1) come close to exhaustively constituting any enquiry into whether other ani-
mals are the sorts of creatures which can inform this quest for wisdom. We 
learn how to be good by living lives with others which demand that we ask mor-
al questions and take moral action. 
It is clear, though, that one of these branches of enquiry (1,2) follows logically 
from the other, I must first at least suspect a someone of being a someone (2) 
before I can ask more complex questions about the moral category into which 
they fit (1). The only way in which these two lines of questioning (1,2) would be 
entirely identical is if all someones were to be understood as belonging to a sin-
gle, simple moral category or if the degree of someoneness of which a some-
one consisted was directly and in some equally simple way correlated to their 
moral category. The reason Singer's insight about the lack of correlation be-
tween intelligence and rights is so useful here is that, given the close connec-
tion between 'intelligence' and the psychological complexity tentatively dis-
cussed here as 'spiritual', it is easy to see how asking how much of a someone 
someone is does not necessarily translate easily into how we should treat that 
someone. Murdoch’s mother of many children may gain more moral insight and 
chance for moral cultivation from her life with simple souls than might the ethics 
professor who spends all of her time with other ethics professors discussing 
ethics.  
I would spend money feeding my dog before sending money to save some ref-
ugees, I would  almost certainly save the life of any bear before that of any vio-
lent criminal, but I may sooner prevent the death of that criminal than the death 
of a mosquito. These are crude illustrations, perhaps provocatively so, but they 
serve to illustrate the complexity of the relationships between the idea of per-
sonhood ('spirituality') under discussion and more traditional notions of psycho-
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logical complexity like 'intelligence', not to mention filial responsibility and de-
sert.  
It is clear that much of this more traditional debate around intelligence does ap-
ply to this current idea of personhood. Some word juggling inevitably needs to 
be done when it comes to attempting to outline a relatively novel way of thinking 
about any issue (or at least one which attempts to escape some of the re-
straints surrounding extant ways of talking and thinking). 'Personhood', 'person' 
and 'people' do, admittedly, have so much baggage as to be likely to lead to 
confusion and whilst they may serve a political and philosophical purpose their 
conceptual viscosity renders them a bag of blunt tools at best (which is not to 
discount the occasional usefulness of blunt tools). In a similar vein, terms like 
'rational' and 'intelligent' carry a two-dimensional, enlightenment-age quality 
which, though it is common to philosophy, still glosses over the complexity of 
lived realities in an unhelpful fashion. We are not isolated little nuggets of cere-
bral process which can be detached from the rest of our emotional and sensa-
tional lives, such a model, though occasionally argumentatively convenient, fails 
to stand up to metaphysical, phenomenological, psychological and anthropolog-
ical scrutiny.234 
Language, quite apart from being something which it is important to clarify and 
resolve in order to better express and illuminate these problems, is also a phe-
nomenon of central importance in informing our understanding of personhood 
itself. Language as terminology as opposed to language as the subject in ques-
tion. Language ability is certainly one key aspect of both the gulf perceived be-
tween humans and other animals and the way in which we think about intelli-
gence more broadly. We talk, they don't. We think in abstract linguistically ex-
                                            
234 Of course, there are very few (academics) who would adhere to any crude forms of ratio-
centric mind-body dualism. Brie Gertler laments this kind of straw-manning of dualism and 
defends a kind of naturalistic dualism from physicalist criticism on the basis that physicalist 
objections suffer from worse problems than the naturalist dualist: B. Gertler, ‘In Defense of 
Mind-Body Dualism’, in J. Feinberg and R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Reason and Responsibility, 
(Belmont, CA, Thomson Wadworth, 2005), pp.285-98 (p.295). My own criticism is not, how-
ever, anywhere near a physicalist approach and is closer to what I have tried to characterise 
as roughly Wittgensteinian. It may also be tempting to describe the approach as phenome-
nological and I hope there is room for a conjunction between ideas which might more com-
monly be conceived of as phenomenological and those which might be thought of as related 
to making sense. Cf. R. A. Noë, ‘Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What It Makes Sense to 
Say.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 54, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1–42. (Noë is 
more broadly concerned with an exegesis of Wittgenstein which situates phenomenological 
thinking securely within the development of Wittgenstein’s work. My own use of the phrase 
‘making sense’ and its cognates is broader and closer to the way in which Gaita talks about 
‘meaning’, R. Gaita, The Philosopher’s Dog, pp.95-115). 
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pressible terms, they don't. If you can't think with words then you can't think ra-
tionally. If an alien turned up and attempted to communicate linguistically, we 
would not hesitate to think of this extra-terrestrial species as a people. Of 
course, if this alien species descended from the heavens in vast machines we 
would be likely to have made our conclusions long before any communication 
took place. Indeed, as Spielburg's 'Close Encounters of the Third Kind' ex-
plores, our initial communications with an extra-terrestrial species may well be 
musical (or perhaps mathematical) rather than anything more typically linguistic. 
Evidence of technology and art seem enough to suggest persons long before 
humanoids lurch forth. So language may simply be one indicator of what might 
loosely be described as 'intelligence'; technology and art being other possible 
options and if a species demonstrates any of these then we can be happy 
enough with them belonging to the same category of creature as ourselves 
along with the ethical prizes which accompany that categorisation. 
Similarly, we can well imagine tool use and creative activities being cited as ev-
idence in support of animal rights in a court. They must think like us since they 
are able to do these things, so we should think of them as being like us in mor-
ally relevant ways. You have passed the test, welcome to the club! Nor does 
this kind of thinking seem to be in direct opposition to the Benthamite insight on 
suffering. Ideas about psychological complexity inform our understanding of suf-
fering. If someone can think about themselves in abstract, linguistic ways, then 
they have more to lose and more to gain.235 If someone makes tools then they 
can be robbed of those tools, of their designs, of their future. If someone can 
create art then they can appreciate art, they can be the sorry victim of bad art! 
Being a person because you are intelligent or being a person because you can 
suffer in a particularly rich way may differ in that one is binary and the other an-
                                            
235 Raymond Frey is probably the best known proponent of using criteria of this kind to judge 
the moral importance of non-human animals. In many ways, the ‘degrees of moral status’ 
argument which I follow here reflects the utilitarian arguments of Frey. I do not, of course, 
follow Frey’s thoughts on ‘quality of life’ in the kind of way he means something more like 
‘how much life is being enjoyed’ (I understand it is not quite as crude as this but I mean to 
set up a contrast). My own scale relates to a thick concept of fulfilment in which being alive, 
life as such, carries a great deal of weight. Ultimately, much of the divergence here comes 
down to where the weights are placed. My own suggestion is that it is only through the kind 
of ‘living with’ described above that these kinds of weights (on psychological complexity, be-
ing alive, being in conflict etc.) can be (more or less) accurately assessed. R. G. Frey, ‘Utili-
tarianism and Animals’, in T. L. Beuachamp and R. G. Frey (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Animal Ethics, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.172-93 (pp.189-93).    
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alogue but both may end with humans occupying a very special place, apart 
from the other creatures.  
But this never happens in life. When I find my pigs using sticks to prop up their 
beds, when my horses kick the gate to make a noise to gain attention, when the 
dogs roll in festering corpses to perfume themselves or when I uncover the vast 
cityscapes of the ants beneath my tomato plants, I do not suddenly come to re-
alise their membership of my group, the ethical elite, The People. If I removed 
the sticks from the pig's paddock, I have no doubt they would miss them, they 
would suffer in a way the chickens cannot, for the chickens care nothing for 
bedroom accessories. If I padded the gate so as to prevent the horse from mak-
ing a clamor I have no doubt they would suffer a disappointment, an enforced 
impotence in a way the ants cannot, for the ants care nothing for dinner bells. 
The song of the birds opens a world of possibilities for pleasure and pain which 
is far beyond the cold, dark ways of the earthworms. But it isn't simply cumula-
tive. There is no doubt that when the details of these other lives are revealed, 
their strange and sometimes familiar means and ends, our view of these lives is 
enriched, brought closer, but there is no tally which neatly matches a scale of 
personhood.  
Certainly, the people from outer space may reveal themselves, who they are, 
through technology and art, and this idea can help us see the limitations of ide-
as of abstract linguistic thinking as the criterion for personhood but the reality is 
that there is no criterion for personhood. Tool use and adornment may be cited 
as evidence to compel us into recognising the membership of other animals in 
our morally considerable category, but despite the analogue nature of this col-
lection of details: tools, music, communication, social activity; it is modular, de-
tached and only half the story. There's no doubt that when I see the care with 
which the pigs construct their beds (only some pigs I might add) I am given a 
wider window into the depths of those lives and so too is the someoneness of 
those lives brought more forcefully into view but this isn't evidence which I bring 
to bear on my deliberations. These details are part of a tapestry, not a checklist. 
It isn't that these things do nothing to show me that these creatures are more or 
less persons, they sometimes do just that, but they are only a part of a wider 
story of perceiving personhood, of perceiving life.  
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The force of Bentham's insight would seem to lie in a suggestion that morally 
relevant suffering is a more rudimentary thing than the kinds of things which are 
attributed to human, linguistic, technological and artistic kinds of psychology. 
The fear a cow feels when entering a slaughterhouse, the smell of blood, the 
sound of screams, these things require no abstract thinking and may even be 
amplified by a lack of ability to think in that way. Most of us can relate to the ter-
ror of childhood, when the darkness concealed all manner of evil things and the 
way this horror has been subdued by an ability to think abstractly about the ac-
tual likelihood that any such monsters do hide in the night. If we become 
bogged down with a tally of language ability, technology, art, neurology, social 
behaviour, then we lose something of the raw and basic power granted by Ben-
tham's turn to suffering. Something which is seen in the eyes, smelled in the 
breath, felt in the beating heart.  
 
Tomatoes Breathe 
Anyone who has worked in a greenhouse growing them knows the smell of the 
breath of tomatoes. My fiancée worked so long and monotonously in such a 
place that she can no longer stand the smell, to me it is still a smell of rare deli-
ciousness.  
'Breath'? Surely 'the smell of tomatoes' would do just as well, better even. 
'Breath' would just be poetic license gone too far, obfuscation rather than illumi-
nation, a trick of words to bring the worlds of vegetables and animals closer. 
Poetry as opposed to philosophy. Sentiment rather than good sense. 
__________ 
 
Yet, if there is no sharp morally relevant distinction to be drawn between hu-
mans and other animals then why stop at animals? Surely the difference be-
tween animals and plants is just a matter of degrees. And then why stop there? 
If we're including plants why not rocks? Why not volcanoes, oceans, clouds of 
dust, balls of burning gas which sail through the heavens? Aren't these just 
lesser persons?  
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There are two initial concerns here, (1) terminology and (2) reductio ad absur-
dum. Words are like analogies, stretch them too far and they fail. Arguments 
from reductio ad absurdum don't hold much water. The latter problem may as-
sist in resolving the former.  
It will be important now, rather than continuing to trip over the persistent tangle 
of meanings of our blunt, rusty tools, to arrive at some terms which are rather 
less clumsy (1). Having outlined a starting point for the kind of analogue con-
cept which is in question, something which is, in part, about personhood, 
someoneness, perspective and degrees of psychological complexity but more 
centrally about something raw and basic, something which can suffer, it will be 
important to refine this idea further so as to forge something more wieldy.  
At the very least, the reductio sounds out the clarion call of philosophy in gen-
eral: 'consistency!', and so we may be tempted to push this idea of something 
with psychological suffering towards something more elemental, something to 
do with 'life'. 
Of course, we could always just ignore the reductio. I have already dismissed 
the bloody-minded, clean freakishness of philosophy before, with its puerile al-
lergy to loose ends, and reductio ad absurdum is rather less reputable than the 
law of non-contradiction. Why be bothered by this urgency for consistency? I 
can dissolve the boundaries between two sets and reinforce the boundaries be-
tween two similar sets, why not? 
But plants aren't people, they are not creatures either really, there is just too 
much about mind and psychology in those words, let alone the humanoid forms. 
By understanding why plants do or do not belong to this realm of philosophical-
ly/morally relevant consideration we can better formulate the ideas in play and 
their corresponding terms. 'Person' may serve certain philosophical and political 
purposes, but even those special purposes break down when they drift so far 
from natural language. So little remains of what we had when we began with 
these words that there is more confusion left than fruit. 
No secret has been made in this thesis of the very short distance it moves from 
Plato and Aristotle, this present discussion is no exception. There can be no 
doubt that modern and ancient discussions of the life and psychology of hu-
mans and other organisms is rooted solidly in Aristotle's treatment of the topic. 
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By once again acknowledging how and where my own theory conforms and di-
verges from Aristotle it will be easier to negotiate these problems.  
Aristotle is clear about the importance of grounding this enquiry, on the nature 
of ψυχή, in natural language.236 Sadly, the term 'ψυχή' has been heavily tram-
melled by modern academia and medicine leaving little of the more nuanced 
Greek meaning to play with. This particular term has passed from the natural, 
into the technical and out the other side again, having been washed of its 
broader meaning and bearing instead the ensigns of modern medicine. 
Crucially, Aristotle, as always, seeks to divide the phenomenon in question into 
distinct parts with distinct characteristics which in turn lead to very definite corol-
laries. The different categories of organism have increasing numbers of parts to 
their soul, one stacked on top of the other.237 In effect, by disputing the moral 
(or 'living-with') relevance of categories based on genetics, appearance, intel-
lect, technology etc. I have taken issue with the modern descendants of Aristo-
tle's categories of ψυχή. As has been a constant principle in this discussion, 
however, this sort of dispute (over the significance or otherwise of a category) is 
taken in a matter of degrees. This is to say that, yes, of course, humans are dif-
ferent from other animals and animals are different from plants, but the morally 
relevant similarities are what are of chief interest here. If I were looking to ad-
vertise an opera I wouldn't give much thought to designing a poster which ap-
pealed to goats; were I to consider where to place a fireworks display, I would 
give very little thought to the impact the spectacle would have on the surround-
ing oak trees but I would worry a fair bit about how it might disturb neighbouring 
dogs. Aristotle is adamant that thinking about ψυχή in its general sense is of lit-
tle use in his own discussion: 
...it is absurd in this and similar cases to look for a common 
definition which will not express the peculiar nature of any-
thing that is and will not apply to the appropriate indivisible 
species, while at the same time omitting to look for an account 
which will.238 
I hope it is not absurd to seek something more general in this case and if it 
proves that any relevance to 'living-with' is restricted to a particular group of 
                                            
236  EN – I:XIII, 1102 a28-30 
237  Which he espouses in his discussion ‘On the Soul’; Aristotle, De Anima, (London, Har-
vard University Press 1957), particularly at §III:XII, 434. 
238 Ibid., II:III, 414 b25-8. 
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ψυχή then it would then be wise to delineate a category which suits this group-
ing.  
I can only feel a certain selfish regret that ψυχή has been so comprehensively 
adapted and assimilated into the English language since it is clear enough that 
in its most general ancient sense it can accommodate the sort of phenomenon 
in question here. שֶֶפנ  (nephesh) has a long history of being seen as the He-
brew equivalent of this Greek term and might allow for a kind of philological 
short-cut away from the somewhat tangential game of 'which word shall I 
choose?'239  
Whether it is Greek or Hebrew, though, doesn't help us negotiate how we can 
get away from any instinct to delineate different aspects of שֶֶפנ and render any 
general category less significant. If the only thing which matters to living-with is 
that a thing be living, that it has (as Aristotle might suggest) a nutritive aspect to 
its שֶֶפנ then why bother with the rest? Why not just talk about 'life' and be done 
with 'souls'. One immediate response to this suggestion is that 'life' can carry a 
very binary sense (life and death) and for this reason does not fit the model of 
what is being discussed here. Another more important point is that what is re-
quired is something which captures both quantity and quality; this is to empha-
sise the importance of accommodating both the way in which it is reasonable to 
say that a butterfly's way of life is different from my own and, how, in a certain 
strict (and morally relevant) sense, it is also lesser.  What is needed is a certain 
meaning which Bentham's 'suffering' conveys but without the necessity of 'sen-
tience' with its heavily psychological flavour of awareness and reflection.  
It is fortunate that at this juncture a return to the outset of this thesis is prudent, 
for 'wellbeing', 'εὐδαιμονία' is the stated goal of this exercise (both present aca-
demically, and more broadly: philosophically and in life). Things with שֶֶפנ are 
things which can be more or less well, indeed, their δαίμων (ψυχή/שֶֶפנ) can be 
more or less εὐ. This is emphatically not a question of either a physical wellbe-
ing or a mental wellbeing, it is something which necessarily requires a dissolu-
                                            
239 I have no doubt that my use of שֶֶפנ represents something of a misuse (or an overstretching 
of the scope of its ancient meaning). It seems highly probable that שֶֶפנ did, in fact, carry very 
much the same sort of sense as Aristotle’s animal soul as opposed to the vegetative soul 
(Cf. D. L. Clough, On Animals: Volume One, Systematic Theology, [London, Bloomsbury, 
2012], pp.31-2). Ψυχή would, undoubtedly make a better fit but, as I say, it’s taken and ‘liv-
ingness’ is too clumsy and ‘life’ too misleading to be used in anything like a novel way. 
 136 
136 
tion of that distinction into a more teleologically orientated conception of wellbe-
ing.   
The idea that a tomato plant can possess εὐδαιμονία may seem just as fanciful 
(if not more so) as the idea that a tomato might have some kind of psychology. 
Surely one requires the other, you can't have εὐδαιμονία without a mind. To at-
tend to this problem in any detail would be to indulge a very similar discussion 
as that which just resulted in opting for שֶֶפנ over ψυχή, it veers dangerously 
close to becoming a problem of philological interest rather than one of concep-
tual analysis. Εὐδαιμονία, since it is so closely associated with wisdom, may 
well carry too much sense of a peculiarly human route to wellbeing but the im-
portant sense which it does convey is the way in which the wellbeing of those 
who have achieved εὐδαιμονία is dependent upon a kind of fulfilment of pur-
pose, a directional way of being which is somehow inherent rather than a prod-
uct of inclination. There is certainly no stretching required in order to think about 
the 'flourishing' or 'doing-well' of other living things and it is precisely this which 
is of uttermost importance in gaining wisdom through living with. Indeed, the 
culmination of much of this discussion so far is in the suggestion that human 
flourishing is only one particular form of flourishing amongst many and, what is 
(will be) more, it is peculiar in that it is constituted, at least in part, by the under-
standing of and pursuit of the flourishing of other lives.240 
The relationship between what was previously discussed as personhood and 
what is now the capacity for a teleologically orientated form of wellbeing (שֶֶפנ) 
may seem distant cousins at best, if not entirely unrelated, but if some idea of 
τέλος, of purposiveness, were taken in a weak sense as central to both person-
hood and a capacity for wellbeing then this distance might be reduced to a 
point, to nothing. By 'τέλος in a weak sense' what is meant is that no grand 
metaphysic is necessarily implicit. One need no't posit some grand design or 
even terribly particular purpose for a tomato plant in order to agree that it does, 
as a living organism, and as part of a group of similar organisms, appear to ex-
hibit a kind of purposiveness.  
                                            
240 One might be inclined, at this stage, to give this key to human flourishing a name, perhaps 
the name of a virtue, 'compassion' or 'love', and dedicate the rest of this treatise to the explo-
ration of exiting theories of love and compassion towards both human and non-human life. 
This would be to jump-the-gun but is certainly of significant importance in what follows. 
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Of course, this current thesis does posit a semi-metaphysical teleology insofar 
as it rests upon a theory of moral realism. This realism is important for meeting 
the kind of objection which might seek out the teleological foundations which 
can lead to a stronger synthesis of the purposiveness of all living things and, 
ultimately, the way in which we human persons should live our lives. This is 
'τέλος in a strong sense' and whilst this is the suggested trajectory of the current 
argument, it is not necessary as a first step, a weaker sense of purpose can get 
us some way without too much novelty. This is to say that the two distinct pro-
jects of: 
1. Formulating a perspicuous and morally relevant category whereby 'per-
sonhood' ('mind'/'psychology') and 'wellbeing' ('fulfilment'/'flourishing') are 
seen as contiguous phenomena, different in degree rather than type; 
and, 
2. Articulating a compelling theory of life whereby the activities of all living 
things are seen as grounded in some more metaphysically orientated 
concept of 'The Good' which is both directly knowable and inherently 
compelling; 
Both require a concept of τέλος, of 'end orientation', for the syntheses they 
seek. (1) Requires only a very weak, almost everyday sense of τέλος, or pur-
posiveness: much of what constitutes my own psychology (both conscious and 
non-conscious): desire, will, purpose, hope, can, in a commonsensical way (ra-
ther than anything more strictly behaviourialist) be viewed as common with the 
actions of other animals and, indeed, those of plant-life. The fulfilment of a con-
scious aim is eudaimonically (and phenomenologically) contiguous with the ful-
filment of non-conscious behaviour towards a goal. When I wake up in the mid-
dle of the night and drift hazily to the bathroom, my actions are not clearly divid-
ed from those occasions when I far more explicitly intend to use those same fa-
cilities, (say, before a long trip). Even were we to exclude conscious aims as too 
qualitatively different from instinctive behaviour, our own more explicitly morally 
relevant 'flourishings' often come in the form of non-conscious fulfilments (from 
the avoidance of pain to simple actions of comfort and joy). To prevent my 
daughter and fiancée from breastfeeding in their sleep (about as rudimentary 
and non-conscious a thing as one might attribute to humans) would be quite as 
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unconscionable, if not more so, as any interruption of plans, schemes or de-
signs.  
Project (2) entails project (1) but also a kind of union of τέλος which is far less 
easy to digest, far more removed from everyday conceptions of 'end orienta-
tion'. If we can swallow the first spoonful of τέλος, however, the more hefty pill, 
with dandelions and slugs conforming to 'The Good', will go down somewhat 
easier.241 
_____________ 
I was feeding my daughter. She is still very young and sometimes she would 
rather forgo the solid food and go straight to the breast milk. Lacking mammary 
glands I find myself in the disappointing position of being unable to sate this 
particular penchant so, when her mother is busy, I must use guile and charm to 
coax my daughter into accepting solid food. 
In addition to not lactating, I am also aware of the nutritional value which solid 
food represents (if only, at times, as a supplement to breast milk). So when 
Myrtle (my daughter) does eat, and when she eats well, with relish and amply, 
there is a peace, a satisfaction, a kind of deep warmth and fulfilment. Her eyes 
will grow both distant and content, her movements will calm as she chews un-
feasibly large mouthfuls and gulps them down. I look at her chubby thighs and 
strong, delicate fingers, each (thank goodness) where it should be, each cours-
ing with blood filled with the goodness of her food and, alongside a heavy dose 
of gratitude, I am struck by a visceral sense of my own role in her success, in 
her growth, in her trajectory.  
Between caring for my daughter there are times when I am back outside, back 
amongst the pigs, amongst the vegetables.  
At the side of it all, tucked away in a corner of the garden, are two plastic struc-
tures which look a bit like green beehives; these stout pillars house the worms. 
Of course there are worms everywhere, they are the race of beings which 
                                            
241 It should also be noted that, along with the general ethos of epistemological, ethical and ac-
ademic moderation which has hitherto been professed, comes the acknowledgment that the 
more novel (or at least 'novel' in the academic context in which they are currently expressed) 
claims made in this thesis may be rejected by any critic whilst leaving the possibility of ac-
cepting the less weighty claims made along the way. I'd quite like it if you ate all your greens 
but if you can only manage a few peas then that's better than nout. 
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writhe in the beating heart of it all, they throb beneath us and churn death into 
life, they are utterly necessary. But these particular worms are my worms and, 
what is more, they have taps. At the base of the wormeries are taps by which I 
might draw off the liquor of their digestion, leachate, black water. The leachate 
is food for the tomatoes. I draw off the leachate, I dilute it with rain water and 
pour it on the soil around the tomatoes. I touch the tomatoes, I train the toma-
toes around their string supports, I remove growth which will sap the plant's 
strength and I weed around their bases. Days pass, weeks pass, all of this re-
peats. The greenhouse is filled with the fresh, green incense of those lithe, vi-
brant beings. These vines also course with a blood, a sap which carries the 
goodness of the worm-water, and in the air I can smell that process, that flour-
ishing, and it is not just loosely analogous to feeding my daughter, in a deep, 
abiding and powerful sense it is the same.  
Peace, satisfaction, a keen sense of my own role in the fulfilment of these other 
lives, in helping to guide their trajectory, of caring.  A visceral and barely con-
scious sense of the ancient past which stretches beneath these lives and the 
future into which they are thrown (into which they throw themselves). An ex-
tended and contiguous thing, rich and alive. 
In the depths of night she breathes, sometimes I have to check she is breath-
ing, I will rest my hand on her middle and feel for that motion. Some dreadful 
idiocy persuades me that she may have stopped, that the world might just have 
ceased turning in the night for no reason in particular (because, for some, it 
does so fickly cease), and so I must check, check that she is breathing. And I 
draw close to hear that breath, and I smell it; so sweet and full, so soft and new. 
Not like the belching boglands of my ancient guts, prematurely aged and 
abused, this small breath speaks of gardens within, fresh and simple.  
The tomatoes are always young and always exhale this same air of vitality. But 
it is heady and quick, full of the vibrance of a short and fecund life. Prince 
amongst its fellows under glass, the tomato is in a hurry to live enormously. So 
exuberant and enthusiastic is this force of life, with barely a space between this 
growth and the sunlight at its source, that a gardener must be constantly atten-
tive.  
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A vine tomato (for there are many kinds) which is left to its own devices will be-
come a chaos of leaf and branch with little fruit to speak of. Respect for the to-
mato plant, for its way of life, and pursuit of its flourishing and of my own, does 
not equate to a passive encouragement of its own activity regardless of direc-
tion or character. 'Living with', 'symbiosis', is not just a question of allowing any 
living thing the freedom to move in whichever direction it will, it is often quite the 
opposite.  
Negotiating this need to constrain and generally infringe upon other lives is cer-
tainly key to the process of philosophy by 'living-with'. Indeed, 'symbiosis' is a 
good term, not only for the pleasingly Greek note it strikes in this already archa-
ically coloured exercise, but also for the connotations it delivers of a close-nit 
and multi-species negotiation of resources. For these reasons, and for the sake 
of avoiding a repetition of ‘“living-with' other living things’ (with its slightly clumsy 
vagueness and occasional demand for tiresomely inverted commas), 'symbio-
sis' will be used in its place as much as possible.  
Before pursuing the more nuanced and complex negotiations of symbiosis, it 
will be important to consolidate these thoughts on non-human lives by reflecting 
on why these particular lives are a good source of wisdom in contrast to a large-
ly human symbiosis. 
 
Wellbeing I know, very different lives and honest 
Allowing for the continuity of personhood and wellbeing through a very general 
conception of purposiveness, allowing for this analogue capacity for εὐδαιμονία, 
why, then, would we be concerned with the wisdom which might be gained at 
the 'lesser' end of this scale of שֶֶפנ? 
Living with other humans, learning their language, conversing with them, nego-
tiating their hugely complex social systems: expectations and prohibitions, sure-
ly this would be a better source of wisdom, of ethically orientated insight, than 
watering cabbages. After all, the very definition of wisdom with which we are 
working (however broad that might be) is anchored in Socrates' apologetic con-
fession of understanding ‘μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ’, a humble and critical 
attitude which is proper to humans, not tomatoes.  
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There are three kinds of reason why non-human life is an appropriate focus for 
this analysis of ethical-wisdom through symbiosis (which now might plausibly 
and more neatly be called 'symbiotic ethics'): 
1. As mentioned at the outset of this discussion, this is an area of life of 
which I have extensive and direct experience. There are undoubtedly 
many forms of learning through symbiosis, so very many ways of seek-
ing wisdom through life with others, but this is one I can extoll and reflect 
upon in detail. I have found εὐδαιμονία out there, I have found it in the 
soil, and in the trees, I have found it in my cooking pot and in my family's 
enjoyment of the food which lies at one end of this chain.  
This personal insight should be sufficient to excuse an articulation of a particu-
lar means of achieving a goal. As with other points in this discussion, this is the 
'weaker' of two points, the easier to swallow. It is not necessary to claim exclu-
sive validity of method in order to claim some validity of method.  
The objection, however, that human life, by dint of its prima facie preeminence 
in שֶֶפנ, represents the overwhelmingly obvious choice as a setting for seeking 
wisdom through living with others, cannot simply be dismissed. Since human 
life is, by necessity, the fount and fulcrum of this entire theory of wisdom then 
one would need good reason to go beyond philosophical anthropology (even 
granting the poetic addendum hitherto suggested).  
An initial response to this objection could take a similar form to that which was 
previously associated with Singer. Just as a greater capacity for suffering (or 
wellbeing) does not necessarily directly translate into a greater duty of care (we 
may rightly care more for the infant than the adult) nor does it necessarily di-
rectly translate into a greater or more easily accessed source of wisdom (well-
being/moral learning).  
However, since some link is being intimated between the extent of a capacity 
for wellbeing, שֶֶפנ, and the manner in which we might practice symbiotic ethics, 
a lack of necessarily direct relationship does not amount to a sufficiently robust 
defense against an objection based on the prima facie preeminence of human 
שֶֶפנ. More must be said. 
Ultimately, a stronger claim than 'some validity' is being made. Living with non-
human life is a particularly good source of wisdom because it involves; 
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2. Lives which are very different from our own and,  
3. Lives which are, in a certain important sense, basic. 
These two qualities: (2) the degree of difference from human life, and (3) being 
of a basic (or fundamental) nature, must be dealt with separately although they 
are intimately related.  
The first point (2) follows directly from the central principle of philosophical an-
thropology as discussed previously. The process of learning by coming into con-
tact with other perspectives is facilitated by (and to some degree requires) the-
se perspectives being radically different from our own. The man who holds the 
elephant's trunk will learn less from the man who holds the trunk a little further 
on than he will from her who grapples with the legs or ears. For a greater com-
pleteness of vision one must seek out those views which have previously elud-
ed oneself.  
Of course, this kind of thinking, this seeking out of radical difference, has met 
with justifiably stern criticism in anthropology. The idea of 'noble savages' who 
live lives so distant from those of 'civilised man', or of wisdom from a mysterious 
orient are manifestly crude and shortsighted.242 Geographical distance and su-
perficial differences between cultures do not translate easily into a disparity of 
ideas, perspectives, ways of life and ethics. One could as easily find radical dif-
ference at home as one might find it on antipodes. 
And yet, modes of subsistence, environment and history can and do contribute 
to a pattern of difference, and so much more so does species.  
But just as the process of observation and participation is a delicate balancing 
act of opposites and seeming contradictions, so too is the fruitfulness of differ-
ence a complex and subtle balancing act. The principle of balance which has 
come to dominate this thesis (and will continue to do so) is of central im-
portance in understanding the way in which the degree of difference between 
oneself and another life-form is not a simple and direct route to ethical insight. 
Indeed, it would hardly be right to call what I witness in the life of the tomato 
plant a 'perspective' (again a neologism, or archaism like שֶֶפנ helps to encom-
pass these complexities). With enough שֶֶפנ, the way of life, the location, the di-
                                            
242 S. Hurn, Humans and Other Animals, p.50-1. 
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rection and experience of a living thing might be called a 'perspective', an 'out-
look' perhaps, or an 'approach' to achieving εὐδαιμονία, but not so with a toma-
to or pumpkin plant. And the lessons differ accordingly. Sometimes it may seem 
that the simplicity of the plants, of their sedentary quietude, has little to offer, 
that the vibrance and personality (and personhood) of the pigs invites a whole 
new way of seeing the world, and the kale plants just... grow. The pigs relish the 
sunlight, the beetroots merely absorb it; the chickens lust for the seed, the 
chard just excretes it. The horses feel the biting wind, the trees merely change 
their colour.  
Differences of insight, simplicity or complexity, do not equate to value, yet some 
common-sense limits must be recognised. The difference of the life of a pig 
from my own brings to me new ways of seeing the world, a different way of life, 
but the way in which our eyes, eyes so similar in form, function and character, 
can meet and find one another acts as a bridge which the garlic plants cannot 
share. Difference does foster fresh insight, but only so much and it is not the 
only concern. Similarities offer routes by which differences might be reached, a 
common ground on which novelty can freely play.  
And what of moral accuracy? Won't I learn more about goodness from the virtu-
ous idiot than I will from the vicious genius? And what of those who are neither 
vicious nor virtuous? Given the (albeit tentative) moral-realism of this discus-
sion, wouldn't this mode of ethical enquiry be most fitting? That pigs break 
sticks in a certain way, or that spinach defends against slugs by these means or 
those seems precariously irrelevant to any substantive moral insight. It may well 
be suggested that the immoral person offers moral insight by the contrast they 
set up, by the example to avoid, so one's company needn't be virtuous to be 
instructive. And yet, it might be observed that immorality is not the same as the 
unthinking amorality of bestial survival. A difference in perspective and way of 
life is one thing, but it must surely be a moral perspective to offer any kind of 
moral insight.   
It must be remembered, however, how broad and inclusive the sense of 'moral' 
or 'ethical' is in this discussion and, indeed, how it is founded on a classical un-
derstanding of εὐδαιμονία. That εὐδαιμονία (understood in a not exclusively 
psychological sense) is a meaningful and plausible activity/state for a non-
human organism has been suggested and so too, does it necessarily follow, 
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that 'ethical activity' (in its broadest possible sense) is also a valid predicate of a 
non-human organism.  
This breadth of 'ethics' is, however, inherently bound to the balance of differ-
ence and similarity. Indeed, one can (though need not necessarily) learn more 
from the virtuous idiot than from the viscous genius, and thus do I learn more 
from the courage of a dog than from the postulations of learned philosophers. 
Yet the lessons of the plants are subtle and cumulative compared to the brutally 
stark virtues of social animals.  
Perhaps what is most crucial, however, in understanding this process of symbi-
otic ethics, is that the learning is not always achieved through a simple percep-
tion. The lessons I learn from the plants about how to be a good human, how to 
be a good me, come in the form of our interaction, in the pace of life which the 
plants impose on me, on the way I observe the passing of time through them, of 
the way their simple needs force my own complex concerns into a leveled con-
text of nutrition and growth, of water and sun, of life and death. And there is an 
important sense in which moral learning can be most powerful when the les-
sons are not given by another’s example but through very personal efforts and 
reflections. Being confronted by a simple, dumb life, caring for it, neglecting it, 
conflicting with it, can offer the most vivid opportunities for the exercise of vir-
tues and vices.  
The conceptual space between these vegetative lessons and those which ex-
ude from the worms is negligible, so too that space between the worm lessons 
and the aphid lessons, the aphid and the beetle, the beetle and the ant, the ant 
and the lizard, the lizard and the toad, the toad and the mouse, the mouse and 
the blackbird, the blackbird and the chicken, the chicken and the horse, the 
horse and the pig, the pig and the dog, the dog and the schoolchild, the school-
child and the teacher. There are no tidy limits within life, no ground barren of 
learning, no convenient box beyond which the lessons cease.  
Even if we were to grant explicit virtue some pride of place amongst the sources 
of ethical wisdom, even so, what שֶֶפנ, what capacity, is necessary for such vir-
tue? This is certainly a substantial question and one which will be continued in 
the following chapter, but supposing we allow for the kind of simple core to vir-
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tue, a unity in ‘ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν’, or ‘κυρίως ἀγαθὸν’,243 which was previ-
ously taken as our starting point, then this is undoubtedly disseminated well be-
yond the human realm. And when I see the pigs wallowing in their mud, when I 
feel the contentment rising and falling in their breath, and I look then at the dis-
may of a human ferociously rubbing specs of mud from their precious clothes, I 
am given a clear picture of virtue and vice; the ἀταραξία of the pigs is masterful, 
enviable, laudable.  
The final justification for the garden as an exemplary setting for true philosophy 
(as it has been understood as a way of life) is the 'fundamental nature' of this 
life (3). This is, of course, quite a grand and vague sort of suggestion and must 
be qualified carefully. Indeed, it is in this elementary or fundamental nature of 
permaculture, of life in the organic garden, that much of the force of this thesis 
is to be located. Due to the pivotal role of this premise, a fuller exposition will 
need to go beyond any brief role it may play in initially justifying the gardening 
context. What can be begun here, though, is an attempt to link this elementary 
quality, this simplicity, to the defining principles of philosophy which have al-
ready been discussed.  
Humility, honesty, first principles, self-sufficiency, freedom from extraneous 
concerns, clarity through simplicity, this could be a list of principles for either 
philosophy or ‘permaculture’.  
As mentioned previously, 'permaculture' can loosely be understood as organic 
gardening or farming. Other terms in this family might be 'homesteading', 'self-
sufficiency' and 'sustainable-agriculture'. A firm definition of 'permaculture' is 
unnecessary at this juncture, what is crucial is that this concept and its allies 
place an emphasis on the interconnected nature of the activities of the organic 
gardener. The end goal is not to create a garden but to live in a way by which 
both human and non-human life might flourish in tandem. We do not grow rho-
dodendrons, we grow rhubarb, we do not tend herbaceous borders, we tend 
herbs; a garden without a kitchen is as alien to permaculture as no garden at 
all.244 
                                            
243  ‘Virtue in the principal sense’ or ‘general goodness’. EN, VI:xiii, 1144b3,6. 
244 Permaculture is, for lack of a better description, an ‘holistic’ framework; it is explicitly con-
cerned with the ethics not only of eating but of all aspects of living. The suggestion is, that 
the best way to approach this is through the sustainable and local production of goods 
 146 
146 
Part of philosophy as a way of life as it has been discussed here, this revival of 
an original form, is an idea of disposing of, or at least drawing one’s energy and 
attention away from those aspects of life which are less vital. When Socrates 
challenges his accusers and expands upon the Oracle's claim, and (to a lesser 
extent) when he conducts any dialogue with those Plato sends his way, he is 
stripping things away. Preconceptions, poorly founded confidence, misplaced 
priorities, untenable inconsistencies, unnecessary distractions, these things are 
the primary victims of Socrates' philosophical fire. By paring down our thoughts 
Socrates helps to reveal the foundations of our ideas and our way of life, this is 
a process driven by and aimed towards an intellectual honesty. Permaculture 
shares this impetus.  
Now, whether a particular economic or political movement shares more or less 
with Socrates' (or Plato's) philosophy is: (A) not exhaustive of the wider aims 
and principles of 'seeking wisdom/wellbeing' which have been discussed here 
and (B) sufficiently vague that it may well just lead us right back to the kind of 
monastic elitism which was objected to at the outset of this discussion. Extolling 
the virtues of stripping away unnecessary distractions could (if we pursued it to 
its 'logical' conclusion) proscribe for us a life which, in Susan Wolf's words, 
seems 'strangely barren'.245 Austere cloisters and silent dinners, a renunciation 
of belongings and an exclusive dedication to truth, beauty and goodness. In-
deed, many people who follow the life of permaculture, who live with other living 
things through this delicate negotiation of shared resources, do profess a simi-
lar ethic of renunciation. A dismay at consumerism and a desire to lead a life 
free from 'stuff' grips many of my friends and perhaps there is some truth here, 
some good sense, but before we go any distance down that foreboding path, let 
us (as usual) take a less onerous step towards this 'honesty' first. 
Quite apart from the consequentialist considerations of hugely complex and ex-
tended farming, processing, transport and distribution industries which are nec-
essary to get food from the soil to a shop, and besides the virtues and vices 
embroiled therein, there is the simple matter of being directly acquainted with 
the whole process. 
                                                                                                                                
(food). Cf. K. Fox, ‘Putting Permaculture Ethics to Work: Commons Thinking, Progress, and 
Hope’, in J. Lockyer and J. R. Veteto (ed.), Environmental Anthropology Engaging Ecotopia: 
Bioregionalism, Permaculture, and Ecovillages, (Oxford, Berghahn, 2013), pp.164-179, (par-
ticularly p.167). 
245  S. Wolf, Moral Saints, pp.419-439. 
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There are certainly more pressing ethical layers to (real) philosophy, but if we 
were to concentrate only on philosophy's conventional mission of perceiving 
and comprehending the more vital and basic aspects of any given phenomenon 
or concept, then the organic garden mimics this principle closely in the trans-
parency it offers. 
I collect the beans from the bean plants. Some of these beans I eat, others I 
save and, come the next summer, I plant them in the soil and (slugs allowing) 
they grow into more bean plants. I eat some of these new beans and some I 
save for next year. This is the extent of things. Mere meters, feet, worms, dirty 
fingernails. Nothing is hidden, everything is directly apparent. It may be more 
visceral, more enacted, but the process of becoming directly familiar with my 
food is very close indeed to the process of becoming directly familiar with my 
thoughts, with my meaning. 
Were I to exclude the non-human elements from my philosophy-by-living-with I 
would be floating on a sea of lazy assumptions; were my effort in ethics to be 
practiced without a garden it would be oblivious to the invisible lives without 
which it would not be possible. Quite apart from anything else, the organic gar-
den is an effort in transparency, in illumination, and for this reason it is also a 
preeminent (possibly necessary) setting for philosophy.  
The beans from the shop are less philosophical than the beans from the gar-
den.     
 
 
 
6 – The Inevitability of Doing Harm, the Importance of Feeling Bad and the 
Central Role of Honesty, and Courage.  
 
 
Thou know'st 'tis common; all that lives must die 
- Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1.2. 
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‘To observe [nonviolence] fully is impossible for men, who kill 
a number of living beings large and small as they breathe or 
blink or till the land'  
- M. K. Gandhi246 
 
"True philosophy must start from the most immediate and 
comprehensive fact of consciousness, and this may be formu-
lated as follows: 'I am life which wills to live, and I exist in the 
midst of life which wills to live.”      
- Albert Schweitzer247 
 
But I'm still fat, still one of those competition eaters, slavering as I drift through 
the supermarket, sloughing packet after packet of plastic-wrapped crap into my 
trolley.  
But no meat, no dairy, no eggs... those are not for me to take; too far, too high a 
price to pay, too much death.  
Honour's little space. Philosophy's refuge. 
Not for me to take. 
…................................................ 
At the heart of the following attempt to expand upon and analyse the ethical 
richness of organic gardening is an idea of 'respect'.  
'Respect', 'honour', 'dignity', 'integrity'. A close familiarity with the basic de-
mands of subsistence (and with a possible flourishing thereby) brings a weighty 
and solid meaning to this family of concepts. The tension of life, of the constant 
flow of destruction and creation, death and birth, of desperate manipulation and 
grateful appreciation, this coalesces in an idea of 'respect' which sits at the core 
of wisdom. 
                                            
246 M. K. Gandhi, Non-violent Resistance (Satyagraha), B. Kumarappa (ed.), (New York, 
Shocken Books, 1961 [compiled 1951]), Vol.2:28. 
247 A. Schweitzer, Civilisation and Ethics, J. Naish (tr.), (London, A and C Black, 1923), p.253. 
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When 'respect' (for now understood in a loose sense together with related con-
cepts) is on the table, Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative 
seems a prudent port of call.    
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in 
that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a 
means only.248   
It is with Albert Schweitzer's alteration of that imperative, however, and his 
thoughts beyond that, by which the following will most directly be guided. 'Hu-
manity' ('die Menschheit') isn't enough.  
Of course, from the mere fact of it, of life amidst life, of life amidst death, a first 
principle might be quite bleak, quite dark. 'The most immediate and compre-
hensive fact of consciousness', the first principle, 'I am life which wills to live, 
and I exist in the midst of life which wills to live'.   
Ultimately, if this idea of life emulating philosophy, of a lived philosophy, is to 
take an idea of basic needs as its foundation then one cannot ignore competi-
tion.  
…............................................... 
I like to eat eggs.   
Eggs are so different from the vegetables, they are thick with the things of 
which I am made. I think I can feel the difference. I am like an egg, I was an 
egg. I can and do eat shocking quantities of eggs.  
Rats also like to eat eggs.  
Now my hens are all gone, eaten by foxes and harassed by the rats. But I 
would go outside in the mornings and open the barn door, every corner rattling 
with frantic claws and the chicken feeder swinging absently. One or two rats will 
decide to run across the floor for a better hiding place.  
The nesting box where the hens lay their eggs is strewn with shell and occa-
sionally there will be an egg which has been rolled to the edge in an attempt to 
move it elsewhere, perhaps a more comfortable place to eat, somewhere away 
from the door which might open, somewhere away from me. 
                                            
248  I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1873), T. Kingsmill Ab-
bot (tr.), (New York, Cosimo Classics, 2008), p.46 
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They are not safe from me. 
I will not poison the rats. Poison is truly vile. I have seen rats die from poison; 
their slowly rupturing innards heave palpably. But besides that torture, it is un-
derhanded, they crawl off into some corner where the only evidence of their 
death is a temporary reek. Poison is indiscriminate, anonymous, pathetic. I will 
not poison the rats because it shows them no respect. 
I let my dogs on them though. 
Of course, I take many other measures to dissuade the rats from maintaining 
their hidden hold on my realm: I lock food away, I attempt to make it difficult for 
them to take advantage of when it is out for the chickens by placing it in sus-
pended feeders, I alter the surroundings and block up runways and holes. I 
spray various strong plant oils of which they should not be fond. But they are a 
hard, clever, quick and tenacious folk. My last resort is to unleash monsters into 
their world.  
Mostly the rats get away, they are usually faster and smarter than the dogs, but 
sometimes they don't; it is usually the young rats who fall. With a scream, a 
short fight, they are done. But babies are replaced swiftly in the world of the 
rats. A quick world, a dark world, heavy-scented, boisterous, careful, clever, 
playful, full of motion and close company.  
Now I have no eggs, and nor do the rats. 
I bear the rats no particular ill will. When the rats find a nice place to make a 
home, close to water, close to grain and eggs, warm and dry, why wouldn't they 
set up their homes here? They will no doubt sniff the air, they will find that air 
filled with dog smell, human smell, cat, but not much fox, and good, tight run-
ways in which to hide. A good home, relatively speaking.  
When I shift around the feed bins, when I nail planks over runways, I'm sure the 
rats become familiar with the fact that this realm is also that of a human, a hu-
man with dogs, but that is the way of rats, they are 'happy to share'. Better to 
fight in here than fight out there. This is not 'deliberation' as such, I'm not drifting 
away from the broad idea of שֶֶפנ into something more familiarly cogitative and 
cerebral in our language-heavy sort of way, no, that would be truly anthropo-
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morphic (in a bad sense), but it is clear that rats do a fair bit of thinking, in a ru-
dimentary but efficient sort of way.  
I had a pet rat once. They are truly wonderful creatures, very like ourselves in 
all sorts of ways, particularly in their indolence and society.  
But we are in competition here. I am life which wills to live, they are life which 
wills to live.  
But they aren't being malicious or neglectful and most of the time they aren't 
even consciously infringing upon something they recognise to be the territory of 
another.   
But sometimes they do recognise this, that this place is, in a certain sense, the 
domain of another, of a potentially threatening other. Even if this recognition 
takes the basic form of merely sensing my identity in this place, my smell, my 
activity, and realising that this extension of my presence and interests is threat-
ening to their own interests, the recognition is still there.  
I suspect that this kind of mutual recognition is behind lots of anger towards 
other living things. It seems more understandable to hunt a wolf with passion 
and adversarial determination than it does to chop down trees in the same way. 
It feels more personal when the rats take my eggs than when lice prevent the 
hens from laying. But as before, as with the spectrum, the web or the sphere of 
שֶֶפנ, from the outer reaches of complex psychology through regions of more 
basic sentience and into a core and vegetative system of absorption and multi-
plication, the struggles, the negotiations are different in degree. 
Mark Rowlands once again employs the extra-terrestrial tool to express the 
need to understand the degree to which the rats do indeed recognise the extent 
to which their activities infringe upon mine.249 Rowlands is ultimately concerned 
with a broader array of capacities which constitute the capacity for moral delib-
eration but the recognition of infringing upon the demands of another is crucial 
to this greater capacity for morality. Rowlands too invokes Nussbaum's concept 
of flourishing and imagines Martians who perceive the importance of recognis-
ing human moral deliberation as core to showing humans proper 'respect' (re-
specting our capacities that we might flourish):  
                                            
249  M. Rowlands, Can Animals be Moral?, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), 
pp.248-51. 
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So to treat a hairless ape with respect – the fundamental mor-
al injunction – requires that one understand its capabilities, 
and treat it in such a way that it is able to exercise those ca-
pabilities, and so live a flourishing life.250 
This kind of reflection might suggest that the kind of continuity between living 
things which has been pursued here is contrary to this Nussbaumian (or 
Greek/Hellenistic) 'fundamental moral injunction'. 'Respect' (now slightly more 
specifically understood as a recognition of and action on behalf of the capacities 
for flourishing of a being) requires a strict discrimination between kinds of ca-
pacity.  
But with the rats, the hens and the dogs, our capacities for flourishing and re-
sultant demands for resources are mutually exclusive. I have knowingly and 
purposely unleashed my hounds upon this people, I have done them terminal 
violence. Just how a rat thinks about me and that which is mine (or whether or 
how the rat even acknowledges that it is indeed mine) is not what was crucial to 
this violence, to this clash, what was crucial was far more visceral.  
This was not an opposition of minds, it was an opposition of guts. I wanted 
eggs, they wanted eggs, and all along the hens who laid the eggs are almost 
forgotten. The meeting of demands does not occur on a cerebral plane it occurs 
in the dirt. The push and pull of different interests, of different lives, occurs less 
in a realm of ideas and more as a sheer bodily collision. There is a palpable 
sense in which my identity is extended into those things, into the eggs, into the 
hens, into the farm buildings. שֶֶפנ  and identity are one; my character and my 
story. The tendrils of my story reach out and cover the hens and their eggs like 
great roots, they mix with the roots of the hens' שֶֶפנ   and also with those of the 
rats. They interlock and strangle one another in an effort to reach the soils for 
which they strive.  
Perhaps most academics are so used to their own territories being infringed 
upon through a lack of scholarly acknowledgment to be able to get a keen 
sense of the continuity of injustice between moral deliberation and sheer biolog-
ical force, but the lesson is also out there, written in muck and blood.  
If this clash of guts is so bitter, if this is a war of sheer life willing to live, then 
why not just try to win the war? Is this the moral lesson from symbiotic ethics: 
                                            
250  Ibid, p.250. 
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that εὐδαιμονία is to be found in brutal biological dominance? Is the ultimate 
wisdom and fulfillment of human life simply that of domination?  
 
Athena: God of War 
Some differences in the intrinsic value of living things has already been 
acknowledged, and an attempt has been made at characterising these differ-
ences as non-dualistic and not purely psychological through the idea of שֶֶפנ. 
Some account must, therefore, be made of how any normative positions regard-
ing non-human life are affected by this idea. 
If it were suggested that all life were in some way equally valuable, if it were 
acknowledged that complex psychology and even psychology as such were not 
necessary conditions for intrinsic value, but that the intrinsic value was of a sin-
gle undifferentiated kind, then the moral conundrums would be of a particular 
kind. That is not what has been suggested here. Instead it has been suggested 
that the kinds of intuitions which make us more appalled by a human being hit 
on the road than a rabbit, and more appalled by the rabbit than the moth, are 
grounded in accurate ethical insight into a range of capacities for flourishing be-
tween living things.  
This reasoning follows very much in the vein of Raimond Gaita to whom this 
essay owes a greater debt than to quite possibly any other living philosopher. In 
his 'The Philosopher's Dog', Gaita sets forth a compelling case for a common 
sense, intuitive discrimination between different species and an ethical concern 
for other animals which does not diminish a primacy of humanity.251 
I know of no one whose dog would be treated as equal to a 
seriously sick infant. If someone did treat their dog like that I 
would not think of them as a pioneer of ethical thought, but as 
someone whose sentimentality had made them wicked.252 
Gaita is not attempting to suggest that any need of a human, any desire of a 
human overrides any need or any desire of a non-human, but what's stopping 
this?  
                                            
251  R. Gaita, The Philosopher's Dog, (London, Routledge, 2003), see pp.197-9. 
252 Ibid. 
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Since שֶֶפנ  comes in degrees, and since humans tend to come somewhere near 
the highest degree of שֶֶפנ, why, then, doesn't a human demand always override 
the demand of another living thing?  
Since שֶֶפנ is being used here to encompass the broad range of capacities and 
interests expressed by organisms in general, polio might offer a compelling ex-
ample of the merits of eradication.253 None but the terminally macabre would 
bemoan the eradication of polio. The suffering which this virus brings humanity 
becomes its primary characteristic, it is 'a disease'. By shifting the discussion 
into the realms of the more obviously biological, hordes of parasites raise their 
ugly heads and still occupy a similarly pathogenic category in our imaginations 
as that of the viruses. Hundreds of thousands of species on this earth flourish 
primarily by taking away from the flourishing of other species; they feed from, 
breed within and otherwise totally depend upon the suffering of others.254 Or-
ganisms which have nothing which even resembles a mind, things of short, 
simple, almost automatic existences, lead to terrible suffering in fish, reptiles, 
amphibians, birds and mammals. The mosquito might have the rudiments of a 
face, its protrusions echo the limbs of our own ancestors, their flitting and diving 
speak of the rudiments of desire, but we will justly destroy them, individually 
and (perhaps) collectively. 
Of course, more could be said on the conceptual and ethical differences be-
tween the destruction of individual organisms and entire collections of organ-
isms, but the fluidity and breadth of שֶֶפנ  can be applied to a collective as easily 
as it can an individual. The hive flourishes as does the lone beast. It is this 
breadth and fluidity (necessary in a discussion of this kind and scale) which 
makes a broad concept like שֶֶפנ so important. Just as שֶֶפנ is partly defined by 
the difference in our dismay at a dead moth and a dead badger (or those as-
pects of that difference corresponding to accurate ethical insight rather than 
prejudice and mere sentiment) so too does שֶֶפנ encompass the difference be-
tween genocide and murder. Scale matters.  
                                            
253  Of course, viruses occupy a position on the scale of שֶֶפנ so extreme that they might 
(and often are) considered not to be living things at all (see: C. Zimmer, Planet of Viruses – 
Second Edition, [London, University of Chicago Press, 2015] p.105). Since, however, שֶֶפנ is 
a primarily inclusive concept designed to dissolve the ethical power of well-defined bounda-
ries, this extremity enhances this illustration rather than detracting from it. 
254  A. Dobson et al, 'Homage to Linnaeus: How many parasites? How many hosts?', in 
PNAS, vol. 105 Supplement 1., (August 12, 2008). 
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So why don't we kill all the wolves and wipe out all the weeds? 
Ancient visions of paradise are often of this sort. Milk, honey, no serpents, no 
diseases.255 This is the land which was made for me by my ancestors, my 
green and pleasant land. As I stand in my Devonshire garden, grumbling about 
foxes and rats, shouldn't I be grateful that I don't need to grumble about wolves 
and bears also? No poisonous snakes lurk beneath these stones, no scorpions 
hide in my shoes. Vaccines and antibiotics have rendered most of the more aw-
ful diseases a distant cultural memory, problems for distant lands, not my comfy 
home.  
Naïve, arrogant, over-privileged, ethnocentric neo-imperialism! To tell inhabit-
ants of more savage lands that wildlife is in some way precious, that the wolves 
have a right to existence, that land should be left wild and not cultivated to pro-
vide food and wealth for their people. To sit pretty on my green hills and dictate 
the preservation of the last vestiges of wilderness in the world, what right have 
I?  
As has been a constant theme of this discussion, a dictum by which these theo-
ries have been drawn, good philosophy is not about finding absolute and uni-
versalisable laws which can be applied to any situation ad absurdum, it is about 
fashioning tools by which the subtle and complex business of life can be best 
pursued whilst remaining anchored in more lofty principles. Hazy lines drawn in 
shifting conditions with an eye to a distant light. Ethically orientated compromise 
is vital. 
Athena is not a goddess of warriors, she does not fight with the rage of her 
brother Ares. Pallas is the quintessence of strategy, she fights with cleverness, 
with circumspection, with compromise.  
This discussion began with an exploration of the relationship between σοφία 
and φρόνησις; it is in the need to negotiate the competing demands encoun-
tered in living with other living things that this relationship is both illustrated and 
employed.  
                                            
255  Of course, the example needn’t be ancient or biblical. The dichotomy between civilisa-
tion (or a desirable environment) and a hostile wilderness which must be tamed or eradicat-
ed is sufficiently modern as to be extant (though many of these more recent instantiations 
take ancient president as their inspiration). See: A. A. den Otter, Civilising the Wilderness, 
(Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 2012), pp.xxi-xxiii. 
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So many times I have been told by conventional farmers and their sympathisers 
that urban people just don't understand the reality of living in the country. These 
townies allow sentiment to overrule what little sense they might have; the cold, 
hard facts of life in the countryside leave no room for these sorts of delusions. 
Badgers, foxes, deer, they need to be killed so that farmers can make a living, 
crops need to be sprayed, hedgerows and trees need to be cut down. They sit 
there in their heated tractor cabins, these 'farmers', crushing the life from the 
soil, they stand in lordly authority over their hundreds of acres and armies of 
Polish drones, they collect their vast sums in subsidy and proclaim their rustic 
wisdom. And it’s just too easy.  
Bigger harvests, warmer tractors, deadlier poisons, cheaper land, fatter chick-
ens, heavier udders, more pigs per square foot, greater profit... greater profit.  
Now, I like food, to this my corpulence can testify, nor am I averse to the com-
forts of technology (similarly evidenced), but when these comforts obscure 
truths, when ease replaces accuracy, then a fundamental tenet of philosophy 
has been undermined. The comfort of agribusiness, of industrial scale witchery, 
sugar and microwave meals becomes an extreme which draws humanity away 
from its true flourishing and into the realms of the unwell. Just as the grand men 
of Athens were made blind to their true nature by their conventions and ambi-
tion, so too do we find ourselves lost. Socrates found the courage to confront 
these men with the demands of humility, with the discomfort of argumentation, 
with the need to compromise, and we must similarly compromise.  
Of course, Plato's strident attitude has already been described as a problem, 
and Aristotle's pragmatic circumspection was identified as a possible means of 
tempering these militant tones, and when it comes to the agrarian concerns of 
life and death, this temperance can offer the same light as before.  
Key to Albert Schweitzer's understanding of the ethical dilemmas involved in 
treating living things as ends rather than purely as means is an appreciation of 
the role of necessity. There are farmers who have told me that they 'need' to do 
what they do in order to 'survive'. Do I 'need' to kill the rats?, do I 'need' the 
eggs which the chickens are laying? Of course, what one means by 'necessity' 
is determined by the criterion by which that necessity is being judged, a practi-
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cal value requires practical facts to determine its applicability. Practical necessi-
ty (as opposed to logical necessity) is instrumental, X is necessary for Y.  
Schweitzer's own wrestling with the problem of necessity has been the source 
of some criticism.256 On the one hand Schweitzer identified the prime ethical 
principle in the requirement to treat all living things as ends in themselves, to 
respect their will to live, and on the other hand he acknowledged the inevitability 
of human life impeding or destroying the life of other living things.257 Due to 
Schweitzer's refusal to acknowledge any explicit hierarchy or differentiation in 
value between different forms of life (also a source of criticism)258 the criterion 
by which necessity could be judged became biological survival. As Schweitzer 
puts it: 'Whenever  I  injure  life  of  any  sort,  I  must  be quite clear  whether  it  
is  necessary. Beyond  the unavoidable  I  must  never  go, not  even with what 
seems insignificant'.259  
Now, it doesn't take huge leap of the imagination to see that if the criterion for 
necessity is survival then a good human life is very swiftly reduced to an ascetic 
and 'strangely barren' form. Perhaps Schweitzer's own life is testament to an 
attempt to live such a life of pure service (though we might cruelly characterise 
his return trips to Gunsbach as hypocrasy), but can we truly recommend that 
everyone lives as Schweitzer lived? Not only does 'survival' resurrect, once 
again, the problem of asceticism, but it also raises weird and dreadful thought 
experiments. As Schweitzer describes: 
In order to keep a heron from starving if it has broken its wing, 
we must condemn that many fish to death. We can show mer-
cy only if we act without mercy at  the same time.260 
And what if a crocodile had broken its leg and the only meat to hand was that of 
humans? Of course, Schweitzer doesn't mean to suggest that those in danger 
of death hold absolute ethical preeminence regardless of species, but his diffi-
culty in negotiating the problems of mutually exclusive demands on life lend 
weight to the employment of an alternative criterion of necessity.  
                                            
256  Mike Martin identifies Schweitzer's muddle of a dichotomy between absolute ethical 
values and practical necessity as being a failure of his ethical theory; M. W. Martin, Albert 
Schweitzer's Reverence for Life, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007), pp.21-2. 
257  A. Schweitzer, Civilisation and Ethics, p.257. 
258  M. W. Martin, Albert Schweitzer's Reverence for Life, pp.31-4. 
259  A. Schweitzer, Civilisation and Ethics, p.264. 
260 A. Schweitzer, Die Weltanschauung der Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben. Kulturphilosophie III, 
Dritter und vierter Teil, (München, C. H. Beck, 2000).  
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שֶֶפנ, carrying as it does something of the Hellenistic (or Nussbaumian) notion of 
flourishing, offers an alternative to a purely biological conception of life which 
enables a more satisfactory negotiation of complex competing demands.261  
שֶֶפנ does not preclude a life of ascetic service, and there is a certain sense in 
which they who flourish through a less compromised form of compassion and 
contemplation may represent greater שֶֶפנ than we who feast and make merry in 
the blood and sweat of our slaves (but that is a matter for another discussion). 
שֶֶפנ does, however, permit lives which are good without complete sacrifice and 
which contain compassion which is full without demanding acts of madness.  
When I press my spade into the soil and I know that there is a very good 
chance I will be destroying lives, hundreds of minute lives, this act can be mor-
ally laudable. When I spend money on clothes for my daughter and not on vet-
erinary care for an injured mouse, this is not to be condemned. But were I to 
lace my barn with poison, were I to set about destroying in its entirety the local 
population of rats in a most painful way and with significant collateral damage, 
this would not be permissible. 
Of course, when normative claims like this are made with little in the way of sol-
id metaethical foundations, rigour is left wanting. There is nothing in the sugges-
tion that living things occupy a position on a scale of 'livingness', in part corre-
sponding to our ethical obligations to, and expectations of them, which tells us 
just which animals it is and is not all right to kill.  
The question stands: why not kill the wolves? They have lesser שֶֶפנ than we, 
that much seems clear, it takes less to fulfill the potential of a wolf than it does 
that of most humans. Replace the forests with towns, universities, libraries, 
even monasteries if you must; the net שֶֶפנ of the world would be increased. 
How would that world be less philosophical? Certainly some damage will have 
been done to achieve this human paradise but the end result will be increased 
εὐδαιμονία in its truest form. Or would it? It would certainly have been expedient 
for Socrates to have lied at his trial, to have used his formidable intellect to out-
wit his opponents so that he could continue (though perhaps in a truncated 
form) his educational work. Instead Socrates decided to look them in the face. 
                                            
261  I also hope that the Biblical undertones of שֶֶפנ  together with its very close meaning to 
that of 'life' means that using it as an alternative to (or expansion of) 'Leben' would be at 
least entertained by Schweitzer. 
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Socrates chose not to deal with his enemy in the abstract but instead to con-
front them and their ideas in their immediate, living form. His accusers would 
have preferred for him to slip away, out of sight, out of mind, to vanish through a 
cloud of deception, Socrates would not allow them this convenience. Socrates' 
accusers were forced to get their hands dirty and to look close upon the dam-
age they were doing. Plato invokes soldierly virtues through his hero and imagi-
nes a close bond between these and the other great virtues of which εὐδαιμονία 
is composed.  
Sheer survival might see my garden planted only with potatoes and kale, but I 
also like beans. Other creatures like beans too and so the business of this little 
war goes on. But neither side in this conflict bears the other ill will. I find myself 
just as Schweitzer says 'amidst life which wills to live'. The fact of the matter is 
just this blunt, this simple, but this simplicity doesn't preclude great lessons in 
virtue. 
On the one hand, what has been said here departs quite markedly from the 
work of Albert Schweitzer. A significant portion of this discussion has been oc-
cupied with the idea that there is a justifiable sense, albeit a complex and rela-
tively vague sense, in which different living things can be treated with more or 
less ethical concern (or urgency). Schweitzer avoids this differentiation, empha-
sising instead the common 'will to live' found in all living things. On the other 
hand, one primary quality of this more nebulous concept of שֶֶפנ, this richness of 
life, has been not only the extracognitive nature of its composition and extent 
but also the extracognitive nature of its epistemology. This is to say (and reiter-
ate) that I do not ponder whether or not a pig is a person, nor 'how much' of a 
person that pig is, I perceive this directly (which is not to say I cannot ponder 
this personhood, nor that this perception cannot be enriched by more detailed 
reflections, but only that the basic datum of 'knowing nephesh', and the virtue of 
caring about it is primarily visceral not speculative. As Schweitzer says: 
A man  is truly  ethical  only when  he obeys  the compulsion  
to  help  all life that  he is able  to  assist,  and  shrinks  from  
injuring  anything  that  lives.  He  does  not  ask  how firmly 
this  or  that  life  deserves  one’s  sympathy  as  being 
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valuable,  nor,  beyond  that, whether  and  to  what  degree  it 
 is  capable  of  feeling.  Life  as  such  is  sacred  to  him.262  
Just as I do not deliberate on the personhood of pigs, nor should I think away 
the 'compulsion to help all life' and shrink 'from injuring anything that lives'. I am 
justified in feeling greater grief over the suffering of farmed pigs than I do over 
that of farmed locusts and of exercising great effort in stopping the one and not 
the other, but this is not the same as feeling no grief over the locusts, of feeling 
no compulsion to improve their lot.  
We can allow Schweitzer to take us this far at least. Not to a monastery per-
haps, but to guilt.  It may seem odd to say so, but pulling a carrot is not exactly 
(or solely) a joyous affair. This little life, this thing I have nurtured from seed to 
full fruit, reaches a point where its death becomes my life. I do not weep for the 
carrot, there is no gnashing of teeth or rending of garments, but as far as I am 
able I sustain my sense of death and of a somber transition.  
φρόνησις doesn't give us a route to perfection. The business of φρόνησις is to 
determine what we are 'able to assist', what the best course of action is, but this 
does not guarantee we arrive at a situation to celebrate. The right course of ac-
tion is not necessarily (and perhaps never will be) a truly good course of ac-
tion.263  
Schweitzer urges us to keep our ethical activity grounded in an absolute ideal of 
perfection, that whatever the difficulties of life, however difficult it might be to 
decide what is best, we must keep a clear view of the goodness by which the 
whole business is navigated. Virtue in its widest sense, human wisdom, σοφία, 
demands a complex admixture of different virtues, many of which are not cogni-
tive in nature.  
Respect (viewed here as synonymous with justice, δικαιοσύνη) courage 
(ἀνδρεία) and compassion (or charity, or love: ἀγάπη) are, amongst other vir-
tues, vital to εὐδαιμονία. The latter two of these virtues are certainly not of a 
                                            
262 A. Schweitzer, Civilisation and Ethics, p.246. 
263 Of course, much could be said about the distinction between ‘right’ and ‘good’; see: W. D. 
Ross, The Right and The Good (1930), (Oxford, Oxford, University Press, 2002), pp.10-11. 
Suffice to say here that by ‘right’ I mean to say that which is the correct course of action 
(based on that which is the virtuous thing to be done, that which is based on the right sorts of 
motivation) and by ‘good’ I mean to suggest the kind of world and events which are desira-
ble. The correct, morally laudable course of action may nevertheless be regrettable in many 
ways and not unremittingly good.  
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primarily cognitive nature and the first only partly. φρόνησις alone, with its com-
plex intellectual ways, is not enough (it would just be a collector of facts, details 
and strategies: a cleverness), it must be part of a complex balance of virtues.  
It might seem that an idea like שֶֶפנ twists Schweitzer's vision beyond recognition 
and is ultimately in direct opposition to it.264  If one must shrink from injuring an-
ything that lives then how can any hierarchy of 'livingness' correctly inform ethi-
cal action? Perhaps when it is built upon (and together with) a variety of insights 
including the desire to prevent any harm whatsoever and bring flourishing to all 
(ἀγάπη). It's not that one virtue, one kind of disposition or way of thinking and 
feeling, would need to oust the others through some kind of psychological and 
moral competition, rather they can coexist. Each aspect of the ethical universe 
paints different aspects of a picture, of a story, and each comes together to form 
a single, more or less complete understanding of what is right or wrong, what 
approximates The Good, that fulcrum without which no part of the story would 
have any meaning and by which the whole is judged. 
Indeed, in the melting pot of the garden, where the little stories of small lives are 
played out in such close detail, the virtues, different kinds of ethical disposition 
and thinking, can be appreciated in their necessarily complex form. An inclina-
tion to have every living thing flourishing to its utmost capacity, to see it live long 
and well, happy and healthy, the desire to keep every creature from pain, every 
plant from harm, this is a good inclination. This 'reverence for life' is real and 
deep. This is the foundational virtuous inclination, ‘selflessness’, with which this 
discussion began. As has been said, this disposition stretches from how I feel 
about my daughter to how I feel about my pigs and even my plants. It might be 
called empathy or love, ἀγάπη or compassion, it doesn't matter too much what 
we call it, but it is powerful, wonderful and terrible.265 When I am confronted by 
                                            
264  As Martin acknowledges, Schweitzer can seem to be recommending a very narrow 
kind of ethic with his emphasis on perfection yet this orientation needn't preclude (and in 
Schweitzer's case does not preclude) the contribution of a wide array of virtuous dispositions 
in ethical deliberation. (M. W. Martin, Albert Schweitzer's Reverence for Life, pp.2-3). 
265  An emphasis on ἀγάπη as a key virtue certainly reflects a departure from the classical 
grounding of this discussion into a more Christian history. Of course, Schweitzer's own think-
ing was of a Christian nature, but more importantly it is entirely consonant with the rest of 
this discussion to suggest that a movement or development in the history of philosophy con-
tributed a profoundly important insight. Of course, Hellenes were familiar with the role of 
ἀγάπη in ethical conduct (no moral creature could be without such a basic awareness) but 
the rise of Alexander, of Rome and finally the collapse of classical European civilisation en-
couraged a shift (and contraction) of philosophy which enabled new insights to come to the 
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images of genocide, of starvation, of dogs having their skin torn from their living 
bodies, of pigs pushed through steel corridors towards the mechanised jaws of 
death, buried alive in their thousands, of the quivering body of a poisoned rat, of 
any countless visions of suffering and death, my blood runs cold and it is as if 
some essence of my being lurches out to them, my soul tries to save them and 
cannot.  
When ἀγάπη brings us to our knees, when all the world turns to darkness and 
compassion leaves us lost, φρόνησις picks us up and offers us a short, sharp 
slap to the face. Enough! All your love is as nothing if you cannot act, if you 
cannot make some change in your small sphere of influence. These ethical in-
clinations are not in competition, they are members of a community of our-
selves, of our stories, and if thinking of them as homunculi helps us to appreci-
ate the logical and psychological validity of this suggestion then so be it.266 But 
ἀγάπη and φρόνησις get us only so far: to the strangely barren hinterland to 
which Schweitzer sometimes seems to lead us; this relentless quest for all living 
things is, although able to compromise, still relatively directionless and prone to 
lead us into realms of emotional and intellectual inconsistency.  
Here is where δικαιοσύνη (respect) steps into the breach. In some ways, justice 
(the ability to recognise, and inclination to act upon what someone deserves) is 
the result of the interaction of ἀγάπη and φρόνησις. A major aspect of φρόνησις 
is an ability to differentiate between different kinds of phenomenon, it is an abil-
ity to recognise not only the extent of one's own power but also the power of as 
many other things as possible so that one can determine what can and cannot 
be achieved and how that might be done. When this inclination to differentiate is 
combined with an ability to recognise suffering and flourishing and a desire to 
increase the latter and decrease the former, desert is a natural mode of resolu-
tion.  
The peculiar thing about justice is its holistic, partly intellectual, partly visceral 
nature. Like φρόνησις it is manifest in a desire to gain as wide a view as possi-
ble and yet it shares with ἀγάπη an intuitive binding principle.267 Unlike 
                                                                                                                                
fore. A reformulation of the virtues may be foremost amongst these Christian contributions to 
philosophy, and is something to be enormously grateful for.  
266  In this sense, what is being said here follows in the vein of Jung and his Archetypes.  
267  It might be claimed that ἀγάπη in its truest form is also holistic, that a universal love for 
all things is the fullest realisation of ἀγάπη. But even if credence were given to this notion, a 
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φρόνησις it does not seek purely to distinguish and discover mechanisms, to 
gain power, instead it drives towards a view of the whole in order to better ap-
preciate how each part fits within that whole under a single principle: fairness.  
Much of any encounter with שֶֶפנ is achieved through δικαιοσύνη; this is certainly 
not to claim that perceiving 'livingness' is purely a matter of appreciating what 
any living thing deserves, only that a significant part of this perception is so 
constituted. But why does this matter? What does this theory of interacting vir-
tues and the richness of moral character have to do with the way in which phi-
losophy as a way of life can be practiced through gardening and how to negoti-
ate the competing demands of thousands of non-human organisms? 
There are four answers to these questions and they concern (1) feeling bad (2) 
courage and honesty, (3) reward and punishment and (4) territory.  
 
Feeling Bad 
The first and most obvious normative implication of these 'gardening virtues' is 
something which has already been stated, namely the way in which negative 
states should accompany virtuous action: that feeling bad about doing the best 
thing is entirely appropriate.  
'Feeling bad' is not entirely synonymous with guilt. Guilt conveys a quite one-
dimensional kind of regret and neglects other ethically important kinds of atti-
tude.  
Confusion about the meaning of regret isn't a preserve of academic speculation. 
A common example of when people become confused about the appropriate-
ness of 'feeling bad' is when people say 'I'm sorry' upon hearing about another's 
misfortune. This confusion may be more prevalent amongst the British, with 
                                                                                                                                
universal love is more like a potential than a realised virtue. The saint who could profess 
such a state would nevertheless find their compassion active only when confronted with par-
ticular examples, particular individuals. Certainly one can ponder, in the abstract, the fate of 
all creatures, but this is still, in an important sense, a particular scenario. To be constantly 
torn apart by all suffering (past, present and future) and to likewise be absorbed by the joy of 
it antithesis would be to exercise a virtue which was no longer a recognisably mortal condi-
tion: something divine, something unattainable, barely imaginable, something normatively 
meaningless.  
 164 
164 
their penchant for saying 'sorry' about almost anything,268 but many of us will be 
familiar with the way this kind of 'apology' is dismissed as inappropriate. Per-
haps one person will have experienced an inconvenience, maybe bad traffic, 
and another will respond: 'I'm sorry' to which the first will answer: 'why? It's not 
your fault.' Now, this is to confuse two senses of 'I'm sorry'. One sense of 'I'm 
sorry' is something like: 'I regret that I made this (or allowed this to) happen' 
(with an implicit recognition that one will attempt to ensure that it doesn't hap-
pen again). Another sense of 'I'm sorry' is more like: 'I regret that this hap-
pened', without any recognition of personal responsibility. This latter apology is 
meant as a condolence and an attempt to express solidarity ('you're not alone in 
your pain, I'm here with you'). Indeed, this latter kind of apology can be quite 
general and take the form of 'I wish the world were not the sort of place that this 
kind of thing happens', recognising that we are all, whether currently suffering or 
not, in the same boat.  
This distinction between guilt (personally responsible regret) and condolence 
(general regret) is crucial to understanding the appropriate bad feeling when 
confronted with negotiating competing demands between living things. This dis-
tinction is crucial, however, not because it exhausts the possibilities for appro-
priate bad feeling, but because it does not. 
It might seem straightforward to categorise appropriate bad feelings when doing 
what seems best as belonging to the second (condolence) form of bad feeling, 
but this doesn't make for a good fit. When I am letting my dogs run amok in the 
barns in the hope that they will scare away the rats, and when they catch and 
kill a rat, my role in that death is clear. When I stand over the little corpse of that 
rat and say sorry, my apology is not simply an expression of general regret at 
the state of our fallen world, it is something more personal and, simultaneously, 
less regretful.  
If one were to be speaking to a survivor of some calamity, a really dreadful in-
justice (perhaps a natural disaster or genocide) in which innocent people were 
hurt and killed, the sense in which one would express regret, 'I'm so sorry', 
would be entirely non-responsible and entirely heartfelt. In a quite powerful and 
clear way, one would wish that those things simply had not happened. When 
                                            
268  The psychology and philosophy of this cultural disposition is another matter, and 
whether this inclination is laudable or misguided cannot be dealt with here.  
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one is confronted with all the little acts of destruction, bloody or otherwise, 
which are 'necessary' in the garden, one is intimately aware not only of one's 
own responsibility in these acts but also of how both these acts and the scenar-
ios which make them necessary are not entirely regrettable. 
Now, the tension involved in an idea of incomplete regret, with its psychological, 
ethical and logical peculiarities, will be explored more fully in the close of this 
discussion; what is crucial here is to recognise that there are forms of feeling 
bad which do not directly entail a desire for the situation to be otherwise. This 
lack of regret is, in a fairly obvious sense, a consequence of 'doing the right 
thing', of acting in a way which seems, both prior to and after the event, to have 
been the correct and morally laudable way of acting. In this way it is possible to 
imagine a situation in which one's own personal responsibility has resulted in a 
better state of affairs despite the overall state of affairs remaining, in some 
sense, upsetting. So, in this way the death of the rats is less bad than my family 
not having access to organic eggs from the garden. I know that if I were to buy 
eggs from the shop, these eggs will have involved far more processing and lo-
gistical complexity. A broad and detailed assessment of the mechanisms in-
volved in getting any item of food permits me to understand the amount of la-
bour, suffering and death necessary to achieve sustenance within a geograph-
ically diffuse and economically specialised system. Quite apart from concerns 
about fuel, space, workers’ rights, hen welfare, antibiotic resistance, chemical 
leeching, water expenditure, corruption, supermarket monopolies or a thousand 
other things, rats will still have been killed to get these other eggs, it’s just that 
someone else will have done the killing. 
One of the most obvious and more naïve responses to this recognition of the 
suffering involved in consumption is to consume as little as possible. Of course, 
this line of reasoning needn't be so short sighted as to fail to see the ascetic ex-
tremities to which it might lead if left in its most uncompromising form, that 
would be an uncharitable formulation of such an objection. If the game being 
played is 'where do I draw the line?' then it is easy enough to imagine someone 
who suggests the line should be drawn elsewhere (in whichever direction and 
however marginally). 'Give up eggs, but not courgettes'. This is certainly some-
where 'justice' starts to be important but it is important to first understand what 
might drive us to draw the line more or less in one direction or another: con-
 166 
166 
sume less, consume more. Is it 'feeling bad' which is to be avoided? Is there a 
line which can be drawn by which we might finally breathe a sigh of relief, hav-
ing shed the dreadful responsibility for suffering; a point at which we can exit 
the world of death? This certainly seems to be a significant source of motivation 
for both those who feel justified in placing great importance on human needs 
and those who place great importance on the suffering of non-human organ-
isms. 
And yet, this escape from feeling bad is less pronounced amongst permacultur-
ists and homesteaders. I have had plenty of conversations with people who 
have found their comfortable niche in the world of consumption, vegans and 
carnivores. So many people have firm ideas about what matters and what 
doesn't and how they can ensure they are able to entirely avoid doing morally 
relevant harm: shorn of responsibility. Not real gardeners though. Certainly 
there is a spectrum of ethical insight amongst all groups and it has never been 
an aim of this discussion to suggest that there is any guaranteed way of attain-
ing such insight, but a lack of comprehensive certainty is not the same as a lack 
of educational excellence. A method of education can be good, even best, with-
out being perfect. Nor has it been the purpose of this discussion to ascertain the 
degree to which the correlation between permaculture and ethical insight is 
causal, that would be an empirical study of a quite different character (though a 
study worth pursuing). No, this is (amongst other things) a qualitative treatment 
of my own life with permaculture. One person's account of their own experience 
of an educational experience can be as valuable in informing a broader view of 
the value of that experience as any statistical analysis of many such individuals. 
I can say without hesitation that life lived in close proximity with other living 
things can be ethically informative, the relationship is (amongst other more 
complex relationships) causal. And part of this life lived with other living things is 
talking to other gardeners.  
I can talk philosophy almost inexhaustibly: ad nauseam. It infuriates and galls 
those who do not share this disposition. I can shift in and out of political and 
metaphysical speculation with relative ease and, crucially, relish. I find 'small 
talk' quite difficult and I am inclined to attempt to push conversation in the direc-
tion of abstract and ethical debate. I suspect this gadflyish talk is part of the So-
cratic dream. There are perhaps a few other subjects on which I can pontificate 
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with similar zeal, perhaps, but none come even close to matching garden-talk. 
Garden-talk and philosophy vie for top spot, and garden-talk is often more so-
ciable.  
Not long ago I was doing a bit of voluntary pottering in a garden at a multi-faith 
ashram in West Wales. Over my years of visiting the ashram I have become 
friends with the monk responsible for the garden. At first it was simply a matter 
of volunteering for a task in which I had some skill (and some enthusiasm) but it 
takes mere moments for two gardeners to get into garden-talk; and garden-talk 
is sudden, swift, deep and familiar. So the monk and I would talk about this 
weed or that, the way this soil behaves or how elephant poo compares with 
horse poo. Weather talk (which might otherwise fit firmly into the 'small talk' cat-
egory) takes on a new and powerful dimension in the realm of garden-talk. 
Each shift in the season, every shower and every dry spell is reflected in the 
performance of each different kind of vegetable. Cold winters can lead to good 
fruit, dry springs can lead to dead seedlings and late plantings. But very few 
gardeners grow exactly the same vegetables as one another, different tastes, 
soils and climates mean different crops and so we may find the year's weather 
has treated one of us kindly and the other cruelly. And all this talk somehow 
feels like it is happening as a small instance, fleeting and fragile, amongst a tru-
ly vast and ancient tradition of garden-talk. Thousands, indeed tens of thou-
sands of years and miles and acres and billions, trillions of conversations all 
about similar things. And it happens during work, it happens as you scrape your 
hands through rock and soil, as you heave at roots and gently place seedlings 
into new ground. And it was thus when I visited the ashram most recently. I 
never even learned the lady's name, but she is now a regular volunteer at the 
garden and without any introduction or even a moment's silence we were plant-
ing out chard and talking about toads. We like toads. She was interested to 
learn that toads are, along with Ravens and humans, the longest living land an-
imal of these islands. I was interested to learn where and how she has encoun-
tered toads in the sides of beds. But we also talked about killing things. 
When one sows seed (always depending upon the species of vegetable) it is 
common to sow more than is needed. This is a sensible course of action since 
many may die, they might be eaten by slugs or snails, mice or voles, and some 
of them may just fail to germinate. So to ensure that you have enough seedlings 
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it is wise, it is prudent, to sow more than needed. But this often leaves unwant-
ed plants. Now, many people will exchange extra seedlings and the trade be-
tween gardeners is one of the greatest joys of the business. I will never come 
home from the ashram without some new vegetable in seed or seedling form. 
But this is often not possible and quite apart from this, it is also wise to plant on-
ly the strongest seedlings. Of all the plants which do germinate and of those 
which survive, many are simply inferior. 'A proper gardener' she called me when 
I showed almost no concern over thinning (killing off the weaker plants). She felt 
bad about it, she wanted to give them all a life if she could, to find a place for 
them. Of course, this might sound like sentimental rubbish which would be un 
unsurprising find in a volunteer at an ashram, but actually it was said with a lev-
el head and no hyperbole. 'A proper gardener'; I'm not sure about that, I think 
perhaps I can be guilty of forgetting about the destruction I am causing: desen-
sitised. This volunteer's reluctance to kill the weak plants was a healthy remind-
er, it wasn't a move away from the reality of the situation, not some fantastical 
metaphysical trip into a realm of crystals and angelic healing, no, it was a move 
closer, a simple shift in attention towards the life in my hands. I killed them still, 
and felt worse about it. We both felt bad about it, and carried on.  
I have only been deer stalking once, only once with the aim of hunting deer and 
killing them and I was not the shooter. There were no deer shot that day but we 
did skin a deer which was shot previously. I have met many people who shoot 
deer triumphantly but there was no chance I would go hunting with one of those 
people, I have never been so unfortunate as to think that would be a good idea. 
No, the hunter with whom I skinned the deer handled the dead animal with re-
spect. Revulsion was certainly not part of the picture but a quiet and constant 
understanding of the deer in life as well as in death was in the air. 'Permacul-
ture' can be as simple as this. It needn't be a wholesale revision of lifestyle in 
order to qualify, it can be partial, it can be gradual, but it must take Schweitzer's 
principle of a reverence for life, of a far reaching compassion, and apply this 
through an ever greater closeness with that life: proximal, practical, intellectual 
and emotional closeness. Killing a deer, a creature so full of life, of desires, joys 
and pains, certainly represents an act of significant destruction: a dramatic act 
against the interests of a living thing, a person, and yet, when it is committed 
with a keen sense of the loss involved, with a bad feeling, and with a sophisti-
cated recognition of (and motivation against) the complex systems of suffering 
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and degradation which have been avoided through this act of killing, then it 
cannot so easily be seen as contrary to a reverence for life. And this happens, 
when the destruction of life is approached with compassion, prudence and hon-
esty, darkness is preserved. I have seen it in hunters and gardeners, in those 
who will themselves closer into the source of things, into the beating heart of 
the systems upon which their own existence must depend and refuse to close 
themselves off from the pain. 
This 'bad feeling' doesn't require regret. Certainly in form this bad feeling does 
resemble the second kind of regret identified above but what is most crucial to 
this resemblance is not regret but, rather, solidarity. With the first form of regret 
it shares a recognition of personal responsibility (though in this instance for a 
morally laudable act) and it combines this sense of causal responsibility with a 
recognition of the inherent value of that which has been infringed upon. To rec-
ognise other living things as ends in themselves is to recognise the responsibil-
ity to share in their pain, to be present with that pain, with their loss (however 
small and trivial that loss may seem). 
Of course, I am not attempting to recommend that we should be breaking down 
in tears each time we pull a carrot out of the ground, the extent of the 'bad feel-
ing' must follow a sense of שֶֶפנ: a tear for a carrot would be silly but for a pig it 
would not. What is crucial is that our motivation is not an escape from a respon-
sibility for suffering, indeed it is almost the opposite. Our motivation can be 
mixed, it must be mixed in the sense of different virtuous dispositions interacting 
in complex ways (often in complementary as opposed to competitive ways), but 
when a desire to eliminate suffering (compassion) is combined with a desire to 
flourish individually (and tribally or familially) one can and should arrive at a 
sense of the need to share in the suffering one has caused. This need is driven 
not only by a desire to appreciate in the fullest sense the truth of what one is 
engaged in (honesty/curiosity) it is also driven by a desire that each thing re-
ceive what it deserves (justice) and a more general desire for fellowship, or 
communion.  
This is the 'thick' nature of symbiotic ethics; stories play out in complex ways 
but this need not translate into ethical aporia, rather it means that familiar ethi-
cal precepts and virtues need to accommodate one another in subtle ways 
which reflect the reality of lived experience. Certainly, one could attempt to offer 
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very specific normative instructions on the basis of this kind of ethical reflection. 
One might, for example, suggest that it is never justifiable to kill pigs in order to 
eat them, since pigs are just too much people, too שֶֶפנ, too much to lose. In 
support of such a suggestion one might offer accounts of interactions with pigs, 
stories of our lives together. Indeed, there was one occasion on which I was 
brought to tears by these pig lives.  
I was fencing off a new area for the pigs, an area of thick brush and hedge 
which I had planned to make into a lawn for my daughter. The pigs are very 
good at clearing this sort of growth and it would both save me the effort and 
give them something nice to eat and interesting to do. At the entrance to this 
new run was an area which I had previously been using to burn various old 
waste, organic and otherwise. The two larger, older pigs had very little trouble in 
ignoring this patch of burnt ground but the two smaller pigs were less keen. 
These two just loitered on the near side of the burn area and sniffed the edges 
gingerly. When they become cautious like this they begin to make quiet noises, 
grunts and squeals under their breath, back and forth they make these noises 
as they shift their feet tentatively. 
I attempted to coax these two pigs into leaping the bonfire site. I used an old 
pallet as a pig-board and gradually decreased their space until there was really 
only one direction in which to go. The male, Button Mushroom, finally plucked 
up the courage and joined the big pigs in their lush, new ground, but the little 
girl, Squash, she stayed behind. I'm not sure how long we were there, me push-
ing her gently towards the scorched soil, her pushing back and growling in bare-
ly audible discontent. A long while. She crawled up a steep bank at the side ra-
ther than move onto the ash and bit by bit she became introverted and visibly 
frightened. In the end I abandoned the pig-board and crouched beside her. She 
has such pretty eyes, framed by tortoiseshell lashes, but they were distant and 
lonely now, and beneath her thick skin I could feel tremors in the tension of her 
body. Each breath came out with desperate little cries. So I held her, and talked 
gently about nothing in particular. It was a long while. Pigs smell like white pep-
per and they are full of self. 
So my thoughts drifted to all those other pigs. Philosophy bids us look to the 
whole, to find detail in the present but not to be confined by it, to discover the 
meaning, the significance of that detail by discovering its wider context. So out 
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there, beyond this little trial, were millions of pigs in steel boxes, millions of eyes 
like these being thrown onto conveyer belts and crushed into machines of 
death. Broken bones, screaming, confusion, air thick with fear. I have seen the 
videos, seen the malpractice, seen the 'good practice'. So I held her closer, and 
I talked more gently, and I cried.  
She walked across the ashes eventually, with tears on her back.   
But no attempt is being made at such specific normative instructions. Perhaps 
somewhere, at some time, under certain circumstances, it has been right to kill 
and eat a pig, I have insufficient powers of φρόνησις to scry such distant details. 
In my garden, alongside my pigs, I find such possibilities barely comprehensi-
ble, just as I find scenarios in which eating humans can be justified equally in-
comprehensible. But there are many gardens in the world. No, following the 
work of Albert Schweitzer, the suggestion here is that the most crucial work of 
philosophy (in its written and most theoretical form) is to help shape our motiva-
tions, to offer new ways of understanding what should inform our decisions and 
actions, not (at least in the first instance) to speculate about particular decisions 
and actions. So, feeling bad about X or Y is not as important as recognising that 
it is right to feel bad even when doing the right thing. By taking familiar and 
widely accepted virtues as axioms and then placing them in the context of living 
with other living things it is suggested that new and more complete systems of 
moral learning can be illuminated. 
In its most basic form the suggestion is that life lived with other living things can 
help to illustrate that:  
• The basic desire for all living things to flourish is ineliminable from, 
though not necessarily sovereign over (necessary but not sufficient for) 
right moral deliberation and action. This desire for universal flourishing is 
concomitant with a desire to limit suffering as far as possible. 
• Not only are death and suffering inevitable but human flourishing will 
necessarily entail the suffering and death of other living things.  
• A recognition that not all flourishing and suffering is of equivalent moral 
weight should not lead to a negation of the desire for all living things to 
flourish. Nor should the desire for all living things to flourish lead to a di-
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minishment of a desire for personal flourishing. Despite prima facie en-
counters with these problems, these various dispositions are commensu-
rate (these dispositions can and should survive this conflict).  
• Other virtuous dispositions can assist in negotiating this apparent con-
flict, one of which (closely related to both compassion and honesty) is a 
desire to share in the lives (joys and pains) of others, and particularly 
those for whom we bear more direct responsibility. This solidarity in suf-
fering is crucial to overall virtue (wisdom). 
I have known farmers who feel bad and I have known farmers who do not, the 
former are, without exception, better people.  
'Feeling bad' is, of course, a quite two-dimensional sort of phrase. I have no 
doubt that even those farmers who suggest that the suffering of their animals is 
not morally relevant do, in some respects, 'feel bad' about this suffering. Quite 
probably the only kind of human which could escape any kind of 'feeling bad' in 
the face of suffering would not really be a human at all, they would be lacking 
something central; we would probably call them a psychopath and indeed their 
soul would be very unwell. But the key to the idea of 'feeling bad' being dis-
cussed here is the way in which it is embraced. This is feeling bad is not to be 
regretted, avoided, denied or dissimulated in any way. This is a feeling bad 
which is parallel to and compatible with 'feeling good'. 
Indeed, when I slice through the writhing length of an earthworm as I dig in my 
vegetable beds, not only should I attend to that mangled thing and dwell (if only 
for slightly longer than a fleeting moment) in the darkness I have brought into 
that little world, I should feel joy in the vegetables themselves and in my act of 
producing food (which will taste nice and be nutritious) for myself and my family. 
Just as the dispositions which give rise to these feelings of sadness and joy can 
and should cohabit our souls, so too should the feelings themselves cohabit.269 
Within the garden itself, within the wild world of living things, there is a model of 
this cohabitation. Conflict is not illusory and yet a healthy and sustainable sys-
                                            
269  The distinction here between 'dispositions' and 'feelings' (with the former giving rise to 
the latter) is an artificial one and, if taken literally, paint an overly simplistic psychological 
model of moral character. There is no point at which compassion stops and sadness and joy 
begin. The division is not psychologically accurate but for the sakes of the above discussion, 
discussing these things in this way is convenient and the conceptual relationships are unim-
portant.     
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tem, a biome which can flourish in stable persistence ad infinitum depends up-
on a complex admixture of seemingly antagonistic forces which, due to subtle 
mechanisms and distinct approaches, coexist and constitute vital components 
of the thriving whole. This is a lesson of the garden: we are gardens... but more 
on this later. 
Solidarity is not the only necessary virtue. 
 
Courage and Honesty 
So far, this negotiation of difficult situations and the avoidance of vice through 
the balancing of various dispositions may sound quite strongly Aristotelean, but 
it is with Plato's soldierly virtues that the most stark lessons of the garden are 
learned.270 
Honesty denies us the ease of looking away, of ignoring the pain, and combined 
with a desire for flourishing in ourselves and all living things, it can bring us to a 
lesson of solidarity and sadness, to the sharing of pain. But sadness, 'feeling 
bad', can be debilitating. This reaching out to those around us and taking re-
sponsibility for our actions is a very local pursuit. This is not to claim that the 
solidarity which has been outlined is a purely passive thing, such unflinching 
contact can take enormous effort, but understanding the compatibility of 'feeling 
bad' and doing the right thing, is not the same as understanding the strength 
necessary to achieve this effort of communion, nor the ethical and intellectual 
context in which it is appropriate (what are the broader implications of this feel-
ing bad? What impact does this appropriate negativity have on our wider ethical 
conduct?).   
It is easy enough to conceive of what is meant by 'honesty' here. Looking into 
the eyes of a cockerel as you slice off his head and feeling the desperate con-
vulsions of his body, the warmth of his blood, these are the brutal and direct 
facts of killing. Lived-honesty, is not a very far cry from intellectual honesty. 
When I have a metaphysical opinion, I have an intellectual duty to become fa-
miliar with the various facts and arguments upon which that position rests. 
When I am going to benefit from some food, I have a similar (if not ethically 
                                            
270  Apol., 28a-29b 
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identical) responsibility to become intimately familiar with the processes by 
which this food becomes available to me.  
It might be suggested that practical honesty and theoretical honesty are ethical-
ly distinct insofar as familiarity with the theoretical underpinnings of a metaphys-
ical position can be achieved without a complete alteration of lifestyle and that 
one can be theoretically familiar with the practical reality without being practical-
ly familiar with the processes. Knowing how a chicken gets on to the plate 
doesn't necessitate putting it there personally.  
This sort of objection would: (1) reflect a lack of appreciation of the kind of 
wealth and leisure necessary to devote time to metaphysical speculation (and 
would therefore almost certainly come from someone who enjoyed those bene-
fits) and (2) fail to appreciate the analogous way in which metaphysical posi-
tions and their arguments can be learned by rote without genuine understand-
ing and that in order for a theoretical position to be truly understood in the way 
that it should be, the arguments and facts upon which it depends should be fully 
understood each time the position is expressed or made use of. So it wouldn't 
even be enough to have killed a chicken once upon a time and to thus express 
a true understanding of the processes leading to the chicken dinner, this would 
leave the rest of the occasions crucially wanting. 
Of course, when dealing with persons, with living things (with שֶֶפנ), there is the 
added (and ethically more urgent) quality of needing to deal with the living 
things involved as ends in themselves as opposed to means to an end. Argu-
ments upon which an opinion rests do not share this same vital quality. Certain-
ly, when one is communicating a metaphysical position part of the impetus for 
communicating that position truthfully and rigorously is out of respect for the 
person with whom one is communicating (whether that person be oneself or 
otherwise). In this way, these two forms of honesty do mirror one another since 
even abstract, argumentative honesty is aimed at treating persons as ends in 
themselves.271 The added ethical urgency in the case of practical honesty 
                                            
271  Teaching raises this sort of ethic to the surface. In my own experience, students can 
and will ask questions to which one does not know the answer. Given a student's relative 
lack of knowledge it is frequently possible to hide a lack of knowledge behind argumentative 
dissimulation: to make a student think you have answered their question when, in fact, you 
have not. This can occur in degrees and I have both seen this done and have certainly ap-
proached doing it myself. The temptation is very great to create an image of oneself as more 
knowledgeable than one actually is.  
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comes from the closer relationship between ends and means: it is frequently 
'necessary' to treat שֶֶפנ as means as well as ends and the danger of treating 
them solely as means is more immediately present.272 
--- 
I once said to a group of friends that I thought people who were not some kind 
of vegetarian  were necessarily stupid, lazy or evil (the group was not solely or 
even largely composed of confessed vegetarians). There was certainly a sense 
in which I wished to be provocative (the provocation largely worked) but I could 
also now comfortably amend this initial proposition to the suggestion that peo-
ple who are not some form of vegan are stupid, lazy or evil.  
This amendment may seem unimportant and this anecdote certainly does not 
represent a clumsy effort to veer off into the specifics of vegan vs vegetarian 
ethics (an empirically boggy area of ethical debate at the best of times), no, the 
point is that I am often not some form of vegan. I claimed above that I don't buy 
eggs or dairy products because this was a step too far, but this just isn't true: 
sometimes I do and, when I do, it is because I am lazy. Perhaps Peter Singer is 
right that there are times when not being vegan is strategically sound for the 
sake of not scaring carnivores away from the idea of vegetarianism,273 and his 
idea that the occasional luxury is justifiable is entirely commensurate with the 
model of flourishing (and a non-ascetic ethic) which has been expressed 
here.274 But there are times when the luxury is not justified, when I know what 
suffering lead to that cream tea and I just plug up the ears of my conscience 
and indulge. In fact, one way or another, I do this all the time.  
'Stupid' is very different from 'lazy' and 'evil' is barely interesting at all. 'Stupid' 
was just a nasty way of saying 'ignorant', which is to indicate those people who 
haven't had access to the lessons of the garden (who haven't been properly ex-
posed to the way in which living things should be treated as ends in them-
selves), they just don't know that they are people too. 'Evil' would just be some-
                                            
272  Again, a distinction is being made here (between theoretical and practical honesty) for 
the sake of  argumentative convenience. The distinction is an artificial one and is not meant 
to contravene the overarching model of philosophy as a way of life. Indeed, the conclusion 
(that both forms of honesty are ethically equivalent) should be viewed as supporting this un-
derlying metaphilosophical model. 
273  P. Singer, 'Peter Singer: An Interview', Satya, October 2006.  
274  Cf. G. L. Francione, 'The Abolition of Animal Exploitation', in G. L. Francione and R. 
Garner The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation?, (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2010), p.11. 
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thing like the 'psychopath' mentioned above, someone who is so broken that 
they just don't feel any compassion at all. No, 'lazy' has something to do with a 
lack of strength and a willing suspension of ethical senses. I can see that a bowl 
of chips would do very nicely, hardly a mortification, but I begin to shut down the 
extent of my vision, my φρόνησις, I narrow my focus to mere words on the 
menu and the smells in the kitchen so that options begin to seem equivalent.  
I do this because it's easier. Feeling simultaneously bad and good about an ac-
tion which has obviously negative impacts but is nonetheless laudable is entire-
ly possible in a temporally, geographically and causally limited frame of refer-
ence, but when φρόνησις brings to the fore an entire world of inexorably linked 
causes and consequences, the chain of death and suffering can seem over-
whelming. It can be very tempting to shut down φρόνησις almost entirely. 
What's needed is courage and honesty. 
The aim of my provocation was to frame that discussion of animal ethics away 
from compassion, and the criticisms of ‘mere sentiment’ which that kind of moti-
vation can engender. There are obviously occasions when a passionate in-
vestment of care coupled with a lack of critical rigour, of hard-headed φρόνησις, 
can justifiably be called sentimental in a bad sense. The recognition of, say, suf-
fering or pain in another animal can cause a kind of sympathetic shock and re-
sult in an inclination to overstretch the importance of an event or imbue some 
behaviour with qualities which are not extant. This is what might be called ‘mere 
sentiment’, since, as Gaita explains, there are clearly times when the recogni-
tion of important emotional states through these kinds of compassionate sym-
pathies are perfectly accurate and not at all ‘mawkish or sentimental’. 275 I had 
hoped that by reaching beyond compassion into the realms of virtues less 
prone to wayward accusations of effeminate inaccuracy, I might hope to set a 
spark in regions of souls otherwise untouched by the motivation of compassion.  
Courage and honesty (ἀνδρεία and ἀλήθεια) inhabit a different (though, crucial-
ly, not unconnected) section of our souls from compassion/charity/universal 
love. These are very active virtues, fiery things. I suspect that diligence occu-
pies a similarly active region. So, calling people lazy, weak, cowardly, pathetic 
                                            
275 R. Gaita, The Philosopher’s Dog, particularly p.115 at which point Gaita considers Rush 
Rhees’ discussion of the death of his own dog and dismisses the idea that there is anything 
‘mawkish or sentimental’ in this kind of reaction (though Gaita discusses this idea throughout 
the book). 
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hits a somewhat different nerve from that exercised by charges of cruelty, un-
feeling disregard and callousness. People can, at least in certain cultures, be-
come proud of their callouses far easier than they can their indolence or cow-
ardice.  
Not to be a vegan, then, is to indulge in languid lethargy; unwilling to embrace 
their moral responsibilities, these pathetic people (we) would rather hide behind 
screens of self-deception and divided labour than face the truth! We, wretches, 
might construct clever little arguments to defend our comfort, no doubt we have 
the luxury of time and wealth that we might collude in such sophistry, but seen 
in the cold light of the real world, thrown down into the filth and blood upon 
which our delicate intellectual ornaments rest, these constructions unravel with 
merciless speed.  
Perhaps this is the sort of militant diatribe which Singer imagines scaring away 
the carnivores.  
But we are all lazy, some more than others, we constantly find ourselves at 
something resembling the infinitesimal juncture of volition and compulsion, of 
responsibility and disease which was outlined at the outset of this discussion.276 
A lack of courage or honesty can feel like a condition over which one has no 
control, how can one hope to 'create' the power to gain power over oneself? Yet 
underneath this despair there lurks that aching nausea of personal responsibil-
ity, that nagging presence of one’s own agency. But this kind of existential or 
solipsistic reflection is a fantasy of which, as we have seen, Aristotle is keenly 
aware, our agency is a thing 'amidst'. Whether I can muster the courage to take 
action, to tell the truth, is linked closely to the stories unfolding about me, of that 
which is present to me. We can take measures to ensure our environments en-
courage virtue, φρόνησις can assist ἀνδρεία: when all is well in the cosmos 
Athena is allied to Ares. The general who hides miles from the front, in cush-
ioned comfort and safety, spends lives as if they were a pittance. The garden, in 
its small way, is an effort to step forward into the fray, to view the battle in its 
bloody reality.  
The combination of ἀγάπη and φρόνησις, and of a recognition of the validity 
and ethical necessity of sadness, can threaten a kind of unsustainable spiral 
                                            
276  Cf. Footnote 136. 
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into despair. As I held that little pig and thought of all those millions of pigs, past, 
present and future, the blackness loomed. What the garden represents is a 
means of training, of strengthening; the only way to combine these apparently 
overwhelming moral inclinations in an emotionally sustainable way is to find a 
way through the darkness, to find a way not to turn back but to forge ahead to 
the unified, balanced virtue on the other side, to σοφία.  
When Odysseus knew that he must sail past the sirens to reach his destination 
he would not close his own ears to their song, that would have been dishonest, 
it would have undermined his entire way of being, it would have made the des-
tination meaningless; what is the return of a master not worthy of being a mas-
ter? Instead, Athena's champion lashed himself to his mast, he threw himself 
into certain torment with the solid assurance of his vessel and crew as both a 
means of progress and a guarantee against self-destruction. Odysseus' cour-
age without cleverness would have been worthless: deadly; his cleverness 
without courage would have been impotent and speculative; without the drive to 
hear the truth of the siren song and without the strength of bravery to undergo 
that voyage he would have been just another lost Argive.  
The garden is just such a vessel. This might seem somewhat of a melodramatic 
appraisal of a simple, genteel country garden, but it is a means of confronting 
ourselves with the truth of the means upon which our existence depends whilst 
doing so in an emotionally and psychologically sustainable way.  
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-  Herbert James Draper, Ulysses and the Sirens, 1909. 
 
The truth of our lives, the world upon which we depend, is not a causally narrow 
thing. Temporally and geographically, our lives are part of a vast and sprawling 
universe teaming with ethically relevant events. So the garden might be 
deemed a petty gesture. There are sweatshops and concentration camps, gen-
ocides and slavery, gargantuan machines of imperial and market consumption. 
The horror of Leviathan; the horror! What is this spec of dirt in this maelstrom of 
life and death? Well, perhaps its smallness is important, and perhaps its small-
ness is deceptive.  
As has been said, the context of our lives is not temporally narrow, we are not 
just what we are right now. The stories of our lives may indeed feature a central 
character (or characters) as Ricoeur suggests but whether we are author or 
reader it would be a mistake to concentrate on this slim volume at the centre.277 
                                            
277 As has already been suggested, this distinction between author and reader is yet another 
confused dichotomy and would also come into the danger of stretching the literary analogy 
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The philosopher is a student of the epics of life which reach out in every direc-
tion: a spherical library suffused with themes. And look! In each volume there is 
a hand in the soil, a hand young and full, a hand old and weathered, a hand 
grasping leaves and roots, wiping a tired brow, catching rain, wielding a well-
worn tool, shooing away the beaks and claws, caressing a snout and a bristly 
back, wiping away the blood, feeding the mouth young and full, feeding the 
mouth old and weathered. Here's that hand, and here again.  
The power of becoming that hand should not be underestimated. The power of 
embodying that kind of historically extended self can be as ethically informative 
as all the learned treatises of the world combined. In the garden is a vessel with 
a deaf crew which can take me into an awareness of this extended self. I could 
throw myself into the front lines, into the desperate subjugation of the diamond 
mine or the stinking gore of the killing floor; then the sirens could scream their 
song at full and terrible volume; but what then? Perhaps there is a time and 
place to stand at the front of the battle, to push into the fiery heat of raw de-
struction, but who could withstand such a blaze for more than a moment? Ares 
alone can fight so ceaselessly.  
So the garden thrusts us into darkness, to blisters, and blood, and filth, and 
freezing rain, but it also offers us a deaf and steady crew, and a mast to which 
we might bind ourselves. Nowhere to run now, king of Ithaca! Cleverest of all 
the Achaeans! Neither flight nor self-destruction are yours to choose. Witness 
the turning of the world! Feel the pain of labour, the aching cost; weigh the pre-
ciousness of the food you eat! 
This kind of ethic, of the importance of bringing oneself closer to the source of 
one's flourishing, of having enough courage and honesty to do so, has much in 
common with political philosophies of alienation and that similarity should be 
acknowledged. Even in its more traditional socioeconomic sphere, this concept 
of separation needn't be confined to motivations for profit or a distancing from 
our own nature, as Sanderson and Pugliese suggest: 
                                                                                                                                
too far. The kind of synthesis between Aristotelian ethics and literary theory which Ricoeur 
formulated is certainly very helpful and these are ideas which I have closely followed, but I 
have attempted to steer as clear as possible from the kind of self-focused, existentialism 
Ricoeur. See: P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative (1983), Vol.1, K. McLaughlin and D. Pellauer 
(tr.), (London, Chicago University Press, 1990), pp.36-7. 
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Marx described other forms of alienation that he believed 
capitalism produces. Instead of valuing workers as human be-
ings who are ends in themselves, the capitalist treats workers 
as means to the end of profit.278 
It is, once again, Kant's second formulation which lies at the heart of this sepa-
ration. Schweitzer's reformulation of this central ethical principle to include all 
living things hinges (in part) on an idea of our own inextricable place within this 
ethical whole:  'I am life which wills to live, and I exist in the midst of life which 
wills to live'. It is this 'amidstness' which the garden can bring to the fore.  
The particular kind of amidstness, of dealienation, which the garden can instill is 
as broad as the concept itself:279 
1. Social Dealienation: An awareness of the labour and suffering (human 
and otherwise) behind the things we consume and an active participation 
in taking direct responsibility for that labour and suffering. 
2. Environmental and Economic Dealienation: A direct encounter with the 
materials of upon which our flourishing depends, on the full nature and 
preciousness of our food and of the complex interconnection of living 
systems and our biological and ethical role in them.  
3. Personal Dealienation: The process of becoming directly familiar with 
שֶֶפנ (as described in chapter 5), allowing oneself to be exposed to and to 
'see' the personness and purposiveness of other living things (accurate 
sentiment as opposed to ‘mere sentiment’). 
4. Seasonal (or 'cosmic') Dealienation: A keen sense of the non-biological 
components of the living system, a direct and highly aesthetic sense of 
                                            
278  R. B. Sanderson and M. A. Pugliese, Beyond Naïveté: Ethics, Economics, and Values, 
(Lanham, University Press of America, 2012), p.253. 
279  It is well to note that the coherence of a single, all inclusive concept of alienation is not 
necessary for the purposes of outlining the parallels between dealienation and 'amidstness'. 
Objections like those of Richard Schacht: '… there is no such thing as alienation... But there 
are myriad alianations' can be accommodated by this current enumeration of types of deal-
ienation (indeed, this kind of objection may support this current division of types). There are 
different kinds of moral disposition (virtues) which drive these different forms of re-
familiarisation, confrontation and conscious efforts towards 'amidstness', and those concep-
tual unities which have been identified as underlying this model of ethical motivation are suf-
ficiently removed from the concept of alienation to avoid any counter-productive conflation 
(however fashionable or otherwise such a conflation may be). Part of the point of discussing 
the garden as a locus for this moral education is to indicate a practical cohesion rather than 
focusing on a conceptual unity. R. Schacht, 'Alienation: The Is-Ought Gap and Two Sorts of 
Discord', in R. F. Geyer and D. R. Schweitzer (ed.), Theories of Alienation: Critical Perspec-
tives in Philosophy and the Social Sciences, (Leiden, Springer, 1976), pp.133-50 (pp.149) 
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the scale and majesty of life on earth. (A less obviously ethical kind of 
dealienation but a crucial part of the lesson in wisdom and wellbeing 
which the garden offers and which will be elaborated on below). 
One reason this similarity with alienation is important is because it can act as a 
theoretical shortcut to the ethical expansiveness of this 'virtue(s)-by-gardening' 
theory.  
Having asserted the continuity of ethical relevance between living things (whilst 
not wholly endorsing the ethical equivalence sometimes suggested by Schweit-
zer) the reality of conflict and an intuitive prioritisation of humanity (or at least 
greater שֶֶפנ) leaves this vague ethic of 'livingness' decidedly wanting in norma-
tive, instructional potency. To those who find domination attractive, in those 
souls where compassion finds less comprehensive purchase, the topography of 
conduct must highlight new features.  
The socio-political axioms which inform modern ethical debate have secured a 
familiar way of talking about the ethics of economics. To ask why I should pay 
attention to the working conditions of those who make my clothes, to ask why it 
is important to regard humans on the other side of the globe as persons like 
myself (in ethically relevant ways) is, in certain respects, fatuous. Whatever 
empathy may or may not be at play, a closing of the gap, a willingness and de-
sire to see the reality is a core principle of justice. Broad and entrenched ideas 
of honesty and courage do inform our understanding of what might be called 
honourable conduct, of treating people as they should be treated: not only as 
means but also as ends. Taking our earplugs out (or never putting them in) is 
not a remotely novel ethic, putting this kind of idea into practice is far more chal-
lenging than grasping the validity of the motivation.     
Finding the right environment suited to opening our abilities of accurate, ethical 
perception is crucial to (or even largely constitutive of) effective and sound ethi-
cal learning. This is a more subtle and complex business than these epistemic 
platitudes might suggest. Sometimes what seems to be a close familiarity can 
exacerbate inaccurate prejudices as much as, if not more than vast distances 
and disengagement. Neighborhoods seething with racial hatred can have their 
preconceptions compounded through personal experience, flames which are 
only fanned by a distant and liberal class of lawmakers who can seem so igno-
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rant of lived realities. Farmers who see their animals every day allow anonymity, 
numbers and a culture of strength, pragmatism and the necessity of callous-
ness to shape their 'realism'.280 The garden is not only a vessel through the per-
ils of the Sirens, it also charts a course along a knife edge between distance 
and contact, between Scylla and Charybdis, between bloody conflict and igno-
rant oblivion.   
Permaculture has been intentionally shaped in an holistic way to be a method of 
confronting social and environmental problems in the widest possible way. By 
growing our own food (in however marginal or complete a way) we familiarise 
ourselves with processes which involve non-humans and humans throughout 
the world. The rain my plants need teaches me about those who suffer drought 
and those who are washed away by floods and all the while maintaining a keen 
sense of the beauty of the water itself. Loosing cabbages to caterpillars may not 
endanger the lives of my family but it helps me understand those who do live in 
such peril. And all the while I can keep sight of the butterflies as butterflies; 
those who merely walk in the hills and marvel at these splendid insects, their 
vibrant colours and elegant flight, risk abandoning themselves to vapid, con-
templative removal, to Charybdis' watery ignorance.  
Of course, organic gardening, homesteading and permaculture represent more 
than just a method of self-help, of neo-hellenistic self-cultivation. By growing my 
own cabbage that is one cabbage I don't need to buy, it is one less thing which 
will add to the vast and spiraling mechanism of industrial agriculture and market 
consumption. In a tangible and immediately apparent way there is a causal rela-
tionship between living a 'simpler life' and taking a personal role in social and 
environmental justice (albeit largely through refusing to take part in bad rather 
than actively preventing it). This activity thus affords an unusually palpable spe-
cies of consequentialist lesson.  
This kind of utilitarian impact of small scale sustainable living might seem a 
striking omission from what has been discussed so far in relation to the ethical 
value of gardening. This avoidance has, however, been for three principle rea-
sons: First, the more practical merits of this kind of lifestyle are complex and 
their sheer multiplicity would require an entire book to do them anything ap-
                                            
280  In editing this essay, it has now become even more apparent, in light of recent turns in 
the Western world, that the political comments here are, at least, particularly timely. 
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proaching justice (tempting but also widely attempted elsewhere).281 Secondly, 
the measurable impact of such a lifestyle requires not only empirical evidence 
but is also highly contestable. Thirdly, before any systematic treatment of the 
practical merits of permaculture could be attempted it would first be necessary 
(or appropriate) to gain a firm and plausible understanding of the kind of 
metaethics upon which any such merit was based.  
Before we can say that gardening is good because soil bacteria, physical activi-
ty, sunlight and organic vegetable based diets have been shown to combat de-
pression we would need to know far more about what we mean by depression 
and why it is something we should avoid. Before we attempt to discuss the way 
in which growing our own beans can help us boycott corrupt farming industries 
which prop-up slavery and violent juntas, we need to know how we should think 
about our own roles in a global economy and the nature of our responsibilities 
to such distant people. Before we can properly talk about all the different ways 
in which we can withdraw support from industrial animal farming and prevent 
the suffering of non-humans, we need to have a better appreciation of why we 
would even bother trying that in the first place. Indeed, this has been one of the 
ways in which this discussion has sought to emulate the work of Albert Schweit-
zer: by taking absolutely fundamental principleles of philosophy as the neces-
sary starting point of any ethical discussion and attempting to suggest that be-
sides the laudable practical impacts of gardening, the experience and actives of 
the garden can play a pivotal role in informing how we approach much more 
general kinds of questions (questions which are logically prior to any more prac-
tical discussion).  
Whilst this kind of logical supersession does play a significant role in the shape 
of this discussion it is also important to note that many of the ethical lessons of 
the garden discussed so far would be fairly vacuous without the assumption 
                                            
281  To correctly understand the development of permaculture as an idea and practice it is 
important to recognise the vital role played by Masanobu Fukuoka. Larry Korn has been in-
strumental in bringing Fukuoka’s work to the English speaking world; see: L. Korn, One 
Straw Revolutionary: The Philosophy and Work of Masanobu Fukuoka, (White River Junc-
tion, VT, Chelsea Green Publishing, 2015). I am reluctant to pin my own colours to a single 
term like ‘permaculture’ too rigidly since there are a range of approaches which may or may 
not be included under this rubric. The practical necessities of sustainable approaches to food 
production and consumption more generally are the matter of both vague, flimsy ‘philoso-
phies’ and resource-focused sciences. Laurel Phoenix and Lynn Walter’s edited collection 
brings together many of these diverse issues and approaches: L. E. Phoenix and L. Walter 
(ed.), Critical Food Issues: Problems and State-of-the-Art Solutions Worldwide, (Oxford, 
ABC-CLIO, 2009). 
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that some kind of practical impact was being made through the activities taking 
place. If growing a cabbage obviously doesn't help anyone, if keeping pigs 
leads to more harm than good, if sifting soil were demonstrably detrimental to 
one’s health and an act of relentless drudgery then the 'moral growth' discussed 
so far would be a hollow if not contradictory achievement.  
Virtue ethics can seem to veer in the direction of self-centered egoism but in 
reality, although this ancient model of ethical discourse introduces a significant 
element of self-cultivation into its musings, this is not to drive consideration 
away from others, but to break down the division between altruism and ego-
ism.282 Attempting to cultivate a clarity of ethical vision and sound moral motiva-
tions through gardening is not separate from the activities of reduced consump-
tion, caring for living things, sharing knowledge etc. they are inextricably linked.  
Much of the 'highly contestable' nature of the more consequentialist approach to 
the merits of organic gardening comes in the form of the impotence and even 
indulgent nature of 'lifestyle ethics'. As Greg Sharzer suggests, this kind of gar-
dening may well represent just an effort to whitewash alienation, to offer a balm 
for bourgeois guilt.283 We lucky few can flee to our patches of green, put all the 
nastiness of global capitalism behind us, and pretend that this seclusion severs 
us from the cycles of suffering and injustice in which the rest of the world is em-
broiled. Not only is this lifestyle very passive in its ethical contributions, it is also 
weak to the point of negligibility: the cogs keep turning anyway.  
There are five important responses to this kind of objection to 'localism': (1) 
Small contributions, even futile contributions can be morally laudable even 
when offered with knowledge of their futility. (2) Refusing to engage in an im-
moral activity, though passive, can be entirely appropriate when more active 
measures are beyond reach. (3) The primary focus of this recommendation of 
gardening is on its usefulness as a mode of moral education and whilst this 
would be absurd if the activities involved were demonstrably impotent or even 
wicked in their consequences, that sort of refutation would require just such a 
demonstration. (4) Permaculture is (as has been said) avowedly holistic and, far 
                                            
282  R. J. Devettere gives a good summation of this false dichotomy (and 'anachronism') in  
R. J. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks, (Washington, 
DC, Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp.26-7. 
283  G. Sharzer, No Local: Why Small Scale Alternatives Won't Change the World, (Alres-
ford, Zero Books, 2012), pp.100-5 
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from precluding the inclusion of other less locally focused activities, may well 
require them. (5) It may also be appropriate to place a particular emphasis on 
one's more immediate ethical environment: to focus on one's own lot.   
With a particular focus on elucidating what is meant here by the appropriate-
ness of emphasizing 'one's more immediate ethical environment' (5) it may be 
possible to offer a robust response to the localism objection and to simultane-
ously shed some light upon these other responses (1-4). By focusing on an idea 
of territory, not only can sense be made of why this 'lifestyle ethics' can avoid 
objections of egoism and bourgeois escapism, but also the way in which justice 
plays a core role in this symbiotic ethics can be brought to fruition.  
 
Territory ('Belonging') 
The kind of ethical prioritisation we permit, the kind of discrimination which is 
intuitively plausible, is not restricted to species (or what has here been dis-
cussed in terms of capacities for flourishing or שֶֶפנ), we discriminate also on the 
basis of 'belonging'. It is not only intuitively right to be more concerned about 
harming a fox than harming an ant, it is also intuitively right to be more con-
cerned about harming my fox, than a stranger.  
This discrimination on the basis of 'belonging' can easily be conflated with dis-
crimination on the basis of whether a thing is more or less similar to oneself and 
with ethics like that of שֶֶפנ speciesism, it will be important to clarify the differ-
ences. 
'Belonging' means, here, something very similar to the motivation towards 'fel-
lowship', 'communion' or 'solidarity' aforementioned as a sound basis for pursu-
ing rather than avoiding 'negative' emotional states. It is a kind of specialised 
ἀγάπη in the face of φρόνησις and our own psychological and biological limita-
tions.  
When Bernard Williams explains that questioning the permissibility of prioritising 
the saving of one's own wife is to introduce 'one thought too many',284 he is 
drawing our attention to ethical motivations which are intuitively correct and at 
                                            
284 B. Williams, ‘Persons, Character and Morality’, in B. Williams, Moral Luck, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.18 
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risk of being obliterated by standardising ethical systems like Utilitarianism.285 
Frankfurt's revision of this parable into terms of 'love' (as opposed to Williams' 
marriage) may seem pedantic but it permits a focus upon the nature of a partic-
ular kind of motivation or virtue and so is useful here.286 This discussion of 'love' 
also permits Frankfurt to distinguish this motivation from something which might 
be a reaction to inherent value: 
As I am construing it, love is not necessarily a response 
grounded in awareness of the inherent value of its object. It 
may sometimes arise like that, but it need not do so. Love 
may be brought about- in ways that are poorly understood – 
by a disparate variety of natural causes. It is entirely possible 
for a person to be caused to love something without noticing 
its value, or without being at all impressed by its value, or de-
spite recognising that there really is nothing especially valua-
ble about it.287 
Now if ἀγάπη, compassion/charity/universal love, is understood as a desire for 
a thing (whether oneself or another) to 'do well', then it is entirely possible to 
see how this grander virtue, despite its distinct character, can be at the source, 
in combination with other virtues, of various dispositions. Certainly this 'love' is 
at the heart of Schweitzer's indiscriminate desire for all living things to 'do well', 
for their will to live to remain unhindered as far as possible. Similarly, this moti-
vation (when combined with φρόνησις and direct experience) is vital to a dis-
criminating awareness of different capacities to 'do well', to flourish (שֶֶפנ). It is 
also possible to see that when combined with a kind of honesty, this desire for 
'doing well' can be at the core of the appropriateness of sharing in those occa-
sions when any living thing is not flourishing: when it is suffering. 
Frankfurt's sense of 'love' is far less broad than these previous uses though, it 
is, in fact, far more familiar. All of these other kinds of love, even when they dis-
criminate on the basis of capacities or inherent value, are somewhat less per-
sonal, they still drive in the direction of perfection and asceticism. Just as Frank-
furt says, it is entirely possible to imagine that out of a desire for all things to 
flourish I am brought to a different kind of personal love, but this needn't be so; 
in fact, the reverse is perhaps more probable and, crucially, more relevant to 
                                            
285 B. Williams and J. J. C. Smart, Utilitarianism: For and Against, (Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1973), p.150. 
286  H. G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, (Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2004), 
pp.36-8. 
287  Ibid. p.38. 
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this current discussion. I am more likely to care about all dogs because I love 
my dog than I am to care about one particular dog because I care about living 
things in general. I am more likely to be brought to a fuller understanding of the 
various 'lovablenesses' (שֶֶפנ) of all life by coming to care about particular living 
things.   
It is tempting to imagine that this very familiar kind of affection, of a preference 
for those to whom we are 'close' is an inclination which can account for the kind 
of psycho-biological speciesism which has been cobbled together in שֶֶפנ. In-
deed, it is this kind of assumption which can lie at the heart of many objections 
to speciesism: 'you only think a monkey is more important than a trout because 
the monkey is more like you and this is an arbitrary basis for moral judgements'. 
This reflects the earlier discussion about 'personhood' and humanoids, with 
similar analogies to racism being applicable. Of course, this kind of reasoning 
may well be the origin of some discrimination between different species but the 
reason for so relentlessly pursuing a novel kind of speciesism is that this super-
ficial basis for discrimination is not ethically sound.  
The motivation I have for donating money to a pig sanctuary rather than a 
salmon sanctuary should be of a different kind to the motivation for buying nice 
food for my pigs. If a single ethical principle were the basis of both my prefer-
ence for my own pigs and my preference for pigs as opposed to salmon then 
there would be a sense in which these judgements took place on a single, linear 
scale and this just seems absurd. My inclination to feed my pigs, to protect 
them from harm, to be witness and party to their flourishing, does sit on the 
same scale as my inclination to, say, feed my daughter, but it is somewhat dif-
ferent from my inclination to give refugees food and protect them from harm. 
The passionate, immediate nature of one inclination and the contemplative, dis-
criminating nature of the other might have led some to believe in the ethical su-
periority of the latter kind of 'love', and that this removed compassion must oust 
our irrational favoritisms, but this censorship is far from self-evidently virtu-
ous.288  
                                            
288 C. S. Lewis is inclined to laud charity (ἀγάπη) above all other love (in this case στοργή 
or φιλία): C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves, (London, Harper Collins, 2002 [1960]), pp.115-130. 
Of course, Lewis is concerned with the way in which all love relates to God but ultimately he 
finds charity to be the only ‘self-sufficient’. 
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Mary Midgley's inclination to draw a parallel between speciesism and 'familyism' 
is an understandable one since, not only do both kinds of discrimination seem 
intuitively correct, they also seem to hold such deep seated places in our ethical 
inclinations as to be vital to human wellbeing, as she says: 
Questions about the morality of species preference must cer-
tainly be put in the context of the other preferences which 
people give to those closest to them. These preferences do 
indeed cause problems. By limiting human charity, they can 
produce terrible misery. On the other hand they are an abso-
lutely central element in human happiness, and it seems un-
likely that we could live at all without them. They are the root 
from which charity grows.289 
Yet, there is nothing precluding the drawing of our ethical waters from multiple 
wells. Williams' aim of protecting our varied and fundamental ethical motivations 
from the rampaging sterilisation of neatly cohesive and logically consistent mor-
al 'systems' is entirely compatible with Midgley's recognition of the inextricable 
role these motivations play in 'human happiness'. If these inclinations can be 
found to coexist (intellectually, emotionally and practically) then an understand-
ing of different kinds of 'love' may help to address some of the difficulties which 
a single concept encounters. A motivation corresponding to a rich conception of 
livingness (based on a broad idea of capacities for flourishing, psychological 
and otherwise) can account for a hierarchy which places an oak tree above a 
mouse or an octopus above marmoset (or perhaps a microscopic ecosystem 
above an individual mammal). A motivation based on 'closeness' will struggle to 
account for this kind of discrimination. This more familiar ethic based on 'close-
ness' does, however, seem a far better fit for the appropriateness of having 
more concern for my marmoset rather than some anonymous octopus or my 
mouse rather than an oak tree on the other side of the world. There is some 
way, perhaps, to do justice to both Midgley and Singer. 
Here I would recall the earlier discussion of an experience of continuity between 
my tomatoes and my daughter.290 Personal affection for both brings to the fore 
                                            
289  M. Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter (1983), (Athens, GA, University of Georgia 
Press, 1998), p.103. 
290 It should be noted that Tim Ingold also recognises this continuity between caring for plants 
and other animals and raising children. Ingold offers ethnographic accounts which attest to 
this experience of continuity and he identifies this continuity as being based in an idea of 
growth more generally. It is certainly tempting to suggest that this idea of growth precisely 
matches the idea of directly perceiving and responding to capacities for flourishing espoused 
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their more basic continuity in שֶֶפנ. I do not, of course, perceive greater im-
portance in my daughter's flourishing than my tomatoes' flourishing simply be-
cause my daughter has greater שֶֶפנ, this is also because I love my daughter far 
more deeply and closely than I do my tomatoes, she belongs to me in a way 
that the tomatoes cannot. But this second kind of love, this personal affection, 
attachment and belonging, though it is distinct, comes to illuminate a broader 
kind of love or regard for livingness in general. So, whether Midgley is correct 
that this love is the sole 'root from which charity grows' or whether Frankfurt is 
right that this causal link is not necessary, it may be quite plausible to suggest 
that personal affection is a good source of greater wisdom, if not the best 
source. 
Regardless of the accuracy of Midgely's claim on the exclusivity of origin, it may 
still be observed that her assertion that these affections are 'an absolutely cen-
tral element in human happiness' seems quite accurate. As has been repeated-
ly suggested, whether an ascetic ethic can be recommended at all to anyone 
does not alter the probable futility in recommending such an ethic to everyone. 
Indeed, it may well be asserted that to imagine a human (or any living thing for 
that matter) without belongings, is to imagine a thing no longer living. Now, to 
jump from personal love to 'belongings' may seem an unfair conceptual leap or 
conflation but the continuity between what might more commonly be recognised 
as ownership and the 'love' of Frankfurt is vital to the conception of 'belonging' 
currently being sought.  
At the outset of this chapter, an attempt was made to outline the nature of my 
experience of my own interests clashing with those of the rats who share my 
garden. This was and is an experience of overlapping territories, of interests 
and identities which stretch into both an environment and other living things. 
They were my chickens, that's why I tried to scare the rats away, that is why we 
fought and why they died.  
When a horsefly lands on my arm and drills their mouthpiece into my flesh there 
is a clear sense of violation and a corresponding clarity in the justification of my 
unthinkingly violent response. I kill the horsefly. This clarity of justification seems 
                                                                                                                                
here but such precision would require another discussion (and perhaps dialogue); T. Ingold, 
The Perception of the Environment, (London, Routledge, 2000), pp.86-87. 
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like it may be defined by my own bodily boundaries but the reality of lived identi-
ty is very far from such dermatological definition.  
There are times when I look at my fiancée or my daughter and I lose all sense 
of being something other than them. In an embrace their smell and breath are 
not something which I am not, there is no sharp boundary, indeed there may be 
times when I am more them than I am me, when I feel their pain (though not in 
precisely the same way) far more forcefully, far more urgently than I feel my 
own, when their smiles and my joy are immediate. This needn't be romantic 
nonsense, nor does it need to be more poetry than sober observation. These 
occasions do not permanently erase my individuality, nor do they really call that 
individuality into serious question, because without that basis of me this experi-
ence of continuity would be meaningless, instead these moments of conjunction 
illuminate the complex and extended nature of my identity or sense of self. 
Even when this sense of self is extended into a more reflexive, temporal, narra-
tive sense, there is room for fracture and strange losses of continuity. Even a 
central character is composed of many plot lines.  
Perhaps, indeed, the most familiar way in which we encounter this kind of ex-
tended identity is temporally. We are concerned about our past and future 
selves in ways that differ from our concern for our present self but this concern 
is a nebulous and extended thing. We very naturally think of ourselves as things 
which are not purely situated in the infinitesimal present moment but instead are 
spread out in time, we dwell on past wrongs and anticipate future success. In-
deed, the moral relevance of these past and potential events is not only propor-
tional to their own magnitude and inherent significance but also how far away 
they are. Very often, that which happened yesterday or is likely to happen to-
morrow is of greater concern than that which happened a decade ago or is cer-
tain to happen in the distant future. These classic components of consequential-
ist calculations are powerful elements of our lived ethical realities and whether 
this inclination feeds into vice or virtue is of significant ethical concern.291 
The concept of belonging currently being proposed as integral to wellbeing 
would bring this kind of temporally extended identity, together with a spatial, 
material and causal extension and identify this regard for ourselves with per-
                                            
291 These are also the sorts of thoughts which feed into the dispute with Galen Strawson dis-
cussed earlier in relation to narrativity. 
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sonal affection, with Williams' 'justification' for saving his wife rather than a 
stranger.  
Of course, this is not a novel approach to love and belonging. An ascetic ethic 
will very often eschew all such forms of 'attachment' (temporal, material, intel-
lectual, emotional etc.). When it was 'asserted that to imagine a human (or any 
living thing for that matter) without belongings, is to imagine a thing no longer 
living' we needn't look very far for just such an example. The Sokushinbutsu 
were one group of humans who did just this.  
Though many tried, only very few succeeded in achieving the self-
mummification which these Buddhist monks valourised.292 This state of 'death-
lessness' was (and is) seen as a vindication of their attempts to reach a purer 
state of existence. The Four Noble Truths which lie at the heart of all Buddhist 
schools pivot about one piercingly dreadful conception of suffering, of दःुख 
(Dukkha). दःुख is real and it should and can be escaped. Ἀταραξία comes 
through a severance with the chaos of the material world. The Sokushinbutsu 
understood this central ethos of Buddhism in the most strikingly direct way and 
took it to its logical conclusion. The raging chaos of the world, the unfathomable 
cascade of cause and effect, the dreadful nausea of responsibility in this teem-
ing cesspit of life, the hopeless confusion of a personal identity spread and frac-
tured throughout time and intention. The extension of self and one's own con-
nection with suffering are the same, contract the self and one will be liberated 
from suffering. It is possible for the human being to become a stone, a distilled, 
simple and inert mote of existence. Unmoving, unliving, undying. For the best 
part of a decade you will starve yourself. For the first thousand days eat only 
seeds and rid your body of all fat and excess flesh. Now progress to eating only 
bark and roots to starve yourself further and into complete emaciation. The third 
stage is, little by little, to drink the sap of the urushi tree and a potion of arsenic; 
this stage will desiccate you, removing all excess moisture. Finally, after years 
of preparation you will enter your tomb and cease all consumption, you will drift 
from this world in a state of complete and absolute meditation, if you have suc-
ceeded then your companions will reveal you one thousand days later in a 
                                            
292 Cf. T. F. Lobetti, Ascetic Practicses in Japanese Religion, (Oxford, Routledge, 2014), 
pp.130-6. 
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mummified state, you will have become a monument to an escape from belong-
ing. No time, no agency, no ownership. A complete retraction of self into a ker-
nel of responsibility. 
This is an end to life. Perhaps Singer would suggest that the Sokushinbutsu 
were ultimately selfish and that this 'sacrifice' did nothing but service a delusion 
based on esoteric metaphysics and not upon real ethical concerns. Instead we 
should simply understand our responsibilities on the basis of a reasonable and 
clear appreciation of agency. An empirically based, statistically informed under-
standing of our ability to affect events in the world needn't be overwhelmed by 
the mysterious magnitude of the metaphysical problems surrounding the causal 
universe and the place of our selves (no-selves) in it. Such cosmic speculation 
and mystical anxiety is disingenuous. Like the Stoics, let us just try to under-
stand what we can do and then do our best. Forget all the finer details about 
personal wellbeing, the indulgence of luxuries, the inevitabilities of suffering and 
Wolf's 'strangely barren' asceticisms, all these musings accomplish is the im-
peding of efforts in genuinely effective altruism.293 
Singer's suggestion that proximity is morally irrelevant remains a powerful sug-
gestion: 
Once we are all clear about our obligations to rescue the 
drowning child in front of us, I ask: would it make any differ-
ence if the child were far away, in another country perhaps, 
but similarly in danger of death, and equally within your 
means to save, at no great cost – and absolutely no danger – 
to yourself? Virtually all agree that distance and nationality 
make no moral difference to the situation. I then point out that 
we are all in that situation of the person passing the shallow 
pond...294  
Yet the insight is hollow when stacked against Bernard Williams' wife drowning 
and it does little to pay service to the complexity of Midgley's suggestion that 
personal proximity (whether causally or through affections and other associa-
tions) is central to human happiness. Certainly Singer is correct that the inevita-
                                            
293 It is important, once again, to take note of the important role Toby Ord and Peter Singer 
have played in forming this new take on pragmatic, statistically based utilitarianism. Singer 
notes Ord’s role in many places ut particularly in: P. Singer, The Most Good You Can Do: 
How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically, (London, Yale University 
Press, 2015) p.97 
294 P. Singer, ‘The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle’, in The New Internationalist, April, 
1997.  
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bility of this impulse is, by itself, morally irrelevant and that its importance as a 
source of other ethical impulses does not justify its sovereign indulgence in the 
face of more pressing responsibilities. And yet, Midgley's suggestion that these 
inclinations are at the core of our being can help to illustrate the way in which a 
combination of inevitability and seminality helps to shape an understanding of a 
disposition which, as Bernard Williams suggests, precedes abstract considera-
tions of power.  
There is a sense in which my killing of the horsefly is justified not by considera-
tions of what choice amongst many is the best choice but, rather, the way in 
which my sense of bodily integrity is something which can and should be de-
fended and that to imagine a being which considers the exercise of its own 
agency as being entirely abstracted from those kinds of reactions is to imagine 
a being which is as desiccated, inhuman and dead as those Japanese mum-
mies. The proper way to consider the ethical weight of our personal affections is 
not like the rarified weighing of charitable donations but more like the killing of 
the horsefly. 
As has already been intimated, it would be naive to imagine that agency can be 
neatly divided into rational and considered actions (which are morally relevant 
and sovereign) on the one hand, and non-conscious, or barely-conscious dis-
positions (which can just about be tolerated as long as they don't get in the way) 
on the other. More or less abstract considerations do certainly feed into ethical 
conduct and so do our senses of personal responsibility due to affections and 
proximity. This is not just some kind of congenital foundation which can be dis-
posed of when 'better reasons' are conceived of, thick psychology means that 
personal proximity is ethically salient.   
What is perhaps most striking in the garden is how this ethical salience (the 
sense of justification in taking direct responsibility for the lives most closely re-
lated to my own) is inseparable from a sense of power and agency exercised 
directly in that same sphere of responsibility. This may seem to be almost tauto-
logical: power or agency being related to personal responsibility and affection, 
but what is demonstrated through organic gardening is the way in which a clear 
appreciation of one's place in an ethical universe is bound tightly to a sense of 
one's own practical potency. To be an affective moral deliberator is to ask the 
question 'what should I do?', and an image of a rational creature suspended in 
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a world of technologies and statistics which enable extremely precise calcula-
tions as to the affect one can have on very distant persons and events, may 
seem to make good sense. It is necessary, however, in order to properly under-
stand the question 'what should I do?', to also have a solid appreciation of what 
is meant by 'what I do'.  
Through an ethics which identifies εὐδαιμονία with σοφία one can perhaps ap-
preciate more fully the vital role a firm sense of personal agency has in leading 
a good life. The things which are causally and emotionally close to me are, in a 
very real and tangible sense, the things which, in large part, constitute me as 
such. For me to flourish my family must flourish and my garden must flourish. 
This is classical alienation writ large (or, indeed, writ small). Each movement of 
my spade is part of a rich and immediate tapestry of 'what I do', of 'doing well', 
and there is no clear separation between that sense of agency and of an appre-
ciation of 'what I should do'. Of course, abstraction and calculation are not ban-
ished from this picture, that would just be to replace one fruitless ethical mo-
nopoly with another. Indeed, this process of gardening, of immediate agency 
and personal responsibility, can help to form a particularly rich conception of 
justice. An understanding of the means by which others can flourish is enriched 
and only accurately understood through an appreciation of the way an organ-
ism's means of flourishing and its identity suffuse one another. Bodily integrity, 
freedom of movement, access to food and water, to clean air and open skies, to 
room for roots and rich soils; all of these things overlap in unending, interde-
pendent and competing systems of flux.   
Similarly to the earlier discussion of an holistic model of learning, this theory 
can sound very similar to models of embodied cognition. Indeed, if less empha-
sis were placed on the cerebral elements of cognition and this kind of philoso-
phy of mind were permitted to be applied to ethics and broader concepts like 
'identity', then certain theories of embodied cognition do reflect many of the ide-
as being suggested here. As Favela and Chemero suggest: 
...if cognition is truly embodied, then cognition is also extend-
ed. We treat 'cognition' as something that systems do and 
treat the 'animal-environment' as a system. If cognition is 
something that systems do, and if cognition is embodied in 
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that system, then cognition is something which extends be-
yond animal boundaries.295 
If the previous anti-cerebral (or only semi-psychological) gloss of שֶֶפנ is allowed 
for here, and 'cognition' is not meant in any strongly rational sense, then this 
kind of philosophy of mind can easily support an ethic in which personal proxim-
ity is given weight. Crucially this idea of extended identity avoids more complex 
and contract orientated ethics of duty. It is not that talking about duties and 
agreements is not compatible with this talk of extended identity, quite the re-
verse, instead it is a matter of setting this ethical dialogue in a novel form which 
avoids some of the strictures of previous formulations.  
If I base my duties towards, for instance, my pigs, purely on an idea of implicit 
agreements, or of contracts based on levels of intelligence, power and agency 
then I will be treating certain elements of my ethical world with an attention and 
emphasis which can threaten to undermine or clash with other considerations 
and, more crucially, conceptually fracture this world in an artificial way. There is 
a basic sense in which I care for my pigs in a particular way because they are 
my pigs. They are mine and they are pigs. And when I have a sense that these 
pigs 'belong' to me this can cover a variety of impressions ranging from owner-
ship to companionship but all of this is founded in a sense of my local sphere of 
existence. Abstractions from this tangible world of straw beds, buckets of water, 
tummy rubs and muddy snouts, cabbage white caterpillars, my daughter laugh-
ing and early frost curling leaves, will, in isolation, inevitably fail to accurately 
correspond to or powerfully motivate actions within this cohesive environment.    
This use of the concept of belonging or extended identity (or integrity) has much 
in common with Gaita's suggestion that the idea of 'rights' adds nothing to a 
discussion of justice, he says: 
Unless an appeal to rights has force to back it, an apprecia-
tion of the wrong being protested depends entirely on a spirit 
of justice in those to whom the appeal is made. That apprecia-
tion need not – I think should not – include the concept of 
rights.296 
                                            
295  L. H. Favela and A. Chemero, 'The Animal-Environment System', in Y. Coello and M. 
H. Fischer (eds.), Perceptual and Emotional Embodiment: Foundations of Embodied Cogni-
tion, Vol. 1, (Oxford, Routledge, 2016), pp.59-74. (p.59) 
296  R. Gaita, The Philosopher's Dog, p.201. 
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Explaining that I should feed my daughter properly because of some discreet 
and immaterial contract which was struck at the moment of conception (or 
birth), does nothing whatsoever to enrich my tangible appreciation that she is 
my daughter. And this understanding of that which is 'of me' is a rich one which 
comes in degrees; indeed it is, just as with all phenomena discussed here, a 
matter of interwoven stories which relate to one another in complex directly per-
ceivable ways. I have no clear notion of how this sense of responsibility would 
alter for those who adopt children, or for those who 'inherit' the children of oth-
ers. I have no doubt that the dynamic of belonging would be altered (however 
subtlety or dramatically), but the contributing plotlines, settings, images and 
characters would all contribute to a new and unique instance of belonging. 
What is clear, however, is that this sphere of belonging, this territory, is, in some 
form or another, absolutely necessary, and it has limits.  
The ingredients for flourishing are as variable as life itself and, at times, just as 
bottomless. I am certain that my pigs would do much better if they had more 
space and if that space included more trees and frequent change. I make sure 
they have food and clean water. In hot weather I ensure they have a cool wal-
low with plenty of water and mud. But they are all different. Some are content 
with old straw, others enjoy new straw; one is very large and needs lots of food, 
two are very small and need far less. But I watch them to know how they are, I 
listen to them when they go to bed, their little chit chat and sudden arguments. 
Do they have enough space? Are they getting along? Who is in charge? These 
questions are real and don't need to fall into the barely-conscious obscurity of 
immediate impressions which has at times dominated the formulation ethical 
reflections in this discussion. But these questions are practical and simple, they 
are achievable and immediately perceivable.  
Put the pig in a cage and see the pig disintegrate, put the tree in a cave and 
see it wither, sow seeds on to concrete and watch them rot. Instead I put my 
pigs in a paddock and watch them play, I allow trees room to spread their roots 
and branches and I keep my seedbeds well mucked. What the garden allows 
me to understand in the most direct of ways, is that I too am one of these lives 
and that the garden itself is the place where I may flourish. 
This may seem a trite and very personal conclusion: 'I like gardening', but that 
is not what I am saying. Every living thing has its territory and these territories 
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are inevitably interdependent and frequently in competition. What participant 
observation of a living system (gardening) reveals is the way in which a living 
system as a whole requires a balance of countless territories and that these ter-
ritories frequently subsume one another. Identities contain other identities, sto-
ries contain other stories, and the more stories a story contains, the more lives 
within that life, the greater the שֶֶפנ.  
Certain identities foster a greater richness of co-identities. The oak tree is ex-
traordinarily generous in this regard. The pedunculate and sessile oaks support 
more life forms than any other British tree. Thousands of species live in, on and 
around the oak, it is a world of worlds. The flourishing of the oak tree depends 
upon and leads to the flourishing of many other species. The crucial fact about 
organic gardening and permaculture is the practical and immediate way in 
which one is forced to acknowledge that, if the garden is to flourish then the 
human must be like this, the gardener must be like an oak tree. 
Now, a fully grown oak is, quite usually, an enormous organism. The tree's re-
quirements for light, water and nutrients means that it and its companions utter-
ly transform the land in which they live. Thick foliage blots out the sun and pre-
vents many other plant species from flourishing beneath; spreading root sys-
tems similarly deny other species an opportunity to thrive. And yet because the 
oak has arrived at this way of life so slowly and because each individual tree 
takes hundreds of years to reach this state of dominance, far more life thrives 
within its sphere of influence than is denied an opportunity. So many species 
have adapted to live within the oak wood because for each niche it takes away 
four more are added. Light may not reach the floor but a vast and abundant 
canopy gives a new vista for those plants and animals which can cling to 
branch and leaf; deep, complex gouges in the oak's bark create a vast surface 
for lichens, mosses and herds of microorganisms to populate. 
When one grows one's own food out in the garden, when one sows a seed, it 
becomes apparent that each living thing has a sphere of this sort, an extended 
identity. Each pea plant needs soil, water and light of just the right kind in order 
that it might flourish, and so too does each variety and species require its own 
mixture of factors to call its own; a certain freedom, a certain food. When one 
approaches this little world of territories from the universal love of Schweitzer, it 
becomes readily apparent that, although a human must cast its shadow over 
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the land, so too can new places for life open through our actions. It becomes 
clear that far from the denial of flourishing being required for (or the conse-
quence of) any other organism flourishing, the flourishing of all is, quite general-
ly, a necessary part of the flourishing of the individual.  
This is, of course, a quite well established dictum of not only organic gardening 
but also modern ecology in general. That ecosystems are hugely complex net-
works of interdependent organisms operating through symbiotic relationships of 
differing degrees of proximity and that each part is important to the whole.297 
What the garden offers is the ability to enact this, to perceive it directly through 
living as one of those organisms in one's own sphere of influence, what the 
garden offers is an opportunity to fully appreciate the sense in which 'I am life 
which wills to live, and I exist in the midst of life which wills to live.'  And this par-
ticipation in 'life', in the great שֶֶפנ, establishes a very clear sense of the way in 
which we are, each of us, things beyond ourselves.  
Standardising moral systems can create a picture of a human agent as an iso-
lated, rational ghost, a kind of simple fragment of moral responsibility which is 
separate from the rest of the world. This kind of ratio-centric moral system can 
make it difficult to appreciate the importance of and respect due to those with 
whom we share a world. Do they deliberate? Do they have rights? Are they 
agents? If we are, instead, able to appreciate the way in which any organism is 
constituted by its ecological context, that it is a nexus rather than an atom, then 
the nuances and complexities of justice can make far more sense. 
And yet, this vague appreciation of extended organisms as the locus of moral 
responsibility not only risks ethical vacuity through its breadth, it also begins to 
sound quite conservative and 'old fashioned'. If living well becomes a matter of 
giving each its due, of the appropriateness of one organism dominating another 
as long as it fosters further life, then won't we just end up with a kind of Hobbes-
ian monarchy (albeit a benevolent one).   
                                            
297 More recent developments in ecology include the use of the idea of ‘systems thinking’ as 
integral to the definition of life itself and this represents a development of just this kind of 
symbiotic understanding. Firtjof Capra and Pier Luigi Luisi expound just this ‘biological’ theo-
ry in: F. Capra and P. L. Luisi, The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Vision, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.318. 
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Well, perhaps drawing political conclusions in this way isn't altogether wrong, 
and it certainly goes some way to putting some normative meat on these other-
wise sparse metaethical bones.  
One means of reaching this kind of normative conclusion with greater clarity will 
be to attempt a reconciliation of otherwise disparate and seemingly incompati-
ble elements. Schweitzer speaks of perfection, and this sits quite comfortably 
with the moral realism with which this discussion opened, yet it sits poorly with 
the messy pragmatism and (albeit virtue based) almost 'power orientated' ethics 
of שֶֶפנ speciesism. How can an embrace of the darkness of life be reconciled 
with a quest for Goodness itself?  
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7 - An Effort to Outline an Attitude of Steady Attention, Poignancy and 
Good Humour in the Face of Death, as Constitutive of Wisdom.  
 
 
A violet in the youth of primy nature, Forward, not permanent--sweet, not last-
ing; The perfume and suppliance of a minute; No more.  
 
- Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1.3. 
 
   
   Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt. 
    
   There are tears for things and mortal things touch the mind. 
    
       - Virgil, Aeneid, 1:461 ff.298 
 
 
Get ready, 
Get Ready to die, 
The cherries say. 
 
   - Kobayashi Issa299 
 
 
There is an elephant in the room: gardening is nice. Gardening is nice because 
one is outside, doing physical exercise and witnessing closely the beauty of the 
natural world. This brings peace, this brings satisfaction, this brings happiness 
in a quite non-technical sense.  
                                            
298 Virgil, Aeneid, C. Day Lewis (tr.), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998). 
299 K. Issa, The Classic Tradition of Haiku, F. Bowers (tr./ed.), (New York, Dover, 1996), 
p.65. 
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Of course, 'gardening' is meant in a fairly technical sense. Pottering about in 
herbaceous borders has already been discounted as the subject of this discus-
sion for the reason that it does not closely adhere to the 'living with' premise of 
this way-of-life philosophy (it would be too much observation and too little par-
ticipation). Ornamental gardening of the sort which Cooper discusses (and 
takes as his primary sense of 'garden') is something which only lies at the fring-
es of this discussion.300 When you take a flower or group thereof, with the pri-
mary goal of enjoying this thing aesthetically (and it is usually a case of visual 
enjoyment) it seems plausible that this activity has more in common with other 
visual arts than it does with the daily grind of subsistence farmers or the mani-
fold ways of life by which humans have and do sustain themselves across our 
world through an interaction with other species.301  
And yet even these gardeners, even those with grand houses and acres of to-
piary. Even those with blousy blooms dripping with herbicides and neat rows of 
useless shapes and colours, are, in a certain sense 'living with other living 
things'. So there is no need to banish such activities from any and all conscion-
able considerations. The core idea of permaculture here, though, should en-
courage an idea of an activity which is rather more than simply pleasant. I am 
sure that those who have sufficient wealth and time do find similar revelations 
and peace in their own fruitless gardens, and the two kinds of gardening are by 
no means mutually exclusive, but the cabbage has rather more to say than the 
azelea. No doubt there is always some room for pimms on the lawn, but that is 
fringe. Let us imagine, instead, wilted potatoes and hedgerows in the rain.  
What then is left of that stupid pleasure in the sun and flower bed, and what 
'more' is there?  
Another gardener, another whose name I never knew, he had two allotments. 
Partly retired he now had more time to spend on the allotment. He had joined 
these two allotments together, twice the space and every inch considered. He 
had a strange fruit fly problem on his raspberry leaves; he thought perhaps I 
might know the cause, I didn't.  
                                            
300 D. Cooper, A Philosophy of Gardens, pp.15-16. 
301 It is fair to say that Cooper acknowledges this phaenomenon of the garden as art and he is 
chiefly concerned with this as a virtuous practice. This is just a different approach and since 
there is some convergence with Cooper in the aesthetic approach of this current thesis there 
is room to think that these two approaches might find some synthesis: Ibid, p.21-61. 
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I have a sense of awe and shame when confronted by good, old gardeners. 
Every week he would spend many hours at his allotment and just like the oth-
ers, just like all real gardeners whom I have met, and heard, and read, his la-
bour and pain were a quiet thing.  
It is worth repeating an early claim made in this discussion: this gardening is not 
a 'hobby'. This man worked and still works in the hospital, he has wages, and 
hours, and lunch breaks, and holidays. The allotment happens outside of these 
things but it is no less a place of labour, or at least, it is no less a place of work 
which should be taken seriously.  
But an income orientated culture of worth leaves little room for a clear public 
dialogue about these works, so it is done in a stoic spirit and with a largely un-
spoken camaraderie in this movement 'back to the land'. Here, in this sterile 
promontory of wealth, this western world of ancient machines, humanity has 
been torn from a way of life bred in deep millennia and it can only creep back 
there in the little spaces, in the quiet moments which this mechanisation af-
fords.302  
It is perhaps unsurprising that Britain should have such a peculiarly fetishised 
culture of the kitchen garden and that it should (as with so many things valor-
ised in these islands) hark back to the Victorian dream where that wage ma-
chine was born.  
They call it a 'stiff upper lip', and this spirit of Stoicism and the English country 
garden certainly brings this current meditation upon life in a Devonshire garden 
far closer to more traditional discussions of classical philosophy as a way of 
life.303 The Victorian manifestation of this ethic is most eloquently expressed in 
Kipling's 'If': 
If you can keep your head when all about you 
 Are losing theirs and blaming it on you, 
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you, 
  But make allowance for their doubting too; 
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting, 
  Or being lied about, don’t deal in lies, 
                                            
302 Of course, at its mid-century inception ‘back-to-the-land’ often represented a wholesale at-
tempt to escape ‘wage slavery’ entirely as Dona Brown notes in: D. Brown, Back to the 
Land: The Enduring Dream of Self-Sufficiency in Modern America, (London, The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2011), p.211.  
303 Which is to say, Stoicism. 
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Or being hated, don’t give way to hating, 
  And yet don’t look too good, nor talk too wise: 
 
If you can dream—and not make dreams your master; 
  If you can think—and not make thoughts your aim; 
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster 
  And treat those two impostors just the same; 
If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken 
  Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools, 
Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken, 
  And stoop and build ’em up with worn-out tools: 
 
If you can make one heap of all your winnings 
  And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss, 
And lose, and start again at your beginnings 
  And never breathe a word about your loss; 
If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew 
  To serve your turn long after they are gone, 
And so hold on when there is nothing in you 
  Except the Will which says to them: “Hold on!” 
 
If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue, 
  Or walk with Kings—nor lose the common touch, 
If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you, 
  If all men count with you, but none too much; 
If you can fill the unforgiving minute 
  With sixty seconds’ worth of distance run, 
Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it, 
  And—which is more—you’ll be a Man, my son.304 
 
Perhaps the jingoism and patriarchy of Kipling are unwelcome but there is 
something here of the wisdom of which the ancients speak and which I have 
heard in the voices and stories of allotmenteers time and again. Even those 
with unruly hair and more musky odours, if they truly dig, if they have muck be-
neath their nails, then there will be something of this quiet strength in them.  
And I think it is about death. 
Montaigne says ‘that to philosophise is to learn how to die’; I think that's true.305   
It is an idea of death which will be at the heart of this final attempt to reconcile 
the idea of universal but discriminating compassion for all as discussed in chap-
                                            
304 R. Kipling, If (1910), (London, O’Mara, 2016). 
305  M. de Montaigne, ‘That to Philosophise is to Learn How to Die’, in M. de Montaigne, 
Montaigne’s Essays, J. Florio (tr.), (London, The Folio Society, 2006 [1580]), pp.61-80. J. 
Malpas and R. C. Solomon, 'Introduction' to J. Malpas and R. C. Solomon (Ed.), Philosophy 
and Death, (London, Routledge, 1998), p.1 
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ter 5 with the recognition of the inevitability of conflict, negative feeling and 
classical virtue put forward in chapter 6. This synthesis will also tie together the 
ideas of absolute goodness, balance and compromise expressed at the outset 
of this discussion through the medium of aesthetic and narrative anthropological 
philosophy as discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
It is a steady pace, poignancy and good humour in the face of death which will 
characterise this ultimate description of wisdom. The hope is that this concep-
tion will not only offer a novel and useful way of understanding wisdom and how 
to achieve it but also something which fits nicely with the classical and intuitive 
senses of virtue already discussed.  
 
The Forgiving Minute 
'Why did you stop growing your own veg?' I asked a farrier friend, 'I just don't 
really have the time, it takes a lot of time' came the answer.  
And so it goes, pretty generally, with this line of questioning. I explained that 
this was one of the two answers I get when I ask people who don't grow veg 
why they do not do so. The other answer (generally from younger interviewees) 
is that they don't enjoy it or that they aren't good at it (or some combination 
thereof). I told our farrier friend how and why this answer of preference was not 
a good answer, how I always feel like saying I don't care if they like it or not and 
they won't improve if they don't practice (there are always people willing to 
teach gardening... always). 
This suggestion, that gardening was not about whether you liked it or not, or felt 
competent, that there were moral demands on doing this thing, seemed agree-
able to this man who works with horses.   
He planned on taking it back up when he retired (or partly retired).  
We got to talking about the link between gardening and the elderly. Perhaps it 
was just that they now had the time, time in retirement in which to indulge this 
pleasant luxury. But maybe it was something else, perhaps there was some 
residue of the victory gardens, some sense of the veg garden contributing to 
good citizenship. A duty, not a pastime. These didn't seem mutually exclusive 
reasons. 
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And I could hardly claim that this man who spends his time bent double, in all 
weathers, at the feet of horses would benefit from the exercise or outdoor time 
which gardening provides. Certainly many of the more subtle benefits in culti-
vating classical virtues and more clearly appreciating the nature of life itself 
would still be of benefit to a farrier (not to mention the more usual environmental 
and economic benefits) but the finer details of this philosophy can represent 
dubious selling points in a tight spot. And aren't we all in a tight spot? Twixt cra-
dle and grave? 
This association we had, between old age and gardening, which is integral to 
the British fetishisation of gardening, may be useful. This association echoes 
the more universal connection between old age and wisdom and this conjunc-
tion between old age, gardening, wisdom and death is far more than mere coin-
cidence.  
As with gardening, and as has already been stated, philosophy can seem like 
the luxury of those with time on their hands. Truth for its own sake; who can af-
ford such a thing when the basic necessities of life consume all but the merest 
scraps of our time and energy?  
We do find time for certain things though, don't we? Things which we refuse to 
mechanise and for reasons of virtue keep close, personal and simple? We 
might call them natural. Perhaps this, as with Kipling's verse, is redolent of an 
antiquated conservatism. It comes forth in Chersterton's discussion of democ-
racy: 
It is not something analogous to playing the church organ, 
painting on vellum, discovering the North Pole (that insidious 
habit), looping the loop, being Astronomer Royal, and so on. 
For these things we do not wish a man to do at all unless he 
does them well. It is, on the contrary, a thing analogous to 
writing one’s own love-letters or blowing one’s own nose. 
These things we want a man to do for himself, even if he does 
them badly. I am not here arguing the truth of any of these 
conceptions; I know that some moderns are asking to have 
their wives chosen by scientists, and they may soon be ask-
ing, for all I know, to have their noses blown by nurses. I 
merely say that mankind does recognize these universal hu-
man functions...306 
                                            
306  G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy, p.44. 
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And perhaps this vision of old age speaks as much of something social as it 
does of something biological. These people come from a world in which grow-
ing some food is just one of those things which one must do for oneself. There 
is an expectation that we find time for certain things and that by seeking to del-
egate these things for the sake of efficiency we lose something important, 
something which speaks to the classical virtues of respect, of justice, of cour-
age. 
Indeed, this harking back to an age of no-nonsense, hard-working, self-
respecting partly self-sufficient people is at the heart of the permaculture 
movement. An author on a par with Fukuoka in this movement (perhaps even 
more influential) is John Seymour. It was Seymour's 'The New Complete Book 
of Self-Sufficiency' which acted as a catalyst for thousands of people to join this 
'back to the land' movement during the 70s.307 It was, indeed, the book which 
most influenced my own initiation into gardening. Seymour's account of self-
sufficiency, apart from being eminently practical, is peppered with reminis-
cences of a time in which some level of self-sufficiency was entirely ubiquitous 
and upon parts of the world where, for young and old, this remains the norm: 
The country garden of my childhood was a mixture of vegeta-
bles, flowers, soft fruit, tree fruit (oh, those greengages!) and 
very often tame rabbits, almost certainly a hen run, often pi-
geons, and often ferrets. It was a very beautiful place indeed. 
Now, alas, it has disappeared under a useless velvety lawn 
and a lot of silly bedding plants and hardy perennials.308 
Seymour's suggestions and life have been the target of some criticism, and 
perhaps justifiably so. Even at the time of writing these words, Monty Don (an-
other paragon of the gardening life), has voiced his own discontents with Sey-
mour and the ideas he spawned.309 Don is concerned that the more zealous 
and naive of Seymour's followers have an all or nothing attitude and that 'self-
sufficiency' should be replaced with a more moderate concept of 'self-
provision'.310 And this difference, between complete, revolutionary self-
sufficiency and growing some vegetables in your garden also seems to echo 
the characteristics of hurried, foolhardy youth and patient, wise old age.   
                                            
307  J. Seymour, The New Complete Book of Self-Sufficiency', (London, Dorling Kindersley, 
2009[1976]). 
308  Ibid. p.40. 
309  M. Don, 'The Full Monty', BBC Gardeners' World Magazine, August, 2016, p.17  
310  Ibid. 
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It should be emphasised that what is not being claimed here is that the elderly 
are all wise and the young all foolish, nor is any kind of empirical claim being 
made about trends in wisdom and foolishness and their correlation with age, 
rather, what is of interest are established associations and whether these asso-
ciations can cast some light on the concept of wisdom being described here 
and its association with gardening.311 Even were these ideals of youth and old 
age entirely fictitious, mere myths (and this entire absence of correlation seems 
just as implausible as a precise match) they would still be of some use in de-
scribing the nature of wisdom. For, there seems to be yet another internal con-
tradiction afoot, one which these associations may illuminate.  
The kind of austere, moralistic demands of the good-old-days appear to make a 
poor match for the pragmatic, laissez-faire compromises of planting the odd 
bean if you have a spare half-hour at the weekend. It is easy to see how an 
idea of gardening and 'The Good Life' hives off into camps of bitter, garden cen-
tre scouring, Tories on the one side and twinkly-eyed, yoghurt-weavers on the 
other. Quite a gulf lies between these foes. Time is the resource they distribute 
differently, one group gives it all, the other offers only the final scraps. 
It would be absurd (and quite immoral) for an academic to brandish moral ex-
pertise in the face of those who work extreme hours for little financial reward 
compared to those in education. To recommend a philosophy with no mind to 
practical reality is (as has already been claimed as a central premise of this 
treatise) not only immoral but also futile. Certainly one can imagine a world (as 
an ideal or thought experiment) in which everyone has time for lots of gardening 
and recommend just such a system to future generations. Apart from being of 
little immediate practical value, however, this kind of musing would also fail to 
do justice to the sense in which our time is always limited. Of course, it may be 
possible to simply take account of differing amounts of 'free time' (which proba-
bly means something like: time not spent making money) and suggest that 
those with very little should spend less time gardening whilst those with more 
                                            
311  As aforementioned, these associations come in differing degrees of frequency. Old age 
and wisdom are certainly a common pairing (a discussion of wider important and extensive 
history which can only be touched upon here). The Association between old age and gar-
dening has far more to do with wage based economics and traditions of retirement and, as 
such, is (thankfully) restricted to a more narrow selection of humanity. These cultural associ-
ations of gardening in a British context are explored in greater detail by Lisa Taylor in: L. 
Taylor, A Taste for Gardening: Classed and Gendered Practices, (Oxford, Routledge, 2008), 
p.112 . 
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should spend more. What may be more powerful, though, is the elucidation of a 
way of thinking about time which compliments the virtue-driven demand to grow 
vegetables rather than rationing that demand. It is a way of thinking about time 
(in the not exclusively or highly cerebral sense of 'thinking about' which this dis-
cussion has frequently employed) which these archetypes of old age, gardening 
and wisdom can help illustrate. It is a correct attitude towards time which can 
assist both Tory and Hippie, overworked nurse and ‘wilfully’ unemployed. The 
garden is not just a place to spend time, but a place to learn about how time 
should be ‘spent’.  
The curious thing about our idealised old person is that they simultaneously 
have more time and less time and it doesn't seem to be their retirement which is 
conceptually crucial to the way in which they dig for victory.  
As I have watched my own grandparents in the garden it has become apparent 
how much harder this task has been for them than it has for me. They stoop to 
weed a patch of ground and their bones creak under the strain (though I cannot 
claim to be completely creak-free). They plant a seed without any confidence 
that they will live long enough to eat the fruits (indeed, in one case, they did 
not). Each task takes many times longer for them than it does for me and yet I, I 
from whom death seems so distant, will worry about how to fit this task in here, 
and that task in there. My future spreads out before me and each decade, year, 
month and moment becomes squeezed so tight by a sense of anticipation and 
expectation that by the time it is upon me it has slipped from my grasp without 
notice. Tomorrow hurtles towards me with such ferocious speed that I turn my 
gaze elsewhere so as to avoid its searing inevitability. And yet with those for 
whom the reality of death is (at least temporally) far nearer there can be a re-
versal of this urgency.  
Certainly there is a sense in which these people grow vegetables not only be-
cause they have time and that it is pleasant but because that is just what good 
people do. The virtues already enumerated which can be cultivated and enact-
ed through gardening can and are demonstrated by cultures and populations 
both past and present. These kinds of examples, of allotmenteers and aged vic-
tory diggers could and should make for a compelling means of demonstrating 
the value of this way of life. Yet there is more to this conjunction of age, wisdom 
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and gardening; there is a means of understanding how we should conceive of 
time and how we 'use' it.   
I saw a young man give a reading in a church. Afterwards he explained to the 
priest that he had never done this before and that he was hugely anxious about 
his performance. The priest, a much older man, gently advised that slowing 
down would be a good idea next time. The young man had anticipated this 
problem and had even interspersed his script with reminders to slow down. 'It 
comes with time' explained the priest.  
Students do this too; when giving presentations they will fail to manage their 
pace, they will lose track of time. Perhaps all of us do this sort of thing. Why is it 
difficult to slow down? Why is it so hard to take a breath and survey that which 
lies before us? And what if death were closer? What if I were told that I had a 
decade left? A year? A month? A Week? Would I similarly press these last few 
increments of time into optimum reward? Is this what Kipling's 'man' must do? 
To 'fill the unforgiving minute with sixty seconds worth of distance run'? Perhaps 
this is what he means, to squeeze our time dry. If so, it sits poorly with the other 
sentiments he expresses.  
A year after Kipling's poem was published, W. H. Davies offered his own take 
on this subject in 'Leisure': 
What is this life if, full of care, 
We have no time to stand and stare. 
 
No time to stand beneath the boughs 
And stare as long as sheep or cows. 
 
No time to see, when woods we pass, 
Where squirrels hide their nuts in grass. 
 
No time to see, in broad daylight, 
Streams full of stars, like skies at night. 
 
No time to turn at Beauty's glance, 
And watch her feet, how they can dance. 
 
No time to wait till her mouth can 
Enrich that smile her eyes began. 
 
A poor life this if, full of care, 
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We have no time to stand and stare.312  
 
There is some common wisdom here, between Kipling and Davies. I have seen 
it in the garden.  
Kipling's man is solid and quiet, Davies' life is still and patient.  
In the chaos of a winter storm a naked oak tree will sway and creak, it will snap 
and fray. The frosts will enter its wounds and prize them open. The spring 
brings new life and with this come a thousand tiny mouths, each mouth more 
hungry than the last. In the heat of summer, disease will fester on the tips of 
leaves which have escaped the ravages of these unseen mouths and autumn 
urges this titan onward again, down into death, forward into life. And after the 
winter storms return, in the stillness of a cold morning, the 'unforgiving minute' 
will be counted out by single drips from a gnarled and mossy limb.  
That's the thing with time: it is a many faced monster.  
I will watch a bee at work, a thousand bees at work, and I will wonder at their 
frantic industry. Flower after flower is examined and utilised, each moment is a 
moment of action. And yet the activity of these creatures seems right, it is not 
incongruous with the monolithic, ponderousness of the trees or the earth itself. 
The bees and a thousand other insects certainly run at a different pace from the 
soil, the vegetables, the trees, but these paces are complimentary. Indeed there 
is a dance, just as Davies says, and there is something vital and wise (which is 
to say capable of informing virtue as opposed to itself necessarily being virtu-
ous) in the way each organism, whether moving in quick step or a barely per-
ceptible sway, moves together with its fellow dancers.  
So why not be the bee? Why not understand our place as that of the fast mov-
ing creature amidst a slow world? And what does this have to do with our sense 
of mortality and old age anyway? 
One answer could be that we certainly can be the bee, sometimes, because 
sometimes that's what's called for. Any idea of wisdom which necessitated an 
unceasingly slow pace to all activities would not be wisdom at all but foolish-
ness. Some laudable activities demand speed, they demand urgency. Many of 
the most obviously selfless acts are those which take place in sudden, uncon-
                                            
312  W. H. Davies, ‘Leisure’, in Songs of Joy and Others, (London, Fifield, 1911).   
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sidered fits of activity. No thought, barely any sense of intention, just action. 
Diving into a river to save a drowning child or speaking up in defense of a wor-
thy cause which is under attack, these kinds of act could almost stand as defini-
tions of courage. Even were the examples less dramatic and confined to more 
prosaic and practical matters, fast activity is still often appropriate. 'Self-
provision' and life lived with other living things affords plenty of occasions for 
reinforcing this more practical demand for speed. Changes in weather often 
demand sudden action. One must, indeed, make hay whilst the sun shines. So 
why, then, with all of these quite intuitively compelling instances of laudable rap-
id action, should this link between old age, wisdom and slow, still patience per-
sist?  
Perhaps it is just a misleading association: a cultural mistake. For one thing this 
talk of 'rapid' and 'slow' action may fail to accurately convey the sense in which 
different kinds of 'quick' activity constitute very different kinds of psychological, 
conceptual and moral phenomena. Trying to fit many activities into a day and 
rushing from one activity to another represents a very different sort of activity 
from split second decisions made in the heat of the moment, and also from 
planned but physically rapid activities like sporting activities or exercise. When 
subjected to greater analytical scrutiny there may be nothing of importance 
(nothing ethically relevant) to tie these disparate 'fast activities' together. Rather 
than attempting to delineate these different kinds of activity in an attempt to es-
tablish their divisions and permutations, however, it would be far more charita-
ble and fruitful to concentrate on that aspect of 'slowness' which is most rele-
vant and those activities which pertain to this sense.  
Davies’ life, 'full of care', is not a life which is 'careful'. The life Davies imagines 
is a life lived without attention paid to worthwhile moral concerns, of being dis-
tracted by concerns, by worries, which may seem important but which, in fact, 
when considered carefully and properly, are not so important. This raises again 
the earlier effort to reconcile Aristotle and Plato's differing approaches to the 
subject of wisdom through a concept of an appreciation of importance. There is 
a sense in which 'full of care' contrasts directly with 'careful', proper attention as 
opposed to improper worry, and it is this 'carefulness' which is synonymous with 
a steady, slow and gradual activity, something done 'in good time'.  
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Here we can find a conjunction between Kipling's unforgiving minute and Da-
vies' 'no time'. Kipling's sixty seconds stands amidst a list which is full of oppos-
ing forces, a list of virtues which sees his man battered side to side by forces of 
fortune, society and temptation. The middle ground is maintained between the-
se forces in a steady pace to match his meter. Like a metronome or a counted 
breath, each move comes in the face of opposing forces, a course, like that of 
Odysseus, steered along a finely balanced path. And all of this is achieved 
through its own internal force, a kind of restraint and perspective: a stepping 
back. Whether a force is a push or a pull the internal force counsels a kind of 
caution, a distributed carefulness.  
 
This is the same practice which was identified with anthropological philosophy, 
this being directly involved and at the same time withdrawn. Indeed, this is the 
peculiar paradox which has been a constant theme of this attempt to describe 
the nature of wisdom; it is that balancing of the seemingly contradictory princi-
ples of detail and breadth. Simultaneously paying close attention and allowing 
for the widest possible picture: a squinting focus through a lens and a wide 
eyed scan of the horizon. To focus on the detail of that which is most important 
and to do so in a way which is not only aware of a wider scheme but a way by 
which this wider awareness is integral to this focus. As was discussed in rela-
tion to Aristotle and Plato's discussion of wisdom (σοφία), a simple focus upon 
important things would not be true wisdom (always excluding its contrary as it-
self being an 'important thing'), for it would fail to situate these things in relation 
to their context and therefore any correct focus would be essentially accidental 
and fragile (a true belief but not a justified, true belief). Simply having a broad 
view, a cosmic view, would similarly fail to qualify as wisdom since our ‘embod-
ied’, human condition requires that the most important things (moral insights) 
are acted upon accordingly (φρόνησις and σοφία). 
 
The virtuous manner of treating and viewing time (which might, perhaps loosely, 
be identified with the virtue of patience) may owe its association with an ideal-
ised vision of old age to just this combination of focus through broad perspec-
tive and broad perspective through focus. A careful attention to detail and priori-
tisation of the small, common but important things in life may seem a natural 
consequence of the far reaching experience which this old person would have 
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accrued in their lifetime. Time enough to see mistakes repeated, for regrets to 
be born out and each act and object to fit more clearly in its place. And yet, 
there is another boundary, another force at work in this wise-slowness, this care 
and attention.  
 
Change is inevitable, ubiquitous and vital. Sudden change, slow change, painful 
change, pleasurable change, beneficial change, harmful change. Our ideal old 
age carries not only an experience of life (and the knowledge this affords) but 
also a chance to greater appreciate the nature of this ubiquity of change and 
the variety and nature of change as such. As much as time itself can be experi-
enced in the abstract, this wrinkly archetype has an embodied understanding of 
this constant.  By the very nature of this character they have, through good for-
tune (and perhaps some design) come to experience the passing away of their 
own self in a way which is, in a sense, ‘seemly’. They are dying slowly, drifting 
away in such a fashion that mirrors the way the rest of the world moves. 
Change is death, change is the tempo of the universe and life itself moves at a 
certain rate, to grow old is to physically engage in this process of living and dy-
ing.   
 
The concept which links this ideal old age, the correct way of viewing and treat-
ing time, and life in the garden, is decay. Gardeners, you'll find, proper garden-
ers, are experts in and enthusiasts of decay.  
 
Death is rarely a clearly defined event. Just as with שֶֶפנ being a thing which is 
more or less life, so too does death come in increments. We, as things of much 
שֶֶפנ, can become used to thinking about death in a very dramatic sort of way. 
Movement, heat, sound, when these are gone then life has ceased. Even those 
of us who have other animals in our lives will know the shocking sense of death 
in the touch of a corpse. It is a strange and alien thing, a world away from the 
living being. And yet, many of us know also that contrary experience of being 
unsure, of life and death hovering in close companionship, allowing for little cer-
tainty (that certainty conventional philosophy craves). Plants give a constant 
reminder of this death-life. Without the rapidity and vibrancy of animal שֶֶפנ, 
plants will often appear to be dead only to hold, deep within their withered crust, 
some green signs of moisture and new life. Vegetative reproduction, the activity 
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of taking cuttings from plants and propagating them into new plants, holds a 
similar sense of death-life. A severed limb, seemingly a thing destined for im-
mediate corruption, when given the right conditions, will flourish into fresh 
growth: rebirth.  
 
Yet there is a thing which is neither plant nor animal and both at the same time, 
a thing which is the ultimate crucible of death-life, the baseline of שֶֶפנ: compost 
is the pride and joy of the organic gardener.  
 
To the uninitiated compost may seem to be a totally inanimate thing, beyond 
merely dead it is the point at which living things have become so far from life, so 
far from thriving individuality through this corrupted mixture of detritus that they 
now constitute a kind of elemental or mineral substance. Like sand, air or water 
this stuff is mere matter. And yet how wrong this view would be. The mind of the 
philosopher, always in the second glance, the mind of the gardener-poet, seek-
er of wisdom, finds here a steaming jungle of microscopic life. Even to the na-
ked eye compost is a busy thing. The visible signs of bacteria and their appre-
ciable heat are static enough, but a huge range of invertebrates play an enor-
mous role in the decomposition of organic matter. Chief amongst these beings, 
at least in the eyes of gardeners, are the worms.  
 
Of course, ‘worms’ is far too generic a term to be of any real biological signifi-
cance when it comes to the processes of decomposition since there are so 
many species which, both locally and globally, occupy a range of niches in the 
processing and redistribution of dead, dying and living matter.313 And yet, 
whether it is a meaty earthworm in the cold soil or a sleek tiger worm sliding 
through steaming muck, these beings are often the sign of wellbeing which gar-
deners seek and despite their variety, offer a sign of continuity in health be-
tween the freshest dung and the oldest of soils. When soil or muck is prized 
open with a fork, what one looks for is worms; more worms means greater soil 
                                            
313 I am talking specifically about ‘earthworms’ of the order Ogligochaeta of which there are over 
5000 recognised species of earthworm; see: C. A. Edwards and P. J. Bohlen, Biology and 
Ecology of Earthworms, (London, Chapman and Hall, 1977), pp.114-15. On the significance 
of this group of animals it is worth noting Charles Darwin’s remark that ‘It may be doubted 
whether there are many other animals which have played so important a part in the history of 
the world, as have these lowly organized creatures’; in C. Darwin, The Formation of Vegeta-
ble Mould Through the Action of Worms, (London, John Murray, 1904), p.288. 
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health, greater soil health means more vegetables. And despite the vibrancy 
and skittish, otherworldly haste of the mites, ants, centipedes, nematodes, fruit 
flies and other invertebrates which populate rotting, organic matter, the worms 
inevitably bind these lesser dances into a great, steady, throbbing rhythm of life. 
The worms and their dark kingdom beat out the drum to which all life must 
move. The primordial ooze, the slime whence all has come and whither all must 
return, is the alpha and omega of life itself.  
 
What this close familiarity with compost and worms can offer is a real sense of 
the pace at which life, because of the natural rate at which things decompose, 
must move. If things die faster than they decay, or live faster than they decay, 
then that is when problems arise. If vegetables are harvested at a rate greater 
than that at which nutrients are returned to the soil through these miniature 
ecosystems of decomposition then life becomes thin and threadbare, the supply 
lines are overstretched and the chain comes undone. Similarly the system 
breaks down when too much matter, too much death, is introduced. Many gar-
deners are familiar with this latter problem, and the horror of acrid piles of (bad) 
slime in a compost heap overwhelmed and unable to breathe. 
 
In the most prosaic sense, all of this talk about compost and worms highlights a 
notable feature about organic gardeners which is often lacking from those who 
do not grow: the growers smile at muck. And this general good humour about 
muckiness and ‘creepy crawlies’ is not only (for it is this also) a simple, meek, 
kind-hearted acceptance of things in which other people find cause for revul-
sion. This embrace of muck is founded on a deep sense of the vital role which 
these small, steady, humble things play in the grand scheme, and the neces-
sarily close relationship between death and life. 
 
This understanding need not be particularly intellectual. Simply by regularly 
handling this matter which is an intimate and inextricable mixture of death and 
life, and gaining a keen sense of its importance to the health of all things, and of 
the slow and steady way in which it develops and decays over seasons and 
years, one can gain a very direct sense of one’s own place in this dance of 
death-life. The reality of one’s status as ‘food for worms’ may fill some with pure 
dread, but to this dread the gardener adds joy: ‘Oh! To be food for worms!’ 
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Again, as with the stoic resilience of Kipling’s ‘If’, this familiarity with, ac-
ceptance, and even celebration of those things which might more commonly be 
regarded as lowly and repulsive, sits well with Hellenistic traditions of philoso-
phy as a way of life. It is worth repeating that most insightful of Marcus Aurelius’ 
passages:  
And so, if a man has sensibility and a deeper insight into the 
workings of the universe, scarcely anything, though it exist on-
ly as a secondary consequence to something else, but will 
seem to him to form in its own way a pleasing adjunct to the 
whole. And he will look on the actual gaping jaws of wild 
beasts with no less pleasure than the representations of them 
by limners and modellers; and he will be able to see in the 
aged of either sex a mature, prime and comely ripeness and 
gaze with chaste eyes upon the alluring loveliness of the 
young. And many such things there are which do not appeal 
to everyone, but will come to him alone who is genuinely inti-
mate with nature and her works.314 
It is a species of uncommon attention which the emperor counsels. When one 
sees the whole one can see how important the small, ugly, hitherto insignificant 
things really are.  
 
And it is not just the Stoics with whom this philosophy chimes. This theme of 
finding that which is great in that which is lowly is echoed throughout the classi-
cal tradition. It may even be tempting to find here the central doctrine of Dioge-
nes and his dog-people.315 With their insistence on eschewing social norms in 
favour of lives lived in filth and base, animal-like behaviour, the Cynics exclu-
sively and uncompromisingly sought wisdom in the most insalubrious of ways. 
And, of course, Socrates’ trial is never far from either Marcus Aurelius’ wild 
beasts or Diogenes’ dogs. As Ian Cutler notes in his discussion of the Cynics, 
despite the extreme ascetic form which the Cynic practice took, the humility of 
Socrates is common to both these vagabonds and the more sociable Stoics.316 
 
More importantly than Greek precedent is the fact that this insight is just as 
common and intuitive as the link between age and wisdom. An awareness of 
                                            
314  M. Aurelius Antoninus, 'Mediatations', §3:2:3 
315 Cf. I. Cutler, Cynicism from Diogenes to Dilbert, (Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 2005), p.13. 
316 Ibid. 
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absence, of limitation and full extent, grants the perspective necessary to ap-
preciate the importance of things and, more often than not, things which 
seemed unimportant whilst within are shown to be highly important when 
viewed from without. This could be as simple as the truism that people tend not 
to appreciate what they have until they don’t have it, or (more to the flavour of 
this current topic) the way in which a near view of death (one’s own or anoth-
er’s) can cause people to revaluate their priorities and find, in a strangely sur-
prising way, that small, otherwise mundane things are the truly precious things.  
 
It is indeed (in an echo of Susan Wolf) strangely surprising. Strange, not really 
because of the ubiquity and intuitiveness of this folk-wisdom, but because it is 
always shocking to find that when grand facades are shattered, when mighty 
dreams crumble as all things must, it is in the rubble of this wreck, in its dust, 
that real beauty can be found. It is shocking because silence is shocking when 
all about is noise and bluster. Socrates’ accusers are full of bluster. They are so 
confident in their own way of life that they progress along their narrow path in a 
constant state of acceleration. It seems to them that their way is obvious, that 
the task is transparent however littered by obstacles it may be. It seems as 
though the best way through an obstacle is to accelerate even more, to blast 
through and onward. So why wait? Why question? It can be no surprise that 
charging through life in this way (full of care) leaves no time to either gain a 
sense of the grand scale of things, to step back and see the whole picture, or 
indeed to pay attention to the details and small beauties.  
 
Compost has it all. Compost marries life and death in such a way that a grand 
perspective is inevitable. A sense of creeping and inevitable dissolution suffus-
es the vitality which compost encompasses and bestows. The quick and the 
dead pivot about yet another infinitesimal fulcrum, an impossible point upon 
which the distinction between living and dead depends and in which this distinc-
tion is irrelevant. Even the ancient trees depend upon this stratum and to it they 
will return. It is composed of them, dark and loamy, dead leaves and rootlets, 
rotted bark millennia old, and rocks older still: Earth. Not only does compost en-
gender a sense of these grand, cosmic and terminal things it is also, of course, 
a world of miniature detail. To understand the virtues of compost or soil, one 
must get down and close, pull it apart with ones hands and inspect the life with-
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in, the details of the grain, the identity of the matter, the scent it gives. The 
broad view and the focused: both withdraw from the swift hubbub, the clean 
world of money and men, and permit us to see things as they truly are. 
 
Dread and Joy 
 
One might fairly describe this slowness as ‘patience’, or perhaps ‘attention’ 
(‘temperance’ may also fit the bill): a willingness to give time to the unfolding of 
important things. It might also be observed that, as with the other virtues which 
go towards a realisation of the master virtue (wisdom: the union of virtues), ‘pa-
tience’ also must wrestle with other virtues. It has already been explicitly 
acknowledged that certain courageous acts may require an unthinking speed of 
action, and it has also been acknowledged that different kinds of speed (or 
haste) may well occupy different moral and psychological statuses. Quick calcu-
lation in a moment of difficulty may well result in great advantage. The swift 
processing of information may mean that mere seconds of deliberation are 
equivalent to another creature spending an aeon considering an object or 
event: one woman’s five minutes is another woman’s hour.  
 
So this virtue must line up with the others, and through that balancing act which 
has already been described (something calculated, observed, learned and intui-
tive) even the virtue of finding the rightful time and place must find its rightful 
time and place.  
 
There are two points which must arise from this observation. First, the kind of 
harmonious dance, the finding of pace and rhythm with the natural world which 
has been attributed to ‘patience’ is crucial and must inform any description of 
this virtue. Secondly, this virtue (despite being one of many parts which com-
bine to form wisdom) permits us to view the characteristics of wisdom which are 
more than simply the sum of its unified parts. 
 
      ________ 
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Behind everything said so far in this discussion of wisdom has been something 
hitherto unspoken.  
 
‘Mono no aware’ is a Japanese phrase which is often associated with Virgil’s 
‘(Sunt) lacrimae rerum’. ‘(There are) tears for/of things’.317 The ambiguity of Vir-
gil’s language here is wonderfully expressive of the relationship of learning by 
doing (participant observation) which has been identified here with good philos-
ophy; and not necessarily in any particular realm but in the world as such.318 Is 
the pathos native to me or to the world, or does the pathos itself demonstrate 
the fallacy of this dichotomy? Indeed, a certain kind of ambiguity, or indetermi-
nacy, is also crucial to the Japanese use of mono no aware: ‘aware’ (ah-wah-
re) can be sadness or joy.319 What is core to both phrases is a sense of the 
emotional impact which brokenness, tragedy or just change should have upon 
us. 
 
It would be fair to equate much of the content of this concept (or group of con-
cepts) to an attempt to deal with the cognitive, aesthetic and ethical dissonance 
arising from a sense of how things should be and an awareness of how things 
are: a problem of evil, as it were. The suggestion is, loosely, that when one can 
hold on to both a sense of what is good in life and the inevitability of dissolution 
and suffering, one will find that a state of simultaneous sadness and joy is 
meaningful and appropriate. It is this concept, this attitude of sombre content-
ment, which was reflected early on in Socrates’ smile, the smile of wisdom, and 
it is this quiet thing which has guided the discussion largely unseen.   
                                            
317 For an example where this association has reached the point of being a simple translation 
see: I. de Angelis, The Japanese Effect in Contemporary Irish Poetry, (Houndmills, Palgrave 
Macmilan, 2012), p.19  
318 David Wharton has offered a gratifyingly rigorous analysis of this half-line of Virgil’s epic 
(which has achieved a level of ubiquity that makes taking its meaning for granted a real risk) 
in: D. Wharton, ‘Wharton, David. "Sunt Lacrimae Rerum: An Exploration in Meaning." The 
Classical Journal 103.3 (2008): 259-79 (p.276). Here Wharton takes the view that the ambi-
guity of the phrase serves to interrupt the reader and give them pause for thought. I am in-
clined to agree (I should like to agree) with Wharton that this sort of technique fits well with 
the elegance and subtlety of Virgil’s work but I would also add that this kind of interruption 
fits both the mood of the sentiment itself and its setting. Aeneas is engaged in an interruption 
of his journey, he must stop and think and the awkwardness and possible expansiveness of 
this phrase lends a certain weight to its probable philosophical content in the shape of the 
concepts and virtues discussed here (from patience to poignancy).   
319 Steve Odin gives a good summary of the way in which both ‘mono no aware’ and ‘aware’ as 
such are subject to a complex ongoing discussion as to how these terms should be under-
stood: S. Odin, Tragic Beauty in Whitehead and Japanese Aesthetics, (London, Lexington, 
2016), pp.276-75 
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So the suggestion is this: wisdom must be a mixture of different virtues. Differ-
ent virtues place emphasis on different things which are important. Wisdom is 
the activity of combining these virtues and weighing their respective values 
against one another when necessary and finding the best admixture. This prac-
tice and judgement is achieved by enacting these different virtues and learning 
from as broad a range of contexts as possible in which they are called for in 
oneself and reflected in others (be they human or, as is often more informative, 
non-human). A perfect amalgam of all virtues fully realised is both practically 
and conceptually impossible. So, by the pursuit of wisdom it becomes apparent 
that not only are valuable things limited but so too are the virtues by which 
those objects are pursued and, although these virtues may be tied together and 
defined by a unifying principle of The Good (goodness as such), wisdom is not 
only limited to being an approximation of this goodness, it is also definitively 
characterised by this approximateness.  
 
There is something a bit contradictory here, an element of the incommensura-
ble, and yet, as was suggested at the outset of this discussion, the accommo-
dation of such contradictions is itself an important part of wisdom. The value of 
wisdom lies in the degree to which it succeeds in judging appropriately (by ob-
serving and learning) and acting according to all those things in life which are 
most important, those things which make ethical demands upon us, yet, in order 
that the greatest degree of success might be achieved in this aim one must 
come to embrace (in a certain sense, for it is a mitigated embrace) the inevita-
bility of failure. To wish this failure away (which would seem very similar to a 
desire for success) would reflect a hubris entirely at odds with the attention, re-
straint and humility necessary for wisdom. And so, even at this core of wisdom, 
another seeming incompatibility must be entertained. Like Socrates’ ‘human 
wisdom’, the desire for great wisdom requires the desire for imperfect wisdom.  
 
      _______ 
 
 
Cherry blossom does not have an exclusive claim on the teaching of mono no 
aware. Of course, no suggestion to this effect is inherent in the Japanese love 
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of the cherries, it is more an epitome or convenient conflation. Indeed, the 
achievement of a sense of transitoriness in all things and the state of being 
moved to a simultaneous joy and sadness by that sense (mono no aware) is 
associated with the changing of the seasons quite generally. Nor is this being 
moved by the flux of the natural world exclusive to Japanese aesthetics.320 
What may be worth noting about the Japanese tradition, however, is the man-
ner in which finding time to appreciate the flowers has become an important cul-
tural staple.321 Taking a picnic under the trees when they are in bloom is seen 
as an important thing to do and perhaps there is some collective wisdom in this. 
What is certain is that the flowers of many species in the Rose family (amongst 
which the cherries are counted) lend themselves particularly well to the kind of 
stopping, standing and staring which Davies finds important. The brief, fragile 
and delicate beauty of these blooms demands that distractions and clumsy 
movements must be set aside if their virtues stand any chance of being appre-
ciated. Almost as soon as the flower is full, its petals drift into the wind and are 
gone.     
 
I would nominate the hawthorn as an able alternative to the cherry in teaching a 
sense of the tears of things.  
 
I know that people regularly fail to notice the mayflower. Cars speed along past 
hedgerows which, for a short time in spring, are heavy with pinkish white, like a 
wall of candyfloss snow. And the petals too conform to fleeting type as they are 
caught in the breeze. But they are smaller than the cherry’s petal and these 
thorn filled zephyrs will be peppered with swarms of confetti so fine that they 
can seem like flecks of ash delivered from a distant, unknown cataclysm. For 
me this raises the thorn above the cherry, this rumour of weddings and confla-
grations. The cherries are undoubtedly delicate but their fragility is sometimes 
too obvious, too tailored to picnic ease. The thorns are dark creatures. They 
smell like dead things. As a child I would delight at the confusion on people’s 
                                            
320 Douglas Cairns draws a connection between ancient Greek senses of this transitriness re-
flected in literature and the Japanese tradition in D. Cairns, ‘Exemplarity and Narrative in the 
Greek Tradition’, in D. Cairns and R. Scodel (ed.), Defining Greek Narrative, (Edinburgh, Ed-
inburgh University Press, 2014), p.107.  
321 On the central place of Sakura Zensen (the ‘Cherry Blossom Front’ which moves across Ja-
pan as the spring progresses) see E. Ohnuki-Tierney, ‘Cherry Blossoms and Their Viewing: 
A Window onto Japanese Culture’, in S. Linhart and S. Früstück (ed.), The Culture of Japan 
as Seen Through Its Leisure, (Albany, NY, SUNY, 1998), pp.213-36. 
 223 
223 
faces after I had asked them to smell the mayflower. They are not sure if it is 
pleasant or not. There is a soft, nauseating, fleshy sweetness to the flower. 
Somehow the smell achieves a weight and lightness which unsettles something 
deep in both brains and belly. The fishy edge has also been associated with 
sex.322 Triethylamine (TEA), the compound which gives mayflower its discom-
forting perfume, is also exuded by the recently deceased, and the closely relat-
ed Trimethlamine (TMA) causes the smell of rotting fish and vaginal dis-
charge.323 
 
Hawthorns cut a particularly ragged figure in their winter nakedness. On high 
ground they relent to the cold air so dramatically that their figures, like spider 
pennants, form cruel exaggerations of the harsh wind, their witch-fingers 
stretching out in frozen supplication. And behind the soft, pink-stained blankets 
of spring, the black labyrinth lurks, festooned with crazy teeth. Pre-Christian 
traditions echo in faerie associations, links with the other world, with holy wells 
and fate-twisting powers.324 I can entirely sympathise with these dreamy no-
tions, for I know of nothing more elfish, more betweenish, than the Hawthorn.  
 
So it is not only the fleeting beauty of its blossoms which can help us sense the 
power of change in all of life, but also the perpetual weirdness of the hawthorn, 
its uneasy marriage of life and death.  
 
But flowers are important. It can be hard for a bleak skeleton of a thing to catch 
precious attention; thorns can seem like something to avoid rather than dwell 
upon. So let the flowers do the marketing and let their sudden deaths be a re-
minder. Let this quick succession melt into near simultaneity of life and death to 
the extent that the elation at one and disappointment at the other can meld to-
gether. By stopping to pay attention to the flowers, people have, very important-
ly, stopped to pay attention. 
 
It does not matter how quick someone is, in thought or deed, the flowers open 
and fall at their own pace. And this is the lesson: like Murdoch, and Weil before 
                                            
322 As noted by: R. Maybe, Flora Britannica, (London, Chatto and Windus, 1996), p.212. 
323 M. Inaba and Y. Inaba, Human Body Odor: Etiology, Treatment and Related Factors, (To-
kyo, Springer, 1992), p.93 
324 R. Maybe, Flora Britannica, p.212 
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her, the otherness towards which attention is paid, upon which attention is set, 
is utterly key to this virtue. Internal pace must melt away if real attention is to be 
achieved, it is a kind of surrender to the value beyond oneself. To push or pull, 
to carry on, would be to fail. Perhaps this too is why the blossoms are so in-
sightful, for they dissolve into the wind so readily, no sooner do they realise 
their fullest potential than do they offer themselves up to the medium of their 
destruction. As Weil suggests: 
Pure, intuitive attention is the only source of perfectly beautiful 
art, truly original and brilliant scientific discovery, of philosophy 
which truly aspires to wisdom, and of true practical love of 
one’s neighbour (sic).325 
Of all discrete virtues (which is to say those virtues which are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions of wisdom), this attention comes closest (or perhaps shares 
a similar status with φρόνησις) to being a practical guide in the realisation of 
wisdom. And really this is nothing surprising. Wisdom has been characterised 
as primarily being a process of learning (improvement by coming to understand 
and acting accordingly) and careful attention is certainly an intuitive part of good 
learning. Teachers know this well enough and since we have all been pupils of 
some shape or form, familiarity with the vital relationship between learning and 
paying attention is easy to recognise. Yet how many of us neglect this lesson? 
Philosophy is (or should be) just the practice of not neglecting it.  
 
The philosopher is the one who does not turn away, who pays attention. And, in 
paying attention, finds that there is so very much which matters.  
 
I was talking to the village vicar and explaining how the impact of our cat dying 
takes on a different character for us since, when you live with lots of animals, 
you come to be very well practiced in death. Naturally enough the vicar took this 
as the suggestion that we have become, in a quite usual kind of way, desensi-
tised to death and the loss of those about whom we care. I tried to explain that 
this is not what I meant. I am not sure I did a terribly good job of conveying the 
sense of ‘well practiced in death’ which I truly meant but I attempted to offer a 
bit of Gatia’s insight on the difference between accurate and erroneous senti-
ment. We are still sentimental, just not merely sentimental. Because there is a 
                                            
325 S. Weil, An Anthology, S. Miles (ed.), (London, Virago Press, 1986), p.273. 
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sentiment which is the most crucial of all sentiments, the ‘hinge’ sentiment as it 
were, that which Schweitzer correctly identifies as the core of all ethics: love, 
the knowledge that life and its flourishing matters. The vicar pointed out that 
people in the country tend to be more robust in this sort of way and our conver-
sation turned to how I have found that too many ‘country people’ become cal-
lous and uncaring. Unable to hold on to the enormity of life and death, the sheer 
scale of how much there is which does matter, they throw away their caring and 
take on a sardonic bitterness towards death. Not willing to entertain the emo-
tional and intellectual magnitude of both life and death, instead they become a 
slave to death alone and the creeping inevitability of all destruction becomes 
the only tune to which they will dance. Pitch hearts I have seen in ruddy faces; 
icy eyes set like empty wells on cheeks veiny with the poison of ten thousand 
brandies.   
 
Yet, as has been noted, love (whether universal compassion or proximal affec-
tion) may well make itself known as the primus inter pares amongst the virtues, 
but the various directions in which it pulls us (to all the world and to our home 
and own) can become an overwhelming and vague collection of impulses, 
something which threatens self-destruction rather than self-fulfilment. If the 
forces of love(s) are to be combined in any meaningful and successful way, 
then a relationship must be developed between oneself and the world which 
permits an equilibrium between self and world, learner and learned, lover and 
beloved.  
 
Weil imagines that this balance, this successful acceptance of love, does itself 
constitute a kind of perfection: ‘there exists a focal point of greatness where the 
genius creating beauty, the genius revealing truth, heroism and holiness are in-
distinguishable’.326 It may be imagined that Weil’s ‘genius’ is something appli-
cable only to the kind of grand mystics and ascetics who have already been 
dismissed here as either implausible or impractical. Who else but a saint could 
exercise this kind of moral brilliance? And yet attention itself may give some 
clues as to the way in which a kind of perfection can be found in the imperfec-
tion of juggled life, death, suffering, desires and weaknesses.  
                                            
326 S. Weil, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind (1943), A. 
Wills (tr.), (London, Routledge, 2002), p.229 
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It might be too trite and flat to suggest that the lesson of the hawthorn (or cher-
ry) blossom is that death, through its limitation of life, grants life value, but two 
things should be noted about this trite flatness. First there is something which 
must be noted quite pointedly as a key part of the conclusion of this discussion 
as a whole: that finding the conclusion of a meandering and complex succes-
sion of reflections to be very familiar and commonsensical is indicative of true 
philosophy and precisely what this essay set out to achieve. Secondly it should 
be noted that ‘trite flatness’ is never (and especially when such broad ethical 
concepts as these are at play) as tritely flat as it seems.  
 
This thesis began with an exposition of Aristotle’s claim that common sense in-
tuitions must play a central role in philosophy as a standard against which theo-
ries should be tested. It is worth recalling the passage of the Nichomachean 
Ethics which was taken as a central tenet of this investigation: 
In matters of emotion and of action, words are less convincing 
than deeds; when therefore our theories are at variance with 
palpable facts, they provoke contempt, and involve the truth in 
their own discredit… Hence it appears that true theories are 
the most valuable for conduct as well as for science; harmo-
nising with the facts, they carry conviction, and so encourage 
those who understand them to guide their lives by them.327 
In this way, it is hoped that arriving at an idea of aspects of non-human life be-
ing evocative and appropriate sources of inspiration for intuitions which are 
commonly expressed or held to be true is itself a fitting conclusion for a set of 
philosophical (or narrative-poetic participant observation) reflections.   
 
As to the matter of these intuitions having greater depth than might at first be 
apparent, it will be important to return to the manner in which these realisations 
of value through the apprehension of limitations are ‘strangely surprising’.  
 
As aforementioned, careful attention can reveal great importance in that which 
might otherwise have been dismissed as unimportant. The most peculiar aspect 
of this suggestion is that it appears at first to fly in the face of an epistemology 
which sets common intuitions as a primary standard against which reflections, 
                                            
327 EN § X,i (1172a34-1172b7). 
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observations and arguments are judged. If on the one hand it is being claimed 
that things which seem, fairly uncritically, to be correct are indeed correct (or at 
least are one of the best means at our disposal for judging the accuracy of other 
suggestions) and on the other hand it is being suggested that the ‘unexamined 
life’ is liable to great error, then we may have another contradiction.  Yet, it 
would be a mistake to imagine that the ubiquity and strength of the insights and 
ways of life against which Aristotle would have us judge our philosophical re-
flections are synonymous with an uncritical acceptance of all our everyday as-
sumptions and comforts.  
 
First, Aristotle himself is clearly most concerned with practical evidence and the 
kind of paradoxes with which the Eleatics had played: the fact that multiplicity is 
observably extant should be given some weight in our thinking. The epistemo-
logical tenet with which this discussion began and with which it shall now draw 
to a close is concerned with significant points of insight and intuition rather than 
all things which are assumed. It should be recalled that although these two cat-
egories may share some grey space they also occupy poles which separate 
one another to a practical degree. Personal preferences and diverse ways of 
life will always yield a near infinite array of interpretations as to what is and is 
not significant in life but even when the bricks and mortar of metaphysical scep-
ticism are discounted, moral questions can still present similarly tangible points 
of mutual recognition (if not consensus) about which our reflections may turn. 
Some stories transcend the boundaries of time and place.328 
 
Of course, even the most timeless of tales can be the subject of disagreement. 
Nietzsche finds in Hamlet an ideal of unravelling. Hamlet is witness to the most 
brutal inconsistencies and injustices of life and through this experience Nie-
tzsche finds that the prince is liberated from being bound to consistency and 
justice; he explains that such tragic heroes have: 
 …seen into the essence of things, they have known, and it 
nauseates them to act; since their action can change nothing 
in the eternal essence of things, they find it laughable or dis-
graceful that it is expected of them that they reconstruct the 
                                            
328 E. M. Forster goes so far as to imagine all storytellers (‘English novelists’) sitting in a trans-
cendent room together (as if it were in a Platonic realm of Forms); ‘History develops, art 
stands still’: E. M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel (1927), (London, Penguin, 2005) p.27. 
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world that is out of joint. Knowledge kills action; action re-
quires the veiledness of illusion.329 
And yet others of us would find that Hamlet’s lesson in the unfolding of misfor-
tune and injustice is not so much one of inertia and despair (though he may go 
through a fair bit of this), but rather that through a certain species of incapacity 
(and, yes, dark melancholy) Hamlet is shocked into seeing a kind of unifying 
meaning behind the chaos. When he urges Horatio to ‘report me and my cause 
aright’ we may question what ‘cause’ he refers to. Has Hamlet himself not been 
an agent of entropy, of revenge? Horatio has followed the prince in his quest to 
bring about the ruin of a king, and we may be reminded of Hamlet’s own reflec-
tions amidst the graves: 
 
HAMLET 
To what base uses we may return, Horatio! Why may 
Not imagination trace the noble dust of Alexander, 
Till he find it stopping a bung-hole? 
 
HORATIO 
'Twere to consider too curiously, to consider so. 
 
HAMLET 
No, faith, not a jot; but to follow him thither with 
Modesty enough, and likelihood to lead it: as 
Thus: Alexander died, Alexander was buried, 
Alexander returneth into dust; the dust is earth; of 
Earth we make loam; and why of that loam, whereto he 
Was converted, might they not stop a beer-barrel? 
Imperious Caesar, dead and turn'd to clay, 
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away: 
O, that that earth, which kept the world in awe, 
Should patch a wall to expel the winter flaw! 
But soft! but soft! aside: here comes the king.330 
 
Not too curiously, to consider so, not so long as we follow Alexander ‘thither 
with modesty enough, and likelihood to lead it’. Hamlet’s impotence becomes 
intertwined with the impotence of us all; the justice which the prince would exact 
upon the king is the justice to which all of us, kings too, are subject. Joshua 
Billings highlights how this kind of ‘meaningful’ interpretation of Hamlet con-
                                            
329 F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (1872), R. Geuss (ed.) and R. Speirs 
(ed./tr.), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.40. 
330 W. Shakespeare, ‘Hamlet: Prince of Denmark’, in The Complete Works of William Shake-
speare, (London, Rex, 1973). 
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trasts with that established by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.331 Billings focuses 
on the way in which the philosophical insights offered by great and timeless 
drama can be significant points of contention. In reading the more positive con-
clusions of Walter Benjamin, Billings explains how Hamlet can be understood 
as exemplifying ‘…the dialectical worldview of melancholy, in which the mourn-
ing and hope are inextricable…’332 and ‘As the only figure in whom the gap be-
tween consciousness and reflection is bridged, Hamlet redeems baroque es-
chatology from its tendency to dissolve into meaninglessness’.333   
 
And yet both Nietzsche’s reading and readings like those of Benjamin find 
something powerful and insightful in the prince’s meditations on the conflicts 
and dissolutions of the world. Perhaps even those aspects of our social and 
moral worlds which seem most secure and universal are susceptible to some 
kinds of close scrutiny, yet to imagine that this susceptibility renders these 
hinges incapable of acting as powerful points of reference of the sort Aristotle 
finds in ‘facts’ is another thing entirely. These are the great lessons, the great 
stories; these are the conversations which have always been had and which 
always must be had as long as philosophy exists. These stories are the gram-
mar of our lives and yet, just because they stand behind everything we think, 
say and do, it is not true that they are always apparent or heeded.  
 
As common as death and just as surprising.  
 
Grammar, key moral principles, skeletons: unseen yet utterly vital, they form the 
structure upon which all depends. 
 
Those of us who have cared for those who cannot appreciate this care may 
know something of this surprise. The elderly, infants, the infirm and non-
humans; try cleaning them amidst a torrent of complaint, try healing them only 
to receive violence, kiss their sleeping brow and marvel at what you find. I have 
seen these things done without real care and attention; and since I am not a 
                                            
331 J. Billings, ‘Spectres of Hamlet in Benjamin and the German theory of Tragedy’ in R. J. Ow-
en (ed.) The Hamlet Zone: Reworking Hamlet for European Cultures, (Newcastle upon Tyne, 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), p.65. 
332 Ibid. p.68. 
333 Ibid. p.71. 
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saint and suffer from all the weakness of exhaustion, irritability, pride, indigna-
tion, entitlement, impatience, anger and despair, I too have done these things 
without real care and attention, without love at the centre. I may grow angry at 
my dog for failing to find a place to defecate swiftly enough in the driving rain, I 
may despair at a relative who forgets what I have done for them and resent this 
lack of gratitude, and yet, when I do succeed, and when I am able to wade 
through the filth, the pain and the loneliness, I find that the simplest things con-
stitute a world entire.  
 
When all the screaming has subsided, when all the insults and violence have 
been endured, when the frozen rain has passed and all that remains are the 
gleaming drips on the naked branch, then how brilliantly they shine. I may not 
entirely know if I feel joy or despair, but when I least expect it the smallest 
things: a smile, a bound of joy, a brief look of gratitude, a moment of serenity, a 
green shoot in spring, the wellbeing of another, these little things stand tall as 
the true home of love. And each time it is strangely surprising. Finding that such 
small things can outshine the vast darkness, that a simple act of kindness can 
dwarf all the titanic disjunctions and unthinking chaos of the universe. It doesn’t 
matter how many times this is shown to be true, how many times we forget this 
lesson and relearn it, this love always comes with a little thrill, a sharp intake of 
breath as we surface, once again, from the depths of life.       
 
It is the little quirks, faults, foibles, overcoming past traumas, our ability to be 
the point of strength and comfort for another in a very specific way which re-
veals love. Paying attention to another helps us see what’s loveable. And it is 
the little details, and the grand themes which require this attention. The glaring 
things which attract or repel require no such time or care, but by giving our-
selves into a state of acceptance and understanding the most precious and ful-
filling aspects of shared life can be discovered. The idea that a woodlouse has 
interests of any particular note may be fanciful to some people, that a tree or 
even a weed should have interests of a similar kind may be equally preposter-
ous but if we can but spend the time to look and to listen, little worlds open up 
and reveal continuity between ourselves and life quite generally.    
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Both universal love, Schweitzer’s Christian compassion, and the more proximal 
and possessive kind of love shine out and grab us like a phoenix from the ash-
es. It is when we find something broken, something faulty, and we find, in this 
brokenness, a deeper kind of perfection than we might ever have been able to 
find in the unblemished version.  
 
The condition of succeeding in balancing the various moral demands which life 
places on us must be accompanied by (or realised through) a complex kind of 
attitude which reflects the strangely surprising nature of love uncovered through 
care and attention.  
 
 
The jester’s bones 
 
What becomes clear (or as clear as may be hoped) is that the achievement of 
this balancing act of wisdom is not borne out in mere equanimity, in emotional 
and intellectual poise, serenity, or Ἀταραξία, it is, instead, a state of sensitivity, 
of ‘understanding’; not understanding of anything in particular but understanding 
as such: ‘understanding’ as an adjective rather than a noun or verb: as in ‘she is 
an understanding sort of person’, something similar in meaning to ‘forgiving’ or 
‘accepting’. 
 
It would be facile to suggest that this wise person, who manages to become 
familiar with the strangely surprising nature of love and perfection in imperfec-
tion, becomes a species of misty-eyed sea cow, drifting through life with nought 
but a smug smile to grace their face. This vision of stoic wisdom might be a 
danger with some models of virtue but this would fail to do justice to the very 
real magnitude of both the evil and the good which this state of surprise enter-
tains. There are two alternative conditions or attitudes which may offer a more 
compelling description of wisdom’s central attitudes and these are (1) poignan-
cy and (2) good humour.  
 
Poignancy is a good word because it captures the way in which an awareness 
of flaws can be vital to a sense of value. Poignancy suggests that an awareness 
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of perfection through imperfection necessarily requires that the initial awareness 
of imperfection is not extinguished by the then coextensive sense of perfection.  
When my daughter gives me a scribble of colour on a piece of paper, or a 
messy clod of soil and grass which she has mangled for me, my description of 
these gifts as ‘perfect’ is not quite the same as when I consider the possibility of 
perfection in Apollo Belvedere, nor am I just lying when I say they are perfect; 
they are perfect. Of course, I am not blind to the crudeness and absurd inepti-
tude of these little offerings. Were I so, then appreciating their perfection would 
be impossible. It is the achievement of approximation in the face of impossibility 
which is itself constitutive of the only kind of perfection which is really meaning-
ful. The reason the fragile blossoms are so evocative of wisdom is that they 
demonstrate the way in which all things are like the least of things. This scribble 
on this piece of paper is a little piece of generosity, a little piece of playful crea-
tion.  
 
My daughter’s efforts are demonstrably far from an artwork of complete and 
cosmic perfection, but I don’t really know what one of those would be like any-
way. I have some sense of the direction in which art must move if it is to better 
approximate that perfection, but since all such efforts will ultimately fail to 
achieve ultimate success then each (even those of Leochares or Michelangelo) 
is alike to my daughter’s scribbles, what matters is that they approximate per-
fection.   
 
Mostly we are blind to these perfections in imperfection. Impressed by the 
achievements which seem so much closer to that infinitely distant goal we ig-
nore the little successes all about us. But attention and love can surprise us, 
they can remind us how small we are and how great every living thing is. And 
yet, if the brokenness were entirely forgotten, if the small things ‘outshone the 
vast darkness’ to the extent that the darkness no longer remained, then these 
small perfections would cease to be meaningful. If the perfection in imperfection 
were an end, if it were a stopping point, then the virtues would cease to be in 
motion and cease to resemble perfection in any way; so it’s not that kind of per-
fection. Of Achilles and the tortoise, it is not who arrives at the finish line which 
is most interesting, but that they are both moving towards it.   
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Dewi Phillips judged I. T. Ramsey harshly for his employment of Kierkegaard’s 
‘infinite approximation’.334 In ‘Religious Language’ Ramsey seeks to use the El-
eatic-esque mathematical analogy of an infinite series leading to a point to sug-
gest how increments of moral superiority can demonstrate the divine perfection 
which they approximate. In this way particular good lives, for all their faults, 
converging at an infinitely distant point of perfection, permit a certain kind of 
knowledge of God.335 Phillips is convinced that Ramsey has things backwards; 
it is the series itself which depends first on the notion of God which Ramsey 
employs rather than the series which offers knowledge of God.336 What is more, 
Phillips contends, there are clearly examples of moral questions where this kind 
of linear scale of goodness is simply not applicable, cases, for example, where 
everyone is at fault.337 As previously in this discussion, those figures who’s 
thought is most crucial to my own are those with whom I must both agree and 
disagree; Phillips is no exception.  
 
If Ramsey spoke instead, rather than of ‘God’, of ‘The Good’, would Phillips 
have less to complain about? If the ideal moral perfection at which these fine 
examples (never) converged were a less religiously loaded idea, then would 
this infinite approximation make sense? Phillips suggests that disagreement 
about what kinds of examples of moral behaviour should be counted and how 
they should be prioritised would still mean that any such series of better or 
worse moral examples could never be truly meaningful. Yet, if Phillips’ sugges-
tion that Ramsey’s idea of God is logically prior to his series were agreed upon, 
and ‘Goodness’ (the possibility of being better or worse as such) were substi-
tuted for ‘God’ then should this pluralism argument hold any sway? As has been 
suggested, the idea that more extreme examples of virtue and vice could not 
provide at least a starting point for this kind of discussion seems at least a bit 
disingenuous if not entirely dishonest. Indeed, this is precisely the reason this 
present discussion began with an exposition of a certain kind of moral realism, 
because it is the concession of the reality of this kind of ‘goodness as such’ 
which acts as a precondition of wrestling with the fractured and occasionally 
                                            
334 D. Z. Phillips, ‘Infinite Approximation’, in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 
44, no. 3, 1976, pp. 477–487.  
335 I. T. Ramsey, Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases, (London, 
SCM Press, 1957).  
336 D. Z. Phillips, ‘Infinite Approximation’, p.484 
337 Ibid. p.485. 
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oppositional activity of juggling the virtues (and conceiving of ourselves as be-
ing better or worse: morally improving). So Phillips appears to be quite right to 
suggest that Ramsey is going at things back-to-front, but if we are not looking 
for proof of God (or goodness) but instead just for a good way to think about our 
own moral improvement (or deterioration) and thereby improve more effectively, 
could Ramsey’s model of infinite approximation still be of use?  
 
It is with Phillips’ ultimate objection to Ramsey that this essay finds greatest 
concordance. Phillips suggests that the very idea of divine perfection makes 
nonsense of the goodness(es) we find in this imperfect world, the idea of our 
goods being devoid of their imperfections sterilises and nullifies their mean-
ing.338 By way of illustration Phillips turns to Wallace Stevens’ poem ‘Sunday 
Morning’ and it is worth repeating the sixth stanza here: 
 
Is there no change of death in paradise? 
Does ripe fruit never fall? Or do the boughs 
Hang always heavy in that perfect sky,  
Unchanging, yet so like our perishing earth,  
With rivers like our own that seek for seas 
They never find, the same receding shores 
That never touch with inarticulate pang? 
Why set the pear upon those river-banks 
Or spice the shores with odors of the plum? 
Alas, that they should wear our colors there,  
The silken weavings of our afternoons,  
And pick the strings of our insipid lutes! 
Death is the mother of beauty, mystical,  
Within whose burning bosom we devise 
Our earthly mothers waiting, sleeplessly.339 
 
And perhaps there is just some confusion about the idea of perfection here. 
Maybe Ramsey’s mistake was in the discussing the perfection of God as op-
posed to another kind of perfection. It would seem entirely plausible to suggest 
that ‘perfection’ could just mean something beyond which we cannot meaning-
fully or conscionably desire. And it would seem implausible for Phillips to object 
to an approximation of this kind of perfection. Perfection could be imagined as 
the opposite of imperfection or it could be imagined as that in which we should 
rejoice and which we should find fulfilling. 
                                            
338 Ibid. p.485-6. 
339 W. Stevens, ‘Sunday Morning’, in W. Stevens, Selected Poems, (London, Faber and Faber, 
1967), p.33 
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It may well be suggested that as soon as perfection loses its mystical sense of 
incomprehensibility and enters the realms of ‘just something beyond which we 
cannot meaningfully or conscionably desire’, then a qualitative line has been 
crossed which alters the idea beyond recognition. If the kind of perfection being 
talked about is not faultlessness and is just a sense of contentment with one’s 
lot and an acceptance of the faults of loved ones, then the idea of approxima-
tion is unnecessary. Far from being approximated, this kind of perfection is reg-
ularly achieved and is conceptually unproblematic. When a ‘wise’ person man-
ages to achieve a reasonable balance of courage, cleverness, compassion, jus-
tice, personal love, aesthetic appreciation, attention etc., then we could just say 
that they have achieved a kind of goodness beyond which we cannot reasona-
bly expect anyone to go. 
 
It would, though, be absurd to suggest that imperfection is desirable if one 
meant by imperfection things which are undesirable, such a flat contradiction 
would be beyond even the permissions of this discussion’s relaxed epistemolo-
gy. What may not, however, be a flat contradiction, is the suggestion that imper-
fection does consist of all sorts of things which possess undesirable elements 
but that we cannot conceive of a world which is better than this when devoid of 
those things of which those undesirable elements are a necessary part.  
 
Killing is, in relative isolation, bad. I can see the fear and hear the pain, it is hor-
rific. I can, just about, paint crude fictions in which killing doesn’t happen and 
these visions (for all the details they neglect) are pleasant things. There is a 
sense in which less killing draws towards an ideal of no killing, a perfect, non-
violent world. Denying members of my family (human or non-human) freedoms 
and pleasures is, in relative isolation, bad. I can, again, paint crude pictures of 
worlds in which all of their desires are fulfilled, all of their needs met and there is 
no cause to restrain or chastise. The reason that these fantasy worlds, so in-
compatible in their respective content, are so similar, is that they draw on a 
common principle of improvement, to deny them an orientation towards im-
provement, towards perfection, would render them as meaningless as these 
two dimensional images would render the whole.   
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The infinite approximation which can escape Phillips’ objections is ultimately a 
kind of dynamic compromise. This approximation needn’t always be linear and 
perhaps Phillips is right about the implausibility of such a scale, but this need 
not mean that a constant attempt to balance all moral demands is meaningless. 
It is the constant need to pay attention, to assess, to judge and act accordingly 
in perpetually shifting circumstances which gives wisdom the peculiar quality of 
simultaneous tension and ease which is expressed in the attitude of poignancy.  
 
Regret and contentment, sadness and joy, action and acceptance. The attitude 
is itself a psychological manifestation of the balance and compromise achieved 
in moral learning.  
 
And yet, there is something missing. All of this oh-so-worthy sense of poignancy 
or pathos is just a bit dour. Wallace Stevens’ poem rings very true and is won-
derfully evocative of the sense of intermingled darkness and light which lies at 
the heart of this theory of wisdom, but his ‘insipid lutes’ and ‘silken weavings’ 
just seem a bit clean. The ‘tears of things’ so far seem to be very heavy tears, 
very serious. I, for one, in reading Stevens’ poem, cannot help but hear, amidst 
all the languid serenity of this scene, a tuneful and unexpected little fart.  
 
Flatulence is a wonderful thing for informing humility. The moving magnificence 
of the natural world which can be witnessed in the garden, all dappled sunlight 
and mossy skeletons, can draw one into a sense of grand and cosmic signifi-
cance, an Apollonian reverie full of the promise of insight and philosophy. This 
dream is disrupted brilliantly by the improbably long farts of an unseen horse. 
The little fragile things of life aren’t just pathetic, they aren’t just models of the 
universe in microcosm, they are funny.  
 
The ‘strangely surprising’ nature of the realisations at the heart of wisdom share 
much in common with jokes. The idea that great facades crumble to nought is 
not just expressive of poignancy, it is also a bit ridiculous. The near contradicto-
ry nature of finding perfection in imperfection, of finding greatness in the little 
things, has similarities with the incongruity theories of humour.340 When some-
                                            
340 Cf. N. Carroll, Humour: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), 
p.49-50 No further exposition will be offered here of theories of humour, not only for the rea-
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thing unexpected happens which contrasts in an ironic sort of way with that 
which preceded it, this is funny.  
 
There’s nothing wiser than a joke at a funeral. They call it ‘gallows humour’ 
sometimes but that can carry a sense of desperate ignorance, of looking the 
other way, and of dishonesty. Undoubtedly there are jokes which can act in this 
way, to draw attention away from dreadful things, but there are jokes at funerals 
which are not like this at all. Very great and weighty matters, particularly the 
death of a loved one, can become overwhelming and threaten to engulf us in 
despair by obscuring less conspicuous details. Incongruity is like a slap in the 
face, undignified and base realities can cure us of a false sense of magnitude 
and importance, they can help us gain a sense of perspective. When we talk 
about that time when she became hopelessly drunk and vomited on his lap, or 
when, as a child, he groped the breasts of someone he shouldn’t. These kinds 
of memories can act as a way of realigning our attention away from just the ut-
ter limit of a life and its greatest heights, back to the person as a whole, warts 
and all. 
 
And how you miss every blemish of his skin, his bad breath and just the way he 
wagged his tail. Those absurd little things.  
 
And we will laugh with a splutter through the snot as it rolls down our lips, mix-
ing with the tears.  
 
Wisdom is the act of not giving up that snot-soaked laugh, not forgetting it or 
discarding it as soon as the passions have passed, but instead holding it there 
behind a more sustainable, everyday approach to life. This is the ‘smile’ which 
has been repeated throughout this essay, it is the attitude of a man accused by 
his peers of corrupting the young, of not taking himself or others too seriously.  
 
The garden acts as a constant reminder of the absurd little things. The stupid 
antics of the dogs and the pigs are a wonderful counterpoint to the enormity of 
                                                                                                                                
son that these are unnecessary for the points being made here but also because attempting 
to reduce humour to a set of causes or conditions risks a kind of inappropriate reductionism. 
It is tempting to wheel Bernard Williams back out for the sake of defending the suggestion 
that asking why something is funny is just ‘one thought too many’; ask that kind of question 
and it might just stop being funny.   
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death, of wars and disease. Crushing cabbage white caterpillars between my 
fingers is a grim business, but it is done amidst the brilliant hues of the delicate 
nasturtiums, and still the ravens will twist and play and giggle. Perhaps this 
laughter dances dangerously close to a precipice of madness, and this may 
present a concession to Chesterton’s fears and the risks Strawson finds in nar-
rative life. Wisdom undoubtedly resides in the ability to balance a range of 
seemingly incompatible qualities, to carry as great a weight of learning, detail 
and responsibility as one is able, so perhaps there is a sense in which this 
weight pushes a mind to the brink of insanity, but certainly not beyond. The 
breadth of wisdom is itself a guard against insanity, it is a kind of moral and 
psychological spreading of risk; one is less likely to find oneself suddenly over-
whelmed and broken by an unforeseen moral dilemma if a very great range of 
moral dilemmas, the manifold depths, darknesses and triumphs of life have al-
ready been foreseen. Of course, there is a fine line between spreading risk and 
overstretching supply lines but the two are not mutually exclusive.  
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Draft Preface 
 
It is hoped that this book will do a little to help us understand how to be good 
people.  
 
The book is not intended for a solely academic audience, though it is primarily 
written for an audience familiar with some of the existing literature commonly 
read by those studying philosophy in higher education.  
 
In terms of more specific academic contributions (though the book does, in part, 
dispute the inclination to think about academia in this categorised fashion) the 
discussion is aimed chiefly at the existing field of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ 
(sharing much with ‘virtue ethics’). However, there is an attempt made, within 
the text, to appeal to the much broader disciplines of academic philosophy and 
the social sciences; primarily in the hope of bringing these fields closer to one 
another.  
 
As something of a working assumption, the book takes the idea that there is 
some kind of ‘virtue as such’, a nebulous core of goodness to which we can all 
aspire and that it has something to do with an understanding of important things 
which is contiguous with practical action. There is a central core here of self-
improvement and so (as with other literature within the ‘philosophy as a way of 
life’ field) there is an aspect of ‘self-help’ to the text. The stance is taken that 
ethics without an element of ‘self-help’ would be somewhat hollow. So there is 
an extent to which the book is aimed at that ‘self-help market’. 
 
This broader appeal is particularly felt in the section of the book (a good half) 
which takes organic gardening as its subject matter. It is hoped that the book 
can bring philosophers to gardening and gardeners to philosophy.  
 
The book is written with a tight mix of conventional and unconventional styles. 
Poetic means are central to the theory of the discussion and this principle is en-
acted in the text itself. So too, are more traditional and metaphysical means 
employed to reach the book’s goals. As with other works in ‘philosophy as a 
way of life’, the book maintains a foundation in Plato and Aristotle, but it is not a 
discussion restricted by a genre of source material. Japanese philosophy, 
Shakespeare and Albert Schweitzer are key points of reference and at all points 
the book attempts to avoid easy categorisation in both its style and content.  
 
The book is formed into two distinct halves. The first half approaches metaphil-
osophical, metaethical and metaphysical questions through traditional philo-
sophical means. This first half establishes the theoretical groundwork for the 
second. This second half takes, as its subject, encounters with non-human liv-
ing things in a horticultural/agricultural environment. Central ethical problems 
associated with human interactions with non-human life are the fulcrum about 
which this latter half pivots and which ultimately underpin an investigation into 
the nature of virtue as a negotiation of conflicting interests. The two halves are 
finally synthesised in a theory of brokenness as central to wisdom.  
 
